Kevin Master v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0925-MR
KEVIN MASTER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KATHLEEN S. LAPE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-01762
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Kevin Master (“Appellant KM”) appeals from a
judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized from his property pursuant to a search warrant. For the reasons explained
below, we vacate the judgment and remand.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
In October 2019, a detective with the Kentucky State Police (“the
Detective”) submitted an affidavit seeking a search warrant for Appellant KM’s
residence. The affidavit provided by the Detective stated the following in support
of the warrant:
[T]he U.S. Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and
[Border] Patrol (USCBP) alerted [the Detective] that a
package believed to contain a child-sized sex doll was
being shipped to [Appellant KM at his home address in]
Kentucky. The package originated from a company in
China and was shipped to the United States via FedEx.
USCBP Officer Monique Ford noticed discrepancies
between the shipping manifest description of the contents
and the actual size of the package. The package was
opened by USCBP and found to contain an anatomically
correct child size doll manufactured for purposes of
sexual gratification. . . . [The Detective’s] investigation
revealed [Appellant KM] does, in fact, live in the
apartment to which the package is addressed. [The
Detective] conducted surveillance on the residence and
noticed a vehicle registered to [Appellant KM] parked
outside the residence as recently as October 5, 2019.
[The Detective] has been employed with the Kentucky
State Police for 25 years. [The Detective] is assigned to
the ICAC [Internet Crimes Against Children] Task Force
and is specially trained in offenses involving the abuse
and exploitation of children, including but not limited to
child pornography and child sexual abuse. Based upon
[the Detective’s] training and experience, [the Detective]
believes any person who orders a child sex doll from
China has gone to great lengths to achieve sexual
gratification for a sexual attraction to children. [The
Detective] believes anyone who orders a child sex doll is
also likely to be downloading, viewing, sharing, and/or
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manufacturing child pornography. [The Detective]
knows child pornography to be readily available via the
internet from the same types of illicit websites that sell
child sex dolls. [The Detective] also knows computers,
smart phones, and other electronic devises often contain
the illicit images even after being “deleted” by the user.
[The Detective] also knows people who look at child
pornography often store collections of the matter for
future use.
Based upon all of the above, [the Detective] requests that
the search warrant be issued to search [Appellant KM’s
residence] in order to further [the Detective’s] continuing
investigation.
Based on that affidavit, a district court judge (“the warrant-issuing
judge”) signed a search warrant for Appellant KM’s residence. During the search,
police found additional sex dolls and child pornography on Appellant KM’s
electronic devices. Appellant KM was arrested and charged with 20 counts of
matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. Appellant KM filed a motion
to suppress, arguing lack of probable cause to search his residence.
In September 2020, the circuit court held oral arguments to determine
if a testimonial hearing on the motion to suppress was necessary. During those
contentious arguments, the parties disagreed as to the circuit court’s standard of
review and the existence of probable cause. The Commonwealth argued that
ordering a child sex doll is indicative of a sexual attraction to children and such a
buyer is more likely than not to possess child pornography. Conversely, Appellant
KM argued the Detective “failed to engage in any meaningful investigation that
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could be used to support any of his suspicions or assumptions,” and ownership of a
child sex doll does not create a legal nexus to ownership of child pornography.
Ultimately agreeing with the Commonwealth, the circuit court denied
the motion to suppress. In an order entered in October 2020, the court found that
[the Detective] states that he is an experienced police
officer who has trained in and worked on internet crimes
involving child pornography. Based on his experience,
Chinese web sites that sell the type of child sex doll
purchased and received by [Appellant KM] also contain
child pornography. He also attests that, in his
experience, a person who goes through the lengths that
[Appellant KM] went through to obtain such a
prepubescent sex doll from China does so for sexual
gratification for a sexual attraction to children and has
likely downloaded, viewed, shared, and/or manufactured
child pornography.
This court finds [the Detective] established a substantial
basis for a reasonable belief by the warrant-issuing judge
that because [Appellant KM] ordered and received a
prepubescent sex doll designed for sexual gratification
from China, likely through a web site containing child
pornography, there is a fair probability that he
downloaded, viewed, shared and/or manufactured child
pornography and evidence of same would likely be found
in his home and/or on his electronic devices.
After the court denied the motion to suppress, Appellant KM made a
conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression denial. He
was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“It is well established that ‘[s]earch warrants must be supported by
probable cause to satisfy the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.’” Minks v.
Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Ky. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996)). Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), provided the proper standard to review a
decision to issue a search warrant, and was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1984). Commonwealth
v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 47-48 (Ky. 2010). In Pride, the Kentucky Supreme Court
relied upon Gates, wherein the United States Supreme Court had held:
[t]he task of the [warrant] issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
“substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable
cause existed.
Id. at 48 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).
Therefore, at the circuit court level,
The trial court judge faced with a motion to suppress
evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant should
apply the Gates standard, and determine whether under
the “totality of the circumstances” presented within the
four corners of the affidavit, a warrant-issuing judge had
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a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.
Id. at 49.
Here, the circuit court applied that standard of review. At the
appellate court level,1
[t]he proper test for appellate review of a suppression
hearing ruling regarding a search pursuant to a warrant is
to determine first if the facts found by the trial judge are
supported by substantial evidence, [RCr 8.272] and then
to determine whether the trial judge correctly determined
that the issuing judge did or did not have a “substantial
basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.
. . . In doing so, all reviewing courts must give great
deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision. We
also review the four corners of the affidavit and not
extrinsic evidence in analyzing the warrant-issuing
judge’s conclusion.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States. Constitution and Section
10 of the Kentucky Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A search is reasonable if it is supported by a warrant and an
1
We do not agree with Appellant KM that a de novo review is appropriate for this appeal. A
warrantless search requires a de novo review. For a search based on a warrant, a “de
novo review of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting a search warrant is inappropriate
and tends to lead to overly technical analysis . . . .” Id. at 48 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103
S. Ct. 2331).
2
Effective January 1, 2015, Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 8.27 superseded
RCr 9.78; however, the standard for appellate review remained unaffected. Gibson v.
Commonwealth, No. 2014-SC-000158-MR, 2015 WL 9243583 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2015).
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accompanying affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause. Pride, 302 S.W.3d
at 50. An affidavit supporting a search warrant must “reasonably describe the
property or premises to be searched and state sufficient facts to establish probable
cause for the search of the property or premises.” Guth v. Commonwealth, 29
S.W.3d 809, 811 (Ky. App. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Coker v.
Commonwealth, 811 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky. App. 1991)).
On appeal, Appellant KM argues there was not a substantial basis for
finding probable cause existed based on the affidavit submitted by the Detective.
At the time [the Detective] sought the search warrant
there was never any evidence that the internet was used
to order a sex doll. It was surmised by [the Detective],
but he did no investigation prior to seeking the search
warrant to determine if this was even true. [Appellant
KM] could have used an 800 number. There was simply
no investigation other than confirming [Appellant KM’s]
address.
Appellant KM argues there is no nexus between ordering a child sex
doll – which is legal– and owning child pornography. Also, Appellant KM argues
the good faith exception is not applicable because the Detective knew ordering a
child sex doll was legal3 and failed to investigate beyond confirming Appellant
KM’s address. Appellant KM does not allege that the affidavit contained false
statements or omitted facts, but that the affidavit – on its face – was not sufficient.
3
The Detective participated in a similar case one year prior, discussed in more detail below.
Commonwealth v. Phillips, No. 18-CR-01315, Kenton County.
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Finally, Appellant KM argues the five-year conditional discharge was applied in
error.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues the circuit court properly
denied the motion to suppress. Based on the Detective’s 25 years of training and
experience, he concluded that the act of ordering a child sex doll “was indicative of
the fact that [Appellant KM] was sexually attracted to children.” The
Commonwealth argues it is reasonable to conclude that a person who is sexually
attracted to children – as is proven by ordering a child sex doll – is “likely to also
be downloading, viewing, sharing or manufacturing child pornography in
furtherance of their attraction to children.” The Commonwealth argues the good
faith exception could apply but would require a remand to circuit court for an
evidentiary hearing. Also, as a point of accord, the Commonwealth agrees that the
circuit court improperly imposed a five-year conditional discharge period at
sentencing.
A. Search Warrant Fails for Lack of Probable Cause
Applying the standard of review put forth in Pride, Beemer, and
Gates, we review the denial by the circuit court of Appellant KM’s motion to
suppress evidence – obtained pursuant to a search warrant – in two stages. First,
we look to see if substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s overall factual
findings. Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 49. This step gives us pause because there were
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very few factual findings . . . because there were very few facts. While we must
give deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision, we are also limited to the
four corners of the affidavit. Id.
