State v. Stebbins – Per Curiam – Affirmed – Saline ( 2023 )


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  •                           NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    No. 124,422
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
    STATE OF KANSAS,
    Appellee,
    v.
    HEATHER YVONNE STEBBINS,
    Appellant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appeal from Saline District Court; PATRICK H. THOMPSON, judge. Opinion filed February 17,
    2023. Affirmed.
    Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.
    Michael R. Serra, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
    Before ATCHESON, P.J., SCHROEDER and GARDNER, JJ.
    PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Heather Yvonne Stebbins of attempted aggravated
    robbery and criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Before sentencing,
    Stebbins moved for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence, as the witness
    who testified at trial that Stebbins had used a weapon later said she had not. But the
    district court denied that motion after an evidentiary hearing. Stebbins appeals the denial
    of her motion for a new trial. After review, we affirm the district court's decision.
    1
    Factual and Procedural Background
    We first review the evidence leading to Stebbins' convictions. In February 2020,
    Saline County law enforcement officers spoke with Stephanie Guntz and Kevin
    Fernandez, who said they were victims of an armed robbery. According to Guntz and
    Fernandez, they were traveling to Florida on a Greyhound bus when they were kicked off
    in Topeka, Kansas. Guntz telephoned their friend "Charlie," who lived in the area, and
    asked her for a ride to Salina so they could catch another bus at its Greyhound station.
    Charlie, in a car with her friend Darren Jackson, picked up Guntz and Fernandez.
    On the way to Salina, Charlie took a detour allegedly to visit her son's grave. But while
    out in the country, Charlie pulled over and stopped on a dirt road and another car pulled
    up behind them. Two men and one woman exited the rear vehicle, pulled Guntz and
    Fernandez out of the front vehicle at gunpoint, and stole $3,600 in cash from their bags.
    Guntz and Fernandez did not tell officers that the robbers also stole heroin from them.
    Neither Guntz nor Fernandez could describe the assailants in much detail, but
    Guntz described the woman as white and short with long, dark hair, and she described the
    gun pointed at her as black and silver, possibly a 9mm handgun. Saline County law
    enforcement suspected that "Charlie" was Kinnsley Mathews. They knew Mathews went
    by the nickname "Charlie" and had lost a child in 2019. During a later interview,
    Fernandez identified Mathews as "Charlie" from a photo lineup.
    Law enforcement officers interviewed Mathews in March 2020. During that
    interview, Mathews said the following. Guntz and Fernandez called her for a ride after
    they had been kicked off a Greyhound bus in Topeka. Mathews asked Jackson for help
    because he was the only person she knew that had a vehicle available that day. After
    Mathews and Jackson picked up Guntz and Fernandez, Jackson asked them about what
    belongings they had with them.
    2
    Mathews, who was driving, pulled the car to the side of the road and another
    vehicle driven by Jesse Rick soon pulled up behind them; Stebbins was a passenger in
    that car. Mathews saw Stebbins and Rick brandish firearms and order Guntz and
    Fernandez to get out. Jackson got out as well and participated in the aggravated robbery.
    Jackson then ordered Mathews to drive away, leaving Guntz and Fernandez on the side of
    the dirt road. Mathews did so because Jackson threatened to hurt her if she did not
    comply. Mathews recognized Stebbins because of a previous encounter with her and
    could identify Stebbins by her facial tattoo.
    Jackson and Stebbins were detained by officers but denied any knowledge of the
    robbery.
    Rick was also detained, but he gave a statement to law enforcement. He said
    Mathews and Jackson had traveled to Topeka to steal heroin from Guntz and Fernandez.
    On the way back to Salina, Mathews planned to stage a fight with Jackson to create a
    diversion so that Rick and Stebbins could take the heroin from Guntz and Fernandez.
    Rick was with Stebbins when Jackson called to tell them their location. Rick did not
    know whether Jackson and Stebbins got anything but heroin from the robbery. Rick said
    there was no "gun play" during the robbery, but he was unsure of what had occurred
    before he arrived.
    The State charged Stebbins with two counts of aggravated robbery for the theft of
    the currency from Guntz and Fernandez and one count of criminal possession of a firearm
    by a convicted felon.
