Eladio Castaneda v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2021 )

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1025-MR
ELADIO CASTANEDA APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00043
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2020-CA-1026-MR
ELADIO CASTANEDA APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00184
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2020-CA-1027-MR
ELADIO CASTANEDA APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CR-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND McNEILL,
JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: Eladio Castaneda (“Castaneda”) appeals the Caldwell
Circuit Court’s orders denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. After
careful review, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2019, in circuit case number 19-CR-00043, Castaneda
was indicted on being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun,1 failing to
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 527.040, a Class C felony.
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notify the Department of Transportation of a change in address,2 possession of
methamphetamine,3 possession of drug paraphernalia,4 and being a persistent
felony offender (“PFO”) in the first degree.5 On December 6, 2019, in circuit case
number 19-CR-00184, Castaneda was indicted on counts of possession of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell (more than two grams),6 possession of
drug paraphernalia, trafficking in methamphetamine (more than two grams), and
being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.7 On January 14, 2020, in
circuit case number 20-CR-00002, Castaneda was indicted on a single count of
PFO in the first degree.
While Castaneda was out of custody on bond, the Commonwealth
made him a plea offer. Under the agreement, Castaneda would plead guilty to PFO
in the first degree in 20-CR-00002 and all other charges except PFO in the first
degree in 19-CR-00043 and PFO in the second degree in 19-CR-00184, which
would be dismissed. Pursuant to the offer, Castaneda would serve fifteen years’
2
KRS 186.540(1).
3
KRS 218A.1415(1)(c), a Class D felony.
4
KRS 218A.500(2), a Class A misdemeanor.
5
KRS 532.080(3).
6
KRS 218A.1412(1), a Class C felony.
7
KRS 532.080(2).
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imprisonment with parole eligibility after ten years. The following day, Castaneda
entered guilty pleas in all three cases.
In his colloquy, Castaneda acknowledged (1) he read and understood
the guilty plea; (2) he was not under the influence of any substances at the time he
was entering his pleas; (3) he did not suffer from any mental illness which could
affect his ability to think or reason; (4) he was given adequate time to discuss the
Commonwealth’s offer with counsel and was satisfied with counsel’s
representation of him; (5) he understood the charges against him in each of the
three cases and the facts underlying the charges; (6) he knew his constitutional
rights and was voluntarily waiving them; (7) he signed the guilty pleas freely and
voluntarily; (8) he understood that pleading to being a persistent felony offender in
the first degree required his sentence to ten years’ imprisonment be enhanced to
fifteen years and that he would be required to serve ten years before becoming
eligible for parole; and (9) he was not threatened or forced to enter the guilty pleas.
Video Record (“VR”) at 1/14/2020, 9:35:15-9:44:10. Castaneda’s counsel
informed the court that she had sufficient time in which to discuss the
Commonwealth’s offer with him and, given the situation, she thought he was
making an educated decision. Id. at 9:44:10-9:45:12.
The court accepted Castaneda’s guilty plea and scheduled sentencing
for May 5, 2020. At sentencing, counsel informed the court Castaneda wished to
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withdraw his guilty pleas.8 The trial court continued sentencing and Castaneda
was appointed conflict counsel who filed motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.
The trial court granted a hearing on the motions. Castaneda was the
sole witness. He testified to receiving a phone call from his counsel informing him
that the Commonwealth was offering him fifteen years’ imprisonment and that the
Commonwealth would recommend his wife, who also had pending charges, only
be sentenced to probation. Castaneda testified counsel told him that he only had
two hours to decide whether to accept the offer.
Castaneda testified to accepting the Commonwealth’s offer because
he did not want his children to be without both parents if both he and his wife were
incarcerated. He also felt the Commonwealth used his wife’s pending criminal
charges against him. According to his testimony, his wife did not want him to take
the plea deal. He further alleged counsel did not adequately investigate the
affidavit from Michael Hale, wherein he claimed ownership of the guns found in
Castaneda’s possession.
