Aleksandra Hoffman v. Maurice Patterson ( 2021 )

RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0830-MR
ALEKSANDRA HOFFMAN;
CARSON HOFFMAN; DONATELLO
HOFFMAN; SCARLETTE JANE
HOFFMAN; AND ZACHARY
HOFFMAN APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE ANN BAILEY SMITH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-003157
MAURICE PATTERSON; CARLA
KIRBY; CASSANDRA
RICHARDSON; DEBBIE SPARKS;
AND YVETTE GENTRY APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: This case involves the question of qualified immunity.
We find that the trial court properly determined that all Appellees save Maurice
Patterson were entitled to summary judgment1 as they were all government actors
who were not charged with violating any ministerial duty and are thus entitled to
qualified immunity. We further find the trial court’s analysis correct as to
Appellee Patterson, that summary judgment was appropriate as to the claim against
him, because no “special relationship” existed between him and the Appellants.
Having found that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was appropriate as
to each Appellee, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 16, 2015, Tyler Morgan was in the custody of the Louisville
Metro Youth Detention Services (LMYDS). A Jefferson District Court Judge had
ordered that the juvenile be transported to a local hospital at which time he would
be transferred into the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(CHFS). LMYDS youth program employee Maurice Patterson was assigned the
task of transporting Morgan from the juvenile detention facility downtown to the
suburbs where the hospital was located.
Patterson testified in depositions that he placed Morgan in the middle
seat of the transport vehicle and secured him with a seatbelt as Morgan was
handcuffed in front and shackled. Patterson ensured the side door of the vehicle
was locked, got behind the steering wheel, and began the drive to the hospital. The
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.01.
-2-
relevant policies of LMYDS in effect at the time of Morgan’s transport required
only that the youth be handcuffed and shackled, that the youth not be seated
directly behind the driver, that the driver have a two-way radio to communicate,
that the youth be supervised at all times, and that the employee keep keys and
equipment secure during transport.
Shortly after beginning the drive, the vehicle was stopped by a
stoplight at the intersection of Grinstead Drive and Lexington Road. Before he
could react, Patterson heard the click of the door lock and turned in time to see
Morgan fleeing from the vehicle and running towards a gas station on the corner.2
Patterson tried to grab Morgan to stop him but could not. He began a foot chase
after Morgan.
When Morgan ran towards the gas station, he encountered an idling
vehicle in the parking lot, jumped in the driver’s seat, and took the wheel. Inside
the car were Aleksandra Hoffman and her three minor children; Aleksandra’s
husband Zachary Hoffman was inside the convenience store purchasing supplies
for a trip to nearby Cherokee Park where the family was planning on spending the
afternoon.
2
The vehicle was not equipped with rear door child locks, though some of the agency’s other
transport vehicles were so equipped. No policy in place at the time, though, required a vehicle
equipped with rear door child locks only be used for transport of youth.
-3-
Aleksandra fought with Morgan over the steering wheel and tried to
put the gearshift in park and employ the emergency brake to stop the vehicle.
Morgan, fighting off Aleksandra, hit a vehicle while pulling out of the gas station
parking lot. While the two struggled over control of the vehicle, it rolled into a
retaining wall and a road sign. When Morgan began to drive up an interstate
entrance ramp, Aleksandra again tried to gain control of the vehicle by grabbing
the steering wheel, and in response Morgan head-butted her, sending her head
slamming into the window, almost knocking her unconscious. The car continued
to strike the retaining wall on one side of the ramp and a guard rail on the other
side until it stalled. Once the car stalled, Morgan jumped out. Zachary, who had
been on foot chasing the vehicle with his family inside, arrived and calmed his
children and comforted his wife, and called 911.
Police responded to the scene and detained Morgan, assisted by
Patterson. Morgan was charged with various criminal charges related to the theft
of the vehicle and kidnapping and assault of the occupants and is serving a
sentence of imprisonment for the crimes.
The Hoffmans filed suit against Patterson and his supervisors at
LMYDS in their individual capacities. The trial court granted summary judgment
for Patterson and his supervisors, finding that he owed no duty of care to the
Hoffmans as no “special relationship” existed between them as required by
-4-
Kentucky law for finding liability for negligence against a government employee,
and finding qualified immunity prevented the suit against Patterson’s supervisors
because there was no allegation that any of them violated any ministerial duty. We
agree with each of those conclusions and affirm the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court employs a de novo standard of review on questions
concerning the propriety of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Cmty. Fin. Servs. Bank v. Stamper, 586 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Ky. 2019).
In Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court
explained that “the proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation
when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent
to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” 807 S.W.2d
476, 480 (Ky. 1991). In reviewing such a motion, the trial court must view the
facts “in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor” and in so doing must
examine the proof to ensure that no real issue of material fact exists. Id. “The
movant should not succeed unless a right to judgment is shown with such clarity
that there is no room left for controversy, and it is established that the adverse
party cannot prevail under any circumstances.” City of Florence v. Chipman, 38
S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. 2001), as amended (Feb. 26, 2001).
-5-
Thus, as factual findings are not at issue, the trial court’s decision is
granted no deference; review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is a matter of law. “A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo
because factual findings are not at issue.” Feltner v. PJ Operations, LLC, 568
S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 2018), review denied (Mar. 6, 2019) (citing Pinkston v.
Audubon Area Community Services, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006)).
