In Re the Marriage of Sara Rose Crandall and Jonathan Christian Crandall Upon the Petition of Sara Rose Crandall, N/K/A Sara Rose Rieger, and Concerning Jonathan Christian Crandall, Jonathan Christian Crandall v. Iowa District Court for Linn County ( 2016 )


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  •                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-1783
    Filed September 14, 2016
    IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SARA ROSE CRANDALL
    AND JONATHAN CHRISTIAN CRANDALL
    Upon the Petition of
    SARA ROSE CRANDALL, n/k/a SARA ROSE RIEGER,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    And Concerning
    JONATHAN CHRISTIAN CRANDALL,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    JONATHAN CHRISTIAN CRANDALL,
    Plaintiff,
    vs.
    IOWA DISTRICT COURT
    FOR LINN COUNTY,
    Defendant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill,
    Judge.
    Jonathan Crandall appeals the physical care and economic provisions of
    the dissolution decree. On certiorari, he challenges the court’s contempt ruling.
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, WRIT SUSTAINED.
    David D. Burbidge of Johnston, Stannard, Klesner, Burbidge & Fitzgerald,
    P.L.C., Iowa City, for appellant.
    Karen A. Volz of Ackley, Kopecky & Kingery, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    Jonathan Crandall contests the decree dissolving his eleven-year
    marriage to Sara Crandall on three issues: (1) the denial of joint physical care,
    (2) the visitation schedule, and (3) the distribution of assets. He also brings a
    certiorari challenge to the district court’s order finding him in contempt. Sara
    defends the decree and contempt order and asks for appellate attorney fees.
    Because we agree with the district court’s assessment that joint physical
    care would not serve the best interests of the five Crandall children, we affirm the
    grant of physical care to Sara. We also conclude the extraordinary visitation
    awarded by the district court assures the children continuous physical and
    emotional contact with both parents.
    On the economic issues, we modify in part. We order Jonathan to pay
    Sara $39,144 to equalize the distribution of the parties’ property, including an
    equal distribution of the assets Jonathan liquidated before trial for attorney fees
    and taxes. And in an abundance of caution, we modify the court’s “no fault”
    provision applicable to Jonathan’s unvested restricted stock grants to address
    concerns raised by Jonathan on appeal.
    As to Jonathan’s certiorari challenge to the court’s contempt ruling, we
    sustain the writ. Finally, we award appellate attorney fees to Sara.
    I.    Facts and Prior Proceedings
    Sara and Jonathan married in December 2003 and divorced in July 2015.
    They have five children—ranging in age from three to ten years. The couple met
    at church while students at Iowa State University. Jonathan pursued studies in
    engineering, earning both bachelor’s and master’s degrees. Despite taking time
    3
    off to care for their first child, Sara earned her bachelor’s degree. The couple
    purchased their first home in Huxley assisted by a $10,000 gift from Sara’s
    grandmother.
    During their marriage, Jonathan worked full-time as an electrical engineer,
    while Sara acted as the primary caretaker for the children. The couple belonged
    to a church that encouraged them to pursue traditional gender roles and to
    provide home-schooling for their children.    Home-schooling was important to
    Jonathan because that was how he received his education growing up. Sara
    home-schooled the three oldest children while caring for their fourth child and
    managing the family’s day-to-day finances. Jonathan engaged in many activities
    with the children on weekends, including church-related functions. Shortly after
    their fourth child was born in 2009, the family moved from Huxley to Marion.
    After the move, Jonathan worked as an engineer for Rockwell Collins but
    continued to help with the children in the evenings and on weekends. In August
    2010, Jonathan transferred to Skyworks Solutions, where his hours were more
    demanding. On top of his work schedule, Jonathan devoted time to repairing
    and updating a rental home in Cedar Rapids the parties bought as an investment
    in 2011. When their fifth child was born in March 2012, Sara found it impossible
    to keep up with the home-schooling and the mounting responsibilities of the busy
    household.     In March 2013, she approached Jonathan about enrolling the
    children in public school. Jonathan was disappointed about the decision, but he
    agreed they needed the support of the public school system.
    The parties separated in the summer of 2013. The separation followed
    Jonathan’s Fourth-of-July arrest for operating while intoxicated and his
    4
    subsequent revelations to Sara that he had not been truthful about time spent at
    bars and strip clubs. Sara filed a petition for dissolution on October 15, 2013.
