Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Norman Wilson , 528 S.W.3d 336 ( 2017 )


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  • RENDERED: AU.GUST 24, 2017
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    2016-sc-000411-D_G
    KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPELLANT
    COMMISSION '
    . ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V. CASE NO. 2014-CA~001023
    JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. .14-CI-000854
    ~NORMAN WILSON AND APPELLEES
    UNI_VERSAL LINEN, LLC .
    OPINION QF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS
    _ ` REVERSING
    'The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) appeals
    from a decision of the Court of Appeals which concluded that Appellee Norman
    Wilson had substantially complied with the verification requirement of KRS
    341.450(1) when he filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking
    judicial review of an adverse decision of KUIC. The Jefferson Circuit Court
    dismissed Wilson’s complaint based upon the decision of this Court in Tay-Ior v.
    Kentucky Unen":,ploymeni.L Insurance Commission, 
    382 S.W.3d 826
    (Ky. 2012).
    The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, citing the substantial
    compliance doctrine implicit in Shrimrock Coal Co. v. Taylor, 
    697 S.W.2d 952
    (Ky. App. 1985). We granted discretionary review to examine the continuing
    viability of Sh,amr'ock in light of our decision in Taylor.1
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    After losing his job, Wilson applied for unemployment compensation.
    When he received an unfavorable ruling from the KUIC, he exercised his
    statutory right of judicial review by filing a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court
    pursuant to KRS 341.450(1). As relevant to our review, KRS 341.450(1j
    provides that a party aggrieved by a final decision of the KUlC may obtain
    judicial review of that decision “by filing a complaint against the commission in
    the [circuit court of the appropriate county]. . . . The'complaint. . . shall be
    verified by the plaintz]jcor his attomey.” [Emphasis added.)
    Wilson’s attorney signed the complaint and Wilson signed an attached
    “verification” page which stated: “I, Norman Wilson, have read in its entirety
    the foregoing plea[ding], and to the best of my limowledge the information
    contained therein is truthful and accurate.” Neither Wilson’s signature, nor
    the signature of his attorney, was notarized or otherwise subscribed under oath
    before an ofEcer authorized to administer oaths.
    1 This case squarely presents the question that evaded review in Spears v.
    Goodwine, 490 S.W;Sd 347, 352 (Ky. 2016]. Spears came to this Court as an appeal of
    a writ of prohibition granted by the Court of Appeals. The underlying case presented
    the question of whether Substantial compliance would intervene to save an unverified
    complaint for judicial review of a decision of a public retirement fund board. We
    resolved the issue purely upon conventional writ analysis and did not address the
    underlying issue of substantial compliance. l
    Citing Taylor, the circuit court concluded that Wilson’s complaint lacked
    the verification expressly required by KRS 341.450(1). Accordingly, the circuit
    court dismissed the action, reasoning that the unverified complaint failed to
    vest that court with the authority to adjudicate the case. On appeal, however,
    the Court of Appeals found Sharrirock to be a more fitting precedent. Shamrock
    holds that a complaint which exhibits “a clear attempt at verification” is
    sufficiently compliant with KRS 341.450(1) to authorize judicial 
    review. 697 S.W.2d at 953
    . Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision
    and reinstated Wilson’s claim.
    II. ANALYSIS
    In Taylor, We reaffirmed the “firmly rooted concept of law in= this state
    that the courts have no jurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative
    agencyl action unless every statutory precondition is 
    satisfied.” 382 S.W.3d at 831
    .2 As a general rule, “[t]here is no appeal to the courts from an action of an
    administrative agency as a matter of right. When grace to appeal is granted by
    statute, a strict compliance with its terms is required.” Board of Adjustments of
    (_Jity of Richmond v. Flood, 
    581 S.W.2d 1
    , `2 (Ky. 1978) _(citations omitted).
    Statutory preconditions for vesting courts with the authority to engage in
    judicial review cannot be satisfied by substantial compliance See City of
    2 We acknowledge that the use of the word “jurisdiction” in this context is
    confusing We clarified in Spears that “[t]he deficiency fof an unverified complaint
    seeking judicial review of an administrative order] has no effect on the_circuit court’s
    subject matter jurisdiction 490 S.W.Bd at 352. However, such deficiency leaves the
    “court without jurisdiction of the particular case.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Devondale v. Stallings, 
    795 S.W.2d 954
    , 957 (Ky. 1990) (“lt is only [when ,
    defects are nonjurisdictional in nature] that a discussion of substantial
    compliance . . . is appropriate.”). Consequently, at least with respect to the
    jurisdictional requirements for invoking judicial review of an administrative
    agency ruling, we have no substantial compliance exception to a statute which
    grants the right to appeal. See Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission
    v. caner, 689 s.w.2c_1 360, 361-362 ny. 1985).
    We also noted in Taylor a significant line of cases holding that the
    verification requirement of KRS 3411450[1) requires strict compliance, and
    that the attorney’s signature alone on the petition could not be regarded as
    satisfying the statutory requirement for verification _ '
    We believe [Monyhan,3 Pickhart,4 Fisher,5 and Carter,6 relied upon
    by Fisherj accurately state the rule in the case before us, and thus
    we hold that a properly verified complaint is required to invoke
    circuit court jurisdiction under KRS 341.450(1), and, further, that
    a CR 11 signature by the claimants attorney is insufficient to
    comply with the verification requirements of the 
    statute. 382 S.W.3d at 830
    .
    The Court of Appeals’ decision in Shamrock is plainly at odds with the
    principle of strict compliance Shamroclc, perhaps artfully, evades the foregoing
    3 Monyhan v. Kentucky Unemploymenf Insurance Commission, 
    709 S.W.2d 837
    (Ky.App.l986L
    4 Pickharc v. U.s. Post omce, 664 s.w.2d 939 (Ky. App. 1983).
    5 F£sher v. Kentucky.Unemployment Insurance Commission, 880 S.W.2d'89 1 (Ky.
    App. 1994). .
    6 Kentucky Unemployment Insurance`Commission v. Carter, 
    689 S.W.2d 360
    (Ky.
    1985L
    4
    principles by avoiding the term “substantial compliance.” lnstead, it holds that
    the defective complaint was in “sufficient compliance” with KRS 341.450(1)
    because it exhibited “a clear attempt at 
    verification.” 697 S.W.2d at 953
    .
    Shamrock states that the pleading in question contained "no more than a
    technical defect” and reaches the curious conclusion that the complaint was
    “verified, though not under oath.” 
    Id. By definition,
    “verification” occurs only when the signatory is “under
    oath.” A statement not made under oath cannot be a “verified statement.” As
    we said in Taylor, citing Black’s Law Dr'ctionary and 3 Am. Jur. 2d Afjidavits §
    8, “verification” means “a formal declaration made in the presence of an
    authorized officer, such as a notary public, by which one swears to the truth of
    the statements in the document.” 382 S.W.Sd at 834.
    For whatever reason, the legislature determined that a complaint filed to
    obtain judicial review of a KUIC decision “shall be verified by the plaintiff or his
    attorney.” (Emphasis added.) A fundamental rule of statutory construction
    commands that “effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and
    sentence of a statute.” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 
    78 S.W.2d 748
    , 750 (Ky.
    1934) (citations omitted). The judiciary is constrained to “giv[e] the words their
    plain and ordinary meaning,” and to “[deduce] the intent of the Legislature . . .
    from the language it used, when it'is plain and unambiguous.” Pearce v.
    University ofLouisville, 
    448 S.W.3d 746
    , 749 (Ky. 2014] (citations omitted). We
    cannot disregard the words of the statute Simply because We think the
    resulting application is harsh or we think the statute would be better without
    them. q
    ln context with the rest of the statute, the meaning of “verifie'd” is plain
    and unambiguous; we must give effect to that word. Every pleading filed in the
    courts must be “signed” by the party’s attorney, or by the party himself if he
    has no attorney. CR 1 1. To construe the verification requirement of KRS
    341.450(1] as being satisfied by the unsworn signature of a party or his
    attorney is tantamount to simply reading the word “verified” out of the statute.
    Shamrock’s conclusion that a signed but unsworn petition was “a clear attempt l
    at verification” and thus in “suffici_ent compliance”.with KRS 341.450(1) is
    untenable.
    In 'Taylor, we noted that unlike the claimant in Shamrock, the claimant in
    Taylor had made “no effort at verification at all” and did not even attain the
    measure of “sufficient compliance” tolerated by the court in Shamrock. “If
    Shamrock Coal is our guide for substantial compliance, Taylor falls short of
    that mark.” 382 S.W.'Sd at 833. By side~steppi`ng the question of Shamrock’s
    continuing viability, we left the door open for its application by the Court of
    Appeals in this case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
    unsworn signature on the verification page of Wilson’s complaint qualified as
    the kind of “clear attempt at verification” tolerated under Shamrock’s concept of`
    “sufficient compliance.” Taylor distinguished, but did not overrule,_ Shamrock.
    We correct that omission now. Shamroclc was wrongly decided and is hereby
    overruled. A complaint subscribed with an unsworn signature lacking
    6
    attestation before a notary or another officer authorized to administer oaths is
    merely a signed pleading sufficient for CR 11,' but, it is not a verified complaint
    as required by KRS 341.450(1). n
    'I‘urning back now to the particular facts of the case before us, the only
    question remaining is whether Wilson’s signed, but unsworn, declaration of the
    truthfulness of the complaint complies with KRS 341 .450(1)’s verification
    requirement Taylo‘r resolved that a complaint certified by the attorney does
    not meet the statutory qualification of being “verified.” We distinguished
    “certification” and “verification” in Taylor. “Verification” is “a formal declaration
    made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public, by
    which one swears to the truth of the statements in the document” but
    “[c]ertification is one’S personal affirmation of belief in the truthfulness of what
    is stated in the 
    document.” 382 S.W.3d at 834
    .
    The critical distinction between certification and verification is the latter’s
    required formality of being under oath and attestation by a third party, the
    notary or other official. Wilson contends that he complied with the
    requirements of KRS 341.450 because his pleading is styled as a “Verified
    Complaint,” it is signed by- his attorney, who is an officer of the court, and
    unlike the complainant in ,Taylor, included a declaration that, to the best of his
    knowledge, the information in the complaint ‘is truthful. He reminds us that
    his signature (though unsworn] was his formal declaration made in the
    presence of his attorney, an officer of the court. We do not quest-ion the
    veracity of Wilson or his attorney.
    The Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by this Court do not generally
    require that a pleading be verified; we are accustomed to merely a certification
    of the pleading. But we have long acknowledged that since there is no basic
    right of appeal to the courts from an action of an administrative agency, the
    General Assembly may prescribe the preconditions under which such an
    appeal must be perfected. Flood, 
    581 S.W.2d 1
    . Consequently, given the
    absence of an authorized officer’s statement attesting that Wilson, or his
    attorney, swore under oath to the allegations of the complaint, we cannot
    regard it as “verified” within the meaning of KRS 341.450(1).
    . III. CONCLUSION
    'Having overruled Shamrock_ and determined that the complaint filed
    herein fails to satisfy the verification requirement of KRS 341.450(1), we
    reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the
    Jeff`erson Circuit Court.
    All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Hughes, Keller, and VanMeter, JJ., concur.
    `Wright,_J., dissents by separate opinion in which Cunningharn, J., join
    WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: l respectfully dissent, as l believe Wilson’s
    substantial compliance with the requirements was sufficient to satisfy the
    _ statutory mandates Specifically, Wilson signed an attached verification page
    stating that he “read in its entirety the foregoing plea[ding], and to the best of
    [his] knowledge the information contained therein is truthful and accurate.” All
    that was absent was the signature of a nota.ry. This oversight could have been
    easily rectified and the merits could have then been properly addressed with no
    prejudice to the opposing party.
    In Taylor v. Kentucky Unemployment lns. Comm'n, 
    382 S.W.3d 826
    , 833
    (Ky. 2012), there Was'“no effort of verification at all.” Therefore, this Court
    distinguished Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. ’l_`aylor, 
    697 S.W.2d 952
    (Ky. App.
    1985) wherein the Court of Appeals had held “a clear attempt at verification is
    sufficient.” l would not overturn Shamrock and would, instead, reaffirm its
    holding. Though his signature was not notarized, Wilson made a clear attempt
    at verification which substantially complied with the statutory requirements
    This is a classic case of form over substance and it does not serve the
    administration of justice. Keeping in mind that we are a Court of Justice, it is
    better for us to resolve the issue on its merits rather than tossing it out
    because the motion was not verified. Therefore, l would affirm the Court of
    Appeals and send the matter back to the Jefferson Circuit Court, which should
    then address the merits of Wilson’s claim. Otherwise, the result is simply
    unjust. The legal arena should not be a large-scale game of “gotcha” where
    people win or lose based on technicalities
    Cunningham, J., joins.
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
    Maria T. Russell
    Patrick Byron Shirley _
    E_ducation and Workforce Development Cabinet
    Office of Legal and Legislative Services
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE NORMAN WILSON:
    Fernando Valdizan
    Alex White
    617 Baxter Av`enue`
    Louisville, KY 40204
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE UNIVERSAL LINEN, LLC:
    Gavin Weinrich
    Smith Greenberg 85 Perkins, PLLC
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016 SC 000411

Citation Numbers: 528 S.W.3d 336

Filed Date: 8/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023