Kenneth Kasacavage Estate of James L. Girton, by and Through the Successor Pamela Fayle Williams v. Carroll Brantley ( 2021 )


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  •               RENDERED: MAY 21, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2018-CA-0832-MR
    KENNETH KASACAVAGE, EXECUTOR,
    ESTATE OF JAMES L. GIRTON,
    BY AND THROUGH SUCCESSOR EXECUTRIX,
    PAMELA FAYE WILLIAMS                               APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
    HONORABLE KAREN L. WILSON, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 16-CI-00543
    v.
    CARROLL BRANTLEY,
    FRESH IMPRESSIONS CLEANING
    AND CRIME SCENE,
    FIFTH THIRD BANK TRUSTEE UNDER WILL,
    AGNES ELEANOR GIRTON,
    HALEY ELIZABETH PIPPIN,
    JESSICA NICOLE PIPPIN,
    SHAWN M. PIPPIN,
    MIRANDA DAWN ROWE (PIPPIN),
    UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF HALEY ELIZABETH PIPPIN,
    UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF JESSICA NICOLE PIPPIN, AND
    UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF SHAWN M. PIPPIN                  APPELLEES
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: GOODWINE, KRAMER, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
    MAZE, JUDGE: Appellant, Kenneth Kasacavage, executor of the Estate of James
    L. Girton, by and through the successor executrix, Pamela Faye Williams (the
    “Estate”),1 appeals the Henderson Circuit Court’s judgment against it. For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    James L. Girton died on or about August 30, 2015. Apparently, Mr.
    Girton died at home and, unfortunately, his body was not found for several days or
    weeks. His body decomposed, which necessitated cleaning and restoration of his
    house.
    Mr. Girton’s will named Kenneth Kasacavage as executor of Mr.
    Girton’s estate. After Mr. Girton died, Mr. Kasacavage contacted the coroner for a
    recommendation regarding cleaning and restoration services at the house. The
    1
    Appellant’s notice of appeal lists Pamela Williams’ middle name as “Fayle,” although it is
    listed as “Faye” in all other parts of the notice and in the record on appeal. James L. Girton’s
    name is spelled alternatively in the record as “Girton” or “Girten.” The notice of appeal reads
    “Girton.” Additionally, the notice of appeal identifies “Fresh Impressions Cleaning and Crime
    Scene.” Fresh Impressions Cleaning and Crime Scene Restoration are businesses owned by
    Appellee, Carroll Brantley. Finally, the notice of appeal appears to designate Miranda Dawn
    Rowe (Pippin) as a party-appellee. Miranda Dawn Rowe was named a co-executrix of the Estate
    in 2017.
    -2-
    coroner recommended the businesses, Fresh Impressions Cleaning and Crime
    Scene Restoration, which were both owned by Appellee, Carroll Brantley
    (“Brantley”). When Mr. Kasacavage and Aleshia Edwards, the operator of
    Brantley’s businesses, met to inspect the house, they discovered extensive damage,
    including mold throughout the house and evidence of previous flooding in the
    basement. The Estate does not dispute that the house could not be sold in that
    condition. Mr. Kasacavage retained Brantley to clean up the property so that he
    could get it in shape to sell. The parties agree that Mr. Kasacavage, at that point,
    did not ask Brantley for its hourly rate or for an estimate of how much the work
    would cost. At some later point, Mr. Kasacavage testified that Brantley told him
    the work would cost between $10,000.00 to $15,000.00.
    Brantley performed work at the house, which included replacing
    subflooring and carpeting, cleaning, landscaping, removing unwanted items, and
    hiring subcontractors as needed. However, Mr. Girton’s family members became
    frustrated with Brantley’s work, which they felt was inferior.
    Toward the end of October 2015, Mr. Kasacavage informed Brantley
    that its services were no longer needed. By that time, Mr. Kasacavage had paid
    Brantley two payments of $6,000.00, totaling $12,000.00. Brantley sent Mr.
    Kasacavage an invoice for the balance due, which totaled $14,538.00. Mr.
    Kasacavage refused to pay.