    After she filed for divorce, Sara noticed Jonathan started to engage more in
    hands-on childrearing, to the extent she perceived him trying to “beat her to the
    punch” in completing certain chores. Jonathan also took the step of applying for
    a “temporary writ of injunction” preventing either party from disposing of marital
    assets; the district court granted the injunction on October 31, 2013.
    For almost one year after Sara filed for divorce, she and Jonathan lived
    under the same roof. During this time, Sara started classes at the University of
    Iowa to earn her teaching certificate. By the summer of 2014, Sara found the
    cohabitation “unbearable” and asked Jonathan to move out. He refused, so Sara
    moved into a house purchased by her grandmother. Sara applied for temporary
    orders on custody, physical care, visitation, child support, and attorney fees. On
    August 8, 2014, the court issued an order on temporary matters, rejecting a fifty-
    fifty shared care arrangement because Jonathan’s schedule was not flexible and
    routinely required more than a forty-hour work week, while Sara’s class schedule
    took her away from home less than twenty hours a week. The temporary order
    did afford Jonathan time with the children that exceeded the threshold for
    extraordinary visitation.
    Also while the dissolution proceedings were pending, Jonathan’s parents
    moved from Dubuque to Cedar Rapids, so they could be more available to help
    babysit for their grandchildren. Sara was not in favor of their move and “sat
    down with them to explain that this made [her] very uncomfortable.” She testified
    5
    she believed Jonathan and his parents maintained a “much more conservative
    and rigid value system” than she had come to follow.
    Sara filed an application to show cause in February 2015, alleging
    Jonathan violated the temporary injunction by selling stock and depleting marital
    assets.
    The district court held the dissolution trial on April 15 and 16. The parties
    disputed physical care, visitation, child support, spousal support, and distribution
    of assets.    The court also heard testimony concerning Sara’s contempt
    allegations. In the decree issued on July 22, 2015, the court granted the parties
    joint legal custody and placed physical care with Sara with extraordinary
    visitation for Jonathan. The court directed Jonathan to pay $1933.81 in monthly
    support for the five children and $1600 in monthly spousal support for five years.
    Before dividing the parties’ assets, the court set aside the $10,000 gift from
    Sara’s grandmother, received in 2005, as exclusively Sara’s property. Jonathan
    does not dispute the gift on appeal. The court then divided the parties’ major
    assets and ordered Jonathan to make an equalization payment to Sara in the
    amount of $25,771.41.
    The court also found Sara proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Jonathan failed to obey the court’s October 31, 2013 injunction by liquidating
    $62,586 in stock in 2014 and another $16,946 in stock in 2015.
    The parties filed motions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2),
    which the district court granted in part on October 12, 2015. Jonathan then filed
    a notice of appeal, as well as a petition for writ of certiorari on the court’s
    6
    contempt finding.    The supreme court granted his petition.      This opinion will
    address both Jonathan’s direct appeal and his certiorari claim.
    II.    Scope and Standards of Review
    We review dissolution proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of Sullins, 
    715 N.W.2d 242
    , 247 (Iowa 2006). While we decide the appellate issues anew, we
    give weight to the district court’s findings of fact. 
    Id.
     When it comes to witness
    credibility, “[t]here is good reason for us to pay very close attention to the trial
    court’s assessment.” In re Marriage of Vrban, 
    359 N.W.2d 420
    , 423 (Iowa 1984).
    The trial judge “is greatly helped in making a wise decision about the parties by
    listening to them and watching them in person.” In re Marriage of Callahan, 
    214 N.W.2d 133
    , 136 (Iowa 1974). On appeal, we must rely on the transcript and
    necessarily forfeit the impressions created by the parties’ demeanors. Vrban,
    
    359 N.W.2d at 423
    .
    We review Jonathan’s allegations concerning the contempt finding for
    errors at law. See Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct, 
    735 N.W.2d 621
    , 624 (Iowa 2007). We
    find error if the district court’s factual findings are not supported by substantial
    evidence or if the court has not properly applied the law. 
    Id.
    III.   Analysis of Jonathan’s Appeal Issues
    A. Joint Physical Care
    The first question in Jonathan’s appeal is whether the district court should
    have honored his request for joint physical care of their five children. Physical
    care is a distinct concept from legal custody. Legal custody requires parents to
    make significant decisions about their children’s legal status, medical care,
    education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.      Iowa Code
    7
    § 598.1(3), (5) (2015); see also In re Marriage of Hansen, 
    733 N.W.2d 683
    , 690
    (Iowa 2007). Physical care involves the parents’ obligation and opportunity to
    maintain a home and provide routine care for their children.               
