Sean A. Valdez v. State ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                        COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-17-00040-CR
    SEAN A. VALDEZ                                                  APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                    STATE
    ----------
    FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1428428D
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
    ----------
    Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant Sean A. Valdez pled nolo
    contendere to one count of possession of 4 or more but less than 200 grams of
    methamphetamine, and the trial court placed him on 2 years’ deferred
    adjudication and ordered that he pay a $300 fine. See Tex. Health & Safety
    Code Ann. § 481.102(6) (West Supp. 2017), § 481.115(d) (West 2017). In one
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    point, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    I.    BACKGROUND FACTS
    On the morning of April 29, 2015, Appellant’s wife, Michelle Skyy, called
    Arlington police to report that he had pointed an AR-15 (the gun) at her, 2 and the
    police responded to the couple’s residence. After the police arrived, Appellant
    came out of the house unarmed. The police arrested him, handcuffed him, and
    placed him in a squad car. 3
    Officers then entered the house “to insure there were no other persons
    inside.” In that process, officers saw a “very tall wardrobe closet, like a portable
    wardrobe closet” in the master bedroom. It was big enough to conceal someone.
    Officer Jesse Manning looked inside the wardrobe and saw “fairly substantial”
    marihuana plants. The officers finished the approximately two-minute sweep and
    left the house.
    Because the gun was neither found on Appellant nor seen in the sweep,
    Detective Jack Jenkins drafted an affidavit in support of a warrant for the gun
    (gun warrant). Meanwhile, Appellant had told another officer that the gun was
    2
    Skyy also appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. See
    Skyy v. State, No. 02-17-00038-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 7, 2018, no pet.
    h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    3
    A grand jury later no-billed Appellant for aggravated assault with a deadly
    weapon.
    2
    inside a cushioned bench at the foot of the bed in the master bedroom, so
    Detective Jenkins included that information in the affidavit. However, he did not
    include the information that he had heard about the marihuana found growing
    inside the portable closet.
    The magistrate judge who signed the affidavit and gun warrant wrote
    1:20 p.m. as the time at which he signed the gun warrant but 2:17 p.m. as the
    time at which he signed the affidavit. Detective Jenkins testified at the hearing
    on the motion to suppress that he presented the affidavit and gun warrant to the
    magistrate judge at the same time and that the magistrate judge signed them at
    the same time. Officers searched the couple’s residence pursuant to the gun
    warrant and found the gun in the master bedroom.
    Detective William Bill, a narcotics detective, participated in the search of
    the residence authorized by the gun warrant. He too had already learned about
    the marihuana growing in the master bedroom. While in the residence, Detective
    Bill saw the “large grow tent containing five pla[]nts” in plain view, seized the five
    plants, which he recognized were marihuana plants, and left the home after the
    gun was found.
    Detective Bill then drafted a search warrant affidavit to obtain a warrant
    (drug warrant) to search the residence for “[a] quantity of mari[h]uana, materials,
    containers, or devices used in the packaging, cutting, weighing, [and] distribution
    of narcotics.”   In the affidavit, Detective Bill stated that he had seen the
    marihuana plants while executing the gun warrant but did not mention that other
    3
    officers had previously seen the marihuana in the warrantless sweep and had
    informed him of its presence before his participation in the search for the gun.
    Detective Bill secured the drug warrant and returned to the residence to search it
    again. During the search pursuant to the drug warrant, Detective Bill found and
    seized various items of contraband, including baggies of methamphetamine from
    a safe bolted to the concrete inside the garage.
    II.    MOTION TO SUPPRESS
    Appellant filed a motion to suppress “any evidence obtained pursuant to
    the warrant[s]” on the grounds that “the protective sweep, the issuance of the
    warrants, the affidavits upon which said issuance was based, the execution of
    said warrants, and the return to the issuing judge by the officers executing said
    warrants and the seizure itself were illegal” and violated Appellant’s rights under
    the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, article I, section
    9 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23.
    Appellant specifically argued that the officers lacked justification for the sweep;
    that the arrest, searches, and seizures were unreasonable as they were not
    conducted pursuant to a valid warrant; and that the search warrants were illegally
    issued in that the issuing magistrate’s and judge’s “probable cause determination
    reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances test when, as a
    matter of law, the probable cause determination was not objectively reasonable.”
