James Clayton Bailey v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2022 )

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 10, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2020-CA-1162-MR
JAMES CLAYTON BAILEY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JAMES T. JAMESON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CR-00181
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: James Clayton Bailey brings this appeal from a June 22,
2020, Order Subsequent to Bench Trial, setting out findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and a subsequent August 14, 2020, judgment, sentence, and
order of probation rendered by the Marshall Circuit Court. We affirm.
Background
On July 2, 2017, Bailey was driving east on U.S. Highway 68 in
Marshall County, Kentucky. Bailey was driving a pickup truck pulling a trailer
loaded with a golf cart. Deputy Chris Greenfield, of the Marshall County Sheriff’s
Office, observed Bailey weaving in and out of his lane and initiated a traffic stop.
Bailey denied having ingested any alcohol or medication that day. Rather, Bailey
claimed his weaving was due to the trailer being improperly loaded. Deputy
Greenfield indicated he did not detect any problem with the trailer. Deputy
Greenfield did, however, notice that Bailey’s speech was slurred, his eyes were
bloodshot, and his pupils were dilated. Bailey also failed all three field sobriety
tests administered by Deputy Greenfield. Bailey was arrested and subsequently
agreed to submit to a blood test. Bailey was transported to the Marshall County
Hospital where a blood test was administered. The laboratory report revealed that
Bailey had the following medications in his blood: diazepam, trazodone,
oxycodone, and hydrocodone. It is uncontroverted that Bailey had a valid
prescription for each of the medications detected in his system.
Bailey was subsequently indicted upon driving a motor vehicle under
the influence, fourth offense (DUI – Fourth) (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
189A.010) and possession of a controlled substance in the second degree (KRS
218A.1416). The matter proceeded to a bench trial on December 11, 2019. After
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the Commonwealth presented its evidence, Bailey made a motion for a directed
verdict. Bailey argued that the Commonwealth failed to present expert testimony
regarding whether the prescription medications found in Bailey’s blood impaired
his ability to drive a motor vehicle. The trial court denied the motion. At the
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s proof, Bailey renewed his original motion for a
directed verdict. Bailey additionally argued that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal as the expert’s testimony that Bailey was involuntarily
intoxicated was unrebutted.
By Order Subsequent to Bench Trial entered June 22, 2020, the trial
court concluded that the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence that
Bailey had operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of a substance that
impaired his ability to drive (KRS 189A.010(1)(c)). The trial court further
believed that Bailey had not adequately proven the affirmative defense of
involuntary intoxication. Therefore, the court found Bailey guilty of DUI-Fourth.
The trial court further found Bailey not guilty of possession of a controlled
substance. By a judgment entered August 14, 2020, Bailey was sentenced to a
five-year term of imprisonment with a mandatory sentence of 120 days, to be
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served by home incarceration, with the balance of the sentence probated for a
period of three years.1 This appeal follows.
ISSUES
Bailey asserts the trial court committed reversible error by denying his
motion for directed verdict and finding him guilty of DUI-Fourth, arguing there
was insufficient evidence presented to establish the elements thereof. More
specifically, Bailey believes that expert testimony was necessary to prove that the
prescription medications present in Bailey’s blood were the cause of his driving
impairment.
Additionally, Bailey contends that the trial court erred by concluding
that he failed to establish the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. More
particularly, Bailey asserts that the Commonwealth failed to rebut the testimony of
Bailey’s expert, Dr. George Nichols, who testified that in his opinion Bailey was
involuntarily intoxicated due to liver disease.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
At trial, Bailey moved for a directed verdict at the close of the
Commonwealth’s proof. However a directed verdict motion is clearly improper in
an action tried by the court without a jury. Brown v. Shelton, 156 S.W.3d 319, 320
1
The form upon which the judgment was entered on August 14, 2020, was styled “Judgment and
Sentence on Plea of Guilty.” There was no guilty plea entered in the case and the form appears
to have been utilized for sentencing purposes only.
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(Ky. App. 2004). Rather the appropriate procedural mechanism was a motion to
dismiss in accordance with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 41.02(2).2
R.S. v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 178, 184 (Ky. 2014).
Accordingly, since the trial court conducted a bench trial, the court
should have treated Bailey’s motion as a motion to dismiss under CR 41.02(2)
which reads:
In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence
in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as
trier of the facts may then determine them and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render
any judgment until the close of all the evidence. . . .
