James Brian Snow Individually v. Rachel L. Martin ( 2021 )

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-0198-MR
JAMES BRIAN SNOW,
INDIVIDUALLY; LORNA COOPER
SNOW, INDIVIDUALLY; JAMES
BRIAN SNOW AND LORNA
COOPER SNOW AS AGENTS FOR
THE MATTIE MAE HARTUNG
TRUST; AND MORTON COOPER AS
THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE
MARCIA HARTUNG COOPER
REVOCABLE 1990 TRUST APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CI-00755
RACHEL L. MARTIN APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CALDWELL, McNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
McNEILL, JUDGE: This case involves two separate and adjoining properties.
One property is owned by the Appellant, Morton Cooper, Successor Trustee of the
Marcia Hartung Cooper Revocable 1990 Trust (hereafter “Trust”), et al. The other
property is owned by Appellee, Rachel Martin (hereafter “Martin”). Martin uses a
private pipeline to provide gas service for her residence that connects to the main
pipeline which was installed by the gas company. In order to facilitate this
connection, Martin’s private line extends underneath the Trust property. On July
9, 2017, James Brian Snow struck Martin’s gas line while installing a fence on the
Trust’s property. Martin paid $3,304.00 to repair the gas line and her service was
not restored until November of 2017.
Martin subsequently filed suit in Henderson Circuit Court alleging,
inter alia, that she possessed a sub-surface easement across the Trust’s property to
provide gas service for her residence. The trial court granted partial summary
judgment in Martin’s favor and specifically concluded that she possessed a quasi-
easement to access the Trust property for her gas line. The Trust now appeals as a
matter of right arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and
that it specifically erred in concluding that the grant of a quasi-easement was
reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of Martin’s property. For the following
reasons, we disagree.1
1
Martin did not file a brief on appeal.
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR2 56.03. The Kentucky Supreme Court further explained this summary
judgment standard in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.:
While it has been recognized that summary judgment is
designed to expedite the disposition of cases and avoid
unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material
fact are raised, . . . this Court has also repeatedly
admonished that the rule is to be cautiously applied. The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
doubts are to be resolved in his favor. Even though a
trial court may believe the party opposing the motion
may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary
judgment if there is any issue of material fact. The trial
judge must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue
of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists. It clearly is
not the purpose of the summary judgment rule, as we
have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of
trial if they have issues to try.
807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991) (citations omitted). “Because no factual issues
are involved and only a legal issue is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, we do not defer to the trial court and our review is de novo.” Univ. of
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Louisville v. Sharp, 416 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted). With
these standards in mind, we turn to the applicable law and the facts of the present
case.
II. ANALYSIS
In granting partial summary judgment in Martin’s favor, the trial court
applied the elements necessary for establishing a quasi-easement:
Generally, in order to prove a quasi-easement by
implication of law, a party must show: (1) that there was
a separation of title from common ownership; (2) that
before the separation occurred the use which gave rise to
the easement was so long continued, obvious, and
manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent;
and, (3) that the use of the claimed easement was highly
convenient and beneficial to the land conveyed.
Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 490 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted). The
Court also observed additional relevant factors:
(1) whether the claimant is the grantor or the grantee of
the dominant tract; (2) the extent of necessity of the
easement to the claimant; (3) whether reciprocal benefits
accrue to both the grantor and grantee; (4) the manner in
which the land was used prior to conveyance; and (5)
whether the prior use was or might have been known to
the parties to the present litigation.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hile all of
the factors are considered, the factor involving necessity is considered the most
important.” Cole v. Gilvin, 59 S.W.3d 468, 477 (Ky. App. 2001). In concluding
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that the necessary elements for a quasi-easement were satisfied, the trial court in
the present case determined as follows:
Martin’s tract and the Trust’s tract were separated from
common ownership. The evidence is that Martin’s gas
line had been in use for forty years, well before the two
tracts were separated and long enough to be considered
permanent. The easement for the gas line is highly
beneficial to Martin’s tract. While it may technically be
possible to move Martin’s gas line, it would obviously be
prohibitively expensive to do so.
In granting the Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of the
existence of a quasi-easement, the court denied Martin summary judgment as to
her additional arguments that she possessed an easement by necessity or by
prescription.
Without citation to the record, the Trust generally claims that “[t]he
parties . . . can probably never know for certain, the exact date on which the
offending gas line was installed.” The Trust also argues that the pipeline cannot be
obvious and manifest because of the fact that it was underground. Therefore, the
Trust concludes that the requisite elements for obtaining a quasi-easement were not
satisfied here. To the contrary, the three primary elements provided in Carroll are
not absolute or exhaustive. See Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 490 (emphasis added)
(“Generally, in order to prove a quasi-easement by implication of law, a party must
show . . . .”). Carroll also lists additional factors, with necessity being the most
important. Cole, 59 S.W.3d at 477. As previously cited, the trial court here
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specifically determined that the gas line easement was “highly beneficial to
Martin’s tract.” (Emphasis added.)
In support of its general argument that the easement at issue here is
not reasonably necessary, the Trust appears to imply that either relocating the
pipeline or building a new line would not be unreasonably expensive. In further
support, the Trust cites Knight v. Shell, wherein the Court concluded the following:
The evidence shows beyond question that the roadway in
dispute is not absolutely necessary to the use and
enjoyment of the Knight farm, and considering the fact
that it must be used jointly, if at all, with appellee, it is
doubtful if it would be more convenient than the roadway
recently constructed by appellants. The evidence
likewise shows, as we have said, that the construction of
the new road cost appellants the sum of $116.00, which
certainly is not disproportionate to the value of the
dominant estate as fixed in the deed; to wit, $16,000.00.
233 S.W.2d 973, 976 (Ky. 1950). We find this case to be of little utility in
resolving the present issue. Rather, the more recent published authority previously
cited herein is controlling. Moreover, the Trust has failed to cite to any evidence
of record indicating the construction cost of a new gas pipeline, or any other
relevant evidence. Lastly, the consideration of necessity need not be absolute. To
the contrary, it is “the extent of necessity of the easement” that the court considers.
Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 490. In fact, “[a] greater degree of necessity is required to
create an easement by necessity than for a quasi-easement based on prior use.” Id.The remaining portion of the Trust’s argument on appeal either lacks the necessary
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citation to the record, or is speculative or conclusory. Therefore, we cannot
conclude that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in
Martin’s favor.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the
Henderson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
Harry L. Mathison, Jr.
Henderson, Kentucky
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