In the order on appeal, the circuit court walked through what few facts
we have: a child sex doll was sent to the residence of Appellant KM; ordering and
possessing a child sex doll is not illegal, but “[t]he facts contained in a warrant do
not have to be illegal in and of themselves, rather they must establish the
probability that contraband will be found.” The circuit court then reiterated the
Detective’s assessment – not of Appellant KM specifically – but his general
conclusions about the people and the circumstances surrounding the purchase of a
child sex doll. That was it. Then, the court determined
the affidavit established a substantial basis for a
reasonable belief by the warrant-issuing judge that
because [Appellant KM] ordered and received a
prepubescent sex doll designed for sexual gratification
from China, likely through a web site containing child
pornography, there is a fair probability that [Appellant
KM] downloaded, viewed, shared and/or manufactured
child pornography and evidence of same would likely be
found in his home or and/or on his electronic devices.
And yet, Appellant KM did not receive the doll; law enforcement
intercepted the doll and did not forward it to the residence of Appellant KM. The
circuit court stated that based on the Detective’s experience “Chinese web sites
that sell the type of child sex doll purchased and received by [Appellant KM] also
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contain child pornography.” However, the affidavit provides no proof the doll was
purchased through a web site or that Appellant KM ordered the doll. The affidavit
does not point to empirical data, cite to previous cases, or in any way support the
presumption that web sites selling these dolls also sell child pornography. We are
mindful that this deplorable area of the internet could be difficult to research, and
examples could be hard to find, so we continue with our analysis.
The circuit court stated the Detective believes “a person who goes
through the lengths that [the Appellant KM] went through to obtain such a
prepubescent sex doll from China does so for the sexual gratification for a sexual
attraction to children and has likely downloaded, viewed, shared, and/or
manufactured child pornography.” Again, the Detective showed no direct
connection to Appellant KM beyond his address being on the mailing label. 4
Neither the Detective, nor the circuit court, gave any hint as to what “lengths” the
buyer went through to order the doll. There was no data, no research, and no
evidence supporting the presumption that ordering such a doll was part and parcel
to downloading, viewing, sharing, and manufacturing child pornography. There
was no information in the affidavit supporting the contention that using a child sex
doll for sexual gratification escalates this abhorrent attraction or leads to
4
Although we find the example extreme, we cannot rebut Appellant KM’s suppression hearing
argument: if this search warrant stands, law enforcement would only need to send a child sex
doll to someone’s home in order to obtain a search warrant for a private residence.
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downloading, viewing, sharing, and manufacturing child pornography. Again, this
may be because the subject matter was difficult to study; privacy considerations
may have limited examples, and statistical data may not be feasible in this area, but
the Commonwealth did not address any such issues.
The affidavit relies – almost exclusively – on the Detective’s training
and experience, a knowledge base we do value. The Commonwealth noted that the
Detective’s 25 years of “seasoned experience and specialized expertise were given
due consideration here.” However, it is that breadth of experience that also gives
us pause: wouldn’t an officer with this level of experience know to investigate
prior to applying for a search warrant for a private residence? Thankfully, we need
not address that issue directly, because here, the circuit court failed the second
aspect of our analysis: the circuit court incorrectly determined that the warrant-
issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
We agree that “the expertise and experience of the law enforcement
officer involved in the matter may be a relevant consideration in the determination
of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 199 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Ky. App.
2006) (citation omitted). And yet, while we respect the importance of law
enforcement experience, what are missing are facts specific to Appellant KM. See
Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Ky. App. 2007) (“nothing more
than conclusory allegations” were insufficient to support a finding of probable
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cause). Here, the affidavit does not state that Appellant KM had a criminal history.
The affidavit does not refer to any reports of suspicious behavior nor complaints
from neighbors about Appellant KM. Law enforcement did not previously
subpoena his internet search history from his internet service provider. The
affidavit does not refer to any police surveillance of Appellant KM beyond driving
by his parking lot to confirm the presence of his vehicle.
Moreover, “[a]n officer seeking a warrant must produce adequate
supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause
exists to support the particular search requested.” United States v. Hodson, 543
F.3d 286, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372,
1377 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added)). In Hodson, the Sixth Circuit addressed
“whether a suspect’s ostensibly admitting to having engaged in child molestation is
sufficient, without more, to establish probable cause to search that suspect’s home
for child pornography.” Id. at 286.