    Iowa Code § 598.1
    (7); Hansen, 
    733 N.W.2d at
    690–91 (explaining physical-care parent
    must navigate “the myriad of details” associated with everyday childrearing,
    including what clothes the children wear, when they go to bed, and with whom
    they associate).
    An award of joint physical care requires divorced parents to work closely
    together to coordinate the myriad of everyday details. That is why when deciding
    if joint physical care is in the children’s best interests, we must consider the
    continuity of caregiving, the ability of the divorced parents to communicate and
    show mutual respect, the degree of conflict between them, and the degree to
    which they are in general agreement about their approach to daily parenting
    matters.1 See Hansen, 
    733 N.W.2d at
    696–99.
    Sara and Jonathan agreed to joint legal custody and the district court
    determined that designation was in the best interests of the children. The point
    of disagreement was Jonathan’s request for joint physical care (often referred to
    as shared care). When the court denies a parent’s request for joint physical
    care, its denial must be accompanied by specific findings of fact and conclusions
    of law explaining why shared care is not in the children’s best interests. 
    Iowa Code § 598.41
    (5)(a).
    1
    In deciding appropriate physical care, we also consider the factors listed in Iowa Code
    section 598.41(3).
    8
    The district court provided that glimpse into its thought process, calling the
    question of joint physical care “both difficult and close.” In the court’s opinion,
    “[b]oth parents love the children very much and both parents adequately provide
    for the physical care needs of the children.” The court had “no concerns about
    the physical well-being of the children while they are in the custody of either
    parent.” But the court ultimately decided the Hansen factors tipped the scales
    away from a shared-care arrangement, pointing to the parties’ difficulty in
    successfully communicating and their differing philosophies “as to the role of
    each spouse in a marriage and in the raising and caring for children.” The court
    also concluded, “Sara’s perception that Jonathan does not respect her as an
    equal is not unwarranted.” After denying Jonathan’s request for shared care, the
    court awarded physical care to Sara, continuing the extraordinary visitation
    afforded Jonathan since the temporary order.
    On appeal, Jonathan renews his request for joint physical care. He does
    not alternatively ask for physical care to be placed with him. Jonathan contends
    he and Sara have effectively communicated about their children since the
    separation, their parenting philosophies are not that different, and isolated
    incidents of his disrespect toward Sara are not indicative of their ongoing
    relationship.
    Although the record confirms both Sara and Jonathan are loving and
    capable parents, we agree with the district court’s insightful conclusions and
    ultimate decision that joint physical care is not in the best interests of their five
    children.   The children will experience greater stability and continuity in the
    physical care of Sara with liberal visitation for Jonathan; this arrangement most
    9
    closely approximates the proportion of time spent with each parent before the
    separation. See Hansen, 
    733 N.W.2d at 683
     (focusing on historical patterns of
    caregiving as one factor in joint-physical-care decision).           We acknowledge
    Jonathan’s point that both he and Sara have made concerted efforts at
    communicating for the sake of their children, especially regarding academic and
    extracurricular activities. But we are concerned Jonathan has not consistently
    accorded Sara the same level of respect she has shown him. See 
    id. at 698
    (“Evidence of controlling behavior by a spouse may be an indicator of potential
    problems.”).     Specifically, we find it telling that after the parties separated,
    Jonathan changed the password on their financial accounts, implemented a
    process where he would designate and deposit “a lump sum into the checking
    account for groceries and gas and things for the kids,” and had members of their
    church “go through [her] bank accounts to see how she was spending every
    dime.”
    We also credit Sara’s testimony that they did not agree about their
    approach to daily parenting matters. She testified: “[W]e have different values
    about discipline. I have had time with the kids to sort of develop the skills of
    dealing with five small children . . . . [H]e tends to be permissive until he blows
    up.” See 
    id. at 699
     (noting “parents must generally be operating from the same
    page on a wide variety of routine matters”). Considering all the pertinent factors,
    we reach the same decision as the district court concerning joint physical care.
    B. Visitation
    Given our decision to affirm the district court’s denial of joint physical care,
    Jonathan asks for additional visitation comparable to his proposal for the children
    10
    to alternate between three- and four-day stretches with each parent. Sara urges
    us not to disturb the visitation in the decree. She notes the schedule proposed
    by Jonathan relies heavily on his parents to take care of the children at times
    when Sara is available to care for them.
