Marcellus Phagan v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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RENDERED: MARCH 25, 2021
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2019-SC-0445-MR
MARCELLUS PHAGAN APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE
NO. 18-CR-00109
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Marcellus Phagan appeals as a matter of right from the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court sentencing him to a term of twenty years’
imprisonment following his conviction at a jury trial on rape and sodomy, both
in the second degree. After a careful review, we affirm.
In 2016 Phagan resided in a trailer in Paducah with his girlfriend,
Modesty Nunn, their infant son, and Nunn’s thirteen-year-old goddaughter,
Ashley.1 Ashley testified that one night in mid-July, she was talking on her cell
phone using the speaker function while she showered. During the
conversation she received a text message telling her to get off the phone while
1 To protect the child’s privacy, she will be referred to using a pseudonym.
she was showering. Ashley believed the message came from Phagan. She
stored his number in her phone under the name “Mac” with a moneybag emoji
beside the name. After her shower, Ashley went to the living room and began
playing a video game while Phagan sat on the couch.
Phagan offered to help Ashley with the game when he noticed she was
struggling. After playing together for a time, Phagan pushed Ashley’s head
toward his penis and she performed oral sex on him. He did not ejaculate but
made Ashley promise to tell no one about the event. The pair then went to
Ashley’s room where Phagan told her to undress and they engaged in sexual
intercourse. Phagan did not wear a condom and ejaculated on the bed. Ashley
stated she and Phagan had sex in her bedroom again on August 8, 2016, and
she performed oral sex on him in a car outside a barbershop in November
2017.
On December 20, 2017, Ashley told her mother, Santana Reed, about the
sexual encounters with Phagan. Reed contacted the McCracken County
Sheriff’s Office to report the crimes. Ashley told the responding deputy Nunn
was not home when the sexual acts occurred. She later testified this was
untrue, but she told the officer that to keep Nunn from being in trouble.
Ashley also reported to the deputy she and Phagan never called or texted one
another.
Detective Sarah Martin later interviewed Ashley. During the interview,
Ashley showed Det. Martin a text thread between herself and “Mac” from
October 29, 2017, which alluded to a relationship between the pair as well as a
request from him for sex. Det. Martin took photographs of the text messages
as well as the contact information stored for “Mac.” She confirmed with Ashley
and Nunn that the phone number belonged to Phagan. She also entered the
phone number in the search bar on Facebook and concluded the number
belonged to Phagan.
Following the interview with Ashley, Det. Martin, accompanied by
Captain Ryan Norman and Captain Jesse Riddle, interviewed Phagan at the
Sheriff’s Department in Johnson County, Illinois. The interview was not
recorded2 nor was there documentation of any waiver by Phagan of his Miranda
rights, but a report of the interview was completed the same day. Det. Martin
testified Captain Norman read Phagan his rights and he agreed to speak with
the officers, a point confirmed in later testimony by both Captains Riddle and
Norman. Phagan denied the allegations several times before admitting the oral
sex and sexual intercourse did happen on the same day as back-to-back
occurrences. He stated Ashley came on to him while he was sitting on the
couch and, although he knew it was wrong and he felt badly about it, he went
forward with the sexual contact.
At trial, Phagan testified in his own defense. He admitted some people
called him “Mac.” He generally denied having any sexual contact with Ashley,
denied sending her any text messages, and denied making any admissions to
2 Det. Martin testified she believed Illinois laws prohibited recording interviews
without first obtaining consent from the interviewee. For reasons unestablished in the
record, Det. Martin chose not to seek Phagan’s consent.
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Det. Martin during his interview. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked
Phagan if he believed there was a conspiracy against him and whether Ashley
and the three officers were lying, a line of questioning which drew a mistrial
motion from the defense. The trial court denied the motion but agreed to
admonish the jury.3 Three additional defense witnesses described Ashley as a
dishonest person with a reputation for lying.
