Hemphill v. Johnson & Johnson , 550 F. App'x 890 ( 2014 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ALLEGRA HEMPHILL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    JOHNSON & JOHNSON,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ______________________
    2013-1503
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    District of Columbia in No. 12-CV-0279, Judge Colleen
    Kollar-Kotelly.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 14, 2014
    ______________________
    ALLEGRA HEMPHILL, of Washington, DC, pro se.
    GEORGE PAPPAS, Covington & Burling, LLP, of Wash-
    ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief
    were JEFFREY B. ELIKAN and KELLY V. SILVERMAN.
    _____________________
    Before NEWMAN, DYK, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    2                          HEMPHILL   v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON
    Allegra Hemphill appeals from two decisions of
    the United States District Court for the District of Co-
    lumbia. The district court denied Hemphill’s Motion for
    Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), in which
    she sought to have the court set aside its January 2013
    order dismissing Hemphill’s complaint for failure to state
    a claim. The district court also granted defendant John-
    son & Johnson’s motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b),
    barring Hemphill from filing future patent infringement
    actions against Johnson & Johnson without first obtain-
    ing leave of the district court. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Hemphill first filed suit against Johnson & Johnson
    (“J&J”) in the United States District Court for the District
    of Maryland in 1999, alleging that J&J’s Stayfree, Care-
    free, and Serenity sanitary napkins and adult inconti-
    nence products infringed claim 2 of United States Patent
    No. 4,557,720 (“the ’720 patent”). Hemphill v. McNeil-
    PPC, Inc., 
    134 F. Supp. 2d 719
    , 722 (D. Md. 2001)
    (Hemphill I). The Maryland District Court construed the
    claims and ultimately determined that the accused prod-
    ucts did not infringe the ’720 patent, either literally or
    under the doctrine of equivalents. 
    Id. at 727-29.
    We
    affirmed. Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 25 F. App’x 915,
    915 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Since then Hemphill unsuccessfully
    sought to enforce the ’720 patent against other defendants
    and similar accused products. Hemphill v. Kimberly-
    Clark Corp., 
    605 F. Supp. 2d 183
    (D.D.C. 2009); Hemphill
    v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
    530 F. Supp. 2d 108
    (D.D.C.
    2008); Hemphill v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 
    258 F. Supp. 2d 410
    (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 765 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
    The ’720 patent expired on December 10, 2002. None-
    theless, in February 2012, Hemphill again filed suit
    against J&J, alleging that J&J’s Stayfree and Carefree
    brand feminine care products infringe both independent
    claims of the ’720 patent, and that the defendant induced
    HEMPHILL   v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON                             3
    infringement of the ’720 patent by a third party. The
    district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss,
    denied plaintiff’s subsequent Rule 60(b) motion, and
    granted defendant’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions. The
    plaintiff appealed the Rule 60(b) decision and the sanc-
    tions order to the District of Columbia Circuit, and the
    District of Columbia Circuit transferred the appeal to this
    court.    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    On both issues presented in this appeal, we follow re-
    gional circuit law. The District of Columbia Circuit
    reviews both the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion and a
    sanctions order for abuse of discretion. Lucas v. Duncan,
    
    574 F.3d 772
    , 775 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Twelve John Does v.
    District of Columbia, 
    841 F.2d 1133
    , 1138 (D.C. Cir.
    1988).
    Since the ’720 patent had expired in 2002 and the
    statute precludes recovery “for any infringement commit-
    ted more than six years prior to the filing of the com-
    plaint,” 35 U.S.C. § 286, the district court dismissed
    Hemphill’s claims for untimeliness. In her Motion for
    Relief from Judgment, Hemphill argued two bases for
    reconsideration, “(1) upon re-examination, the [’]720
    Patent reissued; and (2) the District of Maryland court
    that first construed the [’]720 patent erred in construing
    the term ‘swab.’” JA 2310.
    The district court correctly ruled that “reexamination
    certificates do not alter the term of a patent” and therefore,
    the certificate did not change the fact that even if J&J
    had infringed the ’720 patent before its expiration in
    2002, recovery was time-barred when Hemphill sued in
    2012. JA 2310 (emphasis in original). The district court
    also correctly held that Hemphill’s “continued disagree-
    ment with the claim construction of the Hemphill I court
    is not a basis for relief under Rule 60(b).” JA 2311.
    4                         HEMPHILL   v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON
    Hemphill has not shown any grounds for relief under Rule
    60(b), and we affirm the district court’s decision.
    Hemphill provides no argument as to why the district
    court’s award of sanctions was in error. The District of
    Columbia Circuit has set forth guidelines for anti-filing
    injunctions in In re Powell, recognizing that such an
    injunction is “an extreme remedy.” 
    851 F.2d 427
    , 431
    (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted). We have
    reviewed the record and find that the district court’s
    analysis complies with Powell, particularly in light of
    Hemphill’s multiple unmeritorious filings against J&J
    and others.
    AFFIRMED