    The trial court denied the motion after a hearing.
    4
    III.   FINDINGS OF FACT
    The trial court issued findings of fact pursuant to Appellant’s request:
    Officer Jesse Christopher Manning
    1. On April 29th, 2015, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Arlington police
    officers were dispatched to a domestic assault at 4412 Blackberry
    Drive, [Appellant’s] residence (RR 1: 9).
    2. Officer Jesse Manning understood the “subject was potentially
    barricaded inside the house” at the time of the initial dispatch[] (RR
    1: 9).
    3. An offense report . . . indicates that the initial dispatch concerned
    “a complainant being assaulted by her husband who had a gun”
    (Defendants’ Ex. 3, page 1).
    4. When officers arrived at 4412 Blackberry Drive, Co-Defendant
    Skyy (the complainant in the assault case) was outside the house
    (Defendant’s Ex. 2, page 2; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    5. As the officers were taking up positions around 4412 Blackberry
    Drive, [Appellant] exited the house (RR 1: 10, Defendant’s Ex. 3,
    page 1).
    6. [Appellant] complied immediately with officer commands to lie on
    the ground and was handcuffed with his hands behind his back (RR
    1: 10–11; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    7. As Officer Manning was “securing the front door,” he observed
    other officers escorting [Appellant] towards the squad cars (RR 1:
    12).
    8. Soon after that, three Arlington officers (Officer Manning, Officer
    Grimmett, and Sgt. Stellato) entered [Appellant’s] residence to
    conduct a protective sweep, and to specifically clear and secure the
    residence. (RR 1: 13, 16; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    9. The officers’ rationale for conducting this protective sweep was to
    “ensure there were no other persons inside, be it an injured person
    or an additional suspect” (RR 1: 16; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    10. The officers had no “specific” information that there were any
    additional people in the house (RR 1: 24).
    5
    11. According to [O]fficer Manning, in situations like this one (where
    a suspect is arrested outside his home and alleged to have been
    previously armed), “[W]e always clear the structure every time,
    looking for additional suspects or victims of a crime” (RR I: 24).
    12. In the process of “clearing” [Appellant’s] home, the officers
    entered every room of the house (RR 1: 16).
    13. In the master bedroom, the officers located a portable wardrobe
    approximately six feet tall being used as a mari[h]uana grow closet
    (RR I: 16–17; State’s Exs. 6 & 7; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    14. Inside this grow closet, officers found several good-sized
    mari[h]uana plants (RR 1: 17; Defendant’s Ex. 3, page 1).
    15. After observing the mari[h]uana plants, the officers exited
    [Appellant’s] residence and it was decided that other officers would
    procure a search warrant to locate the following items: 1) the
    weapon involved in the call; and, 2) mari[h]uana and possibly
    other drugs or paraphernalia ( RR. 1: 17–18; Defendant’s Ex. 3,
    page 1).
    16. Immediately after exiting [Appellant’s] house, Officer Grimmett,
    Officer Manning, and Sgt. Stellato conveyed the information about
    the Mari[h]uana grow room to other officers, including the detectives
    who had become involved in [Appellant’s] case (RR I: 25). This
    occurred “by 10:00 a.m., 10:30” at the latest (RR: 19).
    17. Officer Manning is credible.
    Detective Jack Jenkins
    18. Det. Jack Jenkins testified that he arrived at the scene and
    spoke with Codefendant Skyy regarding the domestic assault
    allegation (RR 1: 50).
    19. By the time Det. Jenkins arrived, [Appellant] was already in
    custody (RR: 50).
    20. Det. Jenkins drafted a search warrant affidavit requesting a
    search warrant to search [Appellant’s] house for the [gun] that [he]
    allegedly used in the domestic assault (RR I: 51; Defendant’s Ex. 1,
    page 2).
    6
    21. Det. Jenkins testified that he had been “out to the scene” and
    [had] spoken to the responding officers prior to drafting his affidavit
    (RR 1: 54).
    22. Jenkins further testified that, by “early in the morning,” he knew
    that the responding officers had conducted a protective sweep of
    [Appellant’s] house and discovered a mari[h]uana grow operation
    inside the master bedroom. (RR 1: 54).
