Dana Corporation v. Martin Roberts ( 2016 )


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    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
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    PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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    RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2016
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    $uprrmr Court of ITAtuTtalg
    u Li L,
    2015-SC-000476-WC
    DANA CORPORATION                                                     APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                    CASE NO. 2014-CA-001902-WC
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 03-95433
    MARTIN ROBERTS;
    HONORABLE J. GREGORY ALLEN,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD                                          APPELLEES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    Appellant, Dana Corporation, appeals a Court of Appeals decision that
    affirmed an award of permanent total disability ("PTD") benefits to Appellee,
    Martin Roberts. Dana argues that this Court should reconsider the holding in
    Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 
    276 S.W.3d 775
    (Ky. 2008), and find that
    Roberts's motion to reopen was untimely filed. For the below stated reasons,
    we affirm the Court of Appeals.
    Roberts suffered a work-related injury on September 24, 2001. The
    occurrence of the injury was described as "lower back pain/climbing
    on/ servicing equipment, lower back pain from servicing a machine." Roberts
    and Dana entered into a settlement agreement based on a 23% impairment
    rating which was approved by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on
    February 5, 2004. The settlement did not waive his right to future medical
    benefits.
    On February 11, 2011, Roberts filed a motion to reopen, KRS 342.125(3),
    seeking temporary total disability ("TTD") benefits and payment for medical
    treatment. The motion stated that on April 10, 2010, Roberts began to
    experience intermittent back pain which subsequently increased. Because of
    the symptoms, Dr. David Rouben performed an MRI on Roberts which
    indicated a worsening of Roberts's condition. Dr. Rouben restricted Roberts
    from walking and recommended surgery. Dana objected to the motion.
    However, the Chief Administrative Law Judge ("CALJ") concluded that Roberts
    set forth a prima facie case to reopen and sustained the case for another ALJ to
    review.
    The motion to reopen was assigned to ALJ Lawrence Smith. After a
    review of the evidence, AU Smith found that the procedure recommended by
    Dr. Rouben was reasonable, necessary, and work-related. He issued an
    opinion, order, and award on September 19, 2011, which found Dana
    responsible to pay for the medical treatment. ALJ Smith also ordered Dana to
    pay Roberts TTD from the date of surgery to the time he reached maximum
    medical improvement ("MMI"). Roberts underwent the medical procedure in
    November 2011.
    On April 10, 2013, Dana filed a motion and affidavit to terminate
    Roberts's TTD benefits. Dana stated that Dr. Ellen Ballard conducted an
    2
    independent medical examination ("IME") on Roberts and concluded he
    reached MMI on November 2, 2012. Roberts filed a response to the motion
    arguing that Dr. Rouben was still treating him. Dr. Rouben believed that
    Roberts had not reached MMI.
    On May 23, 2013, Roberts filed a "Motion to Reopen for Increased
    Impairment, Changed and Worsening of Condition, and Total Occupational
    Disability." Roberts alleged that his condition obviously worsened because he
    had to undergo the procedure from Dr. Rouben. Roberts noted in 2003, Dr.
    Rouben assigned him a 23% impairment rating but now pursuant to the AMA
    Guides he falls within DRE Category V, which requires a minimum 25% whole
    person impairment. Roberts also contended he was unable to find any type of
    work. Dana responded by filing a motion arguing that Roberts's motion to
    reopen should be barred by the statute of limitations. KRS 342.125(3). The
    matter was reassigned to ALJ Alison Jones.
    ALJ Jones entered an order sustaining Dana's motion to terminate TTD
    benefits effective June 13, 2013. But, she also overruled Dana's motion to
    dismiss based on 
    Hall, 276 S.W.3d at 775
    . Hall stated that for the purposes of
    KRS 342.125(3), any order which grants or denies benefits tolls the statute of
    limitations. She found that ALJ Smith's order reopening the claim and
    awarding TTD and medical benefits restarted the four year period in which one
    may move to reopen the claim. Thus, since Roberts's motion to reopen was
    filed May 23, 2013, and that was less than four years after ALJ Smith's motion
    granting him TTD benefits, it was timely. A petition for reconsideration filed by
    Dana was denied.
    The Board affirmed in a two to one opinion. Chairman Alvey dissented,
    arguing that the dissent in Hall, which wrote that a reopening may only be filed
    four years after the original opinion or award, was correct. He wrote that while
    KRS 342.125(3) allows for reopening for additional TTD benefits, it does not
    revive the four year statute of limitations every time an order granting or
    denying benefits is entered. He noted that a prime objective of the General
    Assembly in passing KRS 342.125(3) was to restrict and not expand the
    granting of workers' compensation awards. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and
    this appeal followed.
    The Board's review in this matter was limited to determining whether the
    evidence is sufficient to support the ALJ's findings, or if the evidence compels a
    different result. W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 
    827 S.W.2d 685
    , 687 (Ky. 1992).
    Further, the function of the Court of Appeals is to "correct the Board only
    where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
    controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the
    evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." 
    Id. at 687-88.
    Finally, review
    by this Court "is to address new or novel questions of statutory construction,
    or to reconsider precedent when such appears necessary, or to review a
    question of constitutional magnitude." 
    Id. The ALJ,
    as fact-finder, has the sole
    discretion to judge the credibility of testimony and weight of evidence.
    4
    Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 
    695 S.W.2d 418
    (Ky. 1985). KRS
    342.125(3) states:
    [e]xcept for reopening solely for determination of the
    compensability of medical expenses, fraud, or conforming the
    award as set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2., or for reducing a
    permanent total disability award when an employee returns to
    work, or seeking temporary total disability benefits during the
    period of an award, no claim shall be reopened more than four (4)
    years following the date of the original award or order granting or
    denying benefits, and no party may file a motion to reopen within
    one (1) year of any previous motion to reopen by the same party.
    Dana requests that this Court overrule the decision in Hall, 
    276 S.W.3d 775
    , or in the alternative find that this matter is factually distinguishable.   Hall
    held that "original award or order" as used in KRS 342.125(3) indicates the
    statute of limitation runs from either the original award or any order thereafter
    which grants benefits. Hall reasoned:
    That the reference to the 'original award or order granting or
    denying benefits' was intended to encompass orders granting
    benefits other than the 'original award,' is established by several
    additional uses in the same statute. For example, KRS 342.125(1)
    allows an ALJ to 'reopen and review any award or order' on stated
    grounds. (emphasis added). It is uncontestable that the reference
    to 'order' in KRS 342.125(1) encompasses an order different than
    the original award, otherwise there could be no reopening of
    awards changed subsequent to the original award, increasing or
    decreasing benefits, as all must concede is the practice. For
    example, KRS 342.125(1)(d) specifically allows a 'reopening and
    review' upon a Ic]hange of disability as shown by objective medical
    evidence of worsening or improvement of impairment due to a
    condition caused by the injury since the date of the award or
    order.' (emphasis added). If the word 'order' was interpreted to
    refer only to the original award, a 'review and reopening' of a
    subsequently increased or decreased award or order could simply
    not occur. And, KRS 342.125(4) acknowledges that the
    Irleopening shall not affect the previous order or award as to any
    sums already paid thereunder.' (emphasis added). Meaning
    simply, that the new award or order will operate prospective only
    for the remaining term of the award.
    5
    Given our further analysis, the conclusion that an 'order
    granting or denying benefits' was tended to encompass an order
    granting benefits different than an original award or settlement is
    compelling. Thus, the reference in KRS 342.125(3) to the original
    award or order granting or denying benefits,' must necessarily refer
    not only to the original award, but to any subsequent order
    granting or denying benefits.
    
