In the Interest of Q.R., Minor Child ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1144
Filed November 6, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF Q.R.,
Minor Child,
T.C., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Calhoun County, Joseph McCarville,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Christine Sand of Wild, Baxter & Sand, PC, Guthrie Center, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Martha Sibbel of Law Office of Martha Sibbel P.L.C., Carroll, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mullins, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, born in
2006.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory
grounds for termination and contends the juvenile court should have applied the
statutory exceptions under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) and (c) (2019) to
preclude termination. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the department of human services in
December 2017, following confirmed methamphetamine use by the mother and
her husband as well as domestic violence and housing concerns. The child had
been living with his maternal grandparents since the school year prior to the
department’s involvement. The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance
(CINA). The father, who lives in Louisiana, had not been actively involved in the
child’s life but expressed interest in taking custody of the child. In March 2018, the
court ordered a home study pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children (ICPC) for the father’s home in Louisiana. In August, the child was
placed with his aunt and uncle in Ogden, along with his two younger brothers.
A caseworker worked with the father to coordinate communication with the
child, despite the child’s reluctance to do so because “he did not know [the father]
and did not feel comfortable.” The father was provided information about the
child’s placement and extracurricular activities schedule so he would know when
he could call. In September 2018, the department reported the father “has not
1
The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. She does not appeal.
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responded to attempts to engage in [Q.R.’s] life. There have been minimal phone
calls.” Since that time, the father began calling Q.R. more often, but the child
consistently expressed he “did not feel comfortable speaking to him.”
In January 2019, the department reported Q.R. was “doing well in school,”
enjoyed playing football and baseball, and described himself as “happy” in his
placement. The child expressed he “wants to stay with his brothers” and “does not
want to go live with his father.” In April, the department reported the father had
been unable to follow through with his contract of expectations with regard to
writing letters, providing financial support, or making efforts to schedule an in-
person visit. Meanwhile, the child began refusing to speak to the father due to the
father’s messages speaking negatively about the mother. The child expressed
that “he has told his father he does not want to live with him and his father has
been dismissive of his feelings.”
The State filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The
termination hearing was held in June. Neither parent was present for the hearing,
but the child was. The record before the juvenile court indicated the child was
“thriving” in his current placement and was bonded to his brothers and aunt and
uncle. The department caseworker testified the contact the father had with the
child was not “significant enough to establish a relationship with [Q.R.] where
[Q.R.] felt a bond with him . . . [o]r establish[] a trust that you would need to with a
parent.” The caseworker acknowledged the home study had not yet been
completed but opined the department had made reasonable efforts because the
father “did not do what he needed to do” to even begin establishing a relationship
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with the child. The department and guardian ad litem recommended termination
of the father’s parental rights.
Following the termination hearing, the court entered its order terminating
the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f).
The father appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.
In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). Our primary consideration is the best
interests of the child, In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006), the defining
elements of which are the child’s safety and need for a permanent home. In re
H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).
III. Discussion
The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court. Although the court terminated
parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find termination
is proper on one ground to affirm. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App.
1999). We will address the termination of parental rights under section
232.116(1)(f). The father does not contest the child is over four years of age, has
been adjudicated CINA, and has been removed from the parents’ physical custody
for more than twelve months. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(1)–(3). But he claims
the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not
have been returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing. See id.§ 232.116(1)(f)(4). Specifically, the father contends he “had no opportunity to
prove that Q.R. could have safely been placed in his care” because the department
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failed to procure a home study, a prerequisite to the child’s placement with him. In
other words, the father contends the department “failed to provide [him] with
reasonable efforts to assist him with reunification.”
What constitutes reasonable services is based on the requirements of each
individual case. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002); see also In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). Here, the father entered a contract of
expectations directing him to make efforts to establish a relationship with the child.
The father was aware of these expectations, but his only real follow-through was
occasional phone calls and Snapchat messages. Caseworkers reminded the
father that he was welcome to participate in hearings by phone, but he declined to
do so. The department reported, “[The father] has not been a part of [Q.R.]’s life
in the past and [Q.R.] is not bonded to him, he does not really know him and he
does not want to be uprooted again.” When asked if the father should be allowed
a six-month extension, the department caseworker responded, “Absolutely not . . .
[b]ecause I don’t want to take the chance nor should [Q.R.] take the chance that
[his] placement could be disrupted.” The caseworker further explained:
Because [Q.R.] deserved to be with his relatives who he is
bonded to. He deserves to be with his brothers who he has bonded
to. He deserves to move on and not worry about being relocated or
his placement disrupted. He deserves to stay where he has built a
family and a life. [Q.R.], since the night he was born, has lived back
and forth between relatives and his mother and he needs a forever
home and he deserves that.
The juvenile court stated, “It is unfortunate that the home study was not completed,
however [the father,] while paying lip service to wanting to establish a relationship
with [Q.R.,] has taken no action to support his words.” Cf. In re J.W., No. 19-0372,
2019 WL 1950009, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019) (“The father complains that
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the ICPC home study was not completed pursuant to these requests. Although
we share the juvenile court’s frustration with the failure to complete the study in a
timely manner, we agree with the juvenile court that the study was not a reasonable
effort required of DHS at the times they were requested.”); In re M.B., No. 08-0673,
2008 WL 2357681, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 11, 2008) (concluding the
department’s reunification efforts were reasonable despite failure to complete a
home study).
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the
department’s reunification efforts were reasonable. We further conclude there is
clear and convincing evidence in the record to show the child could not be placed
in the father’s care at the time of trial. The juvenile court properly terminated the
father’s parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f).
The father also contends the court did not need to terminate his parental
rights because the child is in the legal custody of his aunt and uncle and termination
would be detrimental to the child due to the parent-child bond. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(a), (c). The exceptions to termination of parental rights found under
section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 45
(Iowa 2018). It is within the court’s discretion to consider the circumstances of the
case and the best interest of the child in determining whether to apply the factors.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014). The father claims his bond with the
child “has been well documented throughout this case” and “was testified to by the
department, [his] mother, and [himself] at the termination hearing.” We observe
neither the father nor his mother testified at the termination hearing, and the
department did not believe the father and the child were bonded. In any event, we
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do not believe the closeness of the parent-child bond precludes termination in this
case. We recognize the adoptive family is Q.R.’s aunt and uncle, and they have
indicated “they will not keep [Q.R.] away from his father . . . and he will be allowed
to keep open communication with [him].” Termination and adoption in this case
provide stability to the child while allowing the father a way to maintain contact with
the child.
We conclude termination is in this child’s best interests, and no permissive
statutory exception should be applied to preclude termination. We affirm the
decision of the juvenile court to terminate the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.