State v. G.O. ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                           NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    No. 124,676
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
    STATE OF KANSAS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    G.O.,
    Appellee.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appeal from Shawnee District Court; NANCY E. PARRISH, judge. Opinion filed September 23,
    2022. Reversed and remanded.
    Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.
    Reid T. Nelson, of Capital and Conflicts Appeals Office, for appellee.
    Before HURST, P.J., BRUNS and GARDNER, JJ.
    PER CURIAM: This case comes before the court on the State's interlocutory appeal,
    challenging the district court's decision to suppress G.O.'s confession to having sexually
    abused his stepsister. As the district court noted, the determination whether G.O.'s
    confession was voluntary is a close question. But having examined the totality of the
    circumstances and finding no coercion by the police officer, we reverse.
    1
    Initiation of Police Investigation and DCF Involvement.
    In 2017, G.O.'s stepsister reported allegations of sexual abuse by G.O., which had
    occurred over years. Stepsister initially disclosed the abuse to the KVC Kansas Health
    Facility, which referred the matter to the Kansas Department for Children and Families
    (DCF). KVC and DCF then separately contacted G.O.'s mother to discuss the matter.
    DCF told Mother that she needed to remove G.O. from the family's home before
    Stepsister returned from KVC, and Mother did so. DCF set a goal of reintegration for the
    family, and later met with Mother, Stepsister, and G.O.'s stepfather for weekly counseling
    sessions. DCF also told Mother that the family "needed to be interviewed" and that
    someone would be reaching out to her to set that up.
    Sergeant Ryan Hayden contacted Mother and eventually interviewed each family
    member separately. Based on her conversations with DCF, Mother believed that these
    interviews were required, so she told G.O. he had to meet with Hayden.
    Hayden's 2017 Interview with G.O.
    After discussing a plan with Hayden, Mother drove G.O. to the police station for
    his interview. Once there, Mother asked if she could sit in on the interview, but Hayden
    told her she should wait in the lobby. He then took G.O. to a separate room.
    While walking into the interview room, Hayden asked G.O. if he needed a
    restroom break or a drink; G.O. declined both. Hayden stated that he hoped the interview
    would not take very long and told G.O. he would get him back to school when the
    interview was finished. Hayden introduced himself as "Detective Hayden," and explained
    that he had been a police officer for around 15 years and that he worked with children,
    but typically worked with "young young kids."
    2
    Hayden assured G.O.: "You are not under arrest. You're not going to be under
    arrest when we're done." G.O. agreed that his Mother had told him so and confirmed that
    he knew he would not be arrested. Hayden then suggested that G.O. was summoned to
    the police station to "get some stuff cleared up." Hayden also stated that he was "just
    trying to clear some things up for [G.O.] and [his] sister," but "especially [his] sister"
    because she "was kinda hurting" at that time. Hayden suggested that if they could get
    things cleared up, it would help everyone out. He explained that "this [was not] about
    getting people in trouble, [it was] about trying to fix some things . . . [s]o [they could] all
    move on." Hayden made similar statements about the need to help Stepsister at other
    times during the interview.
    Hayden then repeated that G.O. was not under arrest and would not be under arrest
    when they were done. Yet he noted that they were sitting in an interrogation room, he
    read G.O. his Miranda warnings, and he asked if G.O. understood his rights. G.O.
    responded that he did.
    G.O. answered a few questions about himself, explaining he was in the 11th grade,
    had good grades, played the violin, enjoyed technology, and wanted to attend Washburn
    University. G.O. also acknowledged that Stepsister was hurting "big time" and told
    Hayden that he wanted her to get better.
    Without any prompting or question by Hayden, G.O. then started discussing the
    topic of sexual abuse. He stated that he lived in the basement, that Stepsister would come
    downstairs, that she had issues with Mother, and that he was just trying to make things
    better, but it "went downhill." He admitted to sexually abusing Stepsister and suggesting
    that his actions may have stemmed from his past, saying he had been abused when young
    by his babysitter's son. G.O. explained that his abuser would take him to a bedroom, lock
    the door, and then force him to engage in various sex acts.
    3
    Before asking G.O. for details, Hayden assured G.O. that he could speak freely
    when discussing the sexual abuse that he had committed. Hayden told G.O. that any
    information he was likely to relay was not going to be new or shocking to him. At the
    same time, however, Hayden warned G.O. that the nature of their interview could change
    if G.O. lied or failed to provide pertinent information. Hayden told G.O. that he would no
    longer have "control" over what may happen if G.O. failed to tell the truth. Hayden told
    G.O. that Mother had told him that G.O. wanted to get things off his chest.
    G.O. gave detailed descriptions of several instances in which he sexually abused
    Stepsister. G.O. told Hayden that he understood Stepsister was probably not a willing
    participant when the abuse first started. G.O. also acknowledged that he probably
    persuaded Stepsister to do what he wanted, and she may have gotten used to it as time
    progressed. G.O. also claimed that if Stepsister asked to him to stop mid act, he complied.
    G.O. also claimed that he had not engaged in any sexual behavior with Stepsister for the
    most recent two years, and Stepsister had instigated the final incident.
    When Hayden asked G.O. whether he had threatened Stepsister, he responded that
    he was pretty sure he had not, unless he forgot it. But G.O. then admitted he had probably
    threatened her near the beginning because he did not want her to tell. He added that
    if Stepsister said something happened, she was probably "right." G.O. also told Hayden
    that if he had threatened Stepsister, he never intended to harm her and felt "terrible" about
    what he had done.
    Hayden also asked G.O. about Stepsister's relationship with Mother and his
    relationship with Stepfather. This resulted in another lengthy response from G.O. He
    noted that Stepsister had previously accused Mother of physical abuse, but he said no
    such abuse occurred. G.O. described his relationship with Stepfather as being "very
    awkward" after Stepsister's allegations arose. But G.O. noted that he had been removed
    from the house and was thus not interacting with Stepfather much. G.O. then stated that
    4
    all he wanted to do was to "go home" and to get everything "done and over with" and
    "cleared up." G.O. then volunteered that he had locked himself in a closet, had many
    anxiety and panic attacks, that he takes medication to deal with his anxiety issues, and
    that he is in therapy at DCF bi-weekly. Hayden acknowledged these statements before
    redirecting the conversation to additional details of the alleged abuse.
    Before ending the interview, Hayden asked G.O. whether they had missed
    anything. G.O. thought that they had covered everything but asked if Stepsister had
    talked about anything else. Hayden then asked G.O. whether he wanted to write
    Stepsister a note. G.O. responded with a third lengthy discourse, talking about his "very
    large-scale anxiety attack," after his acts with Stepsister were revealed. Apparently when
    he locked himself in the closet, he wrote a note to Stepsister and notes to Mother and
    Stepfather and pushed them under the door to Mother. To Stepsister, he wrote that he was
    sorry and she did not deserve what happened to her. To the others, he wrote that he had
    not wanted them to find out, but he had tried to help Stepsister to make it better. He did
    not write details and was unsure whether Mother knew he had had sex with Stepsister.
    Hayden then asked again if G.O. wanted to write notes today, and G.O. decided
    not to. G.O. gave Hayden permission to get his previous notes from Mother and said that
    he might write another note in the future. Hayden left G.O. alone in the interview room,
    asked Mother about the apology letter, then returned to the interview a few minutes later
    and escorted G.O. back to the lobby. Hayden did not arrest G.O. that day. In fact, no one
    arrested him until over two years later.
    Initiation of a Criminal Case and Plea Negotiations
    The State charged G.O. in August 2019 with one count of aggravated criminal
    sodomy and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court
    allowed the State to prosecute G.O. as an adult. G.O. later pleaded guilty to criminal
    5
    sodomy, and the State dismissed the remaining count of aggravated indecent liberties
    with a child. The parties agreed to leave G.O.'s recommended sentence open for
    arguments.
    But before sentencing, G.O. moved for a downward dispositional departure. And
    soon after, G.O. moved to withdraw his plea, arguing defense counsel had incorrectly
    told him that he could request a dispositional departure sentence despite K.S.A. 2021
    Supp. 21-6818(a)'s prohibition of such a request. G.O. also moved to withdraw his waiver
    of his preliminary hearing. The district court granted G.O.'s motion, withdrew his plea,
    and set the case for pretrial.
    As pretrial progressed, the State filed an amended and second amended complaint.