The trial court denied Castaneda’s motions and sentenced him to
fifteen years’ imprisonment, consistent with the plea agreement. This appeal
followed.
8
Due to COVID-19 restrictions, sentencing was continued until June 2, 2020.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
If [a] plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw it
must be granted. However, if it was voluntary, the trial
court may, within its discretion, either grant or deny the
motion. . . . The trial court’s determination on whether
[a] plea was voluntarily entered is reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard. A decision which is
supported by substantial evidence is not clearly
erroneous. If, however, the trial court determines that the
guilty plea was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or
deny the motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion.
This decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.
Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes
omitted).
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Castaneda raises the following issues: (1) his guilty pleas
were based in part on ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) the external
pressures of being given only two hours to decide whether to take the plea offer,
and his concerns for his wife and children, rendered his pleas involuntary; and (3)
the trial court failed to consider the totality of circumstances when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
A guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. Russell v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.3d 680, 682 (Ky. 2016) (citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969)). “At
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any time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty . . . to be
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” RCr9 8.10.
First, Castaneda alleges his trial counsel provided him ineffective
assistance which led him to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer. “To
successfully establish the invalidity of a guilty plea based upon the allegedly
deficient performance of defense counsel, the movant must satisfy both prongs of
the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)[.]” Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481
(Ky. 2016).
The movant must demonstrate that: (1) defense
counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and that (2) a
reasonable probability exists that, but for the deficient
performance of counsel, the movant would not have pled
guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. In
making that determination, the trial court must indulge
the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052). Furthermore,
[h]indsight and second guesses are also inappropriate,
and often more so, where a plea has been entered without
a full trial[.] . . . The added uncertainty that results when
there is no extended, formal record and no actual history
to show how the charges have played out at trial works
against the party alleging inadequate assistance.
Counsel, too, faced that uncertainty. There is a most
substantial burden on the claimant to show ineffective
9
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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assistance. The plea process brings to the criminal
justice system a stability and a certainty that must not be
undermined by the prospect of collateral challenges in
cases not only where witnesses and evidence have
disappeared, but also in cases where witnesses and
evidence were not presented in the first place.
Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added)
(quoting Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 132, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745-46, 178 L. Ed.
2d 649 (2011)).
Herein, Castaneda alleges trial counsel failed to properly investigate
statements made by Michael Hale in an affidavit. Castaneda claims his wife gave
trial counsel the affidavit. However, it was made part of the record by Castaneda
at the hearing on his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. Other than Castaneda’s
testimony, there is no evidence in the record proving trial counsel was in
possession of the affidavit or had knowledge of its contents. Hale attested to the
following:
[A]ny and all handguns/firearms found at the address of
306 Bell Street Princeton, Ky 42445 on or around
December 10, 2018 belong to me. Neither Eladio
Castaneda nor Dacia Salyers Castaneda had any
knowledge of said handguns/firearms being on the
property at any time. Neither Eladio Castaneda nor
Dacia Salyers Castaneda were staying at the property at
the time. I have my own set of keys to the property and
let myself in. I bought said handguns/firearms at a gun
show and have yet to register said items in my name.
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Record (“R”) at 93.10
It may be true that Hale could have been called as a witness at trial to
cast doubt on the charge of Castaneda being a felon in possession of a handgun.
However, nothing in Hale’s affidavit indicates his testimony would have had any
effect on Castaneda’s other charges, none of which related to possession of
firearms. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record which proves, had trial
counsel investigated Hale’s claim of ownership of the firearms, Castaneda would
have insisted on going to trial. Rank, 494 S.W.3d at 481 (citation omitted). Given
the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct in advising Castaneda on the
Commonwealth’s offer was reasonable, we cannot determine the conduct was
deficient where Castaneda faced a number of charges unrelated to the guns
allegedly owned by Hale.