    Continuing the extraordinary visitation provided to Jonathan in the
    temporary order, the decree provides:
    Jonathan shall have physical care of the children every other
    weekend from Thursday after school (or 3:30 p.m.) until the
    following Monday morning at the start of school (or 8:30 a.m.); and,
    during the alternate week, every Wednesday from after school (or
    3:30 p.m.) until the following morning at the start of school (or 8:30
    a.m.).
    The decree’s alternating midweek and weekend visitation schedule, in addition to
    alternating holidays and spring breaks, is in the children’s best interests and
    provides them meaningful and sustained time in their father’s care. See In re
    Marriage of Thielges, 
    623 N.W.2d 232
    , 238 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (noting chapter
    598’s supposition that it is generally in children’s best interests to have the
    opportunity for maximum continuous physical and emotional contact with both
    parents can be satisfied by liberal visitation in various forms). All the witnesses
    at the dissolution hearing testified the children are doing well under the existing
    schedule. We affirm the district court’s visitation schedule.
    C. Property Division
    Jonathan also challenges the economic provisions of the dissolution
    decree.   He claims the court erred in valuing and distributing vested and
    unvested assets associated with his employment at Skyworks. Concerning his
    equalization payment to Sara, Jonathan contends the court should have ordered
    11
    the sale of his property and allowed him to deduct taxes and costs. He also
    faults the court for granting Sara access to his financial information.
    1. Property and Jonathan’s Vested Stock
    The district court must divide marital property “equitably between the
    parties,” in consideration of the thirteen factors listed in Iowa Code section
    598.21(5). The division does not need to be equal or follow a certain percentage;
    rather, the court should make a just award under the circumstances.            In re
    Marriage of Hoak, 
    364 N.W.2d 185
    , 194 (Iowa 1985).
    Most of the information regarding assets and liabilities came from
    Jonathan. The valuation and distribution of the parties’ real estate2 and cars is
    not disputed.    The court awarded Sara her Roth IRA.3            At trial, Jonathan
    proposed the court value his vested stock assets (stock options, restricted stock
    grants, ESPP stock) at market value at the time of trial, divide the value of his
    stock assets equally as shown in his Exhibit BBB, and order him to pay $31,877
    to Sara to equalize the property distribution.
    The court adopted Jonathan’s valuations and also adopted his proposal to
    equally split his vested stock assets4 based on the market value Jonathan
    2
    Jonathan’s father holds the $44,000 mortgage on the rental property.
    3
    Jonathan proposed splitting equally his IRA ($50,155.94) and 401K ($107,894.86).
    The court agreed, ordered those assets divided by QDRO, and neither party appeals
    that resolution. See In re Marriage of Veit, 
    797 N.W.2d 562
    , 564 (Iowa 2011) (“[T]he
    QDRO is not itself a property settlement, but is merely a method of effectuating the
    property division.”).
    4
    Jonathan testified his Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) account held shares of
    Skyworks stock that he owned and he could immediately sell these shares. As to
    Jonathan’s separate account holding restricted stock, he explained:
    The company issues stock awards based on company
    performance, as well as personal performance in my job, and it’s an
    award that tries to motivate [me] to keep doing a good job and stay at the
    company because it vests between a three- and four-year period. So
    12
    provided. When we exclude Jonathan’s stock options, which the court awarded
    separately in its later ruling on Jonathan’s rule 1.904(2) motion, the following
    table shows the valuation and division of the these assets:
    Asset                          Sara     Jonathan
    Homestead                                 223,000
    Homestead Debt                           -153,300
    Rental                                     47,000
    Rental Debt                               -44,000
    2006 Odyssey                   8741
    2000 CRV                                     1710
    Sara Roth                     24,326
    J’s Restricted Stock          65,289       65,289
    J’s ESPP                       9410         9410
    Net Assets                   107,766      149,109
    Equalization                  20,671      -20,671
    Property Division            128,437      128,438
    The court also set aside the $10,000 gift Sara had received from her
    grandmother and ordered Jonathan to pay Sara the $10,000 as a part of the
    equalization payment. Therefore, when we add the $10,000 gift to the above
    valuation and distribution, we conclude Jonathan should pay Sara $30,671,5 an
    amount lower than the $31,877 he proposed paying at trial.
    On appeal, Jonathan first claims the court inequitably distributed his
    vested stock assets (restricted stock and ESPP stock).             Without citation to
    authority, he argues the distribution “must explicitly state that the parties are not
    each stock grant . . . is a grant of a certain number of [Skyworks] shares,
    and [then] a certain number of shares are released as a percentage of the
    total each year. And so as the shares vest, they get credited to my
    account, and I have the freedom to sell them immediately for income or
    hold them as an asset and sell them much later for capital gains.
