In the Interest of H.D., T.D., and E.Y., Minor Children, C.Y., Mother ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0427
Filed May 11, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF H.D., T.D., and E.Y.,
Minor Children,
C.Y., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Angela L. Doyle,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Douglas E. Cook of Cook Law Firm, Jewell, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Derek J. Johnson of Johnson & Bonzer, P.L.C., Fort Dodge, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her three children: H.D., born in 2006, T.D., born in 2007, and E.Y., born
in 2011. The mother argues the State failed to prove the statutory grounds and
termination is not in the children’s best interests. She also asserts she shares a
bond with her children that weighs against termination. We affirm.
We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re
M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). “We are not bound by the juvenile
court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the
credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa
2014)). “Our review of termination of parental rights under Iowa Code chapter
232 is a three-step analysis.” Id. Our primary consideration is the best interests
of the children. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
The mother argues the State has failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the children could not be returned safely to her custody at the time of
the termination hearing or within a reasonable time. The juvenile court
terminated the mother’s parental rights to her three children under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2015). On appeal, the mother does not challenge
the grounds for termination under paragraph (e). When a court terminates
parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm the order on any of the
statutory grounds supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The mother’s failure to challenge paragraph (e)
waives any claim of error related to that ground. See Hyler v. Garner, 548
N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur review is confined to those propositions
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relied upon by the appellant for reversal on appeal.”). Therefore, we affirm the
termination on statutory grounds under section 232.116(1)(e).
The mother next contends termination of her parental rights was not in the
children’s best interests under Iowa Code section 232.116(2). Even if a statutory
ground for termination is met under section 232.116(1), a decision to terminate
must still be in the best interests of the children under section 232.116(2). In re
M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 224.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us “giv[ing] primary
consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the
long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The
Iowa Department of Human Services has been involved with this family since
August 2012. This is the second termination action the State has filed against
the mother concerning these children. In February 2015, the juvenile court did
not terminate the mother’s parental rights but instead ordered “another planned
permanent living arrangement” under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(d). In
making its decision, the court determined termination was not in the children’s
best interests at that time because the mother shared a strong bond with her
children and was engaging in unsupervised visits with her children in her home
every weekend.
Following the first termination action, the mother regressed in her limited
progress. She inconsistently attended mental health therapy. She did not have
stable housing or employment. She cancelled visits with her children or attended
the visits unprepared. She did not see the children for four months from August
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until December 2015, and then only saw the children twice for a few hours each
visit from December 2015 until the termination hearing in January 2016.
The juvenile court found,
[The mother] does not follow suggestions to improve her parenting.
She struggles with eliminating the chaos during her limited
visitations and in disciplining the children. [She] does not recognize
that the children have suffered and experienced trauma as a result
of their removal. She has shown no desire, willingness, or ability to
assume even basic caretaking activities for her children. There is
no indication that [the mother] is capable of providing a positive
influence for the long-term nurturing and growth of the children.
[She] cannot meet the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the
children.
Based upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the juvenile
court. We cannot ask these children to continuously wait for their mother to
become a stable parent. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707; see also In re A.B., 815
N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (“It is simply not in the best interests of children to
continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural parents get
their lives together.” (quoting In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997))). “It
is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State
has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping
someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home
for the child.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33,
41 (Iowa 2010)). “[A]t some point, the rights and needs of the children rise above
the rights and needs of the parent.” In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2009). We thus conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights is in
the children’s best interests.
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“Once we have established that the termination of parental rights is in the
children’s best interests, the last step of our analysis is to determine whether any
exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude the termination.” In re M.W.,
876 N.W.2d at 225. The mother asserts an exception under section 232.116(3)
applies because she has a strong bond with her children. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c) (providing a court may decide not to terminate a parent’s
parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination
would be detrimental to the child[ren] at the time due to the closeness of the
parent-child relationship[s].”). “‘The factors weighing against termination in
section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory,’ and the court may use its
discretion, ‘based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best
interests of the child[ren], whether to apply the factors in this section to save the
parent-child relationship[s].’” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113 (citation omitted).
The record clearly shows the mother shares a bond with her children, who
love her in return. Based on the facts included above, however, we agree with
the juvenile court when it found there is “no clear and convincing evidence that
the termination would be detrimental to the children at [the time of the
termination] due to the closeness of the mother-child relationship.” Accordingly,
we find no permissive factors under section 232.116(3) exist weighing against
termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.