Chris Douglas Hawkins v. Deedra Hart Warden ( 2020 )


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  •                 RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2020; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2019-CA-001850-MR
    CHRIS DOUGLAS HAWKINS                                                 APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
    v.                 HONORABLE C.A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 19-CI-00089
    DEEDRA HART, WARDEN                                                     APPELLEE
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: KRAMER, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
    LAMBERT, JUDGE: Chris Douglas Hawkins, proceeding pro se, has appealed
    from the Lyon Circuit Court’s order dismissing his declaration of rights petition
    related to prison disciplinary actions against him that resulted in the loss of good
    time credit. We affirm.
    Hawkins is an inmate at Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP), and this
    appeal concerns two prison disciplinary actions, one in May and the other in June
    2019. The first incident (Discipline Report (DR) No. KSP-2019-01504) had to do
    with a letter Hawkins wrote to Heather Pierce, an inmate at another facility.
    Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women (KCIW) Internal Affairs Captain
    Rebecca Denham rejected the letter sent to Pierce and turned the letter over to KSP
    Internal Affairs Officer Derek Roberts. In the letter, Hawkins “writes a
    conversation and conspires of having Inmate Pierce to have sexual relationships
    with under age children [and] also has a questionnaire he wrote for Inmate Pierce
    to answer in which one question was asked if she would stare at under age children
    at a nudist beach.”
    Sergeant Lauren Hawkins investigated the report and spoke with the
    two officers involved. Captain Denham