    The State charged G.O. with 60 offenses, including multiple counts of aggravated
    criminal sodomy, rape, attempted rape, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child.
    The complaint alleged that G.O. had committed these offenses over a 4-year span when
    he was under 18 and Stepsister was under 14 years old.
    Suppression Proceedings
    G.O. moved to suppress his incriminating statements, arguing he made them
    involuntarily in reaction to Hayden's coercive conduct.
    At the suppression hearing, the State admitted testimony from Hayden and the
    video of his interview with G.O. Hayden testified, and the video confirms, that the overall
    nature of the interview was relaxed and Hayden's tone was cordial. G.O. came and left
    with his Mother, who stayed in the police station lobby during the interview. She had told
    Hayden that G.O. wanted to get something off his chest. Hayden gave Miranda warnings
    to G.O. and G.O. said he understood them. G.O. never invoked his right to stop
    questioning or to have a lawyer present. The interview of G.O. lasted around 50 minutes,
    6
    and they did not take any breaks. Hayden was the only officer in the room; he had his
    firearm but never drew it. G.O. seemed to understand Hayden's questions and gave
    appropriate responses. G.O. did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or
    alcohol.
    G.O. called Mother as his only witness at the suppression hearing. She testified
    that G.O. was 16 years old when he was interviewed and was less mature than his peers.
    He had a mild learning disability but was likely to graduate on time because he was in the
    alternate education program then and getting good grades. G.O. had played the violin
    from 4th grade through his senior year. She considered him "not college material," and
    discounted his college plans. G.O. had never been arrested and had no prior interactions
    with police. He had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and attention deficit
    disorder, and was taking medications for at least one of those disorders when
    interviewed.
    In his closing argument, G.O. claimed that his mental state, age, intellect, and
    background—including his lack of interactions with police and his history of sexual
    abuse—affected his ability to make a voluntary confession. G.O. argued that Hayden
    gave inadequate Miranda warnings because he did not explain the warnings or ask G.O.
    whether he wished to waive his rights and speak to him. And Hayden should have asked
    G.O. about his state of mind or medications that day. He also argued that Hayden's
    repeated statements that he would not be arrested amounted to an improper promise that
    Hayden should have known would induce an involuntary confession from an
    inexperienced 16-year-old.
    District Court Decision and Interlocutory Appeal
    The district court found G.O.'s motion raised "a very close question" but after
    considering the evidence, determined that G.O.'s statements were involuntary and thus
    7
    inadmissible. The district court found that G.O.'s mental condition, lack of experience
    with police, and understanding that the interview would be used only to help Stepsister
    warranted suppression.
    The district court also acknowledged G.O.'s additional request to suppress the
    apology notes G.O. had written and that Mother had delivered to Hayden—which G.O.
    added to his motion the day of the suppression hearing. But the court did not rule on that
    matter to allow the State time to file a response.
    The State filed a timely interlocutory appeal from the district court's suppression
    order, as allowed under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3603.
    Did the District Court Err in Granting G.O.'s Motion to Suppress His Incriminating
    Statements?
    When a defendant moves to suppress incriminating statements as involuntary, the
    State bears the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements
    were freely and voluntarily given. We determine the voluntariness of a confession by
    looking at the totality of the circumstances. State v. Johnson, 
    286 Kan. 824
    , 836, 
    190 P.3d 207
     (2008).
    An individual's statement to government agents is involuntary if it is the product
    of impermissible coercion negating that person's free will. See State v. Gilliland, 
    294 Kan. 519
    , Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 
    276 P.3d 165
     (2012); State v. Stone, 
    291 Kan. 13
    , 21, 
    237 P.3d 1229
     (2010). Application of the exclusionary rule depends on whether "[t]he line between
    proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due
    process" has been crossed. Haynes v. Washington, 
    373 U.S. 503
    , 515, 
    83 S. Ct. 1336
    , 
    10 L. Ed. 2d 513
     (1963). As the United States Supreme Court clarified in Colorado v.
    Connelly, 
    479 U.S. 157
    , 164, 
    107 S. Ct. 515
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 473
     (1986), "police
    8
    overreaching" is an "integral element" to finding a confession involuntary under the Due
    Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
    Supreme Court has never repudiated or limited its holding in Connelly, nor is that holding
    an outlier. In discussing the test for whether a confession has been coerced in violation of
    a suspect's due-process rights, the Court has pointed to "the crucial element of police
    coercion." Withrow v. Williams, 
    507 U.S. 680
    , 693, 
    113 S. Ct. 1745
    , 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 407
    (1993).
    Our appellate courts have recognized Connelly as controlling precedent and have
    found coercion is necessary to find a confession involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Barrett,
    
    309 Kan. 1029
    , 1044, 
    442 P.3d 492
     (2019); State v. Kirkland, No. 122,971, 
    2022 WL 68579
    , at *10 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). "Coercion in obtaining a
    confession can be mental or physical." State v. Jackson, 
    280 Kan. 16
    , 36, 
    118 P.3d 1238
    (2005). A government agent may induce an involuntary statement through improper
    threats of harm, promises of benefit, a combination of the two, or other undue influence
    over the individual. Hutto v. Ross, 
    429 U.S. 28
    , 30, 
    97 S. Ct. 202
    , 
    50 L. Ed. 2d 194
    (1976); State v. Brown, 
    286 Kan. 170
    , 174, 
    182 P.3d 1205
     (2008).
    When deciding whether to suppress, trial courts consider the totality of the
    circumstances and the following nonexclusive factors: (1) defendant's mental condition;
    (2) the interview's manner and duration; (3) defendant's ability to communicate on
    request with the outside world; (4) defendant's age, intellect, and background; (5) the
    officer's fairness in conducting the interview; and (6) defendant's fluency with the
    English language. State v. Vonachen, 
    312 Kan. 451
    , 464, 
    476 P.3d 774
     (2020).
    In addition, our caselaw "recognizes a heightened sensitivity when the accused is a
    juvenile." State v. Gibson, 
    299 Kan. 207
    , 215, 
    322 P.3d 389
     (2014). "A juvenile's
    inculpatory statement must be voluntary and free from coercion or suggestion and must
    not be the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair." 299
    9
    Kan. at 215. Courts must therefore exercise "the greatest care" in assessing the validity of
    a juvenile's confession or statement to law enforcement officers. See State v. Mays, 
    277 Kan. 359
    , 373, 
    85 P.3d 1208
     (2004); State v. R.W., 
    58 Kan. App. 2d 135
    , 144, 
    464 P.3d 27
    , rev. denied 
    312 Kan. 899
     (2020).
    When, as here, the accused is a juvenile, the trial court should consider the
    following nonexclusive factors—commonly referred to as the Young factors—in addition
    to those considered in the adult context: (1) the juvenile's age; (2) the length of
    questioning; (3) the juvenile's education; (4) the juvenile's prior experience with law
    enforcement officers; and (5) the juvenile's mental state. R.W., 58 Kan. App. 2d at 145.
    See State v. Young, 
    220 Kan. 541
    , 546-68, 
    552 P.2d 905
     (1976). These factors largely
    highlight certain factors we traditionally examine in the adult context. See Gibson, 
    299 Kan. at 215
     (recognizing an overlap between some of the factors applied in the adult and
    juvenile contexts).
    When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, appellate
    courts review the factual underpinnings of the decision for substantial competent
    evidence and review the district court's ultimate legal conclusion de novo. This court
    does not reweigh evidence, assess witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence.
    Vonachen, 312 Kan. at 463-64. "An appellate court accepts as true the evidence and all
    inferences drawn therefrom that support the trial court's findings. The key inquiry is
    whether the statement is a product of the accused's free and independent will." Jackson,
    
    280 Kan. at 36
    .
    The District Court's Factual Findings
    The district court properly enumerated the factors from our caselaw that weigh in
    the balance when deciding whether a statement is voluntary. When considering the
    evidence in favor of finding G.O.'s statements voluntary, the district court recognized:
    10
    • G.O.'s interview lasted less than an hour;
    • G.O. was just three months shy of turning 17 years old;
    • G.O. exhibited a good vocabulary throughout the interview, using words
    like "manifested" and "triangulation";
    • Mother had driven G.O. to the police station, was there during his
    interview, and was waiting to take him home; and
    • Hayden gave G.O. appropriate Miranda warnings, and he was not required
    to ask G.O. whether he wanted to waive those rights.
    We agree that substantial competent evidence supports these findings.