    5
    The court ordered Jonathan to pay Sara $25,771.41, which total included the $10,000
    gift. The court did not explain its calculation. We conclude the appropriate equalization
    payment for these accounts plus the gift is $30,671. In our discussion of the contempt
    action below, we increase the overall equalization payment to $39,144, based on
    Jonathan’s liquidation of assets in 2015.
    13
    awarded a specific dollar amount but are awarded one-half of the stocks existing
    at the time of trial regardless of whether their value has increased or decreased
    from the values at the time of trial.” In making this argument on appeal, Jonathan
    abandons the dollar values assigned to the stock in his own property distribution
    proposal and also abandons his proposal that the value of the those assets be
    split equally to determine an appropriate equalization payment.
    We recognize “the general rule that stock should be valued at market
    value if it can be ascertained.” 
    Id. at 192
    . When the district court’s valuation is
    within the permissible range of evidence, we will accept it. 
    Id.
     at 192–93. Upon
    our de novo review, we accept the district court’s valuations based on Jonathan’s
    evidence. See In re Marriage of Moffatt, 
    279 N.W.2d 15
    , 19 (Iowa 1979) (“We
    need not arrive at an exact value. The purpose of determining value is to assist
    the court in making equitable property awards and allowances.”). We modify the
    decree to order Jonathan to pay Sara $30,671 to equalize the asset distribution.
    See Hoak, 
    364 N.W.2d at 194
     (declining request to transfer stock shares as a
    part of the distribution of property).
    Second, Jonathan argues the district court failed to properly account for
    the tax implications of his equalization payment because the court did not order
    him to sell an asset. Jonathan asserts the only assets available to him for this
    payment are his vested stock grants or vested stock options. He asks us to
    modify the decree to order the sale of stock options in the amount of the
    equalization payment.      He proposes to then pay Sara “the net amount after
    taxes.” Sara responds Jonathan is not limited to those assets and can make this
    payment by refinancing the home mortgage.
    14
    In making a property division we consider the tax consequences a party is
    expected to face in satisfying a property settlement.          See 
    Iowa Code § 598.21
    (5)(j). Our supreme court has instructed: “‘[W]here there is no evidence
    to support a discounting based on a sale and the trial court has not ordered a
    sale, the effect of considering income tax consequences on a sale’ diminishes
    the value of the asset to the nonowning spouse.” In re Marriage of McDermott,
    
    827 N.W.2d 671
    , 684 (Iowa 2013) (quoting In re Marriage of Friedman, 
    466 N.W.2d 689
    , 691 (Iowa 1991)) (stating if a dissolution court orders a sale of an
    asset, it may then consider the tax consequences in its property distribution);
    Friedman, 
    466 N.W.2d at 691
     (stating tax consequences are not considered
    when there is no evidence “a sale was pending” and the district court “has not
    ordered a sale”); In re Marriage of Hogeland, 
    448 N.W.2d 678
    , 680–81 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 1989) (stating where equalization payment will require the liquidation of
    capital assets, the income tax consequences of the sale should be considered).
    The district court presumably believed Jonathan had sufficient cash flow to
    make the mortgage payments and satisfy the equalization payment. Jonathan
    has not shown he is unable to refinance the mortgage ($67,000 equity) and make
    the equalization payment.   Jonathan also could use a portion of his salary and
    incentives (as of March 3, 2015—$100,656 base salary; 2014—$97,639 base
    salary plus $71,000 performance bonus).      Further, Jonathan included in his
    monthly expenses the children’s taekwondo lessons, new hefty allowances for
    the children, and their piano lessons. We also note his 2014 purchase of new
    Samsung Galaxy tablets for the children.      On cross-examination, Jonathan
    admitted those costs “are not necessary monthly expenses.” By spending this
    15
    money and including these costs as necessary monthly expenses, Jonathan
    artificially lowered his cash flow. Because Jonathan has not shown he is unable
    to refinance the mortgage, the evidence does not support Jonathan’s assertion
    he would be forced to exercise and liquidate vested stock assets to pay Sara,
    and we decline Jonathan’s request.
    2. Jonathan’s Stock Options.
    Jonathan’s vested stock options, granted when he started work in August
    2010, allow him to buy 2500 shares of company stock at the strike price ($17.13).
    At trial, Jonathan explained exercising the options would be a taxable event
    because he owned the options, not the shares of stock. Jonathan asked the
    court to order him to exercise all the options, obtain the net value, and split the
    net value with Sara.
