Michael Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Nov 29 2017, 10:21 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas P. Keller Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Jackson, November 29, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1707-CR-1733
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D03-1604-F1-9
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Michael Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony battery
resulting in serious bodily injury;1 Level 1 felony rape;2 and Level 3 felony
criminal confinement.3 He argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 5 felony
battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 3 felony criminal
confinement violated the continuous crime doctrine; and (2) there was
insufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Because we conclude
that Jackson’s convictions did not violate the continuous crime doctrine and
because there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim of self-defense,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether Jackson’s convictions for Level 5 felony battery
resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 3 felony criminal
confinement violated the continuous crime doctrine.
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim
of self-defense.
1
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.
2
I.C. § 35-42-4-1.
3
I.C. § 35-42-3-3.
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Facts
[3] As of April 2016, Jackson had dated L.W. “off and on” for eight years,
although L.W. had also begun seeing another man. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12). On the
night of April 26, 2016, L.W. went to Jackson’s house so that they could talk.
At Jackson’s house, L.W. sat on the toilet in Jackson’s bathroom while he was
taking a bath so that she could keep him company. While they were talking,
Jackson brought up the topic of the other man L.W. was seeing. L.W. did not
want to discuss the other man with him, so she stood up to leave.
[4] At that point, Jackson got out of the tub and blocked the bathroom doorway so
that L.W. could not leave. L.W. asked Jackson to move, and he told her that
she “[was not] going anywhere until [she] answered all of [his] questions. . . .”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). L.W. asked again if she could leave, and he said “no,” so she
“got scared” and “started to cry and hyperventilate.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). L.W.
tried to push past Jackson, but he pushed her into the sink.
[5] At that point, L.W. saw that Jackson looked angry and “like he wanted to
fight,” so she drew her gun from its holster in her pants leg and pointed it at
him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). She asked Jackson again to move so that she could
leave, but he did not do so. Instead, he “rushed [her]” and grabbed her hands
so that they were both struggling over the gun. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). During this
struggle, the gun fell out of L.W.’s hands. She retrieved the gun and told
Jackson that she did not want any problems. She just wanted to go. Still,
Jackson “rushed [her]” again, and they got into another struggle over the gun.
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(Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). The gun again fell onto the ground, but L.W. retrieved it and
pointed it at Jackson.
[6] Jackson began to retreat slowly out of the bathroom, and L.W. reiterated that
she “[did not] want any trouble;” she “just want[ed] to go.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22).
However, as Jackson backed up, the clip fell out of L.W.’s gun. She “[dove]”
to the floor to pick it up. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). When she stood up, Jackson was
“coming for [her].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). L.W. tried to fire the gun, but it did not
fire. Jackson attacked her, and they began to struggle over the gun again. L.W.
dropped the gun onto the floor. She ran to the living room and attempted to
leave out the front door, but Jackson pulled her back by her hair as she was
unlocking the door. He threw L.W. onto the couch, jumped on top of her, and
choked her with both hands until she lost consciousness.
[7] L.W. then awoke to a “fiery sensation . . . like a fire [] burning through [her]
body.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). She jumped up, pushed Jackson off her, and again
tried to escape through the living room door. However, Jackson pulled her
back by her hair and started to drag her through the house. L.W. tried to stop
him by hanging onto a doorway, but he pulled her into a chokehold. L.W.
broke free, but Jackson rushed towards her and grabbed her hair again. L.W.
fell onto the floor and grabbed his testicles. In response, Jackson twisted L.W.’s
hand until it “snapped.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32).
[8] L.W. started to scream loudly for help, and Jackson dragged her by her hair to
the window so that he could shut the window. He then slammed L.W. against
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the floor, causing her to hit her head and become dizzy. He took her clothes off
and shoved his whole hand “forcefully” into her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). He
used so much force that he pushed L.W.’s body across the floor, causing L.W.
to lose consciousness again. When she regained consciousness, Jackson was
moving her gun in and out of her vagina, saying “[n]ow I’m fucking you with
your gun.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 36). After that, L.W. passed out again.
[9] L.W. awoke when Jackson poured water onto her face. The water caused her
to cough, choke, and throw up. Jackson got mad at her, saying “You already
peed on my floor and now you’re throwing up on my floor.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35-
36). He then dragged her by her hair to the bathroom and the toilet, where she
passed out again.
[10] Subsequently, Jackson took L.W. to the hospital. When L.W. awoke at the
hospital, she was not sure how she had arrived there. South Bend police officer
Mollie O’Blenis (“Officer O’Blenis”) spoke with L.W. and observed that she
had red marks around her neck, upper thigh, and back, was missing hair, and
had blood in her underwear. She also had a red stain on her right leg above her
knee, which Officer O’Blenis believed was blood. The hospital staff also
determined that she had a fractured hand and a small cut or tear in her labia
minora, which would have likely been caused by “fairly significant trauma.”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 84).
