Dennis Wilcox v. Hi-Desert Memorial Healthcare District , 593 F. App'x 736 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 23 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DENNIS D. WILCOX, M.D., No. 13-55299
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01994-MWF-OP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HI-DESERT MEMORIAL
HEALTHCARE DISTRICT, a California
corporation, dba Hi-Desert Medical
Center; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 11, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN,** District
Judge.
Plaintiff Dennis D. Wilcox, a physician, appeals the district court’s dismissal
with prejudice of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Hi-Desert
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
Medical Center, which terminated Plaintiff’s hospital privileges. Reviewing de
novo, Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2014), we
affirm.
1. Plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred when it stayed this action
pending the resolution of state proceedings is moot, because the state proceedings
have concluded. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of that argument.
2. Claim preclusion bars Plaintiff’s federal claims. We follow California
preclusion rules. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982). We
give preclusive effect to the decision of the Judicial Review Committee because (a)
it acted in a judicial capacity; (b) it resolved disputed issues of fact that were
properly before it; (c) Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claims,
including constitutional claims; and (d) the peer review proceeding and this action
are between the same parties and involve the same primary right, specifically the
right of Plaintiff to maintain staff privileges at Defendant hospital. See Miller v.
County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032–33 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining the
requirements for giving an administrative agency’s decision preclusive effect under
California law); Takahashi v. Bd. of Trs. of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 783 F.2d
848, 851 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an administrative appeal and subsequent
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constitutional claim arising from the termination of the plaintiff’s employment
contract involved the "identical primary right").
3. The district court correctly dismissed the state-law claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. See Westlake Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court,
551 P.2d 410, 411 (Cal. 1976) (holding that, as a general rule, a physician must
exhaust all remedies, including judicial review of an administrative decision,
before bringing an action for reinstatement or damages). Plaintiff is not seeking
relief under a statute as to which there is an "unequivocal[]" expression of
legislative intent to abrogate the exhaustion requirement. Fahlen v. Sutter Cent.
Valley Hosps., 318 P.3d 833, 841 (Cal. 2014). Accordingly, even assuming that
Plaintiff was a whistleblower, his state-law claims are barred because he
abandoned the administrative proceeding voluntarily and failed to seek judicial
review in state court.
4. We have examined Plaintiff’s other arguments and find them
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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