    While the decree assigned Jonathan’s proposed value as his profit in the
    stock options ($198,450) and divided that value equally between the parties, the
    court failed to further specify distribution of this asset.    In Jonathan’s rule
    1.904(2) motion, he asked the court to modify the decree,6 asserting his vested
    stock options “are not a retirement account and cannot be split by a QDRO.
    They can only be distributed to [Sara] by [Jonathan] exercising them, and then
    paying income taxes on the amount received.” Jonathan asked the court to
    award each party 1250 stock options. According to Jonathan, the court should
    further order him “to exercise [Sara’s] 1250 shares, have an accountant
    determine the amount of income taxes [Jonathan] shall pay on this amount, and
    6
    Jonathan’s 1.904(2) motion did not address his two other vested assets—the vested
    restricted stock ($130,578) and the ESPP ($18,819).
    16
    pay [Sara] this net amount.” Finally, Jonathan asked the court to order him “to
    provide to [Sara] all needed access to the relevant records of the plan
    administrator, the account, and the accountant.”
    The court’s October 12, 2015 order granted Jonathan’s motion in part,
    noting its intent for the parties to share equally “any transaction costs, including
    tax liability, incurred by exercising these options.” The court ordered Jonathan to
    accomplish “an equal division in one of two ways: First, if possible, [Jonathan]
    shall transfer one-half of the actual vested units to Sara.” Second, if not possible,
    Jonathan “shall complete all paperwork necessary to allow [Sara] access to all
    information regarding the vested stock option account(s).” Under the second
    option, the court gave Sara sixty days to obtain information and advice and to
    “elect to either (A) require [Jonathan] to exercise the option on one-half of the
    units and give [her] the net proceeds” or “(B) continue to hold all the vested stock
    options jointly and be entitled to one-half of the net proceeds of each option unit
    as it is exercised.” The court specified, if Sara picked option (B), then she had
    “the continued right to complete access to the account information.”
    On appeal, Jonathan asks us to modify the district court’s orders regarding
    Sara’s access to his financial information to state: “Jonathan will provide Sara
    with all quarterly statements of the vested stock options, vested stock grants, and
    unvested stock grants that existed at the time of the decree.          He shall be
    permitted to redact from such statements, any and all financial information
    regarding post-decree financial information.”
    We decline his request. The district court’s rulings make it clear Sara only
    has access to information concerning Jonathan’s financial assets at the time of
    17
    dissolution.   No modification is needed for Jonathan to redact information
    regarding his later-acquired assets.
    3. Jonathan’s Unvested Restricted Stock Grants.
    Jonathan’s restricted stock vests on a deferred timetable set at the time
    his employer granted the shares to him.            The final vesting will occur on
    November 10, 2018, four years after the November 2014 grant of shares.
    Regarding both Jonathan’s vested restricted stock grants (included in the
    equalization analysis above) and his unvested restricted stock grants, his exhibit
    provided:
    Grant                                                             Shares Traded
    Date          Status   Granted    Sellable Unvested Vested            for Taxes
    09/06/2011    N/A          1000        479         0  1000                  383
    11/10/2011    Accepted     1000        479       250    750                 217
    11/08/2012    Accepted     1250        395       624    626                 231
    11/10/2014    Accepted     1000           0     1000      0                   0
    Thus, the restricted stock at issue was granted to Jonathan by his
    employer during the marriage, but some shares, though already granted, were
    unvested at the time of the dissolution. In general, “[v]esting provisions vary
    considerably” as to “the point in time at which vesting will occur (immediately vs.
    deferred).” In re Marriage of Benson, 
    545 N.W.2d 252
    , 254 (Iowa 1996). At trial,
    Jonathan testified to his willingness to divide the unvested restricted shares
    equitably with Sara if a means to do so existed:
    Q. If you could give them to Sara, would you give them to
    Sara? A. I would divide them with Sara equitably.
    Q. If they’re worth nothing, would you give them to Sara? A.
    . . . . You’re saying if there was a legal means to divide an asset
    like . . . an unvested stock grant? I would divide them with Sara, as
    I’ve proposed dividing every asset in this case, 50/50.
