Christopher William Smead v. State of Iowa ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1059
Filed May 11, 2022
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM SMEAD,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Christopher L.
Bruns, Judge.
Christopher Smead appeals the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Fred Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2
BOWER, Chief Judge.
In January 2014, Christopher Smead pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual
abuse and was sentenced to a ten-year suspended sentence, three years of
supervised probation, and a lifetime special sentence under Iowa Code section
903B.1 (2014). Smead did not appeal. Thus, his conviction became final in 2014.
In 2020, Smead filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR),
asserting he was not adequately represented at his plea proceeding and he would
not have accepted the plea had he been informed of the lifetime parole component
of his sentence. Smead alleged he learned of the lifetime special sentence two
weeks before filing the PCR application.
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting the claim was
time-barred by the three-year limitation period of Iowa Code section 822.3 and
“[t]he record reflects that Mr. Smead was aware of the lifetime parole requirement
at the time he entered his plea.” The State later filed a motion for summary
judgment with supporting documents: the guilty plea, the transcript of plea and
sentencing, and the sentencing order. The State asserted Smead was informed
about the lifetime special sentence both orally and in writing and his application
failed to assert any ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
applicable limitations period.
In resistance, Smead filed an affidavit, which states in part:
Based on the limited discussion I had with counsel before I
entered the plea I did not understand that the sentence for the
offense of conviction, sexual abuse in the third degree, carries a
sentence of lifetime parole after the regular sentence is discharged.
I don’t recall that judge said anything about lifetime parole during the
plea/sentencing hearing, and I was not otherwise aware of that
requirement.
3
After a hearing, the district court determined summary dismissal pursuant
to Iowa Code section 822.6 was warranted because Smead was undisputedly
informed of the special sentence and the lifetime-sentence component of his
sentence could have been discovered within the limitations period. Smead
appeals.
Because the district court correctly ruled Smead has not established a
viable exception to overcome the three-year limitations period, the application is
time-barred. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (containing an exception for grounds of “fact
or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period” (emphasis
added)); see also Quinn v. State, 954 N.W.2d 75, 76–77 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020)
(concluding the statute of limitations cannot be avoided where the evidence put
forward to support a claim “was available to the applicant or could have been
discovered with due diligence within the limitations period”).
We affirm. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(a), (e).
AFFIRMED.