ANALYSIS
The Hoffmans filed an action alleging negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress against Patterson and his supervisors, in their
individual capacities. The trial court granted the LMYDS employees’ motion for
summary judgment, holding that they owed the Hoffmans no duty of care because
no “special relationship” existed between them.
The case law is clear. Public officials owe the general public no duty
of care unless the public official has some particular “special relationship” with the
injured party.
In order for the special relationship to exist, two
conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been in
state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the
time the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the
violence or other offensive conduct must have been
committed by a state actor.
Chipman, 38 S.W.3d at 392.
-6-
Here, the violence or other offensive conduct was not committed by a
state actor. Morgan was not a state actor and his criminal behavior was the true
cause of the damages suffered by the Hoffmans. In the Ashby case, infra, the
estate of a woman beaten to death by her paramour sought recompense from the
City of Louisville for failure of employees to arrest the paramour on outstanding
assault charges under the theory that had he been arrested and detained, he would
not have been able to have killed the victim. In holding that the city employees
were not liable, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
Here, it is undisputed both that Ashby was not in state
custody when the violence was committed against her,
and that her assailant was not a state actor. Hence, the
tragic events below did not constitute an actionable due
process violation under [DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct.
998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989)]. Moreover, despite our
abhorrence of the violence suffered by Ashby at the
hands of her assailant, we cannot conclude that any basis
exists for otherwise finding that a “special relationship”
existed between Ashby and appellees so as to have
created an affirmative duty of protection. See, e.g., Santy
[v. Bresee, 129 Ill. App. 3d 658, 661, 473 N.E.2d 69, 72
(1984)] (no special relationship was created between
murder victims and the defendant law enforcement
agency or officers where the victims had requested
protection, the defendants were aware of the murderer’s
threats against the victims, and the defendants had
promised to warn the victims of the murderer’s release
from custody. These circumstances “do not take the case
out of the general rule that law enforcement agencies and
officers do not owe individual citizens a duty to protect
them from crime.”). Hence, it follows that the trial court
-7-
did not err by failing to find that a “special relationship”
existed between Ashby and appellees.
Ashby v. City of Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 190 (Ky. App. 1992), holding modified
by Gaither v. Just. & Pub. Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. 2014).
The Hoffmans claim no special relationship exists between them and
the Appellees which satisfies the requirement, but rather argue that “[e]very person
owes a duty to every other person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to
prevent foreseeable injury.” Isaacs v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Ky. 1999). Such
argument simply ignores a long line of cases that requires the special relationship
be established before a finding of a duty by a government actor to the aggrieved.
See Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky. 1995) (“In order to establish
an affirmative legal duty on public officials in the performance of their official
duties, there must exist a special relationship between the victim and the public
officials.”); Ashby, 841 S.W.2d at 189 (“However, the general rule of thumb, in the
absence of some ‘special relationship,’ is that a municipality or a law enforcement
agency or official does not owe individual citizens a duty to protect them from
crime.”).
The Hoffmans argue that the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Pile v. City of Brandenburg created an exception to the special relationship
requirement. 215 S.W.3d 36 (Ky. 2006). In that case the Court held, in part, that
an officer violated a statute applicable to all motorists which mandates that one
-8-
shall not leave the key in the ignition of an unattended vehicle. The officer
violated that statute, which allowed a prisoner in custody to commandeer the
vehicle in the officer’s absence and cause a fatal accident. The Supreme Court
held that the estate of the innocent decedent could proceed against the officer for
his negligence.
Here, however, there was no statute which Patterson violated which is
also applicable to persons not employed by LMYDS. In applying the proper
standard and looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the Hoffmans, if we
assume as they argue, that Patterson failed to properly secure Morgan in the
vehicle to prevent his flight from the vehicle, such is the failure to follow a policy
of a governmental entity, not a statute applicable to every person, as in Pile.
Further, the Court did not hold in Pile that it was the leaving of a prisoner
unattended in a vehicle which exposed the officer to liability. Rather, it was the
leaving of keys in an unattended vehicle, or a vehicle attended only by a person in
custody, which provided the basis of the negligence finding in Pile, and not, as the
Hoffmans attempt to argue, the leaving of a prisoner unattended in a police vehicle.
The argument fails.
In order to rely upon Pile, an aggrieved party must establish that the
government actor violated a statute applicable to all, not a policy applicable only to
government employees. See Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 446.070 (“[a]
-9-
person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such
damages as he sustained by reason of the violation.”). It is insufficient to rely upon
agency policy because the gravamen of the holding in Pile is that it was the
violation of the statute regarding leaving the key in the ignition, a violation of a
statute imposing a duty on all motorists, which established negligence and liability.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled on the motion for summary judgment.
Even looking at the facts in a light most favorable to the Hoffmans, they could not
establish that any of the Appellees, much less Patterson, owed them a duty of care
which was violated. While it may be that LMYDS adjusted their policies
following this incident to require employees to take greater measures to prevent a
repeat of a terrible event, such as this, to argue that such is indicative of liability is
simply incorrect. First, such conclusion would have a chilling effect on the
updating of policies when circumstances dictate such be done for the protection of
the public and those in the custody of an agency such as LMYDS. Second, such
simply ignores a long line of cases establishing the extent to which governmental
entities and employees are liable to the public. While both the trial court and this
Court approach the Hoffmans’ case sympathetically, we are bound to follow the
law. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
-10-
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Garry R. Adams Michael J. O’Connell
Abigail V. Lewis Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
Kristie B. Walker
Louisville, Kentucky
-11-