    The trial
    At trial, the State presented testimony from Mathews and Rick. The State advised
    that Rick had agreed to testify for the State in exchange for a favorable plea deal and
    3
    without any immunity. Stebbins' counsel objected to Rick's late endorsement as a
    witness, arguing that he had changed his account of events. When Rick first spoke with
    officers, he denied that firearms had been used in the robbery. But contrary to that
    statement, Rick now planned to testify that firearms had been used in the robbery.
    Over Stebbins' objection, Rick was endorsed as a witness and testified at trial.
    Rick testified that he and Stebbins had traveled to the area of the cemetery where
    Mathews' child was buried. While there, he got a text from Mathews or Jackson that the
    man in the back seat of that car had the heroin. Rick approached the driver's side rear
    door of Mathews' vehicle with his gun drawn while Stebbins approached the passenger
    rear door with her gun drawn. Rick believed the stolen heroin was given to Mathews.
    Once back in Salina, Mathews, Jackson, Stebbins, Stebbins' boyfriend, and Rick split up
    the heroin.
    Rick testified that his testimony was in exchange for a favorable plea bargain, but
    that the State had not coerced him to testify and that his testimony was truthful. On cross-
    examination, Rick admitted that he had offered information to officers to try to stay out
    of jail, that he had first told officers no firearms were involved in the robbery, and that
    the robbery was a set up between Mathews and Jackson.
    Deputy Craig Norris of the Saline County Sheriff's Office testified as to events
    after the robbery. When he conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Stebbins was a
    passenger, after she was suspected of the robbery, a Bersa Thunder .380 semiautomatic
    handgun and five rounds of ammunition were found inside her purse underneath her seat.
    She was then arrested.
    The State also presented evidence from a cell phone in Rick's apartment showing
    contacts with "Heather" and "Darrin" on the day of the robbery. Rick later identified this
    4
    phone as his. That phone's location data also showed the phone had been taken from
    Rick's apartment to the general location of the area where the robbery occurred.
    Similarly, the State also introduced data from Jackson's cell phone. That evidence
    showed multiple calls to Stebbins, Rick, and Mathews on the date of the robbery.
    Jackson's cell phone records also showed he had traveled from Salina, to Topeka, and
    then back to Salina that day. And after the robbery, Jackson sent messages advertising
    heroin for sale.
    Mathews also testified. She said she immediately recognized Rick and Stebbins as
    they exited the car that had pulled up behind hers. She then saw Rick and Stebbins
    approaching her car with "guns drawn." When shown the gun seized from Stebbins,
    Mathews said it looked like the gun Stebbins had used in the robbery, but she could not
    be certain it was the same one. Drugs and money were stolen from Guntz and Fernandez,
    and when she returned to Rick's apartment she saw Stebbins, Rick, and Jackson weigh
    and divide the heroin.
    The jury ultimately convicted Stebbins of one count of attempted aggravated
    robbery (a lesser included offense of her original charge of aggravated robbery) and
    criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury acquitted her of a second
    count of aggravated robbery.
    Posttrial events
    After trial, Stebbins moved for a new trial based on a Facebook message Rick sent
    to Marcus Vineyard after Stebbins' trial. That message said: "[T]he county attorney told
    me if I don't change my story and that guns were involved then [I'm] not getting any deal
    and I have to go to trial." Stebbins argued this proved Rick perjured himself during trial,
    warranting a new trial. The State objected to Stebbins' motion.
    5
    The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Stebbins' motion. When the
    defense called Rick to testify, he confirmed that
    • when he was arrested, he had offered to provide information to law enforcement
    to stay out of jail;
    • he had initially told police that no firearms were used in the robbery;
    • he had later told the prosecutor during plea negotiations that he and Stebbins had
    used firearms; and
    • he had sent the Facebook message to Vineyard "within days" of the trial.
    The Facebook message was admitted without objection.
    When Stebbins' counsel asked Rick if he had been told he had to testify that guns
    were involved in the robbery to receive a favorable plea agreement, Rick responded he
    was told, "I have to tell the truth, is what I'm told—was told." During cross-examination,
    Rick maintained that his statements during Stebbins' trial were truthful and were not the
    product of coercion by the State. When asked why he sent the Facebook message to
    Vineyard, Rick replied, "To ease the blow to my reputation." Rick confirmed that the
    Facebook message was not true and that he had sent it so Vineyard would not think that
    he was a "rat." Rick also testified that he had not discussed with the prosecutor what he
    would say at the hearing on the motion for a new trial.