    23. Although Det. Jenkins was aware of this information prior to
    drafting his affidavit in support of the search warrant, he did not
    include this information in the affidavit, as it was drafted solely for the
    purpose of searching for the [gun]. (RR 1: 50–51, 59; Defendant’s
    Ex. 1 , page 1–2).
    24. The search warrant reflects that it was signed at 1:20 p.m. on
    April 29th, 2015 by [an Arlington municipal judge]. (Defendant’s Ex.
    1, page 6).
    25. For reasons Det. Jenkins could not explain, his affidavit in
    support of this search warrant reflects that it was “subscribed and
    sworn to” after the search warrant was signed, at 2:17 p.m. on April
    29, 2015 (Defendant’s Ex. 1, page 3; RR 1:51-52).
    26. Jenkins testified that “They would . . . have been presented to
    the judge at the same time. And I’m not sure why he would have
    wrote (sic) two different times on there. I didn’t catch that at the
    time.” (RR 1: 52).
    27. Det. Jenkins was present at the time the judge signed the
    warrant. (RR 1: 53).
    28. Det. Jenkins is credible.
    Detective William Bill
    29. Det. William Bill testified that he is employed as a narcotics
    detective with the City of Arlington (RR: 27).
    30. On the morning of April 29, 2015, Det. Bill was called to assist
    with the collection of the mari[h]uana that had been discovered by
    the officers during the protective sweep of [Appellant’s] house (RR I:
    35–36; Defendant’s Ex. 4, page 3).
    31. Det. Bill testified that he knew of the mari[h]uana in [Appellant’s]
    house in the “early morning” of April 29th, 2015 (RR I: 37–38).
    7
    32. Bill further testified that, after he received this information, he
    believed that probable cause existed to obtain a search warrant for
    “narcotics or mari[h]uana[.]” (RR I: 42)
    33. Det. Bill arrived at [Appellant’s] house at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. (RR
    1: 33, 35).
    34. At approximately 2:22 p.m., Det. Bill assisted in executing the
    “gun” search warrant (RR I: 38; Defendant’s Ex. 2, page 2).
    35. During this search, Det. Bill observed the mari[h]uana grow and
    the mari[h]uana plants that the responding officers had initially
    observed during the “protective sweep” of [Appellant’s] house (RR I:
    38; Defendant’s Ex. 2, page 2).
    36.   Five mari[h]uana plants were seized during this search
    (Defendant’s Ex.2, page 2).
    37. The [gun] that was the subject of the first search warrant was
    also seized during this search (Defendant’s Ex.2, page 2).
    38. Det. Bill also spoke with Co-Defendant Skyy . . . (who told
    Detective Bill that there was a small amount of mari[h]uana in her
    vehicle and described the bag that contained the mari[h]uana) and
    subsequently searched her vehicle (RR 1 :30–34; Defendant’s Ex. 4,
    page 3).
    39. Det. Bill left the scene and drafted a search warrant affidavit . . .
    to obtain a search warrant to search [Appellant’s] house for “a
    quantity of mari[h]uana, materials, containers, or devices used in the
    packaging, cutting, weighing, distribution of narcotics.” (Defendant’s
    Ex. 2, page 1).
    40. In this affidavit, Det. Bill indicated that, during the execution of
    the gun search warrant, he observed a “grow tent” containing five
    mari[h]uana plants in [the] master bedroom (Defendant’s Ex. 2, 2).
    41. [A Tarrant County district judge] signed the search warrant on
    April 29, 2015 at 7:27 p.m. (Defendant’s Ex. 2, page 4).
    42. During the execution of this second search warrant, at
    approximately 8:00 p.m., officers located and seized a “large
    quantity of green leafy substance,” “a large quantity of US Currency,”
    and “several baggies of crystal[-]like substance” that field tested
    positive for methamphetamine (Defendant’s Ex. 4, page 3–4).
    8
    43. Det. Bill is credible.
    IV.    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
    The trial court also issued conclusions of law. Regarding the protective
    sweep, the trial court concluded:
    •     “The police had an objectively reasonable belief that a person might
    remain in the area who could pose a danger based notably upon the
    fact that” Appellant was not found in possession of the gun;
    •     “The officers could not be certain of who might still remain in the
    residence and the exact location of the [gun]”;
    •     “[T]he police search of the premises that immediately followed
    [Appellant’s] being taken into custody was a proper protective
    sweep”; and
    •     “The protective sweep was reasonable, well-founded under the
    circumstances and legally permissible.”
