United States v. Malik , 112 F. App'x 894 ( 2004 )


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  •                    Certiorari granted, April 4, 2005
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 03-4647
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    KAMRAN MUZAFFAR MALIK, a/k/a Nasar A. Khara,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (CR-03-171)
    Submitted:   September 22, 2004            Decided:   November 1, 2004
    Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Atiq R. Ahmed, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Paul J.
    McNulty, United States Attorney, Steve A. Linick, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Kamran Muzaffar Malik appeals his conviction and sentence
    after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit credit
    card fraud in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1028
     (2000).              The Government
    has moved to dismiss the appeal as waived under the terms of his
    plea agreement.      For the reasons stated below, we dismiss the
    appeal insofar as it relates to Malik’s sentence and affirm the
    district court’s judgment.
    Malik   first   contends      the   district   court    abused    its
    discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
    Because    this   issue   does   not    pertain   to   Malik’s    sentence,   we
    conclude Malik has not waived its review on appeal.
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.             United States v.
    Wilson, 
    81 F.3d 1300
    , 1305 (4th Cir. 1996).            A defendant who seeks
    to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing must demonstrate a
    “fair and just reason” for withdrawal of the plea.               Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 32(e). The district court typically considers: (1) whether the
    defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not
    knowing or voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly
    asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay
    between the entry of the plea and the filing of the motion;
    (4) whether the defendant has had close assistance of competent
    counsel;    (5)   whether   withdrawal     will   cause    prejudice    to    the
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    government; and (6) whether it will inconvenience the court and
    waste judicial resources.   United States v. Moore, 
    931 F.2d 245
    ,
    248 (4th Cir. 1991).
    The most important consideration, however, is whether the
    plea colloquy was properly conducted under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
    See United States v. Bowman, 
    348 F.3d 408
    , 414 (4th Cir. 2003),
    cert. denied, 
    124 S. Ct. 1523
     (2004).   We will closely scrutinize
    the Rule 11 colloquy and attach a strong presumption that the plea
    is final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate.   United
    States v. Lambey, 
    974 F.2d 1389
    , 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
    We conclude the plea colloquy was adequate and that none
    of the Moore factors support Malik’s argument strongly enough to
    overcome the strong presumption that Malik’s plea was knowing and
    voluntary.   Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion when it found Malik failed to demonstrate a fair and
    just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.
    With respect to Malik’s sentence, it is well-settled that
    a defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the right to
    appeal under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) (2000), as long as it is the
    result of a knowing and intelligent decision to forego the right to
    appeal.   United States v. Wessells, 
    936 F.2d 165
     (4th Cir. 1991).
    We review the validity of a waiver de novo.      United States v.
    Brown, 
    232 F.3d 399
    , 402-03 (4th Cir. 2000).
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    Because we conclude that Malik knowingly agreed to the
    waiver, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss with respect to
    Malik’s argument that he was sentenced using the incorrect U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual.    We also reject Malik’s contention
    that his sentence exceeded statutory maximums under Blakely v.
    Washington, 542 U.S. __, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
     (2004).        See United
    State v. Hammoud, __ F.3d __, 
    2004 WL 2005622
    , *28 (4th Cir. Sept.
    8, 2004) (No. 03-4253), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __
    (U.S. Aug. 6, 2004) (No. 04-193).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
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