    We take issue, however, with the district court's factual findings about G.O.'s
    education. The district court found that Mother's testimony contradicted G.O.'s statement
    to Hayden that he was doing well in school, and it found that Mother said G.O. was not
    going to graduate on time. Yet these findings are unsupported by the record.
    Mother's relevant testimony follows.
    "Q. How would you describe his maturity at that time?
    "A. G.O.'s always been a little less mature than his actual peers. Just— it's—he's got
    some mild level learning disabilities. I think that attributes to that.
    "Q. Okay. What school grade was he in in March of 2017?
    "A. He'd been a junior.
    "Q. And how was he doing in school?
    "A. By that time he was doing a lot better because he had gotten appropriate help and
    was moved up to their alternative education program at the high school.
    "Q. Okay. So let's talk about that for a second. You said he was doing better. Had he not
    been doing well before?
    "A. No. He had probably, I would say, C's and D's at the best, except for, like orchestra
    where so long as you show up and participate, you get an A.
    11
    "Q. And was he on schedule to graduate?
    "A. No. He would not have graduated on time, if at all, had he not been moved up
    there."
    True, Mother testified that G.O. had some mild level learning disabilities. Before
    high school, G.O. had testing accommodations—he would have the questions read to him
    so he could comprehend them better. But Mother testified that G.O. was doing "a lot
    better" in school at the time he was interviewed because he had gotten appropriate help
    and he had been moved to the high school's alternative education program. There, he had
    more one on one time and teachers made sure he got his work done. Mother agreed that
    G.O. was getting good grades there and that he "would not have graduated on time, if at
    all, had he not been moved up there." A fair reading of Mother's testimony, in context, is
    that G.O. was doing well in school when he was interviewed, and that he was on schedule
    to graduate on time.
    The District Court's Legal Conclusions
    Our greater concern is with the district court's legal conclusions. The district court
    summarized its reasons supporting suppression as: concerns about G.O.'s education,
    G.O.'s mental issues, G.O.'s lack of experience with law enforcement, and G.O.'s belief
    that the purpose of the interview was to help his stepsister. In making its decision, the
    district court found the case of R.W. "strikingly similar."
    G.O.'s Education
    We have noted above the district court's erroneous factual findings about G.O.'s
    education. Contrary to the district court's findings, G.O. was doing well in his alternative
    educational program and was on track to graduate on time. More importantly, the record
    shows no link between G.O.'s mild learning disability and his oral comprehension or his
    12
    ability to respond during the interview. G.O.'s educational accommodation before high
    school was to have questions read aloud. And in his alternative high school program, he
    had more one on one time with teachers who made sure he got his work done. The record
    shows no more. The record of G.O.'s mild disability and his accommodations suggests no
    reason G.O. would not have understood his situation, Hayden's questions, or how to
    respond to them.
    As the videotape of the interview shows, G.O.'s responses to Hayden, who asked
    oral questions one on one during the interview, were swift, responsive, and showed no
    confusion or lack of understanding. The record thus fails to show that G.O.'s mild
    learning disability made him more susceptible to coercion. See Connelly, 
    479 U.S. at 163-67
     (low intellect no basis for finding a statement involuntary absent coercion).
    G.O.'s Mental Issues
    We have the same concern as to G.O.'s mental state. Although G.O. had
    experienced anxiety, depression, and attention deficit disorder, he was taking medication
    for one or more of those conditions, he was getting counseling, and he does not show that
    he either experienced or exhibited any symptoms of those conditions during his
    interview. Hayden was made aware of those facts during the interview yet made no
    attempt to exploit G.O.'s mental condition.
    That a defendant has such a diagnosis is not determinative. See State v. Swanigan,
    
    279 Kan. 18
    , 38, 
    106 P.3d 39
     (2005) (mental condition is only one factor). In Swanigan,
    however, suppression was "heavily influenced by evidence of the defendant's low
    intellectual functioning and his susceptibility to being overcome by anxiety." State v.
    Harris, 
    284 Kan. 560
    , 580, 
    162 P.3d 28
     (2007). But in Swanigan, unlike here, the
    defendant's doctor confirmed at the hearing that the defendant had difficulty in managing
    anxiety in custodial settings to the extent he was susceptible to being overcome by it. 279
    13
    Kan. at 31. And the Kansas Supreme Court's review of the record "disclose[d] that
    Swanigan's relatively low IQ and his susceptibility to being overcome by anxiety played
    a part in his alternating denials and confessions (which themselves varied considerably)."
    
    279 Kan. at 39
    .
    In contrast, our record fails to show that any of G.O.'s mental conditions affected
    his free will at the time he was interviewed. G.O. did not testify at the hearing, so we lack
    his subjective view of that matter. So any conclusions about what G.O. believed, thought,
    or understood are unfounded. Nor did any doctor testify to G.O.'s susceptibility to being
    overcome by anxiety or another of his mental conditions. And the record fails to show
    that he experienced or showed any symptoms of anxiety or his other mental conditions
    during his interview. To the contrary, the videotape of the interview shows that G.O.'s
    statements were consistent throughout the interview, were responsive to the questions
    asked, and many of his statements were lengthy and unsolicited. The determinative
    question is not whether G.O. had a mild learning disability, or a diagnosis of a mental
    condition, but whether law enforcement officers exploited his mental state or otherwise
    coerced his confession. See State v. Johnson, 
    286 Kan. 824
    , 837, 
    190 P.3d 207
     (2008)
    (citing cases.); Kirkland, 
    2022 WL 68579
    , at *10 (rejecting defendant's appellate claim
    that mental illness rendered his incriminating statements involuntary in part based on
    defendant's failure to make necessary connection between his mental state and his
    susceptibility to coercion). The record shows no exploitation here.
    Hayden's Misleading Statements and Promises
    The district court explained that the thing that "tipp[ed] the balance" in its decision
    was Hayden's misleading G.O. to believe that the purpose of the interview was to help
    Stepsister—Hayden had told G.O. "that they were there to talk about what would help his
    stepsister . . . and that nobody was in trouble." The district court cited R.W. as support for
    this finding. In R.W., the district court stated that "the crucial factor" in finding the 17-
    14
    year-old defendant's confession involuntary was "'the fairness of the officers conducting
    the interrogation.'" 58 Kan. App. 2d at 148.
    But reliance on R.W., which the district court found to be "strikingly similar" is
    misplaced. In R.W., the circumstances were much more egregious than here. Two officers
    interviewed R.W. That interview lasted around four hours. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 148. And
    officers had reassured defendant with misleading statements that the stakes were low for
    70 minutes before he made his incriminating statements. 58 Kan. App. 2d at 141.
    In contrast, only one officer interviewed G.O. His interview lasted only 53
    minutes. Officers initiated R.W.'s interview, but G.O. attended the interview at his
    Mother's request, not Hayden's. Rather than a steady barrage of reassurances for 70
    minutes before R.W. made his incriminating statements, Hayden's statements about not
    being in trouble or being there to help Stepsister were scattered. And rather than give
    short, curt responses to questions by the examiner, G.O. readily volunteered at length that
    he had sexually abused Stepsister, and without any question by Hayden.
    Hayden's statement to G.O. that he was "not under arrest won't be under arrest
    when we're done" was true. Far from a promise that G.O. would never be arrested for his
    crimes, those statements merely convey that G.O. would not be taken into custody at the
    end of the interview. And G.O. was not taken into custody when the interview ended or
    for years afterward.
    G.O. asserts on appeal that "false promises, and statements that provide a
    defendant a false sense of security from prosecution, may render a confession
    involuntary." But in support, G.O. cites only cases from other states.
    Under Kansas precedent, none of Hayden's statements can reasonably be
    objectively viewed as a promise that G.O. would not be criminally punished for his
    15
    actions. To render a defendant's statement involuntary, an officer must promise some
    specific action by a public official. State v. Garcia, 
    297 Kan. 182
    , 196, 
    301 P.3d 658
    (2013); Harris, 
    284 Kan. at 579-80
    . For a statement to be involuntary as a product of a
    promise of leniency, the promise must concern action to be taken by a public official,
    must be likely to cause the accused to make a false statement to obtain the promised
    benefit, and must be made by a person the accused reasonably believes has the power or
    authority to execute it. 
    297 Kan. at 196
    .