    18
    The district court adopted Jonathan’s valuation of the unvested restricted
    shares ($180,859.74) and devised a plan to equitably divide this asset:
    Jonathan is ordered to identify the individual number of
    shares in unvested stock grants he holds as of the date of this
    decree. Hereafter, each year when a number of these grants vest,
    Jonathan shall transfer half the value to Sara. This pattern will
    continue until all identified stock grants vest, or until the grants no
    longer exist through no fault of Jonathan. Jonathan is ordered to
    keep Sara informed of the status of these stock grants and to
    provide her copies of all documentation he is provided by his
    employer regarding these grants.[7]
    Thus, the district court granted Sara an equal portion of the unvested restricted
    stock only if the shares granted during the marriage actually vested in the future.
    (a) Marital Estate. On appeal, Jonathan first claims this asset is not a
    part of the marital estate, pointing out he could not cash out the unvested
    restricted shares at the time of trial and will only obtain these stock shares “if he
    continues to work there at the preset vesting date.”
    We divide the property the parties own at the time of the dissolution, and
    his employer granted him these restricted shares during his pre-dissolution
    employment. Thus, the facts of the existing grants, their value at the time of trial
    (from Jonathan’s exhibit), and their potential for vesting in the future are
    undisputed. Jonathan has not cited any authority for his claim we must reverse
    the district court and rule this asset is not a part of the marital estate. See Iowa
    R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite an authority in support of an issue may
    7
    Based on the $180,859.74 value and on describing the asset as unvested, it is clear
    the court is discussing the unvested stock grants in this paragraph. But the court
    inadvertently used the phrase “unvested stock options.” As Jonathan testified, all of his
    2010 stock options have now vested. We have corrected the court’s inadvertent
    phrasing without notation.
    19
    be deemed waiver of that issue.”). Thus, he has failed to show us why the
    district court’s inclusion of this property was wrong.
    The following treatise contravenes Jonathan’s position:
    To the extent the employee does not receive an unvested
    benefit if the employee leaves the employer after the divorce, the
    remedy is not to refuse to divide the benefit, but rather to divide it
    on a deferred percentage basis, so that the nonowning spouse
    receives a stated percentage of any value which does ultimately
    vest. If a . . . contract right acquired during the marriage does not
    ultimately produce value, no value should be divided; but the fact
    that such a contract right might not produce value is no basis for
    concluding in advance that the contract right will not produce value.
    The uncertainties . . . should affect only the method of distribution;
    they should not be sufficient to prevent the court from considering
    the [contract right] as potentially divisible property.
    2 Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property § 6:48 (3d ed. 2015). Courts
    from other jurisdictions have treated similar unvested benefits as marital
    property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Miller, 
    915 P.2d 1314
    , 1319–20 (Colo.
    1996) (en banc) (stating because husband had already earned the right to
    receive the restricted shares in the future, the shares are “a form of deferred
    compensation and thus constitute marital property”); Chebhab v. Hamilton-
    Chehab, 
    45 So. 3d 533
    , 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting wife’s shares of
    restricted stock granted during the marriage vest and expire at different times,
    including post-decree, and unvested shares are “in the nature of deferred
    compensation” and “a marital asset”).         But see Davidson v. Davidson, 
    578 N.W.2d 848
    , 853–56 (Neb. 1998) (“Stock retention shares are stock shares that
    are unvested when granted” and unvested shares vesting only upon continued
    employment “are not a part of the marital estate”).
    20
    Iowa case law also has recognized future interests may be included in the
    marital estate. See In re Marriage of Schriner, 
    695 N.W.2d 493
    , 498–99 (Iowa
    2005) (stating, similar to pensions, “a future interest is properly considered as a
    marital asset subject to distribution”); In re Marriage of White, 
    537 N.W.2d 744
    ,
    747 (Iowa 1995) (stating a court may divide future book royalties conditioned on
    author-spouse’s performance of post-decree promotional services by a decree
    that “divides the funds when received”); In re Marriage of Howell, 
    434 N.W.2d 629
    , 632 (Iowa 1989) (stating Iowa law normally views pensions as property
    because they are a form of deferred compensation accrued during the marriage);
    In re Marriage of Duggan, No. 01-1887, 
    2002 WL 31423683
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
    Oct. 30, 2002) (including husband’s deferred compensation in the marital estate).
    Jonathan acquired a right to the restricted shares during the marriage, and
    he has not convinced us the district court erred in considering these shares a
    part of the marital estate.
