Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government ( 2017 )

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED
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BIG SANDY REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
v. CASE NO. 2015-CA-001464-DR
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
NOS. 13-C-08761 & 15-XX-00009
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY APPELLEE
GOVERNMENT
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority (the Authority) sued the Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Government (the Urban County Government) in district
court seeking reimbursement for the cost of housing prisoners held pursuant
to warrants issued by Fayette County courts. The district court found that the
Urban County Government is entitled to sovereign immunity, and it granted
the Urban County Government's motion to dismiss. The Authority appealed to
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the circuit court, which affirmed, based on its finding that the county of arrest
controls responsibility for incarceration costs. The circuit court did not
address the issue of sovereign immunity, which it deemed moot. The Authority
filed a motion for discretionary review before the Court of Appeals, a motion
that Court denied. The Authority then sought discretionary review before this
Court, which we granted. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the circuit .
court but for different reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
In the 1980s, the Kentucky Department of Corrections closed or
threatened to close county jails in Johnson, Lawrence, Magoffin, and Martin
Counties.· In order to meet thei~ statutory obligation to provide facilities for
incarcerating prisoners, the four countie~ formed the Authority whose pu_rpose
was to construct and operate a regional jail, the Big Sandy Regional Detention
Center (the Detention Center).
The Authority consists of ten members. Each of the founding counties
appoints two members, with Johnson County, the most populous of the
counties, receiving an aqditional member. The final member is the Johnson
County Jailer, because the Detention Center is in Johnson County. The
Authority is an independent body, and the only input the founding counties
have in the operation of the Detention Center is by way of appointment of the
Authority's mei:nbers through the respective counties' judge executives.
The Authority has contracts with the state, the four founding counties,
and Elliott and Morgan Counties to house their prisoners in the Detention
Center. In exchange for housing those prisoners, the Authority·is paid a per
diem by the counties and the state, with the four founding counties paying a
little less than the others. This per diem, along with a small amount from the
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Detention Center's commissary, constitutes the entirety of the revenue
available to operate the Detention Center.
On March 21, 2013, the Authority filed suit against the Urban County
Government in district court. 1 In its complaint, the Authority listed a number
of prisoners who had been arrested by an officer from one of the four founding
coui.J.ties based on warrants issued by Fayette County courts. Although th~
Authority believed it had no contractual obligation to do so, the Authority
agreed to house those prisoners. in the Det~ntion Center until officials from the
Urban County Government could arrange for their transfer to an Urban County
Government facility. The Authority considered those prisoners to be "Fayette
County prisoners" and billed the Urban County Government the per diem for
each prisoner's stay in the Detention Center. The Urban County Government
refused to pay, which led to this action.
The Urban County Government filed a motion to dismiss, and the
Authority filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, the Urban
County Government argued th~t it was immune from suit and, if not immune,
the obligation to pay for the incarceration of prisoners falls on the arresting
county, not on the county that issued the warrant. In its motion, the Authority
argued that the Urban County Government had a statutory obligation to pay
I We note that the Authority initially named other counties but the Authority
voluntarily dismissed those counties, choosing to proceed against only the Urban
County Government. The Authority also initially filed suit in Johnson County district
court but moved to transfer the action to Fayette County district court, a motion the
Johnson County district court granted. Finally, we note that the Authority initially
filed the action on the district court's small claims docket but, without objection, the
court .transferred it to the regular. docket.
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for the incarceration of prisoners whp were being held pursuant to a warrant
issu,ed by a Fayette County court. In its response to the Urban County
Government's motion, the Authority argued that the statute imposing the duty
on counties to provide for the incarceration of prisoners waives immunity by
implication.
The district court found in favor of the Urban County Government and
dismissed the Authority's complaint. In doing so, the court determined that
the Urban County Government is immune and that immunity had not been
waived either explicitly or implicitly. The Authority appealed to the circuit
court, whi;h affirmed, based on its finding that the county of arrest controls
responsibility for incarceration. The circuit court did not address the issue of
sovereign immunity.
On appeal, the Authority argues, as it did below, _that Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 411.025 requires a county that issues an arrest warrant to
provide. for the incarceration of the prisoner arrested pursuant to that warrant,
regardless of where the arrest occurs. The Urban County Government argues
that KRS 411.025, when read in its entir~ty and in conjunction with other
statutory provisions, requires the arresting county to provide for that
incarceration, regardless of what county issued the arrest warrant. The Urban
County Government also argues that it has immunity, which the Authority
disputes.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Resolution of this appeal primarily requires us to undertake
interpretation of a statute. The construction and application of statutes ·is a
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matter of law, which we review de novo, Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu., Inc. v. Com.
Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998), without any deference to the
interpretation afforded by the circuit court. Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474,
476 (Ky. App. 1998) (citing Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc. v. Revenue
Cabinet Commonwealth of Kentucky, 957 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. App. 1997)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Interpretation
1. KRS 441.025
·When interpreting a statutory scheme, we seek to effectuate the
legislature's intent and "[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language is
presµmed to be what the legislature intended." Stinson v. Commonwealth, 396
S.W.3d 900, 903 (Ky. 2013) (citing Revenue Cabinet v. H.E. O'Daniel, 153
S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005)). "The plain-meaning rule is consistent with
directions provided by the legislature on how to interpret the statutes enacted
by it." Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Ky.
20.04) ·(citing KRS 446.015; KRS 446.080(4)). "Only if the statute is ambiguous
or otherwise frustrates a plain reading, do we resort to extrinsic aids such as
the statute's legislative history; the canons of construction; or, especially in the
case of model or uniform statutes, interpretations by other courts." Stinson,
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396 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d
542, 551 (Ky. 2011)).
KRS 441.025(1) states: "The fiscal court of each county shall provide for
the incarceration of prisoners arrested in the c~unty or sentenced or held by
order of the courts in the county." This statute is, at best, unclear, and, at
worst, inapplicable. However, it is the only statute we have. Therefore, we
must interpret it as best we can.
The Authority argues that a county that issues awarrant for an
individual is responsible for the costs of incarcerating that individual, even if
an arrest occurs in another county. The Urban County Government argues
that the county making the arrest is responsible for the costs of incarceration
regardless of which county originated the charges or warrant necessitating the
arrest. The Authority argues that, if the Urban County Government's
interpretation is correct, there is no reason for the second half of the sentence .
because the obligatio.n would always fall on the arresting county. That
argument is. flawed. There are instances where a county, other than the
arresting county, would be responsible for housing prisoners. For example,
KRS 411.025 applies post-conviction to prisoners who have been sentenced by
order of the courts in the county and to inmates held by order of the court as a
result ofa probation violation. It also applies pre-conviction to inmates held by
order of the courts pending trial. It would additionally apply to those held for .
contempt violations.
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However, the Authority's argument that the county that issues a warrant
is responsible for incarceration costs is equally, if not more, flawed. According
to the Authority, the arre~ting county is only responsible for the incarceration
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of prisoners if the arresting county is also the county that issued the warrant
for the prisoner. For this interpretation to be correct, the statute would require
an "and" instead of an "or" and would have been written as: "The fiscal court of
each county shall provide for the incarceration of prisoners arrested in the
county and senten~ed or held by order of the courts in the county." A prisoner
may be held pursuant to warrants from one county or multiple counties. The
Authority's argument does not account for such a situ~tion.
The Court believes that the correct interpretation begins and ends with
the premise of possession and that a prisoner's status flows from possession
and control. Thus, the prisoners in this case were prisoners of Johnson,
Lawrence', Magoffin, and Martin counties because those counties had
possession and control of the prisoners via arrest. Once Johnson, Lawrence,
Magoffin, and Martin counties relinquished the prisoners to Fayette County,
Fayette County became responsible for the costs of incarceration because the
prisoners would then be held by Fayette County pursuant to an ord~r of the
Fayette County courts.
2. Relying on possession and control in interpreting KRS 441.025 is
consistent with the statutory scheme and criminal procedure practice.
a. Statutory Scheme
KRS 441 applies to the operation and management of county jails and
assigns financial responsibility for_ those jails to each fiscal court. Each county
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is obligated to incarcerate its prisoners, an obligation that can be fulfilled by
providing and maintaining a separate county-run jail or by contracting with
another county or city to house the county's prisoners. The General Assembly
did not mandate that counties reimburse each other for the costs of housing
prisoners held by order or judgment of another county. Had the General
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Assembly wanted to impose that obligation, it could have done so. The absence
of any such statutory provision further supports our holding that the county
with possession of the prisoner bears the cost:
b. Criminal procedure practice
We find additional support for our interpretation in the Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 3.02(1) states:
An officer making an arrest Un.der a warrant issued upon a
complaint shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before a judge as commanded in the warrant. If the arrest is .
made in a county othe·r than that in which the warrant was issued
and the arrested person is not taken as commanded in the
warrant, the arrested person shall be taken before a judge· of the
county in which the arrest is made, who shall consider the
defendant for release on personal recognizance and so release the
arrested person or admit the arrested person to bail for his or her
appearance before the proper judge .... If the offense is non bailable,
or if the person arrested is unable to give bail, the judge shall
commit that person to jail and he or she shall be taken as
commanded in the warrant within a reasonable time by an officer
of the county in which it was issued.
In other words, an arrested person must be taken without unreasonable
delay before a judge if not delivered to the county issuing the warrant. Thus,
the rule contemplates that the county of arrest has a responsibility for the
prisoners in its possession, and as such; the county of arrest should bear the
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costs. The rule further provides for transpqrtation of the prisoner to the county
that issued the warrant. ·
The Authority is concerned that there is no time limit during which a
charging county must pick up and transport a prisoner who is arrested and
held in another county. The Authority reasons that Fayette County will delay
picking up its prisoners in Johnson County to avoid the costs of incarceration.
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There is not an established definition for "unreasonable delay;" however; the
courts have held that 48 hours is not unreasonable, see County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U,S. 44 (1991), and some local court rules in the
Commonwealth provide that the defendant will be arraigned no later than at
the next regular motion hour. Ky R Knott Magoffin Cir. Ct. Crim. Cases 2(A).
Thus, the county of arrest should release the ·prisoner or establish bail for the
prisoner within 48 to 72 hours.
If not released, the prisoner will remain in the jail until the county
issuing the warrant arranges for transportation, which must be done within a
·reasonable time. If the county issuing the warrant does not want the prisoner
to go free, that county will arrange for transportation. Otherwise, it runs the
risk that a judge in the arresting county will release the prisoner on bail. Law
enforcement officers, and indeed elected county offidals, should have an
interest in the prosecution of the perpetrators of alleged crimes in their
communities. Furthermore, prosecuting attorneys have an interest in the just
resolution of alleged crimes committed in the counties from which they were
elected. We understand and note the Authority's concerns regarding undue
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delay and its potential fiscal impact. However, for the aforementioned reasons,
this Court has c"onfidence in the abilities of our various counties and their
elected officials to cooperate in the orderly administration of justice.
B. Contract
.Finally, it is undisputed that the Authority has contracts with the state,
the four founding counties, and Elliott and Morgan Counties to house their
prisoners in the Detention Center. The Authority has stated that it has no
legal obligation to accept prisoners from the Urban County Government or from
any other county with which it has not contracted. The Authority is correct to
the extent that it is only responsible for housing prisoners brought to it by
counties with which it has a contract. For example, the Authority is not
required to accept prisoners who were arrested in Fayette County because the
Authority does not have a contract with Fayette County and KRS 441.025
mandates Fayette County to provide for the incarceration of its prisoners.
Certainly, the Authority can accept prisoners brought to it by otl;ler counties,
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but it does so at its own risk. As we have stated herein, law enforcement
officials in the counties of Johnson, Lawrence, Magoffin, and Martin had an
obligation to arrest these indivi~uals who had outstanding warrants against
them, and therefore, the Authority was obligated to accept these prisoners who
were arrested. by officers in those counties. The Authority is entitled to
payment for its costs of housing these prisoners, an entitlement that comes
through the Authority's contract, which needs to be enforced aga.lnst the
appropriate counties~ In this case, those counties are Johnson, Lawrence,
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Magoffin, and Martin which are obligated to pay the costs as the arresting
counties.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order because the
Urban County Government was not responsible for the costs of incarcerating
prisoners not in its possession;
All sitting. Minton, C.J., Cunningham, Hughes and Keller, JJ., concur.
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Venters, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion which VanMeter, J.,
joins. Wright, J., dissents by separate opinion.
VENTERS, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I concur in the result
reached by the Majority opinion, but I disagree with its reasoning. KRS
441.025(1) cannot answer the question before this Court because it was
drafted and enacted by the legislature to perform an entirely different function.
Wringing that statute to squeeze out an answer to the question before us is like
shaking an apple tree hoping that a peach will fall out. It may be, as the
Majority laments, the only statute we have; but it will never produce the fruit
we· need to resolve this dispute.
Like the clever image that simultaneously appears to be the silhouette of
a vase or the silhouettes of two faces, KRS 441.025 when applied to this
controversy
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is perfectly ambiguous;
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a riddle without a solution. However, when
applied t~ its intended purpose, the statute performs perfectly well, and its
meaning is perfectly clear and unambiguous.
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·I respectfully suggest that KRS 441.025(1) is simply inapplicable to the
present controversy. We are loath to say that we have no law that governs this
issue, but I find it preferable to accept the reality of that unappealing choice
than to infuse that statute with meaning never put there by the legislature. As
its title portends, KRS 441.025 simply places the fiscal responsibility for
incarcerating local pr.isoners-those· who have either been arrested in the
county or committed to jail by a court in the county-on the county
· government rathe.r than upon local municipalities or upon the state
government. Each subsection of KRS 411.025 is devoted to that purpose, and ··
that purpose is entirely consistent with the remaining provisions of KRS
Chapter 441.
'i'
KRS 441.025(1) reads as follows: "The fiscal court of each county shall
·provide for the incarceration of prisoners arrested in the county or sentenced
or held by order of the courts in the county." A less concise but grammatically
equivalent restatement of the statute would read as follows:
The fiscal court of each county shall provide for the incarceration
of prisoners who have either been 1) arrested in the county or 2).
sentenced or held by order of the courts in the county.
Plainly stated, county government ("the fiscal court") bears. the fiscal
responsibility for the incarceration of a person 1) arrested in that county; or 2)
sentenced or held pursuant to the order of a court in that county. The
prisoners that are the subject of the pending controversy ~t equally within
either category. They were arrested in counties served by the Big Sandy
Regional Jail; and they were sentenced or held by orders of a court in Fayette
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County. KRS 441.025 does not differentiate or prioritize the fiscal
responsibility for incarceration in either circumstance. I see nothing in .the
language or grammatical structure of the statute that favors the county of
arrest over the county of the court order, or vice versa. The statute cannot
resolve the conflict we face because it was not written to allocate the
responsibility of incarceration between competing counties; it only establishes
that county governments, rather than cities or the state, must bear that
burden.
Consequently, I would adhere to the general rule that in the absence of
applicable statutes, common law principles are controlling. See Kenton &
Campbell Benev. Burial Ass'n -v. Goodpaster, 200 S.W.2d 120, 127 (Ky. 1946).
Insofar as I can determine, there is no common law cause of action for a
Kentucky county (or a regional entity standing in its place) housing a prisoner
to recover its expenses from another county. I would therefore dismiss the
claim of Big Sandy, leaving it holding the bag until the legislature fills the
statutory gap with a solution of its choosing. Accordingly, I would affirm, as
does the Majority opinion, albeit·upo~ different grounds.
'\ VanMeter, J., joins.
WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from the majority's
. interpretation of KRS 441.025(1). The statute reads: "[t]he fiscal court of each
county shall provide for the _incarceration of prisoners arrested in the county or
sentenced or held by order of the courts in the county." I point out that, in.
construing~ statute, "[w]e presume that the General Assembly intended for the
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·statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and for
it to harmonize with related statutes." Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown,
354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011) (citing Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 276
S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008); Lewis v. Jackson E~ergy Cooperative Corporation, 189
S.W.Sd 87 (Ky. 2005)).
Appellant, Big Sandy _Regional Jail Authority, argues that if the arresting ·
county is responsible for the cost of incarceration regardless of the county from
which the charges or warrant originated; then the latter ~lause of the sentence
is meaningless. The majority disputes this interpretation and lists a number. of
circumstances in which a county other than the arresting county would be
responsible for the ~ost of incarceration. A closer examination of each of the
circumstances listed by the majority is necessary for this analysis.
First, the majority points to postconvictiori prisoners sentenced by order
of a county's courts. In this instance, a prisoner would have tO be in the same
county as the court handing down the sentence. If the sentence is for a felony
conviction, then the state is responsible for the cost of post-judgment
incarceration. If the sentence is for a misdemeanor, th_en the sentencing court
would order th~ prisoner to be incarcerated in the jail of the county where the
court is located and in which the crime occurred.
The next instance listed in the majority's opinion involves prisoners held
by court order for probation violations. The court hearing an. alleged probation
violation and ordering a revocation would be the sentencing court. The court
would order the prisoner incarcerated in tl:ie county jail. The state would be
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responsible for felony prisoners and the county in which the court was located
and in which the crime occurred would be responsible for misdemeanor
pnsoners.
The majority opinion also listed prisoners held for ·contempt violations as
a possible example of a circumstance in which a county other than the
arresting county could potentially be responsible for housing prisoners.
Anyone sentenced for a contempt violation would be sen,tenced by the court in
which the contempt occurred. Therefore, the court would order the prisoner
incarcerated in the jail of the county in which the court was located and the
contempt occurred.
The final circumstance listed by the.majority is what occurred in the
present case. In this scenario, an inmate is held pre-conviction by order of _the
court pending trial. The prisoners in the current case were arrested on
warrants from Fayette County courts. The warrants were orders from Fayette
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County courts to arrest person accused of violating the ~aw .in Fayette County
and to bring them before the courts in Fayette County. KRS 441.025 (1) states:
"the fiscal court of each county shall provide for the incarceration of prisoners .
.·.held by order of the courts in the county." The inmates here were held
pursuant to orders from courts located in Fayette County, where the crimes
occurred.
The officers in the counties served by the jail lacked the legal authority to
arrest the prisoners without the orders to arrest from Fayette County. The
statute is clear that the county responsible for the incarceration is the one in
15.
which the court that ordered the incarceration is located. The court located in
the county in which the crime occurred is the court that would have the case
and the court that would be ordering the prisoner held.
"[I]t has been long established the specific provision takes
precedence over the general prov~sion." Porter v. Commonwealth, 841 S. W .2d
166, 168-69 (Ky. 1992) (citing Morgan County Board of Education v. Elliott, 260
Ky. 672, 86 S.W.2d 670 (1935)). The first portion of KRS 441.025(1) provides·
that each county will be responsible for the incarceration of prisoners arrested
in the county. The second portion provides that the county will be responsible
for prisoners held by orders of the courts in the county. If a person is arrested
pursuant to a warrant from Fayette County, then he is being held by order of
·the courts in Fayette County. Therefore, the more specific provision that a .
county is responsible for prisoners held by orders of the courts of the county·
controls-and Fayette County would be responsible for prisoners arrested
pursuant to orders of the courts of Fayette County.
Pursuant to KRS 431.005(1), an officer may arrest a person if they
observe the crime being committed, have sufficient probable cause of a felony
committed in their jurisdiction, or are ordered to do so by order of a court. If
the arrest occurs because the officer observed the crime being committed or
had sufficient probable cause evidence of a felony committed in the officer's
jurisdiction, then the crime occurred in the county that incarcerated the
·prisoner. In short, an officer makes an arrest either for crimes that occur in
his county or pursuant to court order.
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The majority states that "[t]he General A-ssembly did not mandate that
counties reimburse each other for the cost of housing prisoners held by order
or judgment of another County." I must respectfully disagree. The statute
speci~cally states which counties shall provide for the incarceration of
prisoners. It is not for this court to second-guess, alter or revise the
responsibility provided by the legislature. The fact that the legislature did not
specify how and when one county would reimburse another does not change
the fact that it specified who was responsible to provide for the incarceration.
The language of the statute is clear and its meaning is plain. Each
circumstance described in the statute places the responsibility for
incarceration on the county in which the crime occurred and whose courts·
have the case. For those reasons, I dissent from the majority and would
reverse and remand.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Nelson Theodore Sparks
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Charles Edwards III
Michael Keith Horn
LFUCG Department of Law
.,
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