The jury convicted Phagan of one count of rape and one count of sodomy,
both in the second degree, based on the occurrences in July 2016. He was
acquitted of an additional count of rape in the second degree and a count of
sodomy in the third degree. The jury fixed his punishment at ten years for
each count to run consecutively for a total of twenty years’ imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
Phagan presents three allegations of error in seeking reversal. First, he
contends the trial court erred in admitting the text messages from Ashley’s
phone into evidence without proper authentication. Next, he argues the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Finally, he asserts palpable
error occurred during closing argument when the prosecution discussed the
confession he gave Det. Martin in the absence of a recording or written
statement memorializing the interview.
First, Phagan asserts the trial court should not have admitted text
messages to which he claimed he was not a party to and which he argued were
3 The trial court gave a second admonition shortly following the first, after
defense counsel voiced a concern the initial admonishment was confusing and
requested a more specific statement from the court.
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improperly authenticated. He contends Det. Martin did not sufficiently
investigate the source of the number sending the messages to Ashley, nothing
in those messages indicated who the sender actually was, and only Ashley
stated they came from him.
Here, the Commonwealth sought to introduce a text message thread
alleged to be between Phagan and Ashley. Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 is a
photograph taken by Det. Martin of the contact information for “Mac” on
Ashley’s phone. Commonwealth’s Exhibits 2 and 3 are photographs of the text
messages in question. Ashley testified the photographs depicted the
conversation between herself and Phagan from October 29, 2017, and she
knew they were from him because she had previously received messages from
him via the same phone number. She identified the contact information for
“Mac” as belonging to Phagan. Det. Martin was permitted to read the messages
to the jury and the photographs were admitted into evidence. For his part,
Phagan disputed sending the messages. As below, he argues records from the
telephone company were required to properly authenticate the text messages.
We disagree.
Writings must be authenticated to be admissible but the
Commonwealth’s burden under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 901 to
authenticate a writing is “slight,” requiring only a “prima facie showing.”
Ordway v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 584, 593 (Ky. 2011) (citing Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Ky. 2010)). “Typically, the foundational
authenticity of a writing can be laid simply by the testimony of someone
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personally familiar with the writing or by the contents and characteristics of
the writing itself.” Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 850, 866 (Ky. 2020)
(citing KRE 901(b)(1) and (4)). “Under KRE 901(b), the most common way to
authenticate an item is through testimony of a witness that it is ‘what it is
claimed to be.’” Kays v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. App. 2016).
“Exercising its considerable discretion, a trial court may admit a piece of
evidence solely on the basis of testimony from a knowledgeable person that the
item is what it purports to be and its condition has been substantially
unchanged.” Id. (citing Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky.
2000). We review decisions regarding authentication of evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Brafman, 612 S.W.3d at 866. An abuse of discretion occurs
when a trial court’s decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941,
945 (Ky. 1999). Absent such a showing, a trial court’s determination will not
be disturbed. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005).
As a party to the conversation, Ashley was knowledgeable of the contents
of the contested text message thread and Phagan’s contact information stored
in her phone. Ashley stated Phagan had previously given her his phone
number and she had stored it as “Mac” with a moneybag emoji beside the
name. The photographs indicated “Mac” was the sender and Ashley was the
recipient of the contested text messages, a time stamp appeared at the top of
the thread, and the messages referred to similar sexual activity which was the
subject of the charges being tried. Ashley’s testimony regarding the text
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message thread was sufficient for authentication purposes. Kays, 505 S.W.3d
at 270. Further, Det. Martin confirmed the number shown in Commonwealth’s
Exhibit 1 for “Mac” was the same number Nunn—Phagan’s girlfriend—used to
contact Phagan. Unlike the situation presented in Brafman, the
Commonwealth adduced more than just Ashley’s bare assertion the messages
came from Phagan and no reasonable assertion was presented that the
messages had been fabricated or altered. As such, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in admitting the photographs and contents of the
text message thread.
Second, Phagan argues the trial court should have granted his motion for
a mistrial based on the Commonwealth’s questioning of him regarding the
truthfulness of other witnesses. While the Commonwealth’s questions were
clearly out of bounds, see Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky.
