Rickey Allen Rhoton v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )

RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2020
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2019-SC-0298-DG
RICKEY ALLEN RHOTON APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2018-CA-0254
BATH CIRCUIT COURT NO. 17-CR-00002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
Rickey Allen Rhoton entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-
degree possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled
substance not in original container, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Rhoton was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, probated for three years. He
now appeals the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of the Bath Circuit Court's denial
of his motion to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of October 1, 2016, Kentucky State Police Trooper
Joseph Zalone was on routine patrol in the Peasticks community of Bath
County. Trooper Zalone knew of the area’s reputation as a high-crime area for
drug trafficking and illegal possession of narcotics. Trooper Zalone observed a
blue Toyota Camry with an unbelted passenger. Trooper Zalone executed a
traffic stop of the vehicle which was driven by Rhoton. Trooper Zalone
approached Rhoton's window and observed a small, screw-top metal canister,
approximately two inches long by one-and-a-half inches wide, in the center
console. The canister was of a type that, in Trooper Zalone’s experience, was
often used to conceal illegal narcotics. Trooper Zalone asked Rhoton if he had
any drugs in the car, to which Rhoton responded negatively. Rhoton declined
Trooper Zalone's request to search the vehicle.
Trooper Zalone returned to his cruiser with Rhoton’s license and
registration as well as the passenger’s relevant information. Trooper Zalone
radioed for assistance from a nearby canine unit as he began preparing the
citation. Trooper Zalone testified that it ordinarily took him ten to fifteen
minutes to complete a citation for a seatbelt violation. Trooper Zalone ran the
ordinary records checks on Rhoton and his passenger, discovering the
passenger had an unrelated active arrest warrant. Owingsville Police Officer
Bud Lyons and his drug dog arrived 25 minutes after the initial traffic stop and
while Trooper Zalone was still in his vehicle preparing Rhoton’s citation and
confirming information regarding the passenger’s warrant. At this point, Officer
Lyons assisted Trooper Zalone in removing Rhoton and his passenger from the
vehicle.
After removing Rhoton and his passenger from the vehicle, Officer Lyons
conducted an external sweep of Rhoton’s car, and the dog alerted to the driver's
2
door. Once the door was opened, the dog also alerted to the driver's seat.
Trooper Zalone then searched the interior of the automobile in the area the dog
alerted and found a partially zipped pouch between the driver's seat and center
console. He could see the orange-capped tips of two syringes partially sticking
out of the pouch. Upon further inspection of the pouch, Trooper Zalone found
additional syringes and plastic wrap containing crushed and melted pills. The
metal canister in the console was empty. Rhoton accepted ownership of the bag
and admitted that the pills were oxycodone. Rhoton was arrested and
subsequently indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance,
possession of a controlled substance not in original container, and possession
of drug paraphernalia.
Rhoton moved the trial court to suppress the evidence seized during the
traffic stop arguing that Trooper Zalone impermissibly prolonged the stop to
facilitate the dog sniff search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied Rhoton’s request. The trial court found two rationales for the denial.
First, the trial court found that Trooper Zalone’s extension of the stop was not
excessive given the need to take Rhoton’s passenger into custody pursuant to
his outstanding warrant. Second, even absent the need to take the passenger
into custody, the trial court found that Trooper Zalone’s observation of the
metal canister taken in conjunction with the stop occurring in a high-drug
activity area, provided reasonable articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal
activity sufficient to prolong the traffic stop. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. Rhoton filed a motion for discretionary review which we granted.
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 8.27 governs motions to
suppress evidence and requires the trial court to “state its essential findings on
the record.”1 A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed under a
two-prong test. First, we review the trial court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard.2 Under this standard, the trial court's findings of
fact will be conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.3 Second,
we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts.4 In the
current case, the facts are largely undisputed, and the issue turns on the
second prong of the suppression test: did the trial court and Court of Appeals
properly apply the facts to the law?
III. ANALYSIS
Rhoton moved to suppress the incriminating evidence discovered in his
vehicle, as well as his subsequent admissions, on the basis that the evidence
was the fruit of an illegal search that occurred after the lawful traffic stop was
unlawfully extended. “It has long been considered reasonable for an officer to
conduct a traffic stop if he or she has probable cause to believe that a traffic
1 RCr 8.27(5), RCr 8.20(2); see also Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.
2 A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial
evidence, that is, “evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp.
v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998) (citations omitted).
Davis v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 288, 290 (Ky. 2016) (citing Simpson v.
3
Commonwealth, 474 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Ky. 2015)).
4 Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 417 (Ky. 2013).
