Gregory v. The Alaris Group ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-1014
Filed April 26, 2023
WAYNE WILLIAM GREGORY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE ALARIS GROUP, INC., PARADIGM MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC,
SANDY LESS, and VICKI SHADLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, David M. Cox, Judge.
Wayne Gregory appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. AFFIRMED.
Bruce H. Stoltze, Jr. and Breanne A. Gilpatrick of Stoltze Law Group, PLC,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Chad VonKampen and Joseph J. Porter of Simmons Perrine Moyer Berman
PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.
This appeal arises from a summary judgment proceeding related to an injury
Wayne Gregory allegedly sustained while employed at Whirlpool Corporation. To
assist with his case, Whirlpool and its third-party administrator, Gallagher Bassett
Services, Inc. (Gallagher Bassett), contracted a nurse case manager from The
Alaris Group, Inc, a division of Paradigm Management Services, Inc. (Paradigm).
Gregory later lodged several claims against Whirlpool and Gallagher Bassett.
Gregory also filed an invasion-of-privacy claim against The Alaris Group,
Paradigm, and the case managers who assisted with his care (collectively,
“Alaris”). Alaris moved for summary judgment on the invasion-of-privacy claim,
which the district court granted. Gregory appeals, and we affirm.
I. Background Proceedings and Facts
Gregory filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging he sustained a work-
related injury while employed with Whirlpool. After receiving his claim, Gallagher
Bassett, Whirlpool’s third-party administrator for workers’ compensation claims,
contacted The Alaris Group in search of a nurse case manager for Gregory’s care.
One week later, Defendant Sandy Less sent Gregory’s then-counsel a letter to
inform him she had “been assigned by the [workers’] compensation carrier to work
with” Gregory as a nurse case manager. This letter included “a Release of
Information and Case Management Disclosure form which indicates [Gregory] has
given consent for [Less] to access records related to [his] work injury.” The letter
instructed Gregory to sign and return this form. In July, Gregory’s new counsel
sent Less a letter directing her “to immediately cease and desist from any and all
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contact with Mr. Gregory; and/or his providers in connection with his workers’
compensation claims.” This letter also contained language signed by Gregory:
I hereby revoke any and all waivers and permission for
disclosure of medical information of any format or content to
Ms. Less or any other employees of The Alaris Group Inc.; this
revocation also prohibits any contact or verbal communication
regarding my medical condition to Ms. Less or any other employees
of The Alaris Group Inc.
Less contacted legal counsel, who advised her that Gregory could not control the
nurse case manager and she should continue working on Gregory’s claim.
Defendant Vicki Shadle later replaced Less as Gregory’s nurse case manager.
Alaris acknowledges Less and Shadle continued to work on Gregory’s claim—and
obtained and viewed his medical records—as nurse case managers after his July
letter. Gregory’s counsel later wrote to Alaris, “Mr. Gregory was stunned to learn
of the apparent involvement of Ms. Shadle as ‘his’ nurse case manager.”
Gregory filed suit naming Whirlpool, Gallagher Bassett, and Alaris as
defendants. He lodged several bad faith and wrongful discharge claims against
Whirlpool and Gallagher Bassett, and he claimed Alaris invaded his privacy by
continuing to work on his claim and viewing his medical records after his letter
demanding otherwise. Gregory later dismissed his suit against Whirlpool and
Gallagher Bassett, leaving only the invasion-of-privacy claim against Alaris. Alaris
moved for summary judgment on the invasion-of-privacy claim, and the district
court ruled for Alaris. Gregory appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment ruling for corrections of errors at law. Susie
v. Fam. Health Care of Siouxland, P.L.C., 942 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 2020).
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no disputed issue of material fact exists
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “Summary
judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice run for trial but rather the put up or
shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a [nonmoving] party must show what evidence
it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”
Garrison v. New Fashion Pork LLP, 977 N.W.2d 67, 88 (Iowa 2022) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
Gregory asserts a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
nurse case managers fell under the scope of Iowa Code section 85.27 (2019), that
the district court’s interpretation of section 85.27(2) is overbroad, and that the
district court erred in addressing his invasion-of-privacy claim. We reject each of
these claims.
A. Overview of Invasion of Privacy
While the nature of Gregory’s invasion-of-privacy claim is unclear, it
appears he raises a common law invasion-of-privacy claim. Iowa recognizes four
types of invasion-of-privacy claims: “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another”; “appropriation of the other’s name, or likeness”; “unreasonable publicity
given to the other’s private life”; and “publicity that unreasonably places the other
in a false light before the public.” Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Iowa
1977) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (Am. L. Inst. 1977)).
Gregory does not argue that Alaris appropriated his name or likeness or publicized
his information, so we analyze his claim as unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion.
See id. at 822–23 (explaining the contours of each invasion-of-privacy claim).
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This form of invasion of privacy generally requires the plaintiff to
establish two elements. The first element requires an intentional
intrusion into a matter the plaintiff has a right to expect privacy. The
next element requires the act to be “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.” We have held that an intrusion upon seclusion occurs when
a person “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . .
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).
B. Status of Nurse Case Managers
Gregory first argues the district court erred in holding the case managers
were covered by Iowa Code section 85.27 as representatives of either Whirlpool
or Gallagher Bassett. Section 85.27, which deals with release of information for
workers’ compensation claims, requires that
Any employee, employer, or insurance carrier making or
defending a claim for benefits agrees to the release of all information
to which the employee, employer, or carrier has access concerning
the employee’s physical or mental condition relative to the claim and
further waives any privilege for the release of the information. The
information shall be made available to any party or the party’s
representative upon request.