Specifically, during online chats with an undercover detective,
Hodson admitted his attraction to underage children and stated that he had acted on
his attraction in the past. Id. at 287. Based primarily on those online
conversations, the detective prepared an affidavit. Id. The detective’s affidavit did
not “establish, allege, or even suggest any basis for a finding of probable cause to
believe that Hodson had ever been involved in child pornography in any manner.”
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Id. at 289. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the
immediate search of Hodson’s residence. Id. Police found images of child
pornography on Hodson’s seized computer and charged him with receiving and
possessing child pornography. Id. Hodson moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the search. Id. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and
recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress the pornography
evidence because the warrant was defective. Id. at 290-91.
Next, the district court held a hearing and adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. Id. Finally, the Sixth Circuit agreed, stating “it is
beyond dispute that the warrant was defective for lack of probable cause – [the
detective] established probable cause for one crime (child molestation) but
designed and requested a search for evidence of an entirely different crime (child
pornography).” Id. at 292. The Sixth Circuit determined “it was unreasonable for
the officer executing the warrant in this case to believe that probable cause existed
to search Hodson’s computers for child pornography based solely on a suspicion –
albeit a suspicion triggered by Hodson’s computer use – that Hodson had engaged
in child molestation.” Id. at 293.
Similarly, here, the affidavit contained no basis to support the
Detective’s contention that people who purchase child sex dolls also possess child
pornography. The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Hodson, arguing that
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the Hodson warrant failed because the supporting affidavit “offered no assertion”
of a connection between child molestation and child pornography. The
Commonwealth argues that merely making an assertion that a connection existed is
sufficient under Hodson.
However, we disagree; “asserting” a connection exists – without any
supporting evidence – is not enough. The Sixth Circuit in Hodson stated there may
be a logical inference between conduct and pornography, but that inference “is not
self-evident.” Id. at 290. We too find it a logical step from such conduct – buying
a child sex doll – to child pornography, but we cannot leap across a fact-less void.
We agree with the magistrate judge in Hodson that a warrant-issuing judge may
make reasonable inferences based on common sense, but that judge cannot supply
an empirical link between sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and
pornography possession. Id. at 291.
It is this link that the parties disagree upon, using different verbiage to
describe the “nexus” requirement. Appellant KM argues “the probable cause
standard in an affidavit must minimally show a sufficient nexus between the illegal
activity and the place to be searched” citing United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490,
496-97 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Because the purchase of a child sex doll
was not illegal, Appellant KM argues there was not a sufficient nexus between the
legal purchase of the doll and a search for child pornography. We agree; like in
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Hodson, the activity that prompted the affidavit and search was separate from the
crime being searched for in Appellant KM’s residence.
The Commonwealth uses different verbiage to describe the nexus:
“an affidavit for a search warrant must provide a ‘nexus between the place to be
searched and the evidence sought.’ Elders v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 495, 500
(Ky. App. 2012) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
2004)).” The Commonwealth attempts to create the nexus based solely on child
pornography: the police sought child pornography, which is stored on electronic
devices, devices which are located in the home. Yes, there is a nexus between
child pornography and electronic equipment, but still missing are any facts
connecting Appellant KM to child pornography.
Moreover, if we trace the Commonwealth’s referenced precedent, the
complete Sixth Circuit quote in Carpenter is consistent with the verbiage argued
by Appellant KM, “[t]o justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why
evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a particular place.’ There must, in
other words, be a ‘nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence
sought.’” Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). No matter the verbiage
preference, here, there is no nexus, no connecting facts, between Appellant KM’s
residence and child pornography.
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Therefore, here, the trial judge incorrectly determined that the
warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.
B. Circuit Court Must Determine Applicability of Good Faith Exception
Because there was not a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed, the circuit court must suppress the evidence if the Detective did not
act in good faith. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.
2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Unite States Supreme Court
determined that evidence seized by police should not be
excluded if it is obtained pursuant to a search warrant
which may later be determined to be flawed if the
officers executing the warrant had an objectively
reasonable good-faith belief in the probable cause
determination by the magistrate and the sufficiency of the
warrant. In such cases, the evidence will not be
suppressed.
Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2005) (citing Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 104 S. Ct. 3405).