4
violation has occurred.”5 Furthermore, an officer’s subjective motivations for
the stop are not relevant, “[a]s long as an officer ‘has probable cause to believe
a civil traffic violation has occurred[.]’”6 While officers may detain a vehicle and
its occupants to conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be excessively
intrusive and must be reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the
initial seizure.7 The United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. United States
said that even a de minimis delay beyond the time needed to pursue the
original purpose of the stop fails a constitutional test absent other
circumstances.8
An officer’s ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop do not
impermissibly extend such stop.9 Included in such ordinary inquiries are an
officer’s review of the driver’s information, auto insurance and registration, and
the performance of criminal background checks of the driver and any
passengers.10 In order to extend the stop beyond that required to complete its
initial purpose, something must occur during the stop to create a “reasonable
and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”11
Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Ky. 2013) (citing Wilson v.
5
Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2001)).
6 Id. (quoting Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749); see also Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 291.
7 Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 292 (citing Turley, 399 S.W.3d at 421).
8 575 U.S. 348, 356-57 (2015).
9 See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 293.
10 Carlisle v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168, 176, 179 (Ky. 2020).
11 Turley, 399 S.W.3d at 421 (citing United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 353
(6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotes omitted); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005) (“A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket
5
Our two most recent cases applying Rodriguez are Commonwealth v.
Smith12 and Carlisle v. Commonwealth.13 In Carlisle, rendered earlier this year,
we affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress.14 Rodney Carlisle
was the passenger in a truck driven by Christopher Hughes that was stopped
by officers for improper equipment.15 Officers took Hughes’s and Carlisle’s
identification and, upon doing a check, found Hughes’s driver’s license was
suspended and that both had prior convictions for drug or gun charges.16
Officers told Hughes and Carlisle there would be no citation issued, but
Hughes had to park the truck and leave it at a nearby gas station.17 Officers
then requested, and received, permission to search the truck.18 During the
search, they found a backpack, apparently belonging to Carlisle, containing
items associated with the drug trade including unused syringes, multiple cell
phones, and butane.19 The discoveries led officers to believe that any drugs
to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete that mission.”)
12 542 S.W.3d 276 (Ky. 2018).
13 601 S.W.3d 168.
14 Id. at 171.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 172.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 173.
6
were likely on Hughes’s or Carlisle’s persons.20 A search of Carlisle’s person
resulted in the discovery of marijuana and methamphetamine.21
Carlisle, in his motion to suppress, argued that officers illegally extended
the traffic stop beyond its original purpose and that their continued detention
of Carlisle after the conclusion of the traffic stop was an illegal seizure.22 We
stated that the stop had not concluded; rather, officers had reason to maintain
control of the scene to ensure that Hughes did not continue to drive the vehicle
with faulty equipment and a suspended license.23 We further said that it was
uncontroverted that running a check for outstanding warrants is a routine task
associated with a proper stop.24 Importantly, we then held that an officer may
ask for identification and perform criminal records checks of the driver and any
passengers during a lawful traffic stop as an ordinary measure related to officer
safety.25 Relying on the logic from Pennsylvania v. Mimms26 and Maryland v.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 174.
23 Id. at 176.
24 Id. at 177 (citing Moberly v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 26, 30 (Ky. 2018));
see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 293.
25 Id. at 179; see also State v. Allen, 779 S.E.2d 248 257 (Ga. 2015).
26434 U.S. 106 (1977) (ordering the driver out of a vehicle during a traffic stop
is permissible in the interest of officer safety and not an arbitrary interference with the
individual’s rights).
7
Wilson,27 we held that officers may detain passengers for the entire duration of
the stop, including warrant and background checks, as a safety measure.28
In Smith, police detectives were surveilling Smith based on an
informant’s tip that Smith was trafficking cocaine.29 During this surveillance,
detectives did not observe any of the typical indications of drug activity by
Smith.30 One evening, a detective observed Smith “interact[ing] with another
resident of his apartment building” at a gas station and followed Smith home.31
At some point during the drive, Smith failed to use a turn signal.32 The
detective called in a prepositioned canine unit to initiate a stop.33 The canine
officer found Smith to be cooperative, but nervous.34 The officer then led his
dog on a sniff search of Smith’s car resulting in the discovery of seven grams of
cocaine.35 The entire incident from stop to arrest was eight minutes.36 The trial
court found the use of the dog impermissibly extended the stop, as the “search
27 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (extending Mimms to permit ordering of passengers out
of a stopped car).