Under this rule, “[t]he trial court ‘must weigh and evaluate the
evidence’ rather than, with regard to directed verdict, ‘indulge every inference in
the [Commonwealth’s] favor.’” R.S., 423 S.W.3d at 184 (citations omitted). A
trial court’s ruling under CR 41.02(2) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at
184 (citing Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24, 31 (Ky. 2009)). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
2
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to criminal cases as provided in
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 13.04.
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unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
Finally, if the trial court rules on the merits in favor of defendant,
factual findings must be made on the record pursuant to CR 52.01. R.S., 423
S.W.3d at 184. These findings will not then be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Id. at 188. As fact finder, the trial court alone assesses the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence presented. Id. at 187; see also Moore v. Asente, 110
S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).
Analysis
We begin our analysis by reviewing the elements necessary to prove
Bailey was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a substance that
impaired his ability to drive. Those elements are set forth in KRS 189A.010(1)(c),
which provides:
(1) A person shall not operate or be in physical control of
a motor vehicle anywhere in this state:
....
(c) While under the influence of any other substance
or combination of substances which impairs one’s
driving ability[.]
Simply put, to establish a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(c), the
Commonwealth must prove that a defendant was operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of a substance that impaired his ability to do so. Kidd v.
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Commonwealth, 146 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Ky. App. 2004). And, it is well-established
that where a police officer “has observed a defendant’s appearance and behavior
[the officer] is competent to express an opinion as to his degree of intoxication and
as to his ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.” Id. at 403 (citing Hayden v.
Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Ky. App. 1989)).
In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth called Deputy Greenfield
to testify regarding his observations of Bailey. Deputy Greenfield testified that he
first observed Bailey’s vehicle swerving in and out of his lane of traffic. Upon
contact with Bailey, Greenfield noticed that Bailey’s speech was slurred, his eyes
were bloodshot, and his pupils were dilated. These factors, when combined with
Bailey’s inability to perform the basic physical tasks of the three field sobriety
tests, were sufficient to establish that Bailey was under the influence of a substance
that impaired his ability to drive a motor vehicle. See Kidd, 146 S.W.3d at 403.
As such, we reject Bailey’s contention that the lack of expert testimony prevented
the Commonwealth from proving that Bailey was guilty of driving under the
influence of a substance that impaired his driving. Rather, the Commonwealth’s
evidence, through Greenfield’s testimony, was more than sufficient to establish
Bailey’s impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.
As concerns Bailey’s argument of involuntary intoxication, we note as
a general rule, intoxication does not constitute a defense to a criminal charge;
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however, there are a few exceptions. See King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d
919, 923 (Ky. 2017). Relevant herein, is the exception set forth in KRS
501.080(2), which provides that involuntary intoxication is a defense to a criminal
charge only if such condition “[i]s not voluntarily produced and deprives the
defendant of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” KRS 501.080(2). In
other words, as noted in the Commentary to KRS 501.080, involuntary intoxication
can excuse criminal conduct only if it would be excused under the insanity
provisions as resulting from a mental disease or defect.
In the case sub judice, Dr. Nichols testified that Bailey had liver
disease caused by liver cancer and chronic Hepatitis C. Dr. Nichols also stated that
Bailey’s liver disease caused an increase in the ammonia levels in Bailey’s system.
And, Dr. Nichols further testified that the increased ammonia levels affected the
way Bailey metabolized his medications. According to Dr. Nichols, the inability
of Bailey’s liver to properly metabolize his prescription medications led to Bailey’s
involuntary intoxication or impairment on July 2, 2017. However, Dr. Nichols
also conceded that the prescription medications in Bailey’s blood could have been
the sole cause of the impairment Deputy Greenfield observed. Considering such
testimony, we believe there was substantial evidence presented to support the trial
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court’s finding that Bailey was not involuntarily intoxicated and based on our
review of the record and applicable law, these findings were not clearly erroneous.
In conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Bailey’s motion for directed verdict nor did the trial court err in finding that Bailey
was not involuntarily intoxicated.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order Subsequent to Bench Trial and
judgment entered by the Marshall Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Richard L. Walter Daniel Cameron
Jeremy Ian Smith Attorney General of Kentucky
Paducah, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky
Robert Baldridge
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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