[11] When L.W. returned home from the hospital, she had a voicemail message
from Jackson’s roommate letting her know that her gun had been left in her
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backyard. She also received messages from Jackson on Facebook in the
following days. In the messages, Jackson admitted that “[t]hings went to[o]
far” and said, “MY SINCERE APOLOGIES!!!” (State’s Ex. 27) (emphasis in
original). He also offered multiple times to pay L.W.’s rent and said, “we don’t
need the police involved.” (State’s Ex. 27). At one point, he asked for her
lawyer’s number so that he could “know exactly what got to be said and done.”
(State’s Ex. 27).
[12] Detective Casey Hof with the South Bend Police Department investigated
L.W.’s sexual assault and found several red stains throughout Jackson’s home,
which she believed were blood. She tested a red stain on the carpet in the
hallway, and the sample tested presumptively positive for blood. She then sent
a piece of the carpet for DNA testing, and the State Police Laboratory
concluded that the DNA from the carpet was consistent with L.W.’s DNA.
Investigators also found L.W.’s DNA on the inside of the barrel of her gun.
[13] On April 28, 2016, the State charged Jackson with Count 1, Level 1 felony
rape; Count 2, Level 1 felony rape; Count 3, Level 3 felony criminal
confinement; and Count 4, Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily
injury. The trial court held a bench trial on March 20-21, 2017. At trial,
Jackson’s defense was that he had acted out of self-defense towards L.W. He
testified that she had pointed her gun at him after they had started to argue and
that they had then struggled over the gun. Jackson said that he had wrestled the
gun from L.W. through the struggle and had removed the gun’s clip and tossed
it backwards. However, at that point, according to Jackson, L.W. had run up
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to him and grabbed his testicles. Jackson admitted that he had then grabbed
L.W.’s hair, punched her in the face five or six times, choked her, banged her
head on the floor, and “punched her” in the vagina several times, but he
claimed that he had done so in order to make L.W. release his testicles. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 53). He denied that he had ever placed his hand or L.W.’s gun inside
of her vagina. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter
under advisement.
[14] Thereafter, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon
determining that Jackson was guilty of Level 5 felony battery resulting in
serious bodily injury as a lesser-included offense of the charged Level 1 felony
rape in Count 1; Level 1 felony rape in Count 2; and Level 3 felony criminal
confinement in Count 3. The trial court found Jackson not guilty of Level 5
felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury in Count 4; it concluded that the
continuous crime doctrine applied and that, therefore, Jackson could not be
convicted of two counts of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The
serious bodily injury underlying Jackson’s Count 1 conviction was L.W.’s
unconsciousness after Jackson punched her in the vagina. The serious bodily
injury used to enhance Jackson’s criminal confinement conviction to a Level 3
felony was L.W.’s broken wrist.
[15] The trial court concluded that the State had produced sufficient evidence to
rebut Jackson’s claim that he had acted in self-defense. It reasoned that, even if
Jackson had initially had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury when
L.W. pointed her gun at him, he had “stopped defending himself and actively
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engaged in combat” once the gun was “not in the picture” anymore. (App. Vol.
2 at 36). The trial court sentenced Jackson to three (3) years on Count 1,
twenty (20) years on Count 2, and nine (9) years on Count 3 and ordered the
sentences to run concurrently for an aggregate sentence of twenty (20) years.
Jackson now appeals.
Decision
[16] On appeal, Jackson argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 5 felony battery
resulting in serious bodily injury and criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony
violated the continuous crime doctrine; and (2) there was insufficient evidence
to rebut his claim of self-defense. We will address each of these arguments in
turn.
1. Continuous Crime Doctrine
[17] Jackson’s first argument is convoluted. He notes that the trial court found that
the continuous crime doctrine applied to his offenses, meaning that the offenses
were “compressed in terms of time and singleness of purpose and continuity of
action as to constitute a single transaction.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36) (citing Chavez v.
State, 988 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). The continuous
crime doctrine provides that, under such circumstances, a defendant cannot be
charged multiple times for the same offense. See Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216,
1220 (Ind. 2015). As Jackson notes, the trial court found him not guilty of
Count 4, battery resulting in serious bodily injury, based on the continuous
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crime doctrine, noting that it had found him guilty of battery resulting in serious
bodily injury as a lesser-included offense of his felony rape charge, in Count 1.