Next, Castaneda contests the voluntariness of his guilty plea by
claiming his freedom of choice was overborn by (1) the amount of time he was
given to decide whether to accept the Commonwealth’s offer, and (2) his concern
regarding his wife’s possible incarceration and the impact it would have on his
children. “A guilty plea is involuntary if the defendant lacked full awareness of the
direct consequences of the plea or relied on a misrepresentation by the
Commonwealth or the trial court.” Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558,
10
Citations are to the record in No. 2020-CA-1025-MR, circuit case number 19-CR-00043.
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566 (Ky. 2006) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463,
1472, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)). Furthermore, the Commonwealth “may not
produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 750, 90 S. Ct. at 1470.
In considering claims relating to the voluntariness of a plea, “[s]olemn declarations
in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 569
(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d
136 (1977)).
First, in his colloquy before the trial court, Castaneda testified he
understood the charges against him; had all the time necessary to consult with
counsel and was satisfied with her representation; understood the enhanced penalty
on the charge of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree; and that he
was not threatened or forced to plead guilty. Castaneda does not now allege these
statements were untruthful, nor does he claim he did not understand the
consequences of his plea. He further does not allege the Commonwealth or the
court made any misrepresentations relating to the charges against him or the plea
agreement. Instead, he claims he did not have adequate time to consider the
Commonwealth’s offer. Where a defendant claimed he was rushed into making a
decision regarding a plea offer, the Kentucky Supreme Court has determined “the
urgency inherent in such circumstances does not equate to coercion” and time
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constraints alone do not render a guilty plea involuntary. Thomas v.
Commonwealth, No. 2016-SC-000593-MR, 2017 WL 5023098, *2 (Ky. Nov. 2,
2017) (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-51; Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 570).11
Furthermore, Castaneda’s claims relating to the charges against his
wife are insufficient to prove his guilty plea was involuntary. Pressure which
causes a defendant to plead, even where the Commonwealth is responsible for
some of the factors motivating the plea, does not necessarily prove the plea was
coerced and invalid. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. For example, this Court held a
defendant’s free choice was not overborn so as to make the guilty plea invalid
where the terms of the plea secured the defendant’s release from incarceration to
allow him to spend time with his ill mother. Blanton v. Commonwealth, 516
S.W.3d 352, 356-57 (Ky. App. 2017). Additionally, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has held “[a] plea of guilty is not invalid because it may have been
entered to avoid the Commonwealth’s prosecution of a family member[.]” Nicely
v. Commonwealth, No. 2017-SC-000574-MR, 2019 WL 1167970, *3 (Ky. Feb. 14,
2019) (wherein defendant alleged the primary reason for pleading guilty was to
ensure dismissal of charges against his father).12
11
We cite this unpublished opinion as persuasive, not binding, authority. See Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 76.28(4)(c).
12
We cite this unpublished opinion as persuasive, not binding, authority. See CR 76.28(4)(c).
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Relatedly, Castaneda now argues he wishes to withdraw his plea due
to his concern for his children’s well-being if both he and his wife are incarcerated.
However, he testified to accepting the Commonwealth’s offer with the same
concern in mind. He cites to no authority supporting his allegation that this
concern somehow made his guilty plea involuntary. Therefore, because Castaneda
fails to prove his guilty plea was involuntarily entered, the trial court did not err.
Finally, Castaneda claims the trial court did not consider the totality of
the circumstances in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. “The trial
court is in the best position to determine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding a guilty plea.” Rigdon, 144 S.W.3d at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
“Evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an
inherently factual inquiry which requires consideration of the accused’s demeanor,
background and experience, and whether the record reveals that the plea was
voluntarily made.” Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Ky. 2001)
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
Castaneda does not allege any specific circumstances not adequately
addressed by the trial court. The trial court granted Castaneda a hearing on his
motion and carefully weighed the evidence. In reaching its decision, the court
considered Castaneda’s testimony at the hearing, his colloquy, and deportment
when he entered his guilty pleas, as well as his personal history. Given that
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Castaneda’s pleas were voluntarily entered, we cannot determine, under the totality
of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the orders of the Caldwell Circuit Court are
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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