    No promise of specific action by Hayden was made here. Rather, Hayden's general
    statements about G.O. helping Stepsister or helping himself were like others that the
    Kansas Supreme Court has concluded were not so definite or coercive as to render a
    confession involuntary. See Harris, 
    284 Kan. at
    579-80 (citing cases) (finding confession
    voluntary when defendant was given his Miranda warning, appeared to be intelligent and
    alert, had an 11th grade education and understood English, his responses were
    appropriate for the questions asked, and the interrogation was not particularly long).
    G.O. did not testify that he was confused by any circumstances of his interview, or
    that he thought Hayden's statements assured him perpetual immunity for his criminal
    acts. So unlike the contrary conclusion in In re M.E., No. 2010-G-2996, 
    2011 WL 3558111
     (Ohio App. 2011) (unpublished opinion), which G.O. cites, we have no
    subjective assessment by the defendant of how the officer's statements made him feel.
    And the record, including the video of the interview, shows no confusion.
    The record shows Hayden made no threats of harm or promises of benefit. Nor
    does it show Hayden's undue influence over G.O. False statements by law enforcement
    officers do not automatically render a suspect's confession involuntary. See Swanigan,
    
    279 Kan. 18
    , Syl. ¶ 3. But unfair tactics led to a confession in Swanigan. There, law
    enforcement agents used false information, repeatedly insisted despite their knowledge to
    the contrary that they had found defendant's fingerprint at the scene of the crime, and
    16
    mistakenly told him that he was in pictures from the crime scene. Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. at 29, 32
    . The officers' false statements, coupled with evidence from Swanigan's doctor that
    the defendant had difficulty managing anxiety in custodial settings and was susceptible to
    being overcome by it, led to suppression. 
    279 Kan. at 31
    . Still, nothing like that happened
    here.
    To be sure, "'certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as applied to
    the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of
    justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
    Amendment.'" Crane v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 683
    , 687, 
    106 S. Ct. 2142
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 636
    (1986). But the record shows none of those egregious techniques here. None of Hayden's
    statements, including those about helping Stepsister or not being in trouble, viewed under
    the totality of the circumstances, are egregious enough to render G.O.'s statements
    involuntary. See State v. Ackward, 
    281 Kan. 2
    , 16, 
    128 P.3d 382
     (2006), abrogated on
    other grounds by State v. Milo, 
    315 Kan. 434
    , 
    510 P.3d 1
     (2022) (finding officer's
    "mistakes in fact and law were not egregious, and in some cases they were more an
    exaggeration rather than false").
    G.O.'s Lack of Experience with Law Enforcement
    One other important factor distinguishes our case from R.W.'s. R.W., unlike G.O.,
    trusted the officers who interviewed him and was vulnerable because the school resource
    officer who had introduced him to the officers had befriended R.W. during his father's
    death. R.W.'s experience with law enforcement officers was "based on emotional support,
    vulnerability, and trust":
    "The record reflects that R.W. and the SRO bonded during a vulnerable period of
    mutual grief after the death of R.W.'s father and the death of the SRO's son. Prior to the
    interrogation, R.W.'s only experience with law enforcement was with the SRO, with
    17
    whom he had a 'mentor' relationship. Nothing in the record suggests that R.W. had ever
    had an adversarial interaction with a law enforcement officer or had previously been
    involved in a criminal investigation. As the district court appropriately noted, R.W.'s
    experience with law enforcement officers was based on emotional support, vulnerability,
    and trust." 58 Kan. App. 2d at 147.
    The R.W. panel correctly found that under all the circumstances, the officers' promises,
    benefits, and reassurances overcame his will. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
    541 U.S. 652
    ,
    667-78, 
    124 S. Ct. 2140
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 938
     (2004) (A confession is coerced—and
    inadmissible at trial—when a defendant's "will was overborne.").
    Not so here. Unlike R.W., G.O. had no prior trust or other relationship with
    Hayden or other officers—his experience with law enforcement officers was not based on
    emotional support, vulnerability, or trust. G.O. agrees that the interview was cordial. He
    alleges no express or implied threats. Nor does the record show any promise by Hayden.
    Hayden identified himself as a detective, conducted G.O.'s interview in an interview
    room inside a police station, and gave G.O. proper Miranda warnings before asking any
    questions. As Mother had told Hayden, G.O. wanted to clear the air and get something
    off his chest. G.O. was compelled to confess not by any officer's overreaching acts, but
    by his own guilty conscience.
    The State met its burden to show that more likely than not G.O.'s statements were
    the product of his free and independent will. Thus, the statements should not have been
    suppressed as involuntary.
    Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    ***
    18
    HURST, J., dissenting: The State's interlocutory appeal requires this court to
    determine whether G.O.'s statements to Detective Hayden were voluntarily given, making
    them admissible against him. Although the facts are not in dispute, the majority reweighs
    the substantial credible evidence relied upon by the district court to reverse its sound
    legal decision supported by ample facts.
    When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, appellate
    courts examine the factual underpinnings of the decision for substantial competent
    evidence and review the district court's ultimate legal conclusion de novo. This court
    should not reweigh evidence, assess witness credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence.
    State v. Garcia, 
    297 Kan. 182
    , 186, 
    301 P.3d 658
     (2013). I believe—as did the district
    court—that the totality of the circumstances under the applicable due process analysis
    weighs in favor of finding G.O.'s statements involuntary. Accordingly, I respectfully
    dissent.
    The State bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that G.O. gave the statements freely and voluntarily. In determining the voluntariness of
    G.O.'s statements, this court considers the totality of the circumstances, and "recognizes a
    heightened sensitivity when the accused is a juvenile." State v. Gibson, 
    299 Kan. 207
    ,
    215, 
    322 P.3d 389
     (2014). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances by analyzing
    nonexclusive factors such as:
    (1) defendant's mental condition;
    (2) the interview's manner and duration;
    (3) defendant's ability to communicate on request with the outside world;
    (4) defendant's age, intellect, and background;
    (5) the officer's fairness in conducting the interview; and
    (6) defendant's fluency with the English language.
    State v. Stone, 
    291 Kan. 13
    , 21, 
    237 P.3d 1229
     (2010).
    19
    Because G.O. was a juvenile at the time of his questioning, this court also considers what
    are commonly referred to as the Young factors: (1) the juvenile's age; (2) the length of
    questioning; (3) the juvenile's education; (4) the juvenile's prior experience with law
    enforcement officers; and (5) the juvenile's mental state. See State v. Young, 
    220 Kan. 541
    , Syl. ¶ 2, 
    552 P.2d 905
     (1976); see also Gibson, 
    299 Kan. at 215
     (recognizing an
    overlap exists between some of the factors applied in the adult and juvenile contexts).
    This court's ultimate inquiry is whether the juvenile's statements to police were a
    product of his "free and independent will" or if his will was overborne through the State's
    coercive conduct. See, e.g., State v. Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. 18
    , Syl. ¶ 2, 
    106 P.3d 39
     (2005).
    I.     THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS
    The district court made some factual findings that supported its conclusion that
    G.O.'s statements were involuntary. However, the district court's factual findings were
    not as clear when it came to what, if any, factors weighed in favor of finding G.O.'s
    statements were involuntary, and it did not make findings as to every potential factor. The
    majority states that the district court identified the following factors: (1) The interview
    length; (2) G.O.'s age; (3) G.O.'s mother was at the police station and knew he was with
    the police; (4) G.O.'s vocabulary; and (5) G.O.'s receipt of Miranda warnings—even
    without being asked if he agreed to waive them—as factors tending toward voluntariness.
    While it does appear the district court considered some of these factors, I disagree that the
    court considered G.O.'s age—16 at the time of questioning—or that his vocabulary
    demonstrated voluntariness.
    Rather than finding these factors demonstrated voluntariness, the district court
    merely noted distinctions between State v. R.W., 
    58 Kan. App. 2d 135
    , 144, 
    464 P.3d 27
    , rev. denied 
    312 Kan. 899
     (2020), and the present case, and that G.O. was in fact
    younger, but close in age, to the juvenile in R.W.—a case in which a panel of this court
    20
    upheld the district court's decision to suppress the juvenile's statements. The district court
    similarly noted that G.O. exhibited a good vocabulary by his use of two specific words,
    but made no finding about that. The court ultimately juxtaposed those vocabulary words
    against G.O.'s need for education accommodations, that he failed classes, and that he was
    not on track to graduate when placed in a traditional educational environment.
