In the Interest of Z.J., Minor Child ( 2023 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 23-0254
    Filed April 26, 2023
    IN THE INTEREST OF Z.J.,
    Minor Child,
    V.C., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,
    District Associate Judge.
    A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
    AFFIRMED.
    Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.
    Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Kimberly Opatz of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Badding, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2023).
    2
    DANILSON, Senior Judge.
    A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child,
    challenging the grounds for termination and contending termination is not in the
    child’s best interests. Upon our review, we affirm.
    I.    Background Facts and Proceedings
    The mother and father began their relationship toward the end of 2019. The
    mother gave birth to an older child, V.C., in September 2020. The department of
    health and human services became involved with the family later that year due to
    concerns that then two-month-old V.C. was being left home alone “for unknown
    periods of time,” the family’s “apartment was in a deplorable condition,” and the
    mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the child.           V.C. was
    adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA), V.C. was removed from the
    home, a safety plan was implemented, and services were provided to the mother
    and father.1 Eventually, paternity testing determined the father was not V.C.’s
    biological father. But the couple “remained in a relationship,” and “[c]oncerns
    about [their] stability and safety continued throughout th[e] case,” including
    physical violence, drug use, and inconsistent housing. The mother’s parental
    rights to V.C. were terminated in March 2022.
    Meanwhile, in September 2021, the father moved to his home state of New
    York. Several months later in Iowa, the mother gave birth to Z.J., who was
    immediately removed from her care due to her lack of progress in V.C.’s case. In
    1Although testing determined he was not V.C.’s biological father, “he and [the
    mother] were a couple for a majority of [V.C.’s] case, and services were made
    available to [the father] during that time.”
    3
    March 2022, paternity testing confirmed the father to be Z.J.’s biological father.
    Z.J. was adjudicated a CINA, and he has remained out of parental care since birth.
    The father has never seen Z.J. in person.
    With the parents making little progress toward reunification, the State filed
    a petition to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing over two days in
    September 2022, the juvenile court entered an order terminating their parental
    rights. The father appealed.2
    II.      Standard of Review
    Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.
    In re A.B., 
    957 N.W.2d 280
    , 293 (Iowa 2021).             Our paramount concern in
    termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. In re L.T., 
    924 N.W.2d 521
    , 529 (Iowa 2019).
    III.     Discussion
    The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
    Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2022).              Under Iowa Code section
    232.116(1)(e), the State must establish three elements:
    (1) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA].
    (2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
    the child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
    (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents
    have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child
    during the previous six consecutive months and have made no
    reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given
    the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph,
    “significant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to the
    affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by
    the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to
    financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a
    genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case
    2   The parental rights of mother were also terminated, and she did not appeal.
    4
    permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with
    the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a
    place of importance in the child’s life.
    Under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), the State must establish four elements:
    (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
    (2) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA].
    (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
    the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months
    ....
    (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
    cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the
    present time.
    On appeal, the father contends “[t]he grounds for termination as it relates to
    the child and Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) have not been established.”
    The father does not specify what element or elements he is challenging. Instead,
    he argues “Z.J. could easily be placed with his grandmother in New York in a safe
    environment and give [the father] a chance to prove himself.” Specifically, the
    father contends:
    An interstate compact home study was approved by the State of New
    York for [the father’s] mother. Z.J. could easily be placed there as
    either a long-term or shorter-term placement to allow Z.J. to remain
    with family and form a stronger bond with his father. . . . An extension
    of time would have allowed that to occur, but [the father] was not
    given the chance to do so.
    We interpret the father’s contention to be an argument that he should have
    been granted additional time to work toward reunification. Bypassing the State’s
    claim the father has waived a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting the grounds for termination,3 we find a ground for termination of the
    3 Cf. In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 492 (Iowa 2000) (finding the mother “adequately
    raised the issue on appeal without targeting reasonable efforts argument to each
    specific subsection”).
    5
    father’s parental rights to Z.J. has been established under section 232.116(1)(h).
    At the time of the termination hearing, the father had never met Z.J. “face to face,”
    had not provided financially for the child, and struggled to maintain his own
    independence without assistance from his mother. A caseworker recalled having
    safety concerns with the father’s parenting of V.C. and opined she would not place
    a child in his care. Another caseworker testified the father lacked “basic parenting
    skills,” had “called [V.C.] names” like “dummy or idiot,” and had exhibited
    aggressive behavior toward the mother and providers. Indeed, the record includes
    various reports of the father’s “anger issues,” including that he “punch[ed] the wall”
    when talking to providers and “made threatening comments about providers and
    other individuals.”
    Although the father’s physical distance from the child and limited financial
    means should not alone be a cause to terminate his parental rights, the facts reflect
    a lack of any evidence showing Z.J. could be safely placed in the father’s care at
    the time of the termination hearing. Thus, termination under section 232.116(1)(h)
    was proper, and we affirm. See In re A.B., 
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 774 (Iowa 2012)
    (noting we may affirm the termination order if the record supports termination on
    one of the cited grounds).
    We further conclude additional time to work toward reunification was not
    warranted in this case. Contrary to the father’s claim that he did not know the
    mother was pregnant when he moved from Iowa and he only learned he was Z.J.’s
    father in March 2022, a caseworker testified the father “was aware” of the mother’s
    6
    pregnancy prior to his move to New York and “believed that he was the father.”4
    Yet, despite repeated requests by providers, the father had only very recently
    participated in substance-abuse and mental-health evaluations.          Although the
    father’s substance-abuse evaluation recommended no treatment, a caseworker
    expressed concern about his acknowledged regular use of marijuana to “maintain
    his mental health.”5 Aside from the father’s drug use, the caseworker opined “the
    most concerning thing is just the lack of bond with his child” and his “inability to be
    truthful if [the child] were with him.” Indeed, the juvenile court noted the father’s
    “entire testimony was questionable as to the credibility,” and the court observed
    the father “seemed to give conflicting answers to questions throughout his
    testimony.” We give weight to the court’s assessment of the father’s credibility.
    See In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014).
    In addressing the father’s request for additional time, we have also
    considered the paternal grandmother’s testimony that she would assist and
    support the father in caring for Z.J. if the child was placed in his care in New York.
    But the father’s parental responsibilities cannot be assumed by the grandmother—
    despite her “very good intentions”—particularly in this situation where the father is
    essentially an unknown to the child and providers.6 We also hesitate to take that
    4 Department reports also noted the mother “planned to get custody of [V.C.] back
    and then move to New York to be with [the father].”
    5 As the juvenile court observed, use of marijuana is legal in New York. Even so,
    abuse of the substance may interfere with parenting, as with any other mind-
    altering substances including alcohol, and there is some evidence here that the
    father’s consumption of the substance may exceed casual use.
    6 As one caseworker explained:
    He has never met [Z.J.] in person, never ever demonstrated his
    parenting abilities. There were many concerns in the last case that
    prevented [the mother and the father] from moving forward in
    7
    leap of faith given the testimony of several caseworkers that the grandmother
    “enables” the father and does not “recognize[] the concerns” with his parenting.7
    Lastly, the father asserts termination was not in the child’s best interests
    “because of the importance of maintaining children with biological family and
    strengthening that bond.” Under our statutory best-interests framework, we “give
    primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
    long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
    emotional condition and needs of the child.”            
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2).
    Consideration of these factors and the father’s lack of progress or participation in
    this case provides clear and convincing evidence termination of his parental rights
    is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    interactions, parenting concerns. It’s hard to assess parenting when
    he is not here to be a parent to his child.
    7 That caseworker further opined, “I don’t believe guardianship is ever appropriate
    for a child this young.”