    Regarding the gun warrant, the trial court concluded:
    •     The “affidavit contained sufficient facts to support” the gun warrant;
    •     The facts in the findings of fact support the conclusion that “the
    information relied on by Detective Jenkins as the Affiant of the [gun]
    warrant and affidavit was sufficient to support probable cause to
    obtain a search warrant for the residence”;
    •     “[P]robable cause did not come from information obtained from an
    illegal search and was not tainted”;
    •     “Information regarding the observation of the drug evidence during
    the protective sweep was properly omitted from the search warrant
    affidavit because it was not material to the search for the [gun]”;
    •     “Probable cause existed for the [gun] search regardless of
    observations made during the protective sweep concerning drug
    evidence”;
    •     “Detective Jenkins credibly testified that the difference in time
    between his signature and that of the magistrate was a technical
    9
    discrepancy, as he recalled the magistrate signed the warrant in his
    presence”; and
    •      “[T]he evidence seized as a result of the [gun] warrant is admissible
    as matter of law.”
    Finally, regarding the drug warrant, the trial court concluded:
    •      The “affidavit contained sufficient facts to support” the drug warrant;
    •      The facts in the findings of fact support the conclusion that “the
    information relied on by Detective Jenkins as the Affiant of the [drug]
    warrant and affidavit was sufficient to support probable cause to
    obtain a search warrant for the residence”;
    •      “[P]robable cause did not come from information obtained from an
    illegal search and was not tainted”;
    •      “The protective sweep was proper[, so] any information regarding
    the observation of the drug evidence during the sweep did not taint
    the subsequent search and seizure of such evidence”;
    •      Officers saw the marihuana in plain view while executing the gun
    warrant; “this alone . . . provided probable cause for the [drug]
    warrant”;
    •      “Probable cause existed for the search for mari[h]uana evidence as
    stated in the affidavit”; and
    •      “[T]he evidence seized [pursuant to] the [drug] warrant is admissible
    as a matter of law.”
    V.     DISCUSSION
    A.    Appellant Challenges the Denial of His Motion to Suppress on
    Multiple Grounds.
    In his sole point, Appellant contends that the trial court reversibly erred by
    denying his motion to suppress because:
    •      The initial search was an unlawful protective sweep;
    •      The information obtained during the unlawful protective sweep was
    used to support the drug warrant; and
    10
    •     Absent that information, the drug warrant lacked probable cause.
    Appellant specifies in his brief that “[t]he evidence that should have been
    suppressed was, at a minimum, the ‘large quantity of green leafy substance,’ ‘a
    large quantity of US Currency,’ and ‘several baggies of crystal[-]like substance’
    that field tested positive for methamphetamine,” all seized during the execution of
    the drug warrant.
    B.    We Apply a Deferential Standard of Review to a Magistrate’s Decision
    to Issue a Search Warrant.
    As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently reiterated, “The core of
    the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause and its Texas equivalent is that a
    magistrate may not issue a search warrant without first finding probable cause
    that a particular item will be found in a particular location.”     State v. Elrod,
    
    538 S.W.3d 551
    , 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citations and internal quotation
    marks omitted).     “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
    shown in the affidavit would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
    that the items to be seized were in the stated place.” 
    Id. (citation and
    internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    Although we usually bifurcate our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion
    to suppress—according almost total deference to the historical facts found by the
    trial court but reviewing de novo its application of the law to the facts, Amador v.
    State, 
    221 S.W.3d 666
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), when we review a
    magistrate’s probable cause determination, we apply the deferential standard of
    11
    review set out by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    (1983). Swearingen v. State, 
    143 S.W.3d 808
    , 811 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004). Under that standard, we uphold the magistrate’s probable
    cause determination “so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . .
    conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.”            
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    , 103 S. Ct. at 2331 (internal citations omitted); see also State v.