[18] Jackson now argues that the continuous crime doctrine also prohibited the trial
court from convicting him of two offenses based on L.W.’s serious bodily
injuries. Specifically, serious bodily injury was an element of Count 1, battery
resulting in serious bodily injury, and also an element used to enhance
Jackson’s criminal confinement conviction from a Level 5 felony to a Level 3
felony.4 Jackson argues that the criminal confinement enhancement was
prohibited under the continuous crime doctrine and that he should have been
convicted of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, instead.
[19] However, Jackson’s argument is based on a misinterpretation of the continuous
crime doctrine. In Hines, our supreme court clarified that the continuous crime
doctrine applies only where “a defendant has been charged multiple times with
the same offense.” 30 N.E.3d at 1220 (emphasis added). There, like here, the
defendant challenged his convictions for battery and criminal confinement. Id.
The supreme court noted that battery and criminal confinement were “two
distinct chargeable crimes to which the continuous crime doctrine [did] not
apply.” Id. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the defendant “was not
convicted of multiple charges of criminal confinement, nor multiple charges of
4
Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-42-3-3(b)(1), criminal confinement is a Level 5 felony if “it results in bodily
injury to a person other than the confining person.” The offense is a Level 3 felony if it “is committed while
armed with a deadly weapon” or “results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining
person.” I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(2).
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battery. Nor is battery a crime for which all of the elements necessary to
impose criminal liability are also elements found in Criminal Confinement, or
vice versa.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the continuous crime doctrine
did not apply. See id. Likewise, we find that the doctrine does not apply here.
Even though Jackson’s offenses had one element, serious bodily injury, in
common, they were distinct offenses.5
2. Sufficiency
[20] Next, Jackson argues that there was not sufficient evidence to rebut his claim
that he acted out of self-defense. A valid claim of self-defense is a legal
justification for an otherwise criminal act. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1137
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c) (providing that a person is
“justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the
person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the
imminent use of unlawful force”). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a
defendant must have: “(1) acted without fault; (2) been in a place where he or
she had a right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily
5
[1] Alternatively, the State interprets Jackson’s argument as a double jeopardy argument challenging the use of
the same injury—L.W.’s fractured wrist—to enhance two separate convictions. To the extent Jackson
intended to raise a double jeopardy argument, we find it waived for failure to state a cogent argument
because Jackson did not cite any legal authority to support such an argument. See Anderson v. State, 64
N.E.3d 903, 905 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue
on appeal.”). Waiver notwithstanding, a double jeopardy argument is equally unavailing. Serious bodily
injury was an element of Jackson’s convictions for both Count 1 and Count 3. However, the serious bodily
injury underlying Jackson’s Count 1 conviction was L.W.’s unconsciousness following his act of punching
her vagina. The serious bodily injury underlying his Count 3 conviction was her broken wrist bone.
Therefore, Jackson’s two convictions were not enhanced by the same serious bodily injury.
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harm.” King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
“‘Where a person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack[,] the
right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim
then becomes the perpetrator.’” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (quoting Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999)), trans. denied.
[21] When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the
State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. King, 61
N.E.3d at 1283. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense
directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or
by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the
State has met its burden is a question of fact for the fact-finder to determine.
Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137.
[22] Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
rebutting a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency
of the evidence claim. Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1136-37. We do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 1137. We consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that
support the verdict. King, 61 N.E.3d at 1283. If the defendant is convicted
despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable
person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
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[23] Here, the trial court found that, even if Jackson had initially had a reasonable
fear of death or bodily injury, he “could no longer argue that he had a
reasonable fear of death or of great bodily injury once the gun was not in the
picture.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36). Instead, “Jackson stopped defending himself and
actively engaged in combat.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36). For that reason, the trial
court concluded that Jackson’s self-defense claim had been rebutted.
[24] On appeal, Jackson disputes the trial court’s conclusion, arguing that he had a
reasonable fear of bodily injury after the gun disappeared because L.W. was
grabbing his testicles. He also argues that he did not use more force than
necessary because he did not use a deadly weapon to defend himself. We find
that these arguments are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not
do. See Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1136-37 (stating that we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). L.W. testified that, after she
tried to fire the gun, she dropped the gun during a struggle with Jackson and
attempted to run out the living room door. At that point, Jackson pulled her
back by her hair and choked her. She passed out and, after she woke up,
attempted to escape again. Jackson stopped her, grabbed her by her hair,
dragged her throughout the house by her hair, and put her into a chokehold.
These acts happened before L.W. tried to grab his testicles. Then, according to
L.W.’s testimony, Jackson “snapped” her hand so that it fractured, dragged her
by her hair again, shoved his whole hand into her vagina, and pushed her gun
in and out of her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32). This evidence more than supported
the trial court’s conclusion that after the gun disappeared, Jackson stopped
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defending himself and actively engaged in combat. Accordingly, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim of self-defense.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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