Darian Clay v. Maricarmen Rivera ( 2021 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1255-MR
DARIAN R. CLAY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v. HONORABLE DENISE D. BROWN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-500977
MARICARMEN RIVERA APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Darian R. Clay (“Clay”) appeals the order of the Jefferson
Family Court assigning venue over the continuing litigation concerning the
custody of his minor child to the Oldham Family Court after the child’s mother,
Maricarmen Rivera (“Rivera”), moved to Oldham County and after the Oldham
Family Court had entered orders related to custody, and visitation of the child. We
affirm.
FACTS
Clay and Rivera were never married, but did have a child together,
born in 2010. The relationship ended soon after the birth of the child and litigation
began in Jefferson Family Court in 2011 through the filing of a paternity action.
The parties had almost continuous litigation over custody, visitation, and support
over the next several years in that same action.
At some time between 2016 and 2019 (exactly when is not clear from
the record before this Court) Rivera, having primary custody of the minor child,
moved with the child to Oldham County. In 2019, Rivera sought a domestic
violence order (DVO) from the Oldham Family Court, which was granted on May
17, 2019. Clay appealed that order, arguing, inter alia, that Oldham County was
not the proper venue in No. 2019-CA-0938-MR, 2020 WL 748726 (Ky. App. Feb.
14, 2020).1
1
From the Court’s Opinion in that matter at *2:
On May 1, 2019, the Oldham Circuit Court rendered an amended emergency
protective order (“EPO”) barring Father from any contact with his minor child “H.C.”
(hereinafter “Child”). The EPO was based on an allegation of Child’s biological mother,
Maricarmen Rivera (“Mother”), that Child had bruises and was acting withdrawn after
having been in Father’s care. Mother had noticed the bruising on Child’s bottom, and
took her to a pediatrician who alerted Child Protective Services of possible abuse.
Mother stated that when she asked Father about the bruises, he indicated that he had
“whooped her” because she had broken a karaoke machine.
On May 17, 2019, the Oldham Circuit Court entered a DVO which forms the
basis of the instant appeal. Via the DVO, the circuit court ordered Father not to have any
contact with Child other than supervised, scheduled visitation. The DVO had a term of
one year. Father now appeals from the DVO.
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In an unpublished Opinion, this Court upheld the entry of the one-year
DVO on the merits and specifically found that either Jefferson or Oldham County
would be the proper venue over the matter.
In the matter at bar, Mother could properly file her
petition in her county of residence, Oldham County, or
the county of any pending dissolution proceeding.
Mother and Father are not married, and no dissolution
action was pending in Jefferson Circuit Court. Even if
venue was proper in Jefferson Circuit Court based on the
adjudication of ongoing custody matters – which Father
has not shown – venue would have been proper in either
Oldham or Jefferson Circuit Court. Father has not
demonstrated that Oldham Circuit Court was an improper
venue, and we find no error on this issue.
Id. at *5.
As the expiration of the DVO neared, Rivera moved to extend it and
filed a civil custody action in Oldham Family Court.2 The DVO was extended by
the Oldham Family Court.3 Three days after the hearing at which the DVO was
extended and after the filing of the custody action in Oldham Family Court, Clay
filed a custody action in Jefferson Family Court.4
2
Clay moved this Court to take judicial notice pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence 201 of the
expiry of the DVO, before it was extended by order, on May 17, 2021. That motion was granted
by this Court.
3
20-CI-000205, Oldham Family Court.
4
20-CI-500977, Jefferson Family Court.
-3-
The Jefferson Family Court dismissed Clay’s custody action, finding,
in part:
The parties have one (1) minor child in common.
The parties have a previous Jefferson County action, filed
in 2011. Since that time, Respondent and the minor child
have moved to Oldham County, where they continue to
reside. The parties have participated in litigation
regarding the child through a Domestic Violence case in
Oldham County. Respondent in this case subsequently
filed a circuit custody action in Oldham County, as the
Petitioner in that case. That action is pending. The most
recent action relating to the custody and visitation of the
minor child are through the Oldham County Domestic
Violence action. Therefore, this court concludes Oldham
County is the proper venue to hear the parties’ case. This
action is hereby DISMISSED.
Clay now appeals from that order, arguing that venue properly lay in
Jefferson County, not Oldham County, and that the Jefferson Family Court erred in
dismissing his custody action. For the following reasons, we affirm the order of
Jefferson Family Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Assigning venue over a particular action before a trial court is a
question of discretion. Thus, the review of a determination of venue is for an
abuse of discretion. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 738 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Ky. App.
1987).
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ANALYSIS
As this Court held in the prior appeal instituted by Clay in response to
the entry in Oldham County of the DVO, venue properly lay in both Jefferson and
Oldham Counties, concurrently. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
Jefferson Family Court to determine that of the two proper venues, Oldham County
was the more appropriate situs of the custody determination – given Oldham
County was the county of residence of the minor child and because Oldham
County had most recently handled the litigation between the parties.
Clay mistakenly believes that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) is controlling in this matter, citing it throughout
his briefings to this Court. As Rivera points out in response, the UCCJEA is
applicable only in litigations involving two or more states and is not applicable to
intrastate causes. Though this Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court have noted
that the considerations of the UCCJEA might prove useful in determining venue
considerations, they are not mandatory in such determinations.5
5
These considerations are found in Kentucky Revised Statute 403.834(2):
(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future and
which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state;
(c) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
assume jurisdiction;
(d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
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In considering the proper forum for the visitation issue to
be heard, we are concerned with venue and not
jurisdiction. Pettit v. Raikes, 858 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ky.
1993). However, the same factors applicable to the
jurisdictional issue in interstate custody disputes can be
used for guidance when determining the question of the
proper venue.
Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Ky. App. 2007).
“The UCCJEA is concerned with a child’s substantial connection to
the state at issue, not where the child resides within the state.” Curry v. Curry, 430
S.W.3d 909, 912-13 (Ky. App. 2014). Further, what Clay proposes would have
two different courts litigating custody and visitation issues for this child, which is
contrary to the purpose of the creation of family courts and is not in the best
interests of the child.
The very purpose for the creation of the family courts is
to consolidate litigation and controversies related to a
family into one court. Splitting jurisdiction over custody
matters involving children within the same family and, as
a consequence, forcing the parties to litigate custody and
visitation issues in two different jurisdictions, serves
neither the reason for the UCCJEA nor for the creation of
the family court system. As a general rule, the court
should avoid such a result.
Wallace, 224 S.W.3d at 591.
(f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
(g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
litigation.
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CONCLUSION
The Jefferson Family Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
the civil custody action filed by Clay because Rivera had previously filed such
action in Oldham County, a venue which had already addressed custody and
visitation concerns most recently. The order of the Jefferson Family Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Darian R. Clay, pro se Ben Wyman
Louisville, Kentucky Carrollton, Kentucky
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