    This distinction is likely immaterial to the analysis because the district court did
    not rely on G.O.'s youth in finding the statements involuntary. Rather, the court made no
    factual finding regarding whether G.O.'s age, among several other factors—including his
    ability to communicate with the outside world—impacted the voluntariness of his
    statements. As such, this court may also independently consider those factors. See State
    v. Harris, 
    293 Kan. 798
    , 808-09, 
    269 P.3d 820
     (2012) (proceeding directly to the legal
    conclusions "attendant to each claim without addressing whether the factual findings
    were supported by substantial competent evidence" when the district court "did not make
    specific factual findings related to the motion to suppress").
    The district court determined that under the totality of the circumstances, G.O.'s
    statements were the involuntary result of coercion based on the following factual
    findings:
    •      G.O.'s education;
    •      G.O.'s mental state and issues;
    •      G.O.'s lack of experience with law enforcement; and
    •      G.O.'s misunderstanding about the purpose of the interview as a result of
    unfair interview tactics.
    The State concedes that substantial competent evidence supported each of these findings,
    and merely seeks review of their legal application. Yet the majority decided to reweigh
    the education factor.
    21
    Additionally, the State claims, without any legal support, that because the district
    court relied on only the four identified factors, it therefore found that no other factors
    supported its legal conclusion. Not only does the State's argument lack legal support, it
    also lacks logical and practical support. The district court's identified factors merely
    demonstrate that those factors provide sufficient support for its conclusion. See e.g.,
    Gibson, 
    299 Kan. at 216-17
     (noting that the Kansas Supreme Court has not required
    district courts to consider each Young factor on the record). In fact, sometimes the district
    court makes no factual findings as to the applicable factors and merely provides a legal
    conclusion. See, e.g., Harris, 
    293 Kan. at 808
    . Similarly, if the district court had found
    G.O.'s statements did not require suppression and only cited to two factual findings
    supporting that conclusion—would the State still contend that no other factors could be
    weighed in favor of the district court's conclusion?
    G.O.'s Education
    The district court relied on substantial competent evidence to find that G.O.'s
    education weighed in favor of making his statements involuntary—but the majority
    reweighed the evidence to negate the education factor. The district court clearly discussed
    how it viewed G.O.'s statements about his education, his performance during the
    interview with law enforcement officers, and his mother's testimony about his education.
    The court considered all of these factors and explained that G.O. only demonstrated
    educational success when "he was in an alternative school, which is typically for kids that
    have failed or have a great deal of difficulty in regular classes in high school." Rather
    than rely on the district court's assessment of the competing evidence regarding G.O.'s
    education—the majority reweighs it and heavily relies on G.O.'s postalternative high
    school academic achievements to assess his education rather than the totality as the
    district court did.
    22
    The record reflects that G.O. has a mild learning disability, that he was less mature
    than his peers, that he has previously required an education accommodation of having
    questions read aloud to him, and that he failed multiple classes and was not going to
    graduate on time if he remained in a traditional educational environment. G.O.'s mother
    testified that he had failed high school classes and was working to get back on track
    through the alternative education program. She explained that through the alternative
    education program, G.O. was given one-on-one attention and extra help to enable him to
    graduate—and had he remained in a traditional educational environment he would not
    have graduated. These are all criteria that demonstrate G.O. was not an average learner,
    or capable of succeeding in the traditional educational environment for Kansas high
    school students.
    In 2020, according to the Kansas Department of Education, just over 88 percent of
    Kansas students graduated from high school. Kansas Reflector,
    https://kansasreflector.com/2021/09/04/kansas-education-officials-celebrate-graduation-
    rates-but-say-work-is-far-from-over/ (September 4, 2021). According to the majority's
    reweighing of this evidence, being on track to graduate from high school at the time of
    questioning—even if that requires significant accommodations—means the juvenile has
    the requisite education and intellect to withstand deceptive police interview techniques.
    The education accommodations afforded students with mental, physical, and emotional
    disabilities to enable them to graduate from high school should not be mistaken for an
    indication that all Kansas high school graduates meet the same educational standards.
    The district court relied on substantial competent evidence to find that G.O.'s
    education played a factor in making his statements to Detective Hayden involuntary, and
    I disagree with reweighing that factual finding to undermine the district court's reliance
    on that evidence—particularly when the State concedes the district court's factual
    findings. G.O. demonstrated immaturity, confusion, and misunderstanding. He had a mild
    learning disability, required education accommodations, failed multiple classes, and was
    23
    not on track to graduate prior to the significant intervention of being enrolled in an
    alternative education program. Nonetheless—even if this factor is not considered in the
    totality of the circumstances—G.O.'s statements were involuntary based on the unfair and
    deceptive practices employed in G.O.'s interview.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    After finding the district court relied on substantial competent evidence for its
    factual findings—the appellate court then determines whether the district court accurately
    applied the law to those factual findings. This court reviews the applicable law de novo—
    meaning it looks at the law anew—without deference to the district court's legal analysis.
    State v. Johnson, 
    286 Kan. 824
    , 835, 
    190 P.3d 207
     (2008) ("In reviewing a trial court's
    decision regarding suppression, this court reviews . . . the ultimate legal conclusion by a
    de novo standard, applying independent judgment." [Emphasis added.]). After accepting
    "as true the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom that support the trial court's
    findings," it must then determine "whether the statement is a product of the accused's free
    and independent will." State v. Jackson, 
    280 Kan. 16
    , 36, 
    118 P.3d 1238
     (2005).
    In particular, "[a] juvenile's inculpatory statement must be voluntary and free from
    coercion or suggestion and must not be the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent
    fantasy, fright, or despair." Gibson, 
    299 Kan. at 215
    . Courts must therefore exercise "the
    greatest care" in assessing the validity of a juvenile's confession or statement to law
    enforcement officers. See State v. Mays, 
    277 Kan. 359
    , 373, 
    85 P.3d 1208
     (2004); R.W.,
    58 Kan. App. 2d at 144.
    The district court determined that Detective Hayden's misleading conduct tipped
    the scale in favor of finding G.O.'s statements involuntary. Although the interview itself
    may appear noncombative, that is not dispositive of voluntariness—particularly when
    dealing with a juvenile with no prior experience with law enforcement. See, e.g.,
    24
    Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. at 20, 39
     (finding a statement involuntary even when the defendant
    had been read Miranda warnings, and interviewers were not combative); R.W., 58 Kan.
    App. 2d at 151 (finding juvenile statements involuntary even if Miranda warnings were
    proper and when police were not combative).
    Detective Hayden misled G.O. about the purpose and potential consequences of the
    interview.
    Detective Hayden's misleading and inaccurate statements, which can be
    categorized as unfair interview tactics, weigh heavily in favor of finding G.O.'s
    statements involuntary, even without consideration of G.O.'s education, mental condition,
    and inexperience with law enforcement. See, e.g., State v. Morton, 
    286 Kan. 632
    , 650,
    
    186 P.3d 785
     (2008).
    Morton was a college-educated adult who the Ottawa Police Department and
    Government Service Administration (GSA) suspected of violating the law regarding the
    purchase of government surplus supplies. Morton retained an attorney to represent her in
    the investigation and was interviewed by a police officer with her attorney present.
    Thereafter, the police department closed its investigation of Morton—but several months
    later, Morton's attorney notified her that the GSA investigator requested an interview.
    Morton contacted the investigator and agreed to meet at the police station for an
    interview but did not bring her attorney. Morton asked the investigator if she needed an
    attorney, and the investigator responded that it was not "that kind" of interview—so
    Morton proceeded without her attorney present.
    The Kansas Supreme Court found that Morton was not required to receive
    Miranda warnings because it was a noncustodial interview, but that Morton's question
    was an attempt to determine the nature of the interview. The dual civil/criminal
    investigatory powers of the GSA made the true nature of the interview unclear and the
    25
    court found the investigator's statement was "an affirmative misrepresentation about the
    true nature of the interview." Under the totality of the circumstances, the court found that
    the interviewing agent's misrepresentation about the true nature of the interview to a
    college-educated adult, with no disclosed mental health conditions, who had prior
    experience with law enforcement in the very same action—rendered her statements
    involuntary. Morton, 286 Kan. at 654.
    Detective Hayden repeatedly lied to G.O. about the purpose and intent of the
    interview, made false promises of benefit, misled G.O.'s mother about the true purpose of
    the interview, and used G.O.'s mother to buttress his credibility and authority, all in an
    attempt to elicit incriminating statements from a 16-year-old with a mild learning
    disability, mental health issues, and who had no prior experience with law enforcement—
    in order to conceal the true purpose and potential consequences of the interview, and thus
    deprive G.O. of his free and independent will to voluntarily speak to the detective.