28 Carlisle, 601 S.W.3d at 181.
29 Smith, 542 S.W.3d at 278.
30 Id. at 283-84.
31 Id. at 278-79.
32 Id. at 279.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
8
exceeded what was reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the traffic
stop.”37 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.38
In Smith, we said that the canine officer’s interactions with Smith were
inconsistent with the reason for the stop.39 In fact, the officer conducted a dog
sniff search instead of completing the ordinary elements of the stop.40 We
stated:
[t]he legitimate purpose of the traffic stop…was to cite [Smith] for
making an improper turn…. [I]nstead of diligently pursuing the
purpose of the traffic stop, [the officer] seemingly abandoned the
legitimate purpose of issuing a traffic citation because he
immediately asked [Smith] about drugs and launched the dog’s
sniff search.41
The officer in Smith failed to diligently pursue the traffic violation, abandoning
that mission for the drug sniff search of Smith’s vehicle.42 Prior to the stop,
officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop of Smith’s
car for anything other than the traffic violation, and nothing in the traffic
violation or his interaction with the officer during the stop changed this fact.43
For that reason, we held that the sniff search of Smith’s car was an
37 Id.
38 Id. at 280.
39 Id. at 284.
40 Id. at 281.
41 Id. at 281-82.
42 Id. at 282.
43 Id. at 283-84.
9
impermissible extension of the stop and affirmed the lower courts’ suppression
of the evidence.44
In the present case, Rhoton was stopped for the failure of his passenger
to use a seatbelt. As part of the stop, Trooper Zalone asked for identification
from both Rhoton and the passenger from which he ran an ordinary
outstanding warrants search. A warrants search resulted in a notification of an
outstanding arrest warrant for Rhoton’s passenger, necessitating actions on
Trooper Zalone’s part to execute the warrant. The total encounter was twenty-
five minutes, approximately ten minutes longer than Trooper Zalone’s estimate
of what an ordinary stop for a seatbelt violation would take. Rhoton avers that
this ten-minute addition was an impermissible delay and should result in the
suppression of the evidence found during this period. We disagree.
It is true that Trooper Zalone stated an ordinary stop for a seatbelt takes
ten to fifteen minutes, but this was not an ordinary stop. The routine warrants
check, permitted under Rodriguez and our own precedents, returned an
outstanding warrant for Rhoton’s passenger. This new fact provided
independent probable cause to extend the stop for an amount of time
reasonably necessary to address the outstanding warrant.45 It would be
inconsistent for the law to allow the routine check for outstanding warrants,
44 Id. at 280.
45 See United States v. Offord, 788 Fed Appx. 384 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding the
stop was not impermissibly delayed by officer’s actions to address passenger’s
outstanding warrant); see also Bolin v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Ky. App.
2019) (holding the stop was not improperly delayed where stop had already morphed
into an arrest).
10
yet not allow the officer the time or space to act when such a warrant is
discovered. Furthermore, unlike the officer in Smith, Trooper Zalone did not
entirely abandon the purpose of the initial stop and had an independent reason
to maintain control of the scene given his new information.
Rhoton goes on to argue, even if the outstanding warrant was new
information that Trooper Zalone was privileged to act upon, he could have done
so in a way that permitted Rhoton to go on his way prior to the canine unit’s
arrival. Perhaps Trooper Zalone could have proceeded in such a manner, but
as we stated in Carlisle, officers have an interest in securing those at the scene
until the stop is complete.46 While Carlisle applied to passengers at the scene,
the same logic applies to the driver when the passenger has now become the
subject of the stop. We therefore hold that discovery of an outstanding warrant
as part of a traffic stop provides new probable cause for the resulting increased
duration of such stop. We further hold that such increase does not
impermissibly delay the individuals subjected to the stop, and, in the interest
of officer safety, all those involved in the stop may be detained until the stop is
complete. We reiterate, however, that this new purpose of the stop must be
diligently pursued, and any prolonging of the stop must be related to this new
purpose. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals and the Bath Circuit
Court regarding Rhoton’s motion to suppress.
46 601 S.W.3d at 181; see also U.S. v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding it was not an impermissible de facto arrest to detain driver while officer talked
to passenger).
11
Because we hold today that the tasks associated with the arrest of
Rhoton’s passenger provided an independent justification to seize Rhoton and
his vehicle and that discovery of the warrant was related to the initial stop, we
do not need to, and decline to, address whether Trooper Zalone’s observations
of the metal canister and location of the stop provided a separate, independent
justification to extend the stop.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that actions taken to facilitate the arrest of Rhoton’s passenger
did not impermissibly extended his traffic stop. Therefore, his motion to
suppress the evidence resulting from the subsequent use of the narcotics dog
was correctly denied. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of
Appeals and the Bath Circuit Court on this issue.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
James Daryl Havey
Assistant Attorney General
12