Alicia Howeth-England v. Kentucky Department of Corrections ( 2015 )


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    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
    THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."
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    RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2015
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    ,Suprrntr &turf of (4,4rttfuritv
    2014-SC-000166-WC
    ALICIA HOWETH-ENGLAND                                                   APPELLANT
    ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
    V.                     CASE NO. 2013-CA-000933-WC
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION NO. 10-78249
    KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS; RAFAEL PRIETO, M.D.;
    HONORABLE ALISON E. JONES,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD                                             APPELLEES
    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
    AFFIRMING
    Appellant, Alicia Howeth-England, appeals from a Court of Appeals
    opinion which affirmed a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board that
    denied her enhanced benefits due to a safety violation. Howeth-England
    argues that she is entitled to the, safety violation penalty enhancement because
    her employer failed to alert her to the existence of or fix a metal plate located
    on the floor which caused her to fall. For the below stated reasons, we affirm
    the Court of Appeals.
    Howeth-England was employed by the Kentucky Department of
    Corrections ("DOC") as a corrections officer at the Western Kentucky
    Correctional Complex ("WKCC"). On August 29, 2010, while walking through a
    prison dormitory, she stubbed her toe on a metal plate in the floor, causing her
    to fall and injure her back. As a result of her fall, Howeth-England has
    undergone two lumbar hemilaminotomy surgeries at L5-S 1. She has not
    returned to work. Howeth-England claims she is physically unable to return to
    employment as a corrections officer and that she cannot work full time due to
    back pain and spasms in her lower back and left leg. She filed for workers'
    compensation.
    As a part of the claim, James Purdy, a safety specialist at WKCC,
    testified. He stated that the metal plate, which Howeth-England tripped on,
    was a part of a dormitory which was constructed more than twenty years ago.
    The plate rose approximately three-eighths of an inch above the floor and was a
    brown color approximately a shade darker than the floor. Since the accident,
    the plate has been painted yellow and its edges ground down. Purdy was
    unaware of any prior injuries caused by the plate or any documented
    complaints about it.
    Howeth-England also testified and stated that the area where the plate
    was located was "kind of dark." She was unaware the plate existed until she
    fell. She believed the metal plate was approximately twenty inches by twenty
    inches.
    After reviewing the evidence, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALI") issued
    an opinion, order, and award granting Howeth-England temporary total
    disability benefits and partial permanent disability ("PPD") benefits based on a
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    twenty percent whole person impairment rating. The ALJ also found the metal
    plate constituted a safety violation pursuant to KRS 338.031 and awarded
    Howeth-England a thirty percent increase in her PPD benefits pursuant to KRS
    342.165(1).
    DOC filed a petition for reconsideration' requesting additional findings of
    fact on the alleged safety violation and arguing that the safety violation penalty
    should not be applied. The ALJ affirmed her previous opinion but did amend it
    to include the following additional findings:
    [DOC] relies on the fact that no one had previously complained
    about or been injured by the plate in the floor. The ALJ finds that
    this fact is not sufficient to avoid liability for a safety violation
    penalty. An employer should not be able to avoid taking corrective
    measure to ensure the safety of its employees until one of its
    employees sustains an injury. Moreover, the ALJ does not believe
    that an employer should be permitted to remain "willfully blind" to
    obvious hazards that its employees might encounter in the
    workplace.
    While certain hazards might not be easily ascertainable, and
    therefore, not sufficient to give rise to a finding of an intentional
    violation, the A1.0 found that this case presented the type of safety
    violation that even a layperson could easily recognize. In other
    words, it is common sense that an unmarked, raised plate in a dim
    walkway poses a tripping hazard.
    The DOC appealed the ALJ's decision to apply the safety violation penalty
    to the Board. The Board agreed with the DOC that the safety violation penalty
    should not apply and reversed the ALJ. In so doing, the Board stated:
    Here, the record indicates [DOC] could not have known the metal
    plate posed any kind of a safety hazard before August 29, 2010.
    To permit the factual scenario in the case sub judice to justify a
    safety penalty would broaden the application of the statute to
    1   Howeth-England also filed a petition for reconsideration which is not pertinent to
    this appeal.
    3
    include factual situations not contemplated by the Supreme Court
    and the legislature.
    Howeth-England appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the Board erred
    as a matter of law by substituting its own judgment for that of the ALJ's as to
    the weight of evidence on a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
    and this appeal followed.
    As an initial matter, we note that the ALJ has sole discretion to evaluate
    the weight of the evidence presented.    Whittaker v. Rowland, 
    998 S.W.2d 479
    ,
    481 (Ky. 1999). On appeal, the Board's review is limited to determining
    whether the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the ALJ, or if the
    evidence compels a different result.    Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 
    827 S.W.2d 685
    , 687 (Ky. 1992). The Court of Appeals is only required to reverse
    the Board"if it overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or
    committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
    injustice' 
    Id. at 687-688.
    The first question which must be answered in this appeal is whether the
    DOC violated the "general dutiesP provision of Kentucky's Occupation Safety and
    Health Act, KRS 338.031(1). Then we must determine whether that violation
    entitles Howeth-England to the enhanced safety violation benefits pursuant to
    KRS 342.165(1).
    I. THE DOC VIOLATED KRS 338.031(1)
    KRS 338.031(1), Kentucky's general duties statute, states that, "Each
    employer: (a) Shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
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    employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
    likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; (b) Shall
    comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this
    chapter" A violation of KRS 338.031 occurs when the four-part test outlined in
    Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Offutt, 
    11 S.W.3d 598
    , 599 (Ky.
    App. 2000), is satisfied. That test states that an employer is deemed to have
    violated KRS 338.031 when:
    (1) [a] condition or activity in the workplace presented a hazard to
    employees; (2) [t]he cited employer or employer's industry
    recognized the hazard; (3) [t]he hazard was likely to cause death or
    serious physical harm; and (4) [a] feasible means existed to
    eliminate or materially reduce the hazard.
    