    1.     Detective Hayden's False Statements About the Interview Purpose
    Detective Hayden began by lying to G.O. about the actual purpose of the
    interview. Of course, police may lie to suspects during the course of an interrogation—
    but Detective Hayden's deceptive conduct is a factor when considering the fairness of the
    interview and the totality of the circumstances demonstrating whether the interview was
    coerced. See, e.g., Morton, 
    286 Kan. at 632
    , Syl. ¶ 8. Unlike the facts of this case, the
    majority relies on cases where the defendants all knew they were being interviewed for
    the purpose of investigating a crime. See Garcia, 
    297 Kan. at 196
    ; State v. Harris, 
    284 Kan. 560
    , 579-80, 
    162 P.3d 28
     (2007). G.O. was repeatedly told that his conversation
    with Detective Hayden was not for the purpose of getting anyone into trouble—but
    expressly to "help" his sister deal with her mental health issues.
    26
    While the detective did introduce himself as "Detective Hayden" and then
    explained that he had "been a police officer for 15 some odd years now" and had "been a
    detective for 8 or 9 of those," he made it seem as though his current job differed from his
    prior job. He first explained that he previously worked on things "all the way down to
    you know, theft and shoplifting stuff kinda down here at the low end; I've worked a lot of
    homicides like these guys are working today. And that's kinda the big deal, right, when
    people die." The detective then explained how his job had changed, and said "[n]ow, I
    work a lot with kids. Usually young, young kids, ok. The past few weeks I've been kinda
    talking to your sister—helping—trying to help her out." G.O. responded, "I want her to
    get better," referring to his sister, and Detective Hayden said "[y]ep. Me too."
    Detective Hayden described his current job of working with young kids in contrast
    to his prior job—and never disclosed that his job was to investigate crimes against
    children. Detective Hayden never told G.O. that he was investigating him, or that he was
    investigating crimes against G.O.'s sister, or even that his job was to investigate crimes
    against children. He said that he works with kids and repeatedly said he was just trying to
    "help" G.O.'s sister—and in fact help G.O.
    The detective told G.O. the interview was to "help [his sister] out" and "so we can
    help to understand it." After telling G.O. he was not currently under arrest and would not
    later be arrested, the detective said the purpose of the interview was to "get some stuff
    cleared up" and "clear some things up for you and your sister." At least six different times
    during the course of the one-hour interview, Detective Hayden referred to the purpose of
    the interview as being to help G.O.'s sister with her feelings, to help her out, or to clear
    things up.
    Detective Hayden's expressed desire to help G.O.'s sister do better prompted G.O.
    to talk about his sister's mental health issues, and how she had been sent to a mental
    health facility. G.O. said he wanted to "make sure she does better." G.O. then began to
    27
    discuss his own experience of being sexually abused and Detective Hayden explained
    that:
    "[s]o you know, the research kind of bears out—and my experience bears out—that
    when these things happen, it's not just because they've happened out of the blue, alright?
    A lot of times these things happen because things have happened to people in the past,
    right? And those things start to kind of manifest themselves . . . and people become
    curious, right? And things start to happen, and it kind of gets out of our hands before we
    kind of really know what's going on, right?"
    Detective Hayden said that G.O.'s mom had told him about G.O. being abused,
    and then asked G.O. to provide more details about his own abuse. When G.O. expressed
    reluctance to give details, saying "I don't like doing details," Detective Hayden reassured
    him that some of what they were going to discuss would be "uncomfortable" and
    "probably a little bit embarrassing," but that he had "been doing this for quite a while and
    I can guarantee you almost 98 and a half percent that anything that you're going to tell
    me . . . I've already heard. And it's not going to shock me." Detective Hayden went on to
    reassure G.O. that "from the things that [your sister] and I talked about, alright, this is not
    anything that's uh—well, how should I say this—it's more common than people think."
    And that "[s]o it's just something that you and I are going to talk about so that we can
    move past it to help [your sister] out."
    Early in the interview, Detective Hayden explained the purpose of the meeting by
    saying, "I think you know that your sister's kinda hurting right now . . . [s]o if we can get
    some of this stuff cleared up and kinda aired out, I think that's going to help out
    everybody. Ok?" Later in the interview he expands on how G.O.'s sister's feelings, "I
    think she is confused. And you know, she's a teenager. . . . She's female, which you
    know, there's hormones at play there too. Just like with you and I when we were
    teenagers—you still are, so you know how that goes. I don't think kids are real nice to her
    at school, so she's got a lot she's trying to figure out." He goes on to state that the reason
    28
    he is talking to G.O. is to help his sister work out her feelings about G.O. "I know she
    swing[s] back and forth on how she feels about you. . . . Uhm, but that's kind of why—
    why we're trying to get through this today."
    Detective Hayden was interviewing G.O. about his sexual assault of his stepsister,
    which appears to have started when G.O. was about 12 years old. The detective never
    disclosed that he was investigating a crime, that he was investigating G.O., that G.O.'s
    conduct was criminal, the potential for criminal charges against G.O. for that prior
    conduct, or any potential "trouble." In fact, Detective Hayden repeatedly and consistently
    told G.O. that he would not be arrested and that he was not in trouble, and the purpose of
    the discussion was therapeutic—to help G.O.'s sister, to help G.O. and his sister move
    past this, to clear things up, and to help G.O.'s relationship with his sister. G.O. echoed
    that language back to Detective Hayden as his purpose and intent as well. These were not
    communicated as a tangential result of a criminal investigation—but was the only stated
    purpose to G.O. for the interview.
    The majority seeks to distinguish R.W. by noting that G.O.'s interview was shorter,
    and there was only one detective present—but those factors do not negate that same
    coercive technique employed here, when the detective intentionally described his role as
    that of a pseudo-therapist, and never disclosed that G.O. was the subject of a criminal
    investigation. Having only one detective present made the interview more similar to
    therapy than an interrogation, and the interview was short in part because G.O. had an
    orthodontist appointment and Detective Hayden had already employed this coercive
    technique with G.O.'s mother. Unlike in R.W., G.O. was aware of the topics to be
    discussed with the detective—but just like in R.W.—the detective concealed and, in fact,
    lied about the purpose of the interview and also lied about any potential consequences—
    repeatedly promising there would be none.
    29
    Detective Hayden hid the true purpose of the interview by telling G.O.—a
    juvenile—that it was therapeutic in nature and designed to help him and his sister, who
    had ongoing mental health struggles. Under the facts of this case, this technique was
    coercive and factors into the totality of the circumstances to make G.O.'s interview
    statements involuntary.
    2.     Detective Hayden's False Promises of Benefit
    Not only did Detective Hayden describe the interview in terms of therapeutic
    purposes—he made specific promises of benefit to further mislead G.O. about the
    purpose and potential consequences of the interview. G.O. claims on appeal, as he did in
    the motion to suppress hearing, that the detective's false statements and promises
    rendered his statements involuntary. I agree with the majority that the Kansas Supreme
    Court has held that only a "promise [of] some specific action by a public official" can
    render a defendant's statement involuntary. See Garcia, 
    297 Kan. at 196
    . Detective
    Hayden repeatedly promised G.O. he would not be arrested or be in any trouble if he
    fully disclosed the requested information.
    The majority cites to Detective Hayden's recitation of G.O.'s Miranda warnings to
    demonstrate that his statements were voluntary—but Miranda warnings alone do not
    render otherwise coercive techniques permissible. See, e.g., State v. Swindler, 
    296 Kan. 670
    , 683-84, 
    294 P.3d 308
     (2013) (finding statements involuntary even when defendant
    had been read Miranda warnings); State v. Stone, 
    291 Kan. 13
    , 15, 32-33, 
    237 P.3d 1229
    (2010) (finding statements involuntary even when defendant was read and waived
    Miranda rights). Particularly when those Miranda warnings are repeatedly negated by
    contrary statements and promises of benefit should the defendant not invoke their rights
    under Miranda. Just before reading G.O. his Miranda rights, the detective said, "Like I
    said, you're not under arrest, you're not going to be under arrest." The detective further
    minimized G.O.'s Miranda rights when he explained them by saying—after promising no
    30
    repercussions from the discussion—"[b]ut we're kinda sitting in this room, right. So I'm
    going to read you your Miranda rights. Just so you—you can make sure that you
    understand, ok?" After reading the Miranda warnings the detective asked G.O. if he
    understood "those rights" and G.O. said he did. Although not required, it is notable—
    considering the methods Detective Hayden employed to conceal the nature of the
    interview—that he did not ask if G.O. wished to waive those rights. Thereafter, in
    contradiction to the Miranda rights previously read to G.O., the detective said that if G.O.
    did not tell the detective the complete truth "that's when things start to get out of control,
    right." The obvious implication was that Detective Hayden's promises of benefit required
    G.O. to make full and complete disclosures, and to not invoke his right to silence.
