Orlundo Holloway v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2022 )

RENDERED: OCTOBER 7, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-0003-MR
ORLUNDO HOLLOWAY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-00047
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.
GOODWINE, JUDGE: Orlundo Holloway (“Holloway”), pro se, appeals from a
Fulton Circuit Court order denying his motion for relief under RCr1 11.42. After
careful review, finding no error, we affirm.
On January 27, 2018, Holloway killed David Mackins by shooting
him in the back of the head. On March 8, 2018, Holloway was indicted on
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
murder,2 tampering with physical evidence,3 convicted felon in possession of a
handgun,4 three counts of first-degree wanton endangerment of a police officer,5
and first-degree persistent felony offender.6 A trial was set for September 17-19,
2018. After a competency hearing, the trial court entered an order finding
Holloway competent to stand trial on September 7, 2018.
On September 12, 2018, Holloway pled guilty to the amended charges
of first-degree manslaughter7 and convicted felon in possession of a firearm.8 The
remaining charges were dismissed. The Commonwealth recommended a sentence
of twenty years’ imprisonment for first-degree manslaughter and two years’
imprisonment for convicted felon in possession of a firearm, to run consecutively
for a total of twenty-two years. By final judgment entered October 17, 2018, the
trial court formally sentenced Holloway to twenty-two years’ imprisonment.
Holloway never moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020 (capital offense).
3
KRS 524.100 (Class D felony).
4
KRS 527.040 (Class C felony).
5
KRS 508.060 (Class D felony).
6
KRS 532.080.
7
KRS 507.030 (Class B felony).
8
KRS 527.040 (Class D felony).
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On July 8, 2020, Holloway filed a motion for relief under RCr 11.42
alleging trial counsel was ineffective in trial preparation and counsel coerced him
into pleading guilty. On November 15, 2020, the trial court denied Holloway’s
motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Holloway argues his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary because: (1) his attorney failed to properly investigate his case and
prepare for trial and (2) counsel used his parents to convince him to plead guilty.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under RCr
11.42, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In the context of a guilty plea, the trial court
must “consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and
juxtapose the presumption of voluntariness inherent in a proper plea colloquy with
a Strickland v. Washington inquiry into the performance of counsel[.]” Bronk v.
Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
First, Holloway argues trial counsel coerced him to plead guilty
because counsel failed to raise a justification defense or any defense at all,
investigate the crime scene, or investigate any relevant witnesses. He fails to show
that further investigation would have exonerated him. Instead, the record shows
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multiple witnesses named Holloway as the shooter, and surveillance footage
captured Holloway leaving the scene right after the shooting.
Additionally, Holloway alleges counsel used his parents to sway him
to plead guilty. The Commonwealth asserts Holloway failed to specifically state
facts to support his coercion claim.
In Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131 (Ky. 2012), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held:
While . . . “the voluntariness of [a] plea depends
on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases,” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366,
88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), to be entitled to relief under RCr 11.42,
the movant must “state specifically the grounds on which
the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which
the movant relies in support of such grounds.” RCr
11.42(2). Conclusory allegations that counsel was
ineffective without a statement of the facts upon which
those allegations are based do not meet the
rule’s specificity standard and so “warrant a summary
dismissal of the motion.”
Id. at 140.
Neither of Holloway’s coercion arguments meet the specificity
requirement under RCr 11.42. He conflates counsel’s perceived ineffectiveness in
investigating his case to coercion. He fails to assert how trial counsel coerced him
and used his parents to sway him to plead guilty.
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Instead, the record indicates Holloway entered a voluntary guilty plea.
The trial court found:
the record consisting of the Commonwealth’s Offer on a
Plea of Guilty and Motion to Enter Guilty Plea, along
with the plea colloquy conducted in this matter, all
clearly indicate Defendant’s understanding of the “plea
papers” signed by him and explained to him by his
attorney. The [c]ourt was unable to discern any
impairment of Defendant’s ability to understanding the
proceedings against him at his guilty plea hearing.
Record (“R.”) at 195-96.
Holloway admitted in open court to shooting David Mackins.
“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The
subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is
subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are
wholly incredible.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Ky. 2011)
(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L. Ed. 2d
136 (1977)). We reject Holloway’s claim that counsel’s alleged failure to
investigate his case forced him to involuntarily plead guilty. Based on the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude Holloway’s guilty plea was entered knowingly
and voluntarily.
Additionally, the circuit court noted counsel secured a favorable plea
deal for Holloway. Although Holloway argues a jury could have easily found him
guilty of second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide had he gone to trial,
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this argument is speculative. He faced a life sentence for murder. Instead, counsel
successfully negotiated a twenty-two-year sentence for first-degree manslaughter
and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The Commonwealth dismissed all
other charges. Thus, Holloway failed to show that counsel’s performance was
deficient or that he was prejudiced.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Fulton Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Orlundo Holloway, pro se Daniel Cameron
Eddyville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Melissa A. Pile
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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