    McLain, 
    337 S.W.3d 268
    , 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Flores v. State,
    
    319 S.W.3d 697
    , 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
    In performing our review, we interpret the affidavit supporting the warrant
    “in a commonsensical and realistic manner, recognizing that the magistrate may
    draw reasonable inferences.       When in doubt, we defer to all reasonable
    inferences that the magistrate could have made.”         
    McClain, 337 S.W.3d at 271
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The focus is not on what
    other facts could or should have been included in the affidavit; the focus is on the
    combined logical force of facts that are in the affidavit.”       State v. Duarte,
    
    389 S.W.3d 349
    , 354–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
    “[T]he Fourth Amendment strongly prefers searches to be conducted
    pursuant to search warrants.” 
    McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271
    . Therefore, “purely
    technical discrepancies in dates or times do not automatically vitiate the validity
    of search . . . warrants.” Green v. State, 
    799 S.W.2d 756
    , 759 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1990). Thus, we review technical defects under the totality-of-the-circumstances
    test enunciated in Gates.      462 U.S. at 
    236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331
    ; Green,
    
    12 799 S.W.2d at 757
    –58.       Due to the nature of these technical defects, parol
    evidence, in the form of explanatory testimony, may be used to cure them.
    
    Green, 799 S.W.2d at 760
    .
    C.      Regardless of the Legality of the Protective Sweep, the Gun Warrant
    and Drug Warrant Were Valid, and the Searches and Seizures of
    Evidence Pursuant to the Warrants Were Legal.
    We do not need to resolve the legality of the warrantless sweep of the
    house because, as we show below, the gun warrant and drug warrant were both
    valid and based on probable cause, and neither depended on information
    gleaned from the sweep. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Skyy, No. 02-17-00038-CR,
    slip op. at 7–11 (concluding same in dicta).
    1.    The Independent Source Doctrine Is an Exception to the
    Exclusionary Rule.
    Under the independent source doctrine—an exception to the exclusionary
    rule—evidence derived from or obtained from a lawful source, separate and apart
    from any illegal conduct by law enforcement, is not subject to exclusion. See
    Wehrenberg v. State (Wehrenberg I), 
    416 S.W.3d 458
    , 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2013).
    2.    The Gun Warrant Was Based on Probable Cause, Independent
    of the Sweep, and Valid.
    In his affidavit drafted to secure the gun warrant, Detective Jenkins stated
    that:
    •     Skyy had told him that Appellant took the gun from her when she
    tried to leave the house with it;
    13
    •      Appellant told another officer in a jailhouse interview that the gun
    “was in a small, cushioned[] bench at the foot of the bed in the
    master bedroom”; and
    •      Detective Jenkins had good reason to believe that the gun Appellant
    used or exhibited when allegedly committing aggravated assault with
    a deadly weapon of Skyy was in the residence.
    The affidavit therefore provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for
    concluding that the gun would be found in a search of the residence. See 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    , 103 S. Ct. at 2331; 
    McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271
    ; Skyy, slip op. at
    11.
    Further, nothing in the affidavit or gun warrant referred to information
    obtained during the sweep. See Wehrenberg v. State (Wehrenberg II), Nos. 02-
    11-00560-CR, 02-11-00561-CR, 
    2014 WL 890320
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    Mar. 6, 2014, pet. ref’d) (recognizing facts in affidavit were derived from a source
    independent of the police’s initial warrantless entry and upholding denial of
    suppression motion).
    Finally, regarding the apparent time discrepancy indicating that the
    magistrate issued the gun warrant almost an hour before seeing the affidavit
    supporting it, Detective Jenkins testified that he could not explain the apparent
    discrepancy but that he had presented the two documents to the magistrate at
    the same time and that he was present when the magistrate signed both
    documents.    The trial court found the officer credible.    Accordingly, the time
    discrepancy did nothing to invalidate the gun warrant. See 
    Green, 799 S.W.2d at 759
    –60; State v. Welborn, No. 02-14-00464-CR, 
    2015 WL 4599379
    , at *2 (Tex.
    14
    App.—Fort Worth July 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication), cert. denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 1672
    (2016).
    We therefore uphold the gun warrant.
    3.     The Gun and Marihuana Plants Seized Pursuant to the Gun
    Warrant Were Admissible.