The circuit court did not allow oral arguments on the good faith
exception, so we remand to give the parties an opportunity to do so. The order on
appeal found that “the good faith exception is not in issue and no analysis of same
will be had” due to the court’s finding that the warrant-issuing judge had a
substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. On remand, the
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Commonwealth faces a tough challenge to prove the Detective acted in good faith
because of his familiarity with similar such facts and expectations.
In September 2018, United States Customs Enforcement notified the
Department of Homeland Security of a package shipped from China to Scott
Phillips (“Phillips”) containing a child sex doll. The Department of Homeland
Security contacted the Kentucky State Police who facilitated the delivery to
Phillips. Based on that information, the State Police and the Detective – the same
detective discussed in the order on appeal here – sought a search warrant for
Phillips’ home. The district court granted the search warrant. The search
discovered two child sex dolls. Phillips was charged in district court in September
2018 with one count of possession of a matter portraying a sexual performance by
a minor. After a preliminary hearing, the defense moved for a dismissal of the
felony charge5 due to a lack of probable cause. The district court agreed with the
defense and dismissed the felony charge.
The wheels of justice continued to turn, and the Commonwealth –
based on evidence discovered during the search of Phillips’ home – brought forth
additional charges against Phillips. In March 2020, the defense moved to suppress
the evidence found during the search. After a hearing on the matter, the Kenton
5
Phillips also had minor drug-related charges.
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Circuit Court granted the motion to suppress because it found there were
insufficient facts to establish a fair probability that law enforcement would
discover evidence of a crime. The circuit court stated:
[The Detective] implied his belief that a person
possessing such sex dolls would also be in possession of
a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.
However, he offered no basis to support his suspicion
that the Defendant would probably have child
pornography in his possession. He provided no scientific
or empirical evidence that would establish a nexus
between possession of a child sex doll and possession of
internet child pornography. In United States v. Edwards,
823 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2015), the Court found the
possession of erotica would not provide sufficient
probable cause that child pornography would be found in
a defendant’s home. See also, United States v. Hodson,
543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).
....
The Detective’s belief or opinion that the
possession of the sex doll would establish probable cause
to search the Defendant’s devices must fail. No credible
proof has been presented to establish a required nexus
between possession of the doll and possession of internet
child pornography. See U.S. v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591(6th Cir. 2004); Beckam v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
284 S.W.3d 547 (2009). The officer’s speculation or
conclusory allegations do not support probable cause in
this case. Hensley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 248
S.W.3d 572 [(2008)].
...
[T]he legal possession of the doll would not support the
issuance of a search warrant for electronic devices which
could contain pornography. The search warrant herein,
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which sought devices to establish [Phillips] to have
searched for and purchased sex dolls, does not allege
facts that would constitute a crime.
Commonwealth v. Phillips, Kenton County No. 18-CR-01315, order (filed Aug. 4,
2020).
On remand, the circuit judge may consider matter outside the affidavit
for the good faith analysis. Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328 (citations omitted).
“[W]hen assessing the objective good faith of police executing a warrant, we must
look to the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the
officer but not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. (citing United States v.
Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1990)).
C. Conditional Discharge Must Be Discharged
Also on remand, the circuit court must correct a sentencing error, an
error to which the Commonwealth has conceded. The five-year conditional
discharge is not applicable, and the circuit court must vacate that aspect of
Appellant KM’s sentence. Appellant KM pled guilty to 20 counts of possession of
a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor under Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 531.335, but the conditional discharge statute KRS 532.043(1) does
not include KRS 531.335. See also Chames v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 519(Ky. App. 2012).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The parties are well acquainted with the Phillips case, but we find the
district court’s words – in the Order6 dismissing the charges against Phillips for
lack of probable cause – worth repeating.
As repulsive as the court find this doll and [Phillips’]
actions and shares the Commonwealth’s concerns
regarding the exploitation of children, it is the role of the
Court to apply the law as written and follow precedent of
the Kentucky and Federal Appellate Courts and not to
make law or be a judicial activist by basing a ruling upon
their personal belief and/or moral judgment.
Therefore, we VACATE the Kenton Circuit Court Order denying the
motion to suppress and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing on the good faith
exception. Additionally, we VACATE the improperly imposed conditional
discharge aspect of Appellant KM’s sentence and REMAND for a corrected
sentence.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen Shuff Maurer Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Christina L. Romano
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
6
Commonwealth v. Phillips, Kenton County No. 18-F-01698, order dismissing and remanding
(filed Sep. 27, 2018).
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