Paul Satterfield v. District Attorney Philadelphia , 669 F. App'x 616 ( 2016 )


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  • DLD-011                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 16-3176
    ___________
    PAUL SATTERFIELD,
    Appellant
    v.
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA;
    ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA;
    SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 2-02-cv-00448)
    District Judge: Honorable Jan E. Dubois
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Summary Action
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    October 13, 2016
    Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: October 26, 2016)
    _________
    OPINION *
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Paul Satterfield is serving a life sentence, imposed in 1985 pursuant to a state-
    court murder conviction. The District Court granted Satterfield’s January 2002 petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus, but we reversed on appeal and remanded with instructions to
    dismiss the petition as time-barred. Satterfield v. Johnson, 
    434 F.3d 185
     (3d Cir. 2006).
    The District Court then dismissed Satterfield’s petition by order dated April 19, 2006.
    Years later, Satterfield, invoking the rule from McQuiggin v. Perkins, 
    133 S. Ct. 1924
     (2013), moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the April 19, 2006 judgment of
    dismissal. The District Court denied relief. We granted Satterfield a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”), and that appeal is pending. See CA No. 15-2190.
    In 2016, Satterfield filed in the District Court a pro se motion under Fed. R. App.
    P. 10(e). 1 He primarily argued that the form used to draft his January 2002 habeas
    petition was supplied by the District Court (see ECF No. 2) and contained pre-printed
    text requiring, in error, identification of a district attorney’s office (“the DA”) as a party-
    respondent (see ECF No. 3). 2 Satterfield argued that only his jailor and the local
    Attorney General were proper respondents, see Habeas Corpus Rule 2(a), yet the DA was
    1
    Fed. R. App. P. 10(e) “authorizes the district court to augment the record in two
    situations: (1) when the parties dispute whether the record truly discloses what occurred
    in the district court, or (2) when a material matter is omitted by error or accident. All
    other questions on the form and content of the record are to be presented to the court of
    appeals.” Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 
    807 F.2d 1150
    , 1165 (3d Cir. 1986).
    2
    Satterfield also argued that the docket failed to reflect the date when his habeas petition
    was served on the other respondents.
    2
    added as a party and the caption was amended to reflect as much (see ECF No. 5).
    Satterfield requested that the District Court excise the DA’s appearance from the record.
    The District Court denied Satterfield’s motion to correct the record on appeal,
    concluding that it had previously rejected his request to, in effect, erase the DA from the
    history of the habeas case. See ECF No. 96 (District Court’s April 15, 2015
    memorandum order), p. 3 n.3 (“The District Attorney was lawfully added as a party to
    this action by Order dated April 9, 2002, and thus had standing to pursue an appeal.”).
    Satterfield timely appealed.
    We exercise jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . “When a district court settles a
    dispute about what occurred in proceedings before it, the court’s determination is
    conclusive unless intentionally false or plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
    Hernandez, 
    227 F.3d 686
    , 695 (6th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Graham, 
    711 F.3d 445
    , 452 (4th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See
    Tourscher v. McCullough, 
    184 F.3d 236
    , 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
    We will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because this appeal
    presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. The District Court
    correctly observed that Satterfield’s challenge to the party-respondent status of the DA
    was previously raised (see ECF No. 94) and rejected (see ECF No. 96). Indeed, we, too,
    have rejected Satterfield’s attempts to invalidate the DA’s participation in his habeas
    proceedings. See CA No. 15-2190 (3d Cir. Oct. 7, 2015) (denying peripheral motions).
    In any event, we perceive no flaws in the record on appeal to this Court—in CA Nos. 04-
    3
    3066, 04-3108 or 15-2190—of the sort complained of by Satterfield and which resulted
    from “error or accident.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2); cf. Marron v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
    
    176 F.2d 313
    , 315 (3d Cir. 1949).
    The District Court’s judgment will, therefore, be summarily affirmed.
    Satterfield’s motions for a COA, to expand the COA in CA No. 15-2190, and for
    expedited adjudication are denied as unnecessary, improper, and moot, respectively.
    4