    Here the State asks this court to presume that G.O. understood and believed the
    Miranda warnings read to him by Detective Hayden such that he could invoke them
    anytime, and also that G.O. should have known Detective Hayden was repeatedly lying to
    him about the purpose and consequences of the interview. Receiving Miranda warnings
    is just one factor comprising the totality of the circumstances in determining if the
    detective's deceptive interview techniques violated G.O.'s due process rights. Courts have
    consistently found police interrogations mentally coercive even when Miranda warnings
    are read to adults. See, e.g., Garcia, 
    297 Kan. at 197
    ; Stone, 
    291 Kan. at 32-33
    ;
    Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. at 40
    ; State v. Howard, 
    825 N.W.2d 32
     (Iowa 2012); Cole v. State,
    
    923 P.2d 820
     (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
    Although the factors supporting the totality of the circumstances warranting
    suppression of G.O.'s statements differ from those in R.W.—this particular factor is quite
    similar. Not only did the detective's strategy of presenting himself as a pseudo-therapist
    seek to overcome G.O.'s free and independent will—the detective also affirmatively
    promised G.O. benefits for his statements which contributed to him being overborne. The
    detective also undermined the cursory Miranda warning by stating there would be no
    "trouble" from G.O.'s statements and also implying negative consequences from not
    31
    giving full, complete disclosure. See, e.g., Stone, 
    291 Kan. at 22-24, 32-33
     (where the
    court found the statements involuntary where the police officer inferred that confession
    would positively affect the defendant's jail sentence).
    The majority relies on Harris for the proposition that "none of Hayden's
    statements can reasonably be objectively viewed as a promise that G.O. would not be
    criminally punished for his actions." Slip op. at 16. First, the majority inflammatorily
    misstates G.O.'s argument. He is not arguing that Detective Hayden promised he would
    not be prosecuted for his actions—nor am I contending he should not be prosecuted for
    his actions because of Detective Hayden's promises. Rather, he argues that Detective
    Hayden's promises made his statements involuntary and thus his statements to Detective
    Hayden cannot be used in his prosecution. Rendering the statements inadmissible does
    not prevent the State from prosecuting G.O. using all other admissible evidence at its
    disposal. The implication that enforcement of a defendant's fundamental due process
    rights somehow prevents the State from prosecuting criminal conduct contradicts the
    fundamental principles of our legal system.
    Unlike Harris, who knew he was facing murder charges when he spoke to police,
    here, the police never told G.O. or his family that Detective Hayden wanted to question
    him in connection with potential criminal charges. Contrarily, Harris, had already been
    charged, and his photo widely publicized as a person being sought in connection with
    murder charges. Harris knew his photo was shown on the news and he willingly
    contacted police and presented himself for questioning in connection with murder
    charges. Unlike G.O., Harris was never told the interview was not "about getting people
    in trouble," that Harris was "not under arrest," or that he was "not going to be under
    arrest." Therefore, any minimal promises of leniency by the police in that case are clearly
    distinguishable from what occurred to G.O. in this case.
    32
    Even assuming that G.O. somehow understood there was a possibility of his
    interview being used for his legal prosecution—despite Detective Hayden's repeated
    promises to the contrary—he engaged in a promise of benefit in exchange for G.O.'s
    statements. A promise of leniency may result in a defendant's statement being involuntary
    when that promise:
    (1) concerns action to be taken by a public official;
    (2) is likely to cause the accused to make a false statement to obtain the promised
    benefit; and
    (3) is made by a person the accused reasonably believes has the power or authority
    to execute it.
    Garcia, 
    297 Kan. at 196-97
    .
    Here, as in Garcia, the person making the promise was a police detective—a public
    official—which meets the first criterion.
    Next, the promises must be of the type to make someone willing to make a false
    statement—in other words, the promise must be sufficiently beneficial. Here, the
    promises were that G.O. was "not going to be under arrest," which was said twice in the
    hour-long interview and that the interview "isn't about getting people into trouble," but
    was "about trying to fix some things" and to "help" G.O.'s sister. It is difficult to imagine
    a more beneficial promise to a juvenile who was having trouble at home and had told the
    detective "I've had many upon many anxiety and panic attacks" and that "for weeks upon
    weeks just constant anxiety attacks" than not getting into "trouble," not getting arrested,
    and helping his sister, who was also suffering with mental health issues.
    Finally, the promises were made by Detective Hayden, and it was reasonable for
    G.O. to believe that the detective had the power or authority to execute on at least the
    legal promises. Assuming that Detective Hayden's promises to help G.O.'s sister and to
    "swing" her feelings back toward fondness for G.O. are not the type of benefit
    33
    contemplated by this standard—the promise that G.O. would not get into trouble or be
    arrested—are clearly promises G.O. would believe Detective Hayden could uphold. The
    majority claims that Detective Hayden's promise that G.O. would not be arrested is
    somehow not false because two years had passed from when Detective Hayden made the
    promise and when the State charged G.O. That contention is not only contrary to the
    common definition of a lie, but it is also irrelevant to this analysis. The point is that
    Detective Hayden promised G.O. a benefit, whether true or not, in exchange for his
    interview. Of course had the benefit been true—this case would not be before this court.
    Detective Hayden told G.O.—a juvenile—multiple times that he would not be
    arrested or be in any trouble if he completely disclosed the details of his sexual abuse of
    his sister that occurred several years prior to the interview when G.O. was 12 to 14 years
    old. It was reasonable for G.O. to rely on those promised benefits made by a public
    official. Detective Hayden also said the interview would "help" G.O.'s sister and could
    benefit G.O.'s relationship with his sister, but this court need not determine whether G.O.
    should have reasonably believed Detective Hayden could execute those promises.
    3.     Detective Hayden's Use of G.O.'s Mother
    Not only did Detective Hayden rely on his own authority to deliver the promised
    benefit and mislead G.O. about the interview purpose, but he invoked and relied on
    G.O.'s mother as an authority. Right from the beginning of the interview, Detective
    Hayden referenced his discussions with G.O.'s mother to bolster his misstatements that
    the interview would be used therapeutically to help G.O. and his sister, and would not be
    used to get G.O. into any "trouble." Detective Hayden said, "Your mom probably told
    you but I'm going to tell you again, alright. You are not under arrest," and after G.O.
    acknowledged that he understood, Detective Hayden immediately said "[y]ou're not
    going to be under arrest when we're done." He further explained that his purpose was to
    34
    "clear some things up for you and your sister" because G.O.'s "sister's kinda hurting right
    now."
    Detective Hayden referenced his personal conversations with G.O.'s mom on
    multiple occasions, but specifically to reinforce that G.O. would face no legal
    repercussions or "trouble" resulting from his full disclosure. Shortly after G.O. expressed
    reluctance to provide details—"I don't like doing details"—Detective Hayden told G.O.
    that anything less than full disclosure is when "things start to get out of my control."
    Detective Hayden told G.O.:
    "I also told your mom, right, that—that, you know, things—things start to get out of my
    control. Like if we talk here for—for 45 minutes and you tell me what happened and, uh,
    I go and I find out that some of those things aren't true, or some of the things that you tell
    me wasn't everything—that's when things start to get out of control, right. And I'm not
    saying that you're going to do that. I don't think you're going to even try to do that. I
    know you want to get these things off your chest. That's what your mom told me and
    that's what it seems like so far, right. But I just want to warn you, right. That I don't want
    to go down that road and neither do you and neither does [your sister]."
    Detective Hayden told G.O. that he made the same beneficial promises to G.O.'s mom—
    relying on G.O.'s mother as a trusted authority to bolster these promises.
