James Taylor v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )

RENDERED: MAY 21, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0776-MR
JAMES TAYLOR APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE THOMAS L. TRAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00184
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: JONES, MAZE, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, L., JUDGE: James Taylor (“Appellant”) appeals from a final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment of the Fayette Circuit Court reflecting a
conditional plea of guilty to cocaine possession, tampering with physical evidence,
and persistent felony offender charges. He argues that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence wrongfully obtained by the police. For
the reasons addressed below, we find no error and affirm the judgment on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 1:20 a.m. on November 23, 2018, Lexington police
officers Andrew Schickler and Cole Phillips were patrolling what they described as
a known narcotics area near a Thornton’s gas station in Lexington, Kentucky. The
officers observed Appellant, who was wearing a backpack, walk out of the
Thornton’s and get into a Ford Explorer. The vehicle was driven by Madeline
Montgomery. Nathan Russell was sitting in the front passenger seat. Appellant
got into the back seat, and the vehicle drove away from the Thornton’s property.
Officers Schickler and Phillips were suspicious of Appellant, in part
because of his backpack, and followed Montgomery’s vehicle. After observing the
vehicle commit three traffic violations, Schickler turned on his blue lights and
stopped the vehicle. Schickler and Phillips both approached the car on the
passenger side. The windows on the vehicle were heavily tinted and would not roll
down. Russell opened the door on the front seat passenger side of the vehicle, and
he began talking to Schickler. Phillips would later testify that Taylor opened the
back seat door, though Taylor would say that Phillips opened it. Phillips remained
at the vehicle and made small talk with its occupants, while Schickler returned to
his police vehicle to run the occupants’ information through his computer.
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Phillips then shined his flashlight inside the vehicle and observed a
red baggie at Taylor’s feet that he immediately recognized as containing narcotics.
The baggie appeared to have drug residue on it. Phillips removed all three persons
from the vehicle and asked them who owned the baggie. None of the occupants
would admit to owning the baggie. The officers then searched the inside of the
vehicle, including Taylor’s backpack. Inside the backpack they found scales and
baggies. On Taylor’s person they located methamphetamine, cash, and two cell
phones. What is described in the record as a criminal planning manifesto with
robbery plans and a black mask were found next to where Taylor was sitting in the
vehicle.
The officers arrested Taylor. He was taken to the police station where
he indicated that he needed to use the restroom. Accompanied by police, Taylor
went into the bathroom and began to manipulate something in his buttocks area.
An officer searched the back of Taylor’s pants and found pills and 5.68 grams of
crack cocaine.
Taylor was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance,
tampering with physical evidence, two counts of possession of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a persistent felony offender
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in the second degree.1 Taylor subsequently moved to suppress the admission of the
baggie found in the vehicle near Taylor’s feet and other evidence found in the
backpack and on Taylor’s person. In support of the motion, Taylor, through
counsel, argued that Officer Phillips had no lawful authority to open the back door
of Montgomery’s vehicle, and but for that unlawful act, the baggie would not have
been in plain sight. Further, Taylor argued that because Phillips’ observation of
the baggie was the basis for the search of Taylor’s backpack and person, the baggie
and other evidence were inadmissible.
A hearing on the motion was conducted on May 23, 2019, after which
the Fayette Circuit Court entered an order denying the relief sought. The court
determined in relevant part that: 1) the traffic violations formed a sufficient basis
for an investigatory stop; 2) irrespective of whether Taylor or Officer Phillips
opened the door it was reasonable for Phillips to be standing on the passenger side
of the vehicle away from the traffic flow; and 3) because the windows were
heavily tinted and would not roll down, it was reasonable for the doors to be open
for the officers’ safety. Further, the court found that the incriminating nature of the
baggie with drug residue rendered the subsequent search of the vehicle, including
Taylor’s backpack, constitutionally permissible.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 218A.1412; KRS 524.100; KRS 218A.1415; KRS
532.080(2).
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Thereafter, Taylor accepted a plea offer on one count of possession of
a controlled substance, first degree, tampering with physical evidence, and
persistent felony offender, second degree. As part of the plea, Taylor retained the
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In exchange for the plea to the
reduced charges, the Commonwealth recommended a total sentence of five years
in prison. The recommended sentence was accepted by the circuit court, and this
appeal followed.
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
Taylor argues that the Fayette Circuit Court committed reversible
error in failing to suppress the evidence of his guilt including the red baggie, scales
and other baggies found in the backpack, and the items found on his person. While
acknowledging that Officer Phillips may have been justified in shining his
flashlight into the vehicle, Taylor argues that Phillips was not justified in opening
the rear passenger door. Taylor argues that without opening the door, Officer
Phillips would not have been able to see the red baggie and, without that
observation, the search of the backpack and Taylor’s person would not have
occurred. Taylor contends that the true purpose of the vehicle stop was to search
his backpack and person, and Phillips found a way to effectuate that purpose by
unlawfully opening the back door. Taylor asserts that the evidence of criminality
is fruit of the poisonous tree and thus not admissible in court. As the Fayette
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Circuit Court erred in failing to so rule, Taylor argues that the order denying his
motion to suppress must be reversed.
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S. Ct.
2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). The plain view doctrine applies when a law
enforcement officer is lawfully at the place where the evidence can be plainly
viewed; he has a lawful right to access the object itself; and, the object’s
incriminating character is immediately apparent. Hazel v. Commonwealth, 833
S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1992). Taylor asserts that Officer Phillips unlawfully
opened the door of the Explorer, and that, but for that unlawful action, the red
baggie would not have been in plain view. The question for our consideration,
then, is whether the Fayette Circuit Court properly determined that irrespective of
whether Taylor or Officer Phillips opened the door, Officer Phillips was lawfully
standing on the passenger side of the vehicle with the door open.
In concluding that Officer Phillips’ personal safety required him to
stand on the passenger side of the vehicle with the rear door open, the circuit court
noted that the traffic flow on the driver’s side of the vehicle was heavy on New
Circle Road. The court also found that the vehicle’s windows were darkly tinted
and would not roll down. The court recognized that the officers had a lawful right
to ask the driver for identification, and when she was unable to produce
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identification, it was reasonable to ask the passengers to produce identification.
Given the totality of the circumstances, including the traffic flow on the driver’s
side of the vehicle, the dark windows that would not roll down, the reasonable
need to identify the persons in the vehicle, and the vehicle’s location in a known
narcotics area after midnight, we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that
Officer Phillips was lawfully standing in the open door area from which he
observed the red baggie in plain sight. This is true whether Taylor or Officer
Phillips opened the door, as Phillips had no alternative but to stand in the open
door area because the vehicle’s windows would not roll down. Even if this were
not the case, testimony was adduced that Taylor opened the door, and Officer
Phillips’ body camera appeared to show (though not conclusively) that the rear
passenger door was locked and could not be opened from the outside.
When reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, we
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if they are not
clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence of substance
and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable men. We review
the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de
novo.
Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION
The findings of the Fayette Circuit Court are supported by substantial
evidence of record and are not clearly erroneous. As such, we defer to the circuit
court’s findings. The traffic violations justified the vehicle stop. The officers had
no choice but to engage the vehicle’s occupants through open doors because the
windows were heavily tinted and would not roll down. Officer Phillips reasonably
took a position on the passenger side of the vehicle away from the traffic flow on
New Circle Road. As such, Officer Phillips was properly in a position to shine his
flashlight inside the vehicle and observe the red baggie. Observation of the baggie
then justified the additional search of Taylor’s backpack and person. Given the
totality of the record and the law, we find no error in the Fayette Circuit Court’s
denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kayla D. Deatherage Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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