    Detective Bill helped execute the gun warrant. During the search, he saw
    the marihuana growing and seized five marihuana plants. Appellant does not
    contest the trial court’s conclusion that the plants were in plain view. The officers
    also found and seized the gun.          Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, these
    discoveries pursuant to a valid warrant and the plain view exception, see State v.
    Dobbs, 
    323 S.W.3d 184
    , 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), were independent of the
    initial warrantless search, and the evidence was admissible. See Wehrenberg II,
    
    2014 WL 890320
    , at *2.
    4.     The Drug Warrant Was Based on Probable Cause, Independent
    of the Initial Sweep, and Valid.
    In his affidavit drafted to secure the drug warrant, Detective Bill stated that:
    •      During the execution of the gun search warrant, he had seen in the
    master bedroom “a large grow tent” containing five marihuana
    “plants in various stages of cultivation” and had seized them;
    •      He knew that the plants were marihuana plants because of his
    “training and experience as a police officer and . . . narcotics
    detective”;
    •      Based on his training and experience, he also knew that “the
    components of a marihuana growing operation include but are not
    limited to structural supports, high intensity lights, ballasts, tubs,
    water pumps, tubing/hoses, electrical timers, carbon dioxide
    15
    generators, fans, air filtration systems, grow media, measuring cups,
    and hydroponic nutrient formula/fertilizer”;
    •     “[I]t is typical for [marihuana] growers to have mari[h]uana packaged
    for delivery, as well as scales and currency from the sale of the
    mari[h]uana”; and
    •     He had good reason to believe that “more contraband” and “a
    quantity of mari[h]uana, materials, containers, or devices used in the
    packaging, cutting, weighing, [and] distribution of narcotics” could be
    found in the residence.
    Detective Bill’s affidavit provided the district judge sitting as a magistrate
    with a substantial basis for concluding that more contraband would be found in a
    search of the residence.    See 
    Gates, 462 U.S. at 236
    , 103 S. Ct. at 2331;
    
    McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271
    ; Skyy, slip op. at 11. Further, nothing in the affidavit
    or drug warrant referred to information obtained during the warrantless sweep.
    See Wehrenberg II, 
    2014 WL 890320
    , at *2.          We therefore uphold the drug
    warrant.
    5.    The Evidence Seized Pursuant to the Drug Warrant Was
    Admissible.
    During the execution of the drug warrant, the police discovered:
    •     Two pistols in the master bedroom;
    •     A large digital scale in the garage; and
    •     A large, locked Winchester safe bolted to the concrete in the garage.
    After the Arlington Fire Department opened the safe at the residence, the police
    found the following items inside:
    •     “[S]everal baggies of [a] crystal[-]like substance which . . . field-
    test[ed] . . . positive [for] methamphetamine[]”;
    16
    •     “[S]everal large jars of [a] green leafy substance” which appeared to
    be marihuana;
    •     “[A] large amount of US currency”; 4
    •     Small black scales;
    •     A black assault weapon with ammunition;
    •     A journal bearing the title, Marijuana Plant Journal; and
    •     Appellant’s and Skyy’s birth certificates.
    Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the police discovered all the evidence
    pursuant to a valid warrant, independent of the initial warrantless sweep, and the
    evidence, including the evidence Appellant argues should be suppressed, was
    admissible. See Wehrenberg II, 
    2014 WL 890320
    , at *2.
    D.    The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.
    To summarize, we have upheld the gun and drug warrants because the
    affidavits provided a substantial basis for the conclusion that the items sought
    could be found in the residence and because neither the affidavits nor the
    warrants relied on the initial, warrantless sweep of the residence. Because the
    gun warrant was proper, the gun was legally seized, and the marihuana plants
    were legally seen and seized during the gun warrant’s execution under the plain
    view doctrine. The marihuana plants found in the residence justified the drug
    warrant, under which the evidence Appellant specifically complains of—the
    4
    It is unclear from the record whether a “large quantity of green leafy
    substance” and a “large quantity of US currency” were found in a location in the
    residence in addition to the safe.
    17
    methamphetamine, the marihuana, and the money, was legally seized.         We
    therefore uphold the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress and
    overrule his sole point.
    VI.   CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Appellant’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /s/ Mark T. Pittman
    MARK T. PITTMAN
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; GABRIEL and PITTMAN, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: June 7, 2018
    18