1997) (improper to require a witness to characterize testimony of another
witness as untrue), granting a mistrial for the Commonwealth’s mistake is not
automatic.
“Although a trial court is vested with discretion in granting a mistrial, the
power to grant a mistrial ought to be used sparingly and only with the utmost
caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.”
Commonwealth v. Scott, 12 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Ky. 2000) (citation omitted).
[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only
when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is
a ‘manifest necessity for such an action.’ Woodard [v.
Commonwealth], 147 S.W.3d [63,] 68 [(Ky. 2004)]. (emphasis
added). The cause of the need for mistrial “must be of such
character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and
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impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other
way.” Id. (emphasis added).
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 563 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Ky. 2018).
No manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial existed here. “[A] mistrial
is acceptable only if there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be
unable to follow the court’s admonition and a strong likelihood that the effect
of the inadmissible evidence would be devastating[.]” Id. at 647-48 (quoting
Sneed v. Burress, 500 S.W.3d 791, 805 (Ky. 2016) (Venters, J., dissenting)). A
finding of manifest necessity is precluded when viable options exist. Id.(quoting Cardine v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 641, 650 (Ky. 2009)). One
such option is a sufficient admonition to the jury, a tack taken by the trial
court and assented to by Phagan. In fact, it was Phagan’s counsel who helped
craft the admonition.
A jury is presumed to follow instructions to disregard erroneously
presented evidence. Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky.
1993). This is true unless there is an overwhelming probability the jury will
not follow the admonition and the proffered evidence is likely to be devastating
to the defendant, or if the question was inflammatory or highly prejudicial.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003). None of these
prerequisites exist in this case. Phagan completely denied Ashley’s allegations
and the majority of his defense centered on questioning her credibility. This
theme began in the defense’s opening statement and continued through to
closing arguments. There is absolutely no indication the jury would be unable
or unwilling to follow the trial court’s directive and, based on Phagan’s
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continual attacks on Ashley’s credibility, we cannot say the complained of
question was inflammatory or prejudicial. Thus, the curative value of the
admonition negated the need for declaring a mistrial.
Finally, Phagan argues the Commonwealth improperly discussed facts
not in evidence during its summation. He concedes this argument is
unpreserved and seeks palpable error review under Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 10.26. To be palpable, an error must affect the substantial
rights of the defendant and a manifest injustice must have resulted from the
error. Id. “[T]he required showing is probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.”
Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).
Phagan takes issue with the Commonwealth’s recitation and summary of
his confession to Det. Martin. He contends because no recording or written
statement memorializing the confession exists, there was no way for the jury to
know what questions were asked or what details were given to Phagan before
he made any incriminating admissions, which he continues to deny making.
In his estimation, because there was no recording, it is impossible to determine
whether and to what he actually confessed. Thus, he believes the
Commonwealth’s recitation and summation of the testimony was improper and
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
When presented with an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, this
Court must examine the matter in the context of the overall fairness of the
trial. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 49 (Ky. 2017). To rise to the
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level of reversible error, the misconduct must be “so serious as to render the
entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827,
873 (Ky. 2004) (citation omitted).
The challenged comments in the case at bar were fairly based on the
evidence presented to the jury. Save a single reference to Nunn being asleep
when the crimes occurred, a fact testified to by Ashley, the remainder of the
Commonwealth’s summary of Phagan’s confession was based on the testimony
presented by three officers based on their recollections of the interview and
Det. Martin’s contemporaneously generated report. Our review of the record
reveals no undue prejudice occurred as a result of the comments during the
Commonwealth’s closing statement. It is axiomatic that counsel may draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence and comment thereon. Padgett v.
Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 350 (Ky. 2010). Whether Phagan had
confessed was squarely before the jury based on Phagan’s trial strategy. It
cannot be said the jury’s verdict was swayed by the Commonwealth’s
commentary and argument regarding the contents of the confession. The trial
was not rendered unfair and thus, no error occurred, and certainly no palpable
error.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court
is AFFIRMED.
All sitting. All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Emily Holt Rhorer
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocates
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Thomas Allen Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General
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