    Id. at 599
    (quoting Nelson Tree Services, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health
    Review Commission, 
    60 F.3d 1207
    , 1209 (6th Cir. 1995)).
    Performing the Offutt test indicates that the DOC violated KRS
    338.031(1). First, the raised metal plate upon which Itoweth-England tripped
    presented a hazard to DOC employees. Not only did the metal plate rise almost
    three-eighths of an inch above the floor, but it was also a color which was only
    a shade different from the tile color and was located in an area of the dormitory
    that was dimly lit. Second, a metal plate or any item which constitutes a
    tripping risk for employees is a hazard which is, or should be, generally
    recognized by employers. Third, the metal plate was a hazard which, while not
    likely to cause death, can cause serious physical harm to anyone who trips
    over it. This is evidenced by the serious injuries Howeth-England has suffered
    in this matter. Finally, a feasible means existed to remedy the hazard that the
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    metal plate represented. The DOC ground down the edges of the metal plate
    and painted it yellow after Howeth-England's accident indicating that a means
    existed to reduce the risk of tripping. Thus, the metal plate which Howeth-
    England tripped over at WKCC satisfies the Offutt test, and accordingly
    constituted a violation of KRS 338.031(1). However, as shown by the next
    section,' a finding that the DOC committed a violation of the `general duties?'
    provision of Kentucky's Occupation Safety and Health Act does not
    automatically entitle Howeth-England to the safety violation enhancement.
    II. THE DOC DID NOT INTENTIONALLY VIOLATE THE GENERAL
    DUTIES STATUTE
    A violation of KRS 338.031(1) can satisfy the requirement in KRS
    342.165 that a"specific statute be intentionally ignored. However, not every
    violation of KRS 338.031(1) is egregious enough to justify granting a safety
    violation enhancement. Before the safety violation enhancement is applied it
    must be shown that the employerIntentionally disregarded a safety hazard
    that even a lay person would obviously recognize as likely to cause death or
    serious physical harm!' Hornback v. Hardin Memorial Hospital, 
    411 S.W.3d 220
    , 226 (Ky. 2013).
    Several cases have held that a violation of KRS 338.031(1) entitles a
    claimant to receive the safety violation enhancement. In Apex Mining v.
    Blankenship, 
    918 S.W.2d 225
    (Ky. 1996), an employee was injured in an
    accident caused by the defective condition of a road grader he was operating.
    The safety violation enhancement was applied because It]here was substantial
    6
    evidence that the employer was aware of the defective condition of the grader,
    and it is apparent, even to the lay person, that a piece of heavy equipment
    without breaks, with a decelerator that is not in the proper condition, and with
    a throttle which is fastened in the wide open position creates a safety hazard."
    
    Id. at 229.
    The safety penalty also was applied for a violation of KRS 338.031(1) in
    Brusman v. Newport Steel Corp., 
    17 S.W.3d 514
    (Ky. 2000), when an employee
    was crushed to death while riding on the side of a railroad car. The accident
    occurred because there existed a "pinch point" between the car the employee
    was riding and an adjoining railcar which had walls that bowed out
    approximately two feet. The safety violation penalty was justified because, "(1)
    an obvious hazard was created by the presence of railroad cars with bowed
    sides; (2) complaints about such cars had been raised at a safety meeting a
    month before the accident; and (3) workers routinely rode railway cars,
    including the lead car without punishment." 
    Id. at 520.
    Finally in 
    Hornback, 411 S.W.3d at 227
    , where an employee was seriously injured by falling down
    an elevator shaft due to a failed rescue attempt, the safety violation penalty
    was applied because the employer, in attempting the rescue, did not "take any
    prophylactic measures [to] prevent Hornback from suffering her ultimate fate of
    falling into the open elevator shaft." Key to this holding was a finding that the
    employer was made aware of the dangers of a poorly performed elevator rescue
    and intentionally disregarded them.
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    Comparing the facts of the present matter to prior case law, we cannot
    find that the DOC committed an intentional violation of the general duties
    ,
    statute. In the above cited cases, the employer was aware of the dangers which
    ultimately caused the employee's severe injuries or death. However, the
    employer in all of those cases decided to either disregard general safety
    protocols or ignore obviously dangerous issues. In contrast, Purdy, the safety
    specialist at WKCC, testified that the DOC was unaware of any prior injuries
    caused by the plate during the dormitory's twenty year history or any
    documented complaints about it by any employee. Based on this, and the fact
    that uneven floors such as this are not a blatantly dangerous condition, the
    DOC's failure to recognize that the plate could be a tripping hazard is not
    egregious enough to find that an intentional violation of the general duties
    statute occurred. Thus, Howeth-England is not entitled to enhanced benefits
    for a safety violation.
    For the above stated reasons we affirm the decision of the Court of
    Appeals.
    Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Keller, Noble, and Venters, JJ.,
    sitting. All concur.
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    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,
    ALICIA HOWETH-ENGLAND:
    Rickie A. Johnson
    Rodger Wayne Lofton
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS:
    Kenneth Lance Lucas
    Sarah C. Rogers
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
    RAFAEL PRIETO, M.D.:
    Rafael L. Prieto, M.D., pro se
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