C. C., a Juvenile v. Honorable Christopher J. Mehling, Kenton Circuit Court Judge ( 2021 )

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Supreme Court of Kentucky
2020-SC-0138-MR
C.C., A JUVENILE APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2019-CA-0312
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 16-00576-004
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. MEHLING, APPELLEE
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY REAL PARTY IN INTEREEST
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
Before this Court is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ denial of a writ
of mandamus sought by C.C., who initiated this original action in the Court of
Appeals when he was still a juvenile.
The underlying family court case involved a status-offense charge of
being a habitual runaway brought against C.C. when he was 16 years old. To
the Court of Appeals, C.C. asserted (1) the Kenton Family Court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction over this charge under the Kentucky Juvenile Code
(KJC), specifically arguing the charge was based on a defective complaint that
should be dismissed and (2) the Commonwealth had denied him mandatory
consideration for diversionary measures required by Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 610.030 and KRS 630.050.
We dismiss this appeal because C.C.’s writ application is moot. The
underlying habitual-runaway charge has been dismissed by the trial court, and
C.C. is no longer a minor.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.C. was a child under 18 when he was charged with being a habitual
runaway under KRS 630.020(1), a juvenile-status offense defined under KRS
600.020(32).1 On January 22, 2019, C.C.’s mother filed a juvenile complaint
alleging C.C.’s runaway status. Both parents claimed C.C. had run away from
home three weekends in a row.
In response to the juvenile complaint, Kenton Family Court Judge
Christopher J. Mehling issued a custody order for C.C., and C.C.’s father
delivered him to the Independence Police Station later the same day. C.C. was
lodged in a juvenile detention center overnight. Following a detention hearing
before Judge Mehling the next morning, C.C. was released to his family on
restrictions and with an ankle monitor.
At the later adjudication hearing, C.C. argued his habitual-runaway case
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. His first reason was that the
charges were based on a procedurally defective complaint submitted to the
1 See KRS 600.020(32) (“Habitual runaway” means any child who has been
found by the court to have been absent from his or her place of lawful residence
without the permission of his or her custodian for at least three (3) days during a one
(1) year period[.]”).
2
CDW,2 affidavit missing, which failed to comport with mandatory process
requirements under KRS 610.030(1). His second reason was that he was
eligible for diversion by statute and that he had been improperly denied
consideration for diversion before he was compelled to appear before the family
court. Judge Mehling ruled even if the complaint was defective, he would allow
the defect to be cured, that cases of suspected habitual runaways, unlike other
status offenses, were not subject to mandatory diversion, and that the Kenton
Family Court had jurisdiction over C.C. because of a pending dependency
petition, which happened to be scheduled for a hearing the following day and in
which the Cabinet was recommending residential treatment for C.C. So Judge
Mehling initially declined to dismiss the habitual-runaway petition.
C.C. then instituted this original action in the Court of Appeals seeking a
writ to command Judge Mehling to dismiss the habitual-runaway petition
because the Judge was proceeding against C.C. without subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ, holding the family
court had jurisdiction because the defects in the original juvenile complaint
had been cured and because it, too, found that suspected habitual runaways
are treated different under the KJC than other status offenses. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals held that:
[H]abitual runaway cases in which the child has been detained under an
emergency protective order are an exception and [] noncompliance with
KRS 610.030(6) and KRS 630.050 does not deprive the family court of
subject matter jurisdiction because KRS 610.012, pertaining specifically
to suspected habitual runaways, is more specific, and therefore,
2 Court Designated Worker.
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controls . . . . Accordingly, the offer of diversion or referral to the FAIR
team was not required prior to instituting a status offense case in the
family court.
C.C.’s appeal to this Court followed as a matter of right.3 He asserts an
additional violation of constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection based
on the different treatment of habitual runaways relative to other status
offenders. The Commonwealth rightly points out that this issue was not raised
before the Court of Appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issuance of a writ is an extraordinary remedy disfavored under
Kentucky law.4 “[T]he issuance of a writ is inherently discretionary. Even if
the requirements are met, and error found, the grant of a writ remains within
the sole discretion of the Court.”5 While we review the Court of Appeals’ legal
conclusions de novo, we review its factual findings for clear error and will
reverse the Court of Appeals’ ultimate denial of the writ only if it abused its
discretion.6
3 Ky. Const. § 115 (“In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a
matter of right at least one appeal to another court. . . .”); Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure (CR) 76.36(7)(a) (“An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as a matter
of right from a judgment or final order in any proceeding originating in the Court of
Appeals.”).
4Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Ky. 2015) (citing Ridgeway Nursing
& Rehab. Facility, LLC v. Lane, 415 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Ky. 2013)).
5Commonwealth v. Shaw, 600 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Ky. 2020) (citing Caldwell, at
145–46) (internal quotations omitted). See also Graham v. Mills, 694 S.W.2d 698,
699–700 (Ky. 1985).
6 Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2016).
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III. ANALYSIS
There are two classes of writs: one, where the lower court is proceeding
or is about to proceed without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction and
there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court;7 and two,
where the lower court is proceeding in a case over which it has jurisdiction but
is acting or will soon act erroneously and there exists no adequate remedy by
appeal or otherwise.8
C.C. alleges procedural defects deprived the family court of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Thus, as the Court of Appeals correctly found, C.C.
sufficiently asserted a claim for relief under the first class of writ.
Before us, C.C. specifically asserts two material procedural defects, first,
that the charge was based on an incomplete complaint, and second, that the
Commonwealth failed to follow diversionary procedures for juveniles as
mandated by statute. Both in the family court proceedings and by writ petition
to the Court of Appeals, C.C. has for those two reasons consistently requested
the dismissal of the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Significantly, after he filed the writ application but before the Court of
Appeals reviewed it on the merits, the Kenton Family Court dismissed the
habitual-runaway charge. The Commonwealth then argued in opposition to
7 Henderson Cty. Health Care Corp. v. Wilson, 612 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Ky. 2020)
(citing Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)).
8 Id.
5
C.C.’s writ application that the issue of the family court’s jurisdiction was moot
and that the Court of Appeals should dismiss the writ application as well.
When the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in April 2020, C.C. was
still only 17 years old, having been born in June 2002. The Court of Appeals
considered the Commonwealth’s mootness argument but decided that since
C.C. was still a minor a risk remained that similar issues could arise for him
again. While the Court of Appeals acknowledged the case was not, it found
C.C.’s claims to be the type of case that is capable of repetition yet evading
review. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the merits of C.C.’s writ
application and declined to issue a writ, finding the complaint in the record
sufficiently complete and highlighting in the KJC a statutory basis to except
habitual runaway cases from other status offenses subject to automatic
diversionary review.
Now before this Court, C.C. is no longer a child. He reached the age of
majority in June 2020, approximately a month before the parties presented
arguments on appeal to this Court in July 2020. The habitual runaway case
against C.C. is over, and the record does not indicate similar charges were ever
again brought against C.C. after the Court of Appeals denied his petition.
We need not delve deeper into the Court of Appeals’ holding concerning
mootness. The only given reason the Court of Appeals found to justify its
review of the writ application was because C.C was still a minor at the time.
That is no longer the case, so that reason no longer bears on this case. So
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while the parties did not argue mootness or the evading-review exception in
this appeal, we must find the matter is now moot.
The evading-review exception no longer applies, assuming it ever did.
The decision whether to apply the exception involves two questions: whether
(1) the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before its cessation or
expiration, and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining
party would be subject to the same action again.9
We can answer the first question in the negative. Timely remedy by writ
is typically available where a party claims a defect or lack of jurisdiction,10 and
often the issue is resolved in a lower court without resort to writ in the first
place.
The second question can also be answered in the negative, because C.C.
cannot be subject to the same action again. Being a habitual-runaway is a
status offense that can only be asserted against a child,11 C.C.’s writ
application claimed defects only at issue under the KJC, and, most
importantly, C.C. is no longer a child. The same charge cannot be brought
against him again, not even hypothetically, so there is no longer reason for this
Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992) (quoting In re Commerce Oil
9
Co., 847 F.2d 291, 293 (6th Cir. 1988)) (quotations omitted).
10 Wilson, at 816.
See KRS 600.020(32) (“Habitual runaway” means any child who has been
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found by the court to have been absent from his or her place of lawful residence
without the permission of his or her custodian for at least three (3) days during a one
(1) year period[.]”) (emphasis added); KRS 600.020(9) (“Child” means any person who
has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday . . .”).
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Court to address the procedural defects that allegedly existed before the charge
was dismissed.
Because C.C.’s petition and appeal are now moot, we no longer have a
live controversy before us to resolve. Accordingly, we decline to pass on the
merits of the Court of Appeals’ resolution of C.C.’s writ petition.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons cited, this Court ORDERS that this appeal is dismissed.
Dated: March 25, 2021
All sitting. All concur.
_____________________________________
CHIEF JUSTICE
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
John Wampler
Department of Public Advocacy
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd Dryden Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
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