Jones v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections (Previously filed February 26, 2016 as an unpublished opinion) ( 2016 )


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  •                                       No. 113,270¹
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
    MILO A. JONES,
    Appellant,
    v.
    KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and
    KANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Appellees.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.
    The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes suing a state
    in federal court for money that would be paid from the state treasury based on the past
    conduct of state officials. This is a form of sovereign immunity, under which the
    government cannot be sued without its consent.
    2.
    For some purposes, the State of Kansas has waived its sovereign immunity
    through the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., which generally makes
    Kansas governmental entities liable for damages caused by negligent and wrongful acts
    of their employees acting within the scope of their employment, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 75-
    6103, and protects employees against financial liability for damages caused by their
    actions. K.S.A. 75-6109. But the State of Kansas has not waived its sovereign immunity
    under the Eleventh Amendment through the Kansas Tort Claims Act. See K.S.A. 75-
    6116(g).
    3.
    In this case, the plaintiff, a Kansas prison inmate, obtained a money judgment in
    federal court against a former prison guard for violation of the prisoner's federal civil
    rights. When the plaintiff couldn't collect that judgment because he couldn't locate the
    former guard or any of the guard's assets, he filed the federal judgment against the guard
    in Kansas state court and attempted to collect it against the guard's employer, the Kansas
    Department of Corrections. He cannot do so because the claim arose under federal law,
    Kansas was immune from suit in federal court for that claim, and Kansas has not waived
    its sovereign immunity.
    Appeal from Leavenworth District Court; GUNNAR A. SUNDBY, judge. Opinion filed February
    26, 2016. Affirmed.
    Milo A. Jones, appellant pro se.
    John Wesley Smith, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellees.
    Before MALONE, C.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.
    LEBEN, J.: Milo Jones, a Kansas prison inmate, obtained a money judgment in
    federal court against a former prison guard. Jones wasn't able to collect any of his
    judgment, though, because he wasn't able to locate the former guard or any of that guard's
    assets.
    So Jones has tried to collect the judgment against the Kansas Department of
    Corrections, the state agency that had employed the guard. Jones first tried to do that in
    federal court, but his claim against the state agency was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction:
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Eleventh
    Amendment to the United States Constitution prevented a federal court from entering a
    money judgment against the State for the past conduct of its employees. See Jones v.
    2
    Courtney, 466 Fed. Appx. 696 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing claim
    against the State for lack of jurisdiction); Jones v. Courtney, No. 04-3255-JWL-DJW,
    
    2007 WL 2893587
    (D. Kan. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (granting judgment in favor of
    Jones and against former prison guard). After the federal court dismissed his claim
    against the State, Jones brought suit in the Kansas state court, again trying to collect his
    judgment against the Kansas Department of Corrections, a state agency.
    The state district court also dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction, although it
    didn't explain the basis for its decision. While an explanation would have been helpful,
    the question is a purely legal one, so we must review it independently anyway, without
    any required deference to the district court. See Frazier v. Goudschaal, 
    296 Kan. 730
    ,
    743, 
    295 P.3d 542
    (2013). The State of Kansas argues on appeal here that the district
    court correctly dismissed Jones' claim against it because the State has sovereign
    immunity against his claim under the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically determining
    whether the State is immune also presents a solely legal question, see Cessna Aircraft Co.
    v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority, 
    23 Kan. App. 2d 1038
    , 1045-46, 
    940 P.2d 84
    ,
    rev. denied 
    262 Kan. 959
    (1997), and if it is immune, a court does not have jurisdiction to
    address the claim. See Goldbarth v. Kansas State Board of Regents, 
    269 Kan. 881
    , 894, 
    9 P.3d 1251
    (2000); Jones, 466 Fed. Appx. at 698-99.
    Jones' judgment against the prison guard came on a civil-rights claim under a
    federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Neither the Kansas Department of Corrections
    nor the State of Kansas was a defendant in the federal lawsuit. In fact, they couldn't have
    been because the Eleventh Amendment precludes suing a state in federal court for money
    that would be paid from the state treasury based on the past conduct of state officials. See
    Edelman v. Jordan, 
    415 U.S. 651
    , 662-63, 
    94 S. Ct. 1347
    , 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 662
    (1974);
    Jones, 466 Fed. Appx. at 698-701.
    3
    Even so, Jones argues that he can now collect the federal-court judgment against
    the State in state court. He contends that the State isn't immune because he brought his
    claim as one for mandamus, an action that compels an official to carry out a clearly
    defined duty. He also argues that the State has agreed in the Kansas Tort Claims Act to
    "indemnify its employees against damages . . . caused by an act or omission of an
    employee while acting within the scope of his or her employment." K.S.A. 75-6109. We
    disagree.
    First, Jones isn't trying to get a public official to carry out some general duty of his
    or her job—he's trying to get the State to pay a money judgment obtained based on the
    past conduct of a state employee. That's exactly the sort of liability the State has
    immunity from under the Eleventh Amendment. See 
    Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663
    ("[A] suit
    by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in
    the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."); Jones, 466 Fed. Appx. at 699.
    The State wasn't a party to the federal lawsuit in which Jones obtained his judgment, and
    the federal court had no power to grant a judgment against the State on Jones' claim. It
    stands to reason, then, that filing Jones' federal-court judgment in a state court cannot
    magically transform it into a judgment payable by the State.
    Second, the State has not waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
    Amendment. Another provision of the Kansas Tort Claims Act—not cited by Jones—
    provides that "[n]othing . . . in the Kansas tort claims act shall be construed as a waiver
    by the state of Kansas of immunity from suit under the 11th amendment to the
    constitution of the United States." K.S.A. 75-6116(g). See Connelly v. Kansas Highway
    Patrol, 
    271 Kan. 944
    , 962, 
    26 P.3d 1246
    (2001) (noting that the State has not waived its
    sovereign immunity from suits seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
    (citing Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 
    241 Kan. 13
    , 21, 
    735 P.2d 222
    [1987]).
    4
    Third, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that the State of Kansas has sovereign
    immunity from claims by individuals based on federal law even when the claims are
    brought in state court. 
    Connelly, 271 Kan. at 961
    ; Schall v. Wichita State University, 
    269 Kan. 456
    , 466, 
    7 P.3d 1144
    (2000). Thus, even if Jones would have initially brought his
    claims in state court and attempted to include the State as a defendant, even a state court
    would not have had jurisdiction to enter a judgment on this claim against the State. While
    the State can waive immunity, 
    Schall, 269 Kan. at 466
    , Jones' waiver claim is based on
    K.S.A. 75-6109. As we've already noted, that provision of the Kansas Tort Claims Act
    doesn't serve to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See K.S.A. 75-6116(g).
    In sum, Jones has a valid federal judgment against the former prison guard. He
    was entitled to that judgment and had the right to collect it. What he does not have is a
    claim that can be presented in state court to have the State of Kansas pay that claim: The
    State has not waived its sovereign immunity.
    We therefore affirm the district court's judgment, which dismissed Jones' claim for
    lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    ¹REPORTER'S NOTE: Previously filed as an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court
    granted a motion to publish pursuant to Rule 7.04 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 64). The
    published version was filed with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts on August 3, 2016.
    5