Shauna Ridgley v. Nancy Berryhill , 706 F. App'x 365 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAUNA M. RIDGLEY, No. 14-35865
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05396-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 30, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit
Judges.
Shauna Ridgley appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Ridgley’s application for social
security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir.
2014), and we affirm.
Ridgley argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions from
psychiatrist Dr. Parker and psychologists Drs. Neims, Houck, Trowbridge, and
Wingate that Ridgley had marked functional limitations. The opinions of the state
agency medical consultants contradicted the opinions of Drs. Parker, Neims,
Houck, Trowbridge, and Wingate. The ALJ must make findings setting forth
specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the contradicted opinion of a physician
that are supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1996). The ALJ properly gave limited weight to Dr. Parker’s opinion because
the evidence showed that Ridgley was likely using heroin at the time of his
evaluation. Ridgley did not disclose the drug use to Dr. Parker, and Dr. Parker’s
opinion did not account for the drug use. The ALJ properly discounted the
opinions of Drs. Houck, Trowbridge, and Neims because Ridgley did not
accurately disclose her substance use to these evaluators. Andrews v. Shalala, 53
F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ reasonably gave very little weight to
Dr. Wingate’s opinion because Ridgley did not mention her ongoing heroin use.
Dr. Wingate did not support her diagnosis of PTSD with any symptoms needed to
satisfy the diagnostic criteria and she based her diagnosis on Ridgley’s subjective
2 14-35865
complaints that she was socially isolated, but Ridgley’s friend Ms. Simons
contradicted this subjective report.
Ridgley also argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence
regarding her physical impairments. Ridgley does not identify any error with
specificity, so this Court need not address this argument. Carmickle v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that this Court
need not address arguments that were not argued with any specificity).
The ALJ identified specific, clear and convincing reasons that are supported
by substantial evidence for discounting Ridgley’s credibility regarding the
debilitating effects of her symptoms: (1) she made inconsistent statements to her
medical providers and in her testimony regarding her substance abuse and she
exhibited drug seeking behavior; and (2) she had significant gaps in treatment for
neck pain and mental health. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding that ALJ may consider inconsistencies in testimony in weighing a
claimant’s credibility) (internal citations omitted); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d
947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on inconsistent statements about drug and alcohol
use to reject claimant’s testimony); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2012) (listing among proper considerations for credibility assessment an
inadequately explained failure to seek treatment).
3 14-35865
The ALJ gave germane reasons for assigning only “little weight” to the
testimony of lay witnesses Barbara Safford, Dennis Ketcham and Jenny Simons.
Mr. Ketchum’s statement and Ms. Safford’s 2004 statement did not show that
Ridgley’s limitations were due to her impairments and not a lack of motivation or
intoxication. The ALJ properly rejected Ms. Safford’s 2008 statement because she
did not account for Ridgley’s significant drug use, and the limitations she reported
were consistent with signs of intoxication and drug use. The ALJ discounted Ms.
Simons’s testimony because Ms. Simons described the same limitations as
Ridgley’s testimony; thus, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Ridgley’s testimony
“apply with equal force to the lay testimony.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122.
The ALJ included in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment all
the limitations that were supported by, and consistent with, substantial record
evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the
functional limitations identified by the ALJ in the RFC for light work were
supported by the medical evidence that the ALJ credited, there was no harmful
error at Step 5 of the sequential evaluation process. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881
F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the limitations included in the
hypothetical propounded to a vocational expert need only be supported by
substantial record evidence).
4 14-35865
The new evidence that the Appeals Council considered does not change the
fact that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Brewes v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1159-60, 1162-6 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When a
claimant submits evidence for the first time to the Appeals Council, which
considers that evidence in denying review of the ALJ’s decision, the new evidence
is part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider in
determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence.”)
AFFIRMED.
5 14-35865