    -3-
    On April 19, 2016, Brantley filed a proof of claim in the probate case
    of the Estate in the amount of $14,538.00. On that same day, Brantley also filed a
    mechanic’s lien in the Henderson County Clerk’s office for that same amount. The
    Estate does not dispute that it failed to disallow the claim within sixty days
    pursuant to KRS2 396.055.
    After not receiving payment, Brantley filed suit against the Estate in
    August 2016. In response, the Estate filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging
    Brantley had double billed the Estate, that the work billed in the invoice was
    unsubstantiated, and the bill was possibly fraudulent.
    As an aside, in June 2017, Mr. Kasacavage moved to withdraw as
    executor of the Estate, which the trial court permitted. Immediately thereafter, the
    Estate with new co-executors, Ms. Williams and Ms. Rowe, moved for summary
    judgment. The Estate alleged that Mr. Kasacavage lacked authority to enter into an
    agreement regarding work on the house and that the Estate’s devisees had not
    received proper notice of Brantley’s lien. The trial court denied the Estate’s
    motion, holding that Mr. Kasacavage, as executor, was an agent for the devisees
    when he hired Brantley to clean the house. The Estate is not appealing that order.
    On January 4, 2018, the trial court held a bench trial. Ms. Edwards
    testified on behalf of Brantley regarding the condition of the house and property
    2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    -4-
    when Brantley was retained, the work performed, and the amount due. Mr.
    Kasacavage testified on behalf of the Estate, as well as Ms. Williams and Ms.
    Rowe.
    On March 27, 2018, the trial court entered its judgment in the amount
    of $14,538.003 against the Estate. The court concluded that Brantley’s bill was
    “justly due” and held:
    Edwards testified as to the condition of the house and the
    work done. While [Brantley] billed for many hours of
    labor, there were multiple contractors on the job. While
    the [Estate] argue[d] that [Brantley] overcharged for its
    services, there was no evidence of what a more
    reasonable value would be.
    March 27, 2018 Order, p. 4.
    The Estate filed a CR4 59.05 motion to vacate the judgment, which the
    trial court denied. This appeal followed.5 Additional facts will be developed as
    necessary.
    ANALYSIS
    3
    In the trial court’s March 27, 2018 judgment, the amount due is listed as $14,538.00, but also as
    $14,358.00. The Court assumes the latter number is a typographical error because the complaint
    refers to the amount as $14,538.00. Regardless, the judgment was satisfied in June 2019, so the
    Court assumes the amount is not in controversy.
    4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
    5
    Notably, although Appellant filed its notice of appeal in 2018, various procedural motions
    delayed briefing until 2021.
    -5-
    For its appeal, the Estate argues that the trial court erred by finding
    that Brantley presented sufficient evidence to support its claim. Specifically, the
    Estate claims that Brantley’s bills lacked an adequate description of services and
    dates of services, that photographic exhibits demonstrated the house “remained in
    shambles” after $12,000.00 had already been paid, that Brantley failed to complete
    the work, and that the total bill was unconscionable. The Estate requests this Court
    reverse the trial court’s decision.
    In response, Brantley argues that the trial court’s decision is not
    clearly erroneous. Brantley claims that, although the Estate disagrees with the
    amount of time and effort it spent to clean up the property, the house needed
    extensive attention. Also, Brantley admits its work on the house was not finished
    but claims that was because the Estate told Brantley to cease activity on the
    property before the job was completed. Brantley claims the evidence supported the
    trial court’s findings and requests the judgment be affirmed.6
    6
    Brantley also argues that the judgment was payable pursuant to KRS 396.055. The trial court’s
    March 27, 2018 order mentions KRS 396.055 and recites the fact that “it is the personal
    representative’s responsibility to disallow a claim within sixty days” and “[u]nless the
    representative shows good cause, failure to disallow the claim has the effect of a notice of
    disallowance [sic], making the claim payable.” March 27, 2018 Order, p. 4 (citing DeMoisey v.
    River Downs Inv. Co., 
    159 S.W.3d 820
    , 822 (Ky. App. 2005)). However, the trial court did not
    make a specific finding that the Estate failed to disallow the claim within sixty days or failed to
    show good cause. Because Brantley did not file a cross-appeal on this issue and the Estate did
    not address this issue, we will not consider it on appeal.