    (b) “No fault” provision.      Noting the last stock grant will vest on
    November 10, 2018, Jonathan also challenges the court’s “no fault” language in
    its distribution of this asset. He points out the provision seems to account for
    unvested restricted stock grants that do not eventually vest on the preset
    timetable due to (1) his employer revoking the grant, (2) Jonathan being laid off
    due to company issues, or (3) “Jonathan being unable to work for some no-fault
    reason.” We agree the court’s language encompasses these situations. But,
    Jonathan also claims the court has made him an “indentured servant to his
    current employer” until November 10, 2018. He asks us to eliminate the court’s
    21
    “fault” provision and instead order him to pay Sara only if “they actually do vest
    regardless of the reason.”
    We do not believe the court’s “no fault” language precludes Jonathan from
    switching employers if he has the opportunity to improve his employment
    situation before the November 2018 vesting date. Similarly, if Sara moves away
    and then Jonathan follows and moves to be near his children, Jonathan obtaining
    new employment in those circumstances would not trigger the court’s “no fault”
    language. We decline Jonathan’s request to completely strike the court’s “fault”
    provision.   But to the extent the court’s “no fault” phrasing is unclear, in an
    abundance of caution we modify the decree by expanding the provision to
    specify it encompasses (1) Jonathan’s employer revoking these grants,
    (2) Jonathan being laid off due to company issues, (3) “Jonathan being unable to
    work for some no-fault reason,” (4) Jonathan moving to be near his children if
    Sara moves away, causing Jonathan to seek and obtain new employment, and
    (5) Jonathan switching employers because he has the opportunity to improve his
    employment situation before the final November 2018 vesting date.
    IV.    Analysis of Certiorari Challenge to Contempt Order
    Jonathan alleges the district court acted illegally or exceeded its
    jurisdiction in finding him in contempt for liquidating $62,586 in stock in 2014,
    given the fact that at trial Sara limited her contempt claim to $16,946 in stock
    withdrawals in 2015. Jonathan also contests the finding that he willfully defied a
    court order in making the 2015 withdrawals.       We agree with Jonathan and
    sustain the writ.
    22
    Shortly after Sara filed for dissolution, Jonathan sought and received a
    temporary injunction prohibiting the sale of assets. The court order prohibited the
    parties from:
    Selling, spending, disposing of, encumbering, destroying,
    damaging, transferring to third parties, or converting any asset . . .
    except each party may make expenditures needed for regular and
    ordinary living expenses, reasonable legal fees, and expenses for
    this case. Each party may make expenditures for ordinary
    expenses in the normal course of the parties’ business.
    Sara filed a rule to show cause when Jonathan’s 2014 documents showed
    the receipt of over $60,0000 above his salary, believing he had cashed out stock
    holdings in violation of the injunction.     At trial Jonathan testified $62,586 in
    shares vested in 2014, resulting in a tax obligation, but he did not request or
    receive a $62,586 cash payout.          He also admitted making two smaller
    liquidations in January and March 2015.        After Jonathan provided additional
    information, Sara agreed he did not cash out more than $60,000 in 2014, and
    during the trial she amended her contempt allegations to Jonathan’s liquidation
    and withdrawal of $2898 in January 2015 and $14,048 in March 2015, or
    $16,946.
    In his certiorari challenge, Jonathan asserts he used the 2015 withdrawals
    to pay his attorney fees for the dissolution action and the 2014 income taxes he
    owed. He contends these expenditures were allowed by the injunction. Sara
    argues Jonathan did not present evidence he was unable to pay his living
    expenses and attorney fees without selling the stock and did not apply for court
    permission to liquidate these assets for these purposes.
    23
    Based on the language of the injunction “excepting” reasonable legal fees
    and ordinary living expenses, such as paying one’s income taxes, we conclude
    Jonathan’s liquidation did not constitute a willful violation of the injunction.
    Accordingly, we sustain the writ. But that determination does not fully conclude
    the matter. Sara also owed attorney fees and had ordinary household expenses
    during this time, and Jonathan did not include his liquidated assets in his
    valuations and did not split these assets equally upon liquidation. Therefore, we
    conclude Jonathan must pay Sara $8473 (one-half of $16,946) in his equalization
    payment. Thus, Jonathan’s equalization payment to Sara now totals $39,144
    ($30,671 + $8473).
    V.    Appellate Attorney Fees
    Sara asks for appellate attorney fees in the amount of $6810. Such an
    award rests in our discretion and is based on the merits of the appeal, the
    parties’ needs, and their ability to pay. See Sullins, 
    715 N.W.2d at 258
    . After
    considering all appropriate factors, we order Jonathan to pay $5000 of Sara’s
    appellate attorney fees. Jonathan is assessed the costs of this appeal.
    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, WRIT SUSTAINED.