Iowa Code § 85.27(2). Gregory asserts the initial letter from Alaris did not
represent that the case manager was acting on behalf of either Gallagher Bassett
or Whirlpool. This omission, he contends, creates a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the case managers were protected from liability by this section’s
waiver.
We agree with the district court that Gregory did not present a genuine issue
of material fact. Gregory’s argument ignores the case manager’s statement that
she had been assigned by “the workers’ compensation carrier” to work with
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Gregory. This sentence establishes the case manager was acting under the scope
of section 85.27. Gregory’s citations do not contradict this statement, as they only
state the case manager was working for Alaris. We are required to consider all of
the facts presented, not just some of them. See Parish v. Jumpking, 719 N.W.2d
540, 545 (Iowa 2006) (“[A] genuine issue of fact is presented if a reasonable fact
finder could return a verdict or decision for the nonmoving party based upon those
facts.”). Last, we note Gregory is unable to identify any other plausible entity the
case managers could have been working for.
C. The District Court’s Interpretation of Iowa Code Section 85.27(2)
Gregory next asserts the district court’s interpretation of Iowa Code section
85.27(2) is overbroad. Gregory makes two arguments related to this claim. He
first disputes the district court’s interpretation of the statute relating to an
employee’s release of information, contending the statute authorized him to revoke
the release of his information. Second, Gregory argues the district court’s broad
interpretation of the statute would render it redundant. Specifically, he points to
Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.6, which provides:
At the same time and in the same manner as service of the
original notice and petition, the claimant shall serve a patient’s waiver
using Form 14-0043 (authorization for release of information
regarding claimants seeking workers’ compensation benefits), or a
substantially equivalent form, which shall not be revoked until
conclusion of the contested case.
Because this rule also requires a waiver, Gregory argues a broad interpretation of
section 85.27(2) renders the section superfluous, as a claimant would have already
waived their privilege to relevant medical records. Iowa Admin. Code r. 876-4.6.
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We disagree with both of Gregory’s arguments. First, we find the district
court did not err in its interpretation relating to an employee’s release of
information. In addition to the excerpt quoted above, section 85.27(2) also
provides that
Any institution or person releasing the information to a party or the
party’s representative shall not be liable criminally or for civil
damages by reason of the release of the information. If release of
information is refused, the party requesting the information may
apply to the workers’ compensation commissioner for relief. The
information requested shall be submitted to the workers’
compensation commissioner who shall determine the relevance and
materiality of the information to the claim and enter an order
accordingly.
The language of this section is clear: the employee agrees to release all relevant
information to the employer or employer’s representative. Iowa Code § 85.27(2).
If a dispute occurs and the worker refuses to release certain information, then the
workers’ compensation commissioner decides what information is released. Id.By the language of the statute, the waiver is comprehensive, with a mechanism
built in to resolve disputes.
This reading comports well with the overall purpose of the statute. Section
85.27 creates an “essentially nonadversarial” system to process workers’ claims
“routinely” and pay them “quickly,” to benefit workers. Morrison v. Century Eng’g,
434 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Iowa 1989). To facilitate this system, the act provides for a
free flow of medical information related to a worker’s claim, and a worker waives
any “privilege of confidentiality by filing [their] petition for workers’ compensation
benefits.” Id. at 876.
We also reject Gregory’s second argument that a comprehensive waiver
would render the statute redundant. While the universe of information covered by
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the rule and the statute may be similar, the rule implements the statute by requiring
execution of a waiver, as commonly relied upon by physicians’ offices and other
third parties involved with workers’ compensation claims. See Iowa Code
§ 85.27(2); Iowa Admin. Code r. 876-4.6. A rule that practically implements a
statute is not redundant. See Iowa Code § 17A.2(11) (defining an agency “rule”
as an “agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or
prescribes law or policy, or that describes the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of any agency” (emphasis added)).
D. Gregory’s Constitutional Right to Privacy1
Gregory last argues that the district court erroneously ignored his
constitutional right to privacy, only addressing the common law tort of invasion of
privacy. Gregory contends an analysis based on his constitutional rights would
have led to redress for his injury. We disagree. The district court’s ruling
specifically recognizes that Gregory raised a constitutional claim and rejected it.
So do we.
Because Gregory makes no effort to distinguish claims under the state or
federal constitutions, and could not identify any textual basis for his constitutional
claim, we conclude he has abandoned any claim to a state constitutional right
broader than the federal. See Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 716 (Iowa 2021).
While our courts have recognized a constitutional right to privacy in medical
records, see Ashenfelter v. Mulligan, 792 N.W.2d 665, 672 (Iowa 2010), the
General Assembly can and has abrogated that right by statute more than once.
1Gregory also alleged some type of statutory right to privacy below, but he has
abandoned that claim on appeal.
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See Iowa Code § 85.27 (the workers’ compensation exception at issue in this
appeal); see also id. §§ 622.10(3) (overriding the privacy interest in medical
records for certain civil litigants), (4) (same for crime victim’s privileged records
under certain limited circumstances). Gregory makes no argument that the
workers’ compensation statute is unconstitutional, as-applied or otherwise, and we
find no merit in the alleged constitutional grounding of his complaint.
IV. Disposition
We reject Gregory’s arguments on appeal and affirm the district court’s
summary-judgment ruling.
AFFIRMED.