    -6-
    We begin by noting that this case was tried by the trial court sitting
    without a jury. The case is before this Court upon the trial court’s findings of fact
    and conclusions of law and upon the record made in the trial court. Accordingly,
    appellate review of the trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the rule that
    those findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
    be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
    witnesses.” CR 52.01; see also Patmon v. Hobbs, 
    280 S.W.3d 589
    , 593 (Ky. App.
    2009). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial
    evidence. Patmon, 
    280 S.W.3d at 593
    . And, substantial evidence is evidence,
    when taken alone or considering all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to
    induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
    Corp. v. Golightly, 
    976 S.W.2d 409
    , 414 (Ky. 1998).
    At trial, Ms. Edwards testified regarding the terrible condition of the
    house and property when the Estate hired Brantley. Furniture and books showed
    evidence that the basement had previously flooded. The house had mold and
    mildew throughout, along with black spots which were later identified as a fungus.
    The floor was damaged, through the subfloor and into the basement, from the
    decomposition of Mr. Girton’s body. Sadly, the basement also contained the
    remains of a dog in a crate. Ms. Edwards further testified that she had been
    operating Brantley’s cleaning businesses since 2002 or 2003 and this house had the
    -7-
    worst case of hoarding she had ever seen. Thus, many items needed to be removed
    from the house. In addition, the windows, window sills, and roof were all
    damaged.
    Due to the hazardous conditions, Ms. Edwards testified that her
    workers had to wear hazmat suits and remove flooring and drywall, as well as
    furniture as a first phase. They utilized “ozone machines” to clean the air inside
    the house before they could begin cleaning. Through photographs introduced into
    evidence, Ms. Edwards explained the steps Brantley took to clean-up the house.
    She also testified that the house stood on several acres of land that had been
    neglected, which necessitated extensive mowing and weed-eating. Further, she
    testified regarding subcontractors that Brantley retained to help with the house.
    For instance, they discovered the house did not have running water, which was
    obviously needed to clean. The Estate asked Brantley to hire a subcontractor to
    locate the well and have it repaired, which it did.
    Brantley introduced its invoices into evidence through Ms. Edwards.
    She testified about Brantley’s various charges, as well as amounts paid to
    subcontractors. Ms. Edwards testified that, over the years, Brantley had been
    retained hundreds of times to provide cleaning services and that Brantley’s charges
    to the Estate were fair and reasonable for the services it provided.
    -8-
    On cross-examination, the Estate questioned the number of hours
    spent by Ms. Edwards and Brantley’s workers and subcontractors for the work
    performed at the house. Ms. Edwards admitted that Brantley did not provide an
    estimate to the Estate before beginning work, although she testified that Mr.
    Kasacavage never requested one. She also admitted that she did not have a further
    breakdown of Brantley’s charges other than what was contained in the provided
    invoices.
    For the Estate, Mr. Kasacavage, Ms. Williams, and Ms. Rowe testified
    regarding their dissatisfaction with Brantley’s work. They also expressed
    frustration with the fact that Brantley had not provided an estimate before
    performing the work at the house.
    The Court understands the Estate was unhappy with Brantley’s work
    and the amount charged. However, the Estate was able to cross-examine Ms.
    Edwards regarding the work performed and the invoices for that work. In addition,
    the Estate had the opportunity to call witnesses to dispute the quality or amount of
    work performed compared to Brantley’s charges for that work. The Estate did not
    call any such witnesses.
    Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the trial court
    found Brantley’s bill was “justly due.” As stated, we shall not set aside the trial
    court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. CR 52.01. Also, we give due regard to
    -9-
    the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses presented. 
    Id.
    Based on our review, Brantley presented sufficient evidence through the testimony
    of Ms. Edwards, photographs, and invoices to support the trial court’s decision.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.
    CONCLUSION
    For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
    CARROLL BRANTLEY:
    Mark Joseph Smith
    Timothy Denison                           Harry L. Mathison
    Louisville, Kentucky                      Henderson, Kentucky
    -10-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018 CA 000832

Filed Date: 5/20/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/28/2021