    G.O.'s mother mistakenly believed she was required to have her entire family,
    including G.O., submit to police interviews with Detective Hayden—and Detective
    Hayden never assuaged her of that belief. He never told her that G.O. had the right to
    remain silent, have an attorney present, or that she could refuse to make him available
    unless she was present. G.O.'s mother actually asked to be present during the interview
    but, in front of G.O., Detective Hayden said that she could not be present—preemptively
    cutting off G.O.'s ability to communicate with the outside world. It is true that Detective
    Hayden was not required to relieve G.O.'s mom of her misunderstandings—but he then
    35
    relied on those misunderstandings to buttress his promises to G.O. See Garcia, 
    297 Kan. at 194-98
    .
    Garcia, an adult defendant with prior experience with law enforcement who was
    well aware police were interrogating him related to criminal charges, accused police of
    eliciting an involuntary confession by promising him leniency. Unlike here, the police
    were careful not to outright promise Garcia anything, but instead used his girlfriend to
    convey that if he confessed to robbery the police would not charge him with a more
    serious crime. The police officer had Garcia's girlfriend stand in the doorway and asked
    her to talk to her boyfriend:
    "'[Police Officer:] She is going to stand in that door and she is going to tell you
    that I talked to her and she told the truth.
    "'[Garcia:] Okay.
    "'(Sergeant leaves room and then returns with unidentified female)
    ....
    "'[Girlfriend:] Do you want to go in for murder or robbery?
    "'[Garcia:] I'm fuckin' pretty sure (Inaudible). You know that.
    "'[Girlfriend:] Baby, at least don't go down for murder.
    "'[Garcia:] But I didn't even do shit.. . . .
    "'[Police Officer:] Go ahead, explain to him. Help me help him.
    "'[Girlfriend:] They are going to take you down for murder if you don't—if you
    don't say about the—
    "'[Garcia:] I know they are going to take me down for murder, (Inaudible) for
    fuckin' robbery, all of this, because they are going to book both on me later on
    when I get to the fuckin' station.
    "'[Girlfriend:] They're not going to book you for murder.
    "'[Garcia:] All right, man, I did, I did try to rob that guy.
    "'[Girlfriend:] But he didn't—he really did, he really tried to stop him. He tried to
    stop him from shooting the guy. He really did.'" (Emphasis added.) 
    297 Kan. at 195
    .
    36
    The court found that the exchange with Garcia's girlfriend "did not stop short of
    promising a benefit to Garcia in return for his confession to robbery." 
    297 Kan. at 196
    .
    Although the police officer did not convey the promise, it was nonetheless referring to
    police conduct, and the promise "fits within the parameters of those promises that may be
    deemed to have rendered a confession involuntary." 
    297 Kan. at 196-97
    . Like the officers
    in Garcia, here, Detective Hayden met with someone G.O. trusted—his mother—and
    according to his own statement to G.O.—told her that G.O.'s statements during the
    interview would not be used to arrest him. He then relied on G.O.'s mom to convey that
    information to G.O.—not only that—he told G.O. that he had, in fact, made those
    promises to his mother.
    Detective Hayden repeatedly telling G.O. the purpose of the interview was to help
    his sister who was suffering, promising G.O. there would be no legal consequences
    resulting from his interview if he provided a full confession, and telling G.O.'s mom the
    same while also relying on her as an authority of G.O., all combined to create an unfair
    interview such that G.O.'s statements were not the product of his free and independent
    will. See, e.g., Stone, 
    291 Kan. at 32-33
     (finding a combination of interrogation
    techniques coercive as to an adult).
    G.O.'s Mental State
    It is undisputed that G.O. suffered from anxiety, depression, and ADD at the time
    of his interview with Detective Hayden. His mother testified that he was on medication
    for ADD and anxiety, but that "[She did not] remember which" anxiety medication
    because "[i]t's changed so much now." During the interview, G.O. told Detective Hayden
    that "I've had many upon many anxiety and panic attacks," and "I have medicine to deal
    with anxiety issues. And just for weeks upon weeks just constant anxiety attacks." He
    further explained that his anxiety was "random anxiety attacks about nothing," and were
    not caused by a particular event, "it's just sometimes it's out of the blue" and "[t]hat's one
    37
    of the main issues that the medicine tries to deal with." G.O. summarized by saying,
    "And it sucks."
    G.O. did not testify at the suppression hearing about his mental state during the
    interview, and there is no requirement that he do so. This court must analyze the facts
    presented to determine if Detective Hayden's conduct was sufficiently coercive so as to
    overcome G.O.'s free and independent will under the totality of the circumstances.
    Additionally, Detective Hayden's decision to remain ignorant of G.O.'s mental condition,
    education, and maturity level prior to conducting the interview does not alleviate him of
    the consequences of coercion on someone in G.O.'s position.
    It is true that the defendant's mental condition alone, without any alleged coercive
    interview techniques, does not necessarily make a witness statement involuntary without
    a showing of how that condition impacted the witness. See Johnson, 
    286 Kan. at 837
    .
    But, when there are other factors making the interview coercive, the defendant's mental
    condition can be considered a factor in analyzing the totality of the circumstances.
    Swanigan, 
    279 Kan. at 37
    . Where there is no evidence contradicting the defendant's
    mental condition, as is the case here, this court should not seek to reweigh or eliminate
    this factor based on evidence the defendant could have provided to strengthen its
    contention.
    Here, unlike the facts in Johnson and State v. Kirkland, No. 122,971, 
    2002 WL 68579
     (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion), G.O.'s mental condition is not the only
    factor being asserted to demonstrate his statements were involuntary. See Johnson, 
    286 Kan. at 836
     (When the defense focuses only on the accused mental condition, "the
    absence of other factors is an important consideration" when determining whether low
    intellect or other mental condition alone made the defendant's waiver involuntary.);
    Kirkland, 
    2002 WL 68579
    , at *10.
    38
    G.O.'s Lack of Experience with Law Enforcement
    It is undisputed that G.O. had never been arrested or interviewed by law
    enforcement prior to his interview with Detective Hayden. He had no experience with
    law enforcement in an adversarial manner. Rather than credit his lack of experience as a
    factor weighing toward coercion, the majority focuses on the unique facts of R.W.—
    where the defendant had a prior, friendly relationship with an interrogating officer—to
    conclude that G.O.'s interview was not coercive. The unique facts of R.W. should not be
    used to reframe this factor.
    The relevant analysis is whether G.O.'s complete lack of experience with law
    enforcement techniques is a factor tending to demonstrate involuntariness in his
    statements. See, e.g., Young, 
    220 Kan. at 547
     (describing how lack of any experience
    with "police practices" can be considered in rendering a juvenile confession involuntary).
    As previously explained, G.O. would have had to know and understand that police lie to
    juveniles about the purpose and consequences of interviews in order to have understood
    the implications of the Miranda warnings. G.O., having no prior experience with police
    techniques, was less likely than adults or more experienced juveniles to realize that
    Detective Hayden was lying to him in order to elicit a confession that could be used to
    criminally prosecute G.O.
    This is just one factor to consider when analyzing the totality of the circumstances.
    It alone is not dispositive—but G.O. need not show that he had a prior relationship with
    Detective Hayden that contributed to his misunderstanding of his rights. He merely needs
    to assert that he had no prior experience, which he has done.
    The Totality of the Circumstances
    The totality of the circumstances here demonstrate that G.O. did not voluntarily
    and knowingly waive his Miranda rights and confess to criminal conduct. Detective
    39
    Hayden repeatedly told G.O. that his interview was for therapeutic-type purposes to help
    his sister overcome her mental health struggles. Detective Hayden also promised G.O.
    that his full disclosure during the interview would ensure that he would not get into
    trouble and would not be arrested. That promised benefit strengthened Detective
    Hayden's claims regarding the purpose of the interview. These unfair interview
    techniques, coupled with G.O.'s education, mental health issues, inexperience with law
    enforcement, and his youth all created a coercive interview rendering G.O.'s statements
    involuntary. A juvenile's "inculpatory statement[s] must be voluntary and free from
    coercion or suggestion and must not be the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent
    fantasy, fright, or despair." Gibson, 
    299 Kan. at 215
    . See Mays, 
    277 Kan. at 373
    ; R.W., 58
    Kan. App. 2d at 144. G.O.'s statements were clearly the product of ignorance resulting
    from the detective's deceptive techniques under the circumstances.
    This court must use great care when assessing the validity of juvenile
    confessions—particularly when the determination is such a "close call" as agreed by the
    majority.
    As such, I respectfully dissent.
    40