Abdullah R. White v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2021
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2020-SC-0015-MR
ABDULLAH R. WHITE APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE JOHN DAVID SEAY, JUDGE
NO. 12-CR-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant Abdullah White entered an Alford1 plea to murder and pled
guilty to other crimes. He moved the Larue Circuit Court to allow him to
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. After an evidentiary hearing to
determine the voluntariness of White’s plea, the Larue Circuit Court denied his
motion and sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. White appeals the
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the
Larue Circuit Court’s judgment.
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A Larue County grand jury indicted White on fourteen counts, one of
which was murder.2 The Commonwealth elected to seek the death penalty for
the murder charge. White entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth and pled guilty to four crimes: 1) murder; 2) complicity to theft
by unlawful taking; 3) complicity to tampering with physical evidence, and 4)
complicity to receiving stolen property. As to the murder charge White pled
guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). He was
sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement to a total of forty-five years in
prison: thirty years for murder and five years on each of the three complicity
crimes.
Soon after he entered the plea White contacted his attorneys to move the
trial court to allow his withdrawal of the plea, but the attorneys did not do so.
The trial court vacated White’s conviction after an evidentiary hearing. While
White argued that his plea was not voluntary, the trial court was not
persuaded. The trial court vacated the conviction because of the ineffective
2 The original indictment charged White with committing: Count 1) second
degree burglary; Count 2) theft by unlawful taking-automobile; Count 3) complicity to
theft by unlawful taking; and Count 4) being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree. The amended indictment charged White with committing: Count 5) murder;
Count 6) first degree burglary; Count 7) complicity to first degree burglary; Count 8)
tampering with physical evidence; Count 9) complicity to tampering with physical
evidence; Count 10) tampering with physical evidence; Count 11) complicity to
tampering with physical evidence; Count 12) receiving stolen property; Count 13)
complicity to receiving stolen property; and Count 14) being a persistent felony
offender in the first degree.
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assistance of White’s counsel, i.e., their failure to file a motion to withdraw the
plea.
After his conviction was vacated, White moved the trial court to allow
him to withdraw his guilty plea. White again argued that his plea was
involuntary, the grounds being that he pled guilty under extreme mental and
emotional duress and undue pressure. He also argued that his plea was
tainted by the ineffective assistance of his trial attorneys. He moved the court,
if it found the plea to be voluntary, to exercise its discretion under Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.10 and allow him to withdraw the plea.
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced
White according to the plea agreement. White now appeals the denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
ANALYSIS
Although White pled guilty to four crimes, his Alford plea to the murder
charge is at the heart of his appeal. White argues that by not granting his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court erred because his plea was
not voluntary due to pressure from his counsel and his mother to plead guilty
and due to medication usage at the time of the plea. He further argues that
even if his plea was voluntary, the trial court abused its discretion because
despite his guilty plea, he maintained his innocence and was reluctant to plead
guilty.
A guilty plea is valid if it is entered voluntarily and intelligently by the
defendant. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In determining the
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validity of the plea, “[t]he standard [is] whether the plea represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 31 (citations omitted). “An individual accused
of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his
participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Id. at 37. Consequently, a
defendant who chooses to enter an Alford plea does so despite his protestations
of innocence in light of the various alternatives available to him at the time.
RCr 8.10 provides that the trial court may permit a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea before judgment. However, upon the trial court finding
that the plea was not voluntarily made, then the motion to withdraw the plea
must be granted. Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002)
(citations omitted). “A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which
deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.” Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). “Of course, the agents of the State may not
produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
Because of the factual determinations inherent in this evaluation,
Kentucky appellate courts have recognized that “the trial court is
in the best position to determine if there was any reluctance,
misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead
guilty” at the time of the guilty plea and [is] in a “superior position
to judge [witnesses’] credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony” at an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, this Court
reviews a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea only for abuse of discretion by “ascertain[ing]
whether the court below acted erroneously in denying that
appellant’s pleas were made involuntarily.”
4
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Ky. 2001) (internal footnotes
omitted). The trial court’s findings of facts are reviewed for clear error, i.e.,
whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence. Rodriguez,
87 S.W.3d at 10–11.
White asserts his plea was involuntary, partly due to the ineffective
assistance of counsel. To succeed on the claim, White “must demonstrate that:
(1) defense counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance; and that (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for
the deficient performance of counsel, [he] would not have pled guilty, but would
have insisted on going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481
(Ky. 2016) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Bronk, 58
S.W.3d at 486–87). “[T]he trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial
counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty in a
manner which gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and
validity of the plea.” Bronk, 58 S.W.3d at 487.
