Tyler James Webster v. State of Iowa ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0773
Filed November 30, 2020
TYLER JAMES WEBSTER,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Shawn R.
Showers, Judge.
Tyler Webster appeals the district court’s denial of his postconviction-relief
application. AFFIRMED.
R.E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
“Webster shot and killed Buddy Frisbie.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223,
226 (Iowa 2015). A jury found Tyler James Webster guilty of second-degree
murder. On direct appeal, Webster argued that one of the jurors engaged in
misconduct or evinced bias. Id. at 236. In addressing the issue, the supreme court
explained, “[N]o record was made of voir dire or of the district court’s preliminary
admonition to the jury” but those “shortcomings” did “not raise a question of
preservation of the claims so much as affect[ed] the viability of Webster’s claims
on the merits.” Id. at 233. A record was made of an in-camera examination of the
juror. Id. at 227. The court considered that record and other evidence in finding
the claims unpersuasive. Id. at 233–40.
One justice specially concurred to note the presence of potential ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. Id. at 245 (Wiggins, J., concurring specially). The
justice stated, “[I]ssues regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, if any” would
“have to be fully explored in a postconviction-relief proceeding.” Id.Webster pursued that avenue. He filed a postconviction-relief application
alleging his trial attorney was ineffective in (1) “waiving the transcription reporting
of jury selection, voir dire, and the court’s preliminary admonitions resulting in an
inadequate record for appeal and further review on the merits”; (2) “failing to
question [the] juror . . . in voir dire on her relationship with [the victim’s] family and
for failing to strike or move to dismiss said juror in the preliminary jury selection
stage”; (3) “failing to develop the record during the in camera inspection of [the]
juror . . . and failing to move to dismiss her for cause at the in camera stage”; and
(4) “failing to raise a separate juror bias claim in addition to juror misconduct and
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failing to raise distinct constitutional claims under the Iowa and United States
Constitutions.”1 The postconviction court denied the application following an
evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, Webster reiterates that he “was denied effective assistance of
counsel.” Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims have two components. “First,
the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. To prove prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
at 694. Constitutional prejudice will not be found where the evidence of guilt is
overwhelming. See State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874, 881 (Iowa 2019).
We elect to focus on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See State
v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 2019) (“Failure to prove either
prong is fatal to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”). The postconviction
court stated that prong was “a legal Mount Everest” for Webster. On our de novo
review of the constitutionally grounded ineffective-assistance claims, we agree.
In finding Webster guilty of second-degree murder, the jury considered the
testimony of a woman Frisbie was dating. She stated Webster barged in as Frisbie
was kissing her and she saw Webster “standing over [them] with a gun.” As she
“turned,” Webster “shot [Frisbie].” She “kind of stepped back in shock . . . [a]nd
then he shot again.”
1Webster’s original application simply alleged “[j]ury [m]isconduct.” Counsel
amended the application twice.
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After the shooting, Webster told a 911 dispatcher that he “just shot a man
in the face.” He repeated the statement, stated the man was “dead,” and identified
the man as Buddy Frisbie. When the dispatcher asked if Webster was sure Frisbie
was dead, Webster responded, “Oh, he’s definitely dead. I shot him twice in the
face.” He described the gun, told the dispatcher it was “in the glove box of [his]
truck,” and provided his location. When the dispatcher asked why he shot Frisbie,
Webster responded, “[T]here was an incident with a young lady. I thought it was
getting out of control. He was hurting her . . . .” The woman Frisbie was dating
dispelled this concern, testifying her contact with Frisbie was entirely consensual
and she had no fear of him.
A special agent with the division of criminal investigation interviewed
Webster following his arrest. Webster told him “he had shot Buddy Frisbie two
times in the face.” According to the special agent, Webster
said that he didn’t like the way that it appeared Buddy Frisbie was
treating [the woman], but he may have misunderstood the
situation. . . . He said he left the trailer, walked out to his white
Mazda pickup truck and got his gun . . . , which is a .45 caliber semi-
automatic handgun, retrieved it from his glove box, and went back
into the trailer. . . . [H]e cycled the weapon to make it ready to be
fired.
He shot Frisbie “at point-blank range.” Webster told the special agent that “when
he racked the slide back and made the weapon ready to fire that he knew there
was no turning back.” Webster ended the interview by saying, “It is what it is. It is
what it is.”
We conclude the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Accordingly, there is
no reasonable probability of a different outcome had Webster’s trial attorney
insisted on a record of voir dire, questioned the juror about her relationship with
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Frisbie’s family, more thoroughly developed the record of the in-camera
examination and moved to dismiss the juror for cause following the examination,
and raised distinct constitutional claims, including a claim of juror bias. See
Gunther v. State, No. 09-0275, 2009 WL 3775147, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 12,
2009) (“[T]here was ‘overwhelming record evidence from which a rational jury
could find Gunther guilty of second-degree murder’. . . . [W]e conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of Gunther’s direct appeal would have been
different if he had raised the juror misconduct issue.”).
With respect to the claimed failure to raise a claim of juror bias, it is worth
reiterating—as the postconviction court did—that the supreme court addressed the
claim notwithstanding counsel’s omission. Webster’s efforts to recast the issue as
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim with due process underpinnings is a
thinly veiled attempt to relitigate the issue. See Holmes v. State, 775 N.W.2d 733,
735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (“Issues that have been raised, litigated, and adjudicated
on direct appeal cannot be relitigated in a postconviction proceeding.” (quoting
Wycoff v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1986))). He “cannot now relitigate
issues decided adversely to him on direct appeal.” Id.We affirm the denial of Webster’s postconviction-relief application.
AFFIRMED.