    Stebbins also testified. She claimed:
    • Shortly before the hearing, she had met with Rick at his request;
    • Rick then told her his message to Vineyard was true and he was just trying to
    make things right;
    • a friend heard that conversation but was not called to testify;
    6
    • Rick was "petrified" that his plea agreement would be revoked;
    • the prosecution had pressured Rick to say firearms were used; and
    • Rick had spoken with the prosecution after Stebbins moved for a new trial.
    The district court's decision
    After considering the evidence at trial and at the hearing on the motion, the district
    court denied Stebbins' motion for a new trial. It found:
    • Rick had been questioned extensively during trial by both counsel about his
    history of statements and his negotiations with the State;
    • the jury heard about the inconsistencies between Rick's initial statements to law
    enforcement and his trial testimony, as well as the last-minute timing of his plea
    agreement and the circumstances surrounding it; and
    • the jury could fairly assess Rick's credibility—balancing his plea agreement and
    his testimony—based on the evidence presented at trial.
    The district court elaborated on Rick's motive to change his story and on the
    credibility of his testimony:
    "Mr. Rick's [sic] testified here this morning that he testified truthfully at trial. The
    county attorney had not told him that he had to say guns were involved to get his deal.
    That he was told to tell the truth, and that's what he testified to at trial, was the agreement
    with [the prosecutor's] office.
    "Also, as he testified, there was plenty of motivation for him to try to say
    something else to his friends after he testified at trial. He had been labeled a rat. And in
    the world Mr. Rick operates in, that's not a label you want. He was trying to repair his
    reputation. The message wasn't true. And the Court finds that testimony totally credible.
    This Court's going to find that the message that was given by Mr. Rick to Mr. Vineyard
    7
    was, in fact, just that: An attempt to repair his reputation that he did testify truthfully at
    trial."
    The district court also noted that Stebbins' convictions were not solely the product
    of Rick's testimony. Rather, "[t]he phone records, the phone data, the later divvying up of
    the drug[s], the firearm found under Ms. Stebbins seat when she was arrested, [and] the
    video of the defendant with her conversation from the jail regarding weapons being
    seized" all contributed to her convictions.
    The district court then sentenced Stebbins to a controlling sentence of 120 months'
    imprisonment, denying her requests for downward durational and dispositional
    departures.
    Stebbins now appeals the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial.
    Did the District Court Err in Denying Stebbins' Motion for a New Trial?
    On appeal, Stebbins argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her
    motion for a new trial based on new evidence. She argues that Rick's posttrial Facebook
    message was unavailable at trial and gives rise to a reasonable probability that a new jury
    would render a different verdict if presented with this evidence. The State argues that the
    district court did not err in denying Stebbins' motion for two reasons. First, the district
    court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and it found the
    Facebook message was not credible. Second, even if the message were credible, it is
    merely impeachment or credibility evidence, which is not grounds for a new trial.
    We review an order denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
    evidence for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion if there is an error of law
    or fact or the action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. State v. Ashley, 
    306 Kan. 642
    ,
    8
    650, 
    396 P.3d 92
     (2017). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, if a reasonable person
    could agree with the district court's decision, it will not be disturbed on appeal." State v.
    Moncla, 
    273 Kan. 856
    , 861, 
    46 P.3d 1162
     (2002). As the party asserting the error,
    Stebbins bears the burden to show the district court abused its discretion in denying her
    motion for a new trial. See Ashley, 306 Kan. at 650.
    A successful motion for a new trial must establish two factors: "(1) that the newly
    proffered evidence could not have been produced at trial with reasonable diligence; and
    (2) that the newly discovered evidence is of such materiality that it would be likely to
    produce a different result upon retrial." 306 Kan. at 650.
    As to the first factor, the district court found that the Facebook message was newly
    discovered evidence. We agree—the record shows that the Facebook message was not
    created or sent until after trial, so it could not have been produced at trial with reasonable
    diligence.
    The parties focus their arguments on the second factor—whether the Facebook
    message was so material that it would be likely to produce a different verdict. Newly
    discovered evidence is considered material only if "there is a reasonable probability that,
    had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different." See State v. Warrior, 
    294 Kan. 484
    , Syl. ¶ 11, 
    277 P.3d 1111
     (2012).
    When determining the materiality of the new evidence, the district court judge "must
    assess the credibility of the newly proffered evidence, and the appellate court will not
    reassess the district judge's determination of credibility from such a hearing." Ashley, 306
    Kan. at 650 (citing State v. Warren, 
    302 Kan. 601
    , 615-16, 
    356 P.3d 396
     [2015]).
    "[N]ewly discovered evidence that merely tends to impeach or discredit the
    testimony of a witness is ordinarily not grounds for granting a new trial. State v. Richard,
    
    235 Kan. 355
    , 363, 
    681 P.2d 612
     (1984); State v. Foy, 
    224 Kan. 558
    , 569, 
    582 P.2d 281
    9
    (1978)." Ashley, 306 Kan. at 650. And "[e]ven when the evidence tends to impeach the
    testimony of a witness, the presence or absence of corroborating evidence is an additional
    factor to consider in determining whether newly discovered evidence is so material that it
    is likely to produce a different result upon retrial." 306 Kan. at 650.
    Several reasons convince us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying the motion for new trial. First, the district court determined that the newly
    discovered evidence was not credible enough to warrant a new trial. Rick testified that
    the Facebook message was false, and the district court explicitly found Rick's testimony
    and explanation of its falsity to be credible. This finding stemmed from the court's
    observations of Rick's testimony at trial and at the motion's evidentiary hearing. In
    explaining its credibility determination, the district court stated: "[Rick] had been labeled
    a rat. And in the world Mr. Rick operates in, that's not a label you want. He was trying to
    repair his reputation. The message wasn't true. And the Court finds that testimony totally
    credible." This court will not reassess the district judge's determination of credibility from
    the evidentiary hearing. Warren, 302 Kan. at 615-16; see State v. Ayadi, 
    16 Kan. App. 2d 596
    , 602, 
    830 P.2d 1210
     (1991) (holding that credibility of newly discovered evidence
    offered in support of motion for new trial is for district court's determination).
    Second, the only value of the Facebook message is to impeach or discredit Rick's
    testimony, yet that is generally not grounds for a new trial. See Ashley, 306 Kan. at 650
    ("This court has held that newly discovered evidence that merely tends to impeach or
    discredit the testimony of a witness is ordinarily not grounds for granting a new trial.");
    see also Richard, 
    235 Kan. at 364
     ("A new trial is not granted on the basis of newly
    discovered evidence which merely tends to impeach or discredit the testimony of a
    witness."). This evidence went straight to Rick's motive, and thus his credibility, in his
    trial testimony that firearms were involved in the robbery. See Warren, 302 Kan. at 616
    (stating, "evidence of bias and motive is a valid method of attacking credibility").
    10
    Third, in determining materiality, we consider any corroborating evidence of the
    crucial facts. Ashley, 306 Kan. at 650.
    "Even when the evidence tends to impeach the testimony of a witness, the presence or
    absence of corroborating evidence is an additional factor to consider in determining
    whether newly discovered evidence is so material that it is likely to produce a different
    result upon retrial. State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 
    295 Kan. 525
    , 540, 
    285 P.3d 361
     (2012)."
    306 Kan. at 650.
    We thus consider any corroborating evidence that guns were used in the robbery.
    Mathews testified that both Rick and Stebbins used firearms during the robbery, and this
    was consistent with her initial statements to law enforcement. The State also admitted
    evidence of the phone records, the phone data, the later divvying up of the drugs, the
    firearm found in Stebbins' purse when she was arrested, and the video of the defendant
    with her conversation from the jail regarding weapons being seized to corroborate Rick's
    and Mathews' testimony. Thus, Rick's testimony was not the sole evidence leading to
    Stebbins' convictions. The corroborating evidence that Stebbins used a firearm lessens
    the materiality of Rick's Facebook message.
    Rick's Facebook message, although newly discovered evidence, is not so material
    that it would be likely to produce a different result upon retrial. For these reasons, we find
    no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Stebbins' motion for a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    11