White particularly asserts that he was coerced into the guilty plea by his
trial counsel telling him that if he went to trial, he would get an all-white jury,
that he would be found guilty, and that he would get the death penalty. He
also claims that his plea was involuntary based on his testimony that he was
on mental health medications on the day he entered the plea.
The trial court’s findings of fact do not reflect that trial counsel’s advice
was presented in the absolute terms described by White. Upon review of the
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hearing and as stated by the trial court, trial counsel testified that she
discussed the ramifications of the racial issues in the case, that she informed
White at the time he was considering whether to enter a guilty plea that he
would likely have an all-white jury, be convicted of murder, and receive the
death penalty. Quoting Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 570 (Ky.
2006), which similarly dealt with an attorney’s assessment and advice
regarding the chance of being tried by a jury without members of the
defendant’s race, that trial court concluded that White’s trial counsel did not
place undue pressure on White but was rather fulfilling her ethical obligation
to fully inform her client of his options and the possible consequences of those
options. We conclude the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous and supported the trial court’s conclusion of law. White fails to
show that his trial counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance, putting to rest his claim that his plea was
involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
White also claims the trial court erred by not finding that he was
pressured by his mother to enter the guilty plea so that information about his
past sexual abuse while a child would not come to light during trial. White’s
mother testified to the contrary during the second evidentiary hearing. The
trial court found her testimony credible. With substantial evidence supporting
its finding and credibility determination resting with the trial court, we
conclude the trial court properly found that White did not experience the
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pressure alleged and thus the family pressure allegation did not provide a
reason to grant White’s motion.3
As to White’s claim that his plea was involuntary because he was on
mental health medication on the day he entered the plea, the trial court
conducted an extensive plea colloquy when White entered his guilty plea. Part
of that exchange was reviewing White’s past mental health treatment, which
led into the trial court questioning whether at that time White was experiencing
any problems thinking or reasoning or was physically sick or ill in any way.
White denied any problems and stated he believed he fully understood what
was happening in his case. Having already concluded after the first evidentiary
hearing that White failed to show his plea was not voluntary, the trial court
was not persuaded by White’s mental health testimony at the second
evidentiary hearing that his plea was not voluntary. The court’s finding is
proper under the clearly erroneous standard, and like the preceding claim, his
allegation regarding the medication usage did not provide a reason to grant
White’s motion.
White argues that even if the plea was voluntarily made, the trial court
abused its discretion under RCr 8.10 by not granting his motion. The test for
an abuse of discretion is whether the trial court’s decision is arbitrary,
3 Even if the trial court had found that White’s mother pressured him to enter
the plea agreement, the trial court would not have necessarily found White’s plea was
involuntary based upon that finding. See Dorsey v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.3d 569,
577–78 (Ky. 2018) (In the context of an RCr 11.42 motion, Dorsey claimed that his
mother pressured him to accept the plea deal. This Court concluded that Dorsey’s
mother may have encouraged Dorsey to accept the plea deal, but her influence did not
constitute coercion.).
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unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). White particularly
argues that as a matter of fairness, the trial court should have granted his
motion because he asked for counsel’s assistance to withdraw his guilty plea
within 24-hours of entering it and he maintained his innocence and was
repeatedly reluctant to enter a guilty plea during the colloquy. However, as the
trial court considered the circumstances of White’s case to not warrant a plea
withdrawal and found White’s plea to be voluntary, we cannot find the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion.
Lastly, White asks this Court to provide more guidance to the trial courts
for judging when to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. He advocates
that Kentucky should adopt a more liberal approach when deciding whether to
allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn prior to sentencing. Citing State v. Phelps,
329 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting United States v. Haygood, 549 F.3d
1049, 1052 (6th Cir. 2008)), White promotes the seven-factor test used by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, those factors being:
(1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the
motion to withdraw it; (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid
reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier in the
proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained
his innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the
guilty plea; (5) the defendant’s nature and background; (6) the
degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the
criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the
government if the motion to withdraw is granted.
White advocates this test because he views Kentucky as not liberally and freely
allowing defendants to withdraw guilty pleas. However, as RCr 8.10 allows a
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court to exercise its discretion when deciding a motion to withdraw a plea,
Kentucky maintains a liberal approach and it is within the trial court’s
province to consider factors like those advocated by White. We find no
compelling reason to alter Kentucky’s approach to dealing with guilty plea
withdrawal prior to judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Larue Circuit Court’s judgment is
affirmed.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Robert Chung-Hua Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
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