    Hall, 276 S.W.3d at 784-85
    .
    We decline to reverse Hall at this time. Addtionally, we do not find that
    the facts in this matter prevent the application of Hall. Admittedly, the motion
    in Hall, which tolled the statute of limitations, was filed closer to the original
    order than the one in this matter. However, the fact remains that ALJ Smith's
    order, entered on September 19, 2011, awarded Roberts TTD benefits and is an
    order which restarted the four-year statute of limitations in KRS 342.125(3).
    Thus, Roberts's motion to reopen filed on May 23, 2013, was timely filed and
    shall not be dismissed.
    For the above stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of
    Appeals.
    All sitting. Cunningham, Keller, Noble, Venters, and Wright, JJ., concur.
    C.J. Minton, dissents as follows: I must respectfully dissent as I did in Hall v.
    Hospitality Resources, Inc., 
    276 S.W.3d 775
    (Ky. 2008), because I believe that
    KRS 342.125(3) does not allow for the reopening of a claim filed more than four
    years after the initial award or order granting or denying benefits. Hughes, J.,
    joins.
    6
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
    DANA CORPORATION:
    Guillermo Alfredo Carlos
    James Burke Cooper
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    MARTIN ROBERTS:
    Stephanie Nicole Wolfinbarger
    Jessica Jarboe Logsdon
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015 SC 000476

Filed Date: 7/11/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/14/2016