State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Jordan Cason , 919 N.W.2d 766 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-0567
Filed June 6, 2018
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY JORDAN CASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David N. May, Judge.
A defendant appeals following his guilty pleas. AFFIRMED.
Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Jeffrey Cason appeals following his guilty pleas to two separate charges of
possession of a controlled substance–marijuana with the intent to deliver and third-
degree burglary.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2016, the State filed thirteen separate charges against Cason under
various case numbers. Ultimately, Cason agreed to plead guilty to two separate
charges of possession of a controlled substance–marijuana with the intent to
deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) (2016), and third-degree
burglary, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.6A. The possession charges
carried the habitual offender sentencing enhancement. See Iowa Code § 902.8.
Pursuant to the written plea agreement, all of the remaining charges and cases
were dismissed. The plea agreement recommended the imposition of fines and a
combined sentence of incarceration of thirty-five years, with a mandatory minimum
of six years. After a hearing on the record, the district court accepted Cason’s plea
and sentenced him in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.
Cason appeals, asserting the district court’s plea colloquy was insufficient
and his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the district court’s errors. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b).
II. Standard of Review
Challenges to guilty pleas are ordinarily reviewed for the correction of errors
at law. State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Iowa 2016). We review ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Gant, 597 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa
1999).
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III. Plea Colloquy
Cason asserts the district court erred in failing to advise him of the total
amount of fines he would owe to the State, in failing to inform him of the period of
revocation of his driver’s license, in failing to ask him whether he was under the
care of a psychiatrist or physician, and in failing to establish whether he was
represented by counsel in one of his previous felony convictions. The State
asserts Cason failed to preserve error because he was sentenced immediately and
he waived the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment under the plea agreement.
Alternatively, Cason claims his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to
the district court’s errors. State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006) (noting
a challenge to a guilty plea is not barred “if the failure to file a motion in arrest of
judgment resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel”).
To prove his ineffective-assistance claim, Cason must prove counsel failed
to perform an essential duty and the failure resulted in prejudice. See id. The
prejudice burden requires proof “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” Id. at 138. When an ineffective-assistance claim is made on
direct appeal, we must first determine whether the record is adequate to address
the claim made. State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010). “[M]ost
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea will require
a record more substantial than the one [available on direct appeal].” Straw, 709
N.W.2d at 138. The record is sufficient for us to address Cason’s claims.
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A. Fine & License Revocation
Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to “address the defendant personally in
open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands . . . [t]he mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum
possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea
is offered.” Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 682. “We utilize a substantial compliance
standard to determine whether a plea crosses the rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) threshold. Id.
(citing State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1998)).
At the March 30, 2017 plea hearing, the district court stated:
THE COURT: All right. I need to go through the potential
penalties that apply to each of the charges to which you’re pleading
guilty. First of all, Count I in FECR291658, possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver with a habitual offender
enhancement, that’s punishable by a prison sentence of up to 15
years with a minimum 3-year sentence before you’d be eligible for
parole. There is no fine. You could be required to make restitution,
pay back court-appointed attorney fees, and pay certain court costs.
You’d be required to submit a DNA sample, and there is a D.A.R.E.
surcharge of $10 and a law enforcement initiative surcharge of $125.
Do you understand those potential penalties as I’ve explained them?
[CASON]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Moving on to Count III in
FECR294878. Again, you’re pleading to this as a class “D” felony
with the habitual offender enhancement. And so, again, that’s a 15-
year prison sentence—up to 15 years with a minimum 3 before you’d
be eligible for parole. You could be required to make restitution, pay
back court-appointed attorney fees, pay court costs, submit a DNA
sample, pay a D.A.R.E. surcharge of $10 and a law enforcement
initiative surcharge of $125. Do you understand these potential
penalties as I’ve explained them?
[CASON]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The last charge to which you’re pleading guilty
is burglary in the third degree, a lesser-included offense in
FECR298451, and that’s a class “D” felony without enhancement.
That’s punishable by up to 5 years in prison, fine ranging from $750
to $7500, 35 percent surcharge. You could be required to make
restitution, pay back court-appointed attorney fees, and pay court
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costs, as well as submitting a DNA sample. And, counsel, am I
missing any surcharges on the burglary? I think that’s the end of it.
STATE: You mentioned LEI; correct, Your Honor?
THE COURT: And the LEI surcharge—law enforcement
initiative surcharge—of $125.
Upon our review of the record, the district court adequately detailed the
minimum and maximum penalties associated with Cason’s convictions.
Additionally, the prosecutor addressed the terms of the plea agreement, which
detailed Cason’s driver’s license revocation through the Iowa Department of
Transportation under the two possession charges. When the prosecutor finished
explaining the terms of the plea agreement, the district court responded:
THE COURT: I believe, when I was going over the penalties,
I may have skipped over—potential penalties, I may have skipped
over the driver’s license suspensions, but that was something you
were aware of?
[CASON]: Yeah, I’m aware.
Cason was informed of the maximum and minimum penalties associated
with his guilty plea, including the range of the fine, noting a thirty-five-percent
surcharge on the burglary charge, the term of imprisonment, and the driver’s
license revocation. Accordingly, Cason cannot claim his plea was unknowingly
and involuntarily given and his counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the
court’s plea colloquy.
B. Mental Condition
Cason also claims the court failed to inquire as to whether he was under the
care of a psychiatrist of physician. If “the record suggests a question as to the
mental competence of the defendant, trial court must resolve the question before
accepting a guilty plea.” State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1977). At the
plea proceeding, the court asked:
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THE COURT: And are you under any physical or mental or
other disability that could impair your ability to give complete, truthful,
intelligent, voluntary statements today?
[CASON]: No, sir.
Upon our review of the record, there is nothing to suggest a question as to
Cason’s mental capacity. Accordingly, the district court did not err by failing to ask
Cason if he was under the care of a psychiatrist or physician and Cason’s counsel
was not ineffective in failing to object.
C. Felony Representation
Finally, Cason claims the district court failed to determine whether he was
represented by counsel during one of his previous two felony proceedings. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9). During the plea hearing, the court asked:
THE COURT: Let me ask you about these previous
convictions. Were you convicted of a felony on October 4, 2005,
namely, conspiracy to commit a forcible felony, in Polk County case
FECR167243?
[CASON]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Were you represented by counsel on that
matter?
[CASON]: Yes, sir, I was.
THE COURT: Were you also convicted of a felony, namely,
forgery, on September 17, 2010, in Polk County case FECR227582?
[CASON]: Yes, sir, I was.
Cason claims the court erred when it failed to ask whether he was
represented by counsel in his forgery case. The minutes of evidence set forth the
details of Cason’s prior felony convictions that the State intended to rely upon to
support the habitual offender enhancement. Cason had notice of the case number,
dispositions, and dates of the convictions, and he did not claim he was not the
person previously convicted in those convictions, nor did he assert he was not
represented by counsel and did not waive counsel in those cases. See State v.
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Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 2005) (stating rule 2.19(9) gives the
defendant an opportunity to affirm or deny the allegations the State is obligated to
prove at the second trial); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9). Cason’s only claim is that the
district court did not inquire into whether he was represented. Accordingly,
Cason’s admissions to his prior felony convictions were knowing and voluntary and
his claim of error fails. Thus, his counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to
the court’s plea colloquy.
IV. Conclusion
Because the district court informed Cason of the minimum and maximum
penalties associated with his guilty pleas, the record did not suggest a question of
Cason’s mental competence, and he did not claim he lacked representation at his
previous felony convictions, the court did not err in conducting its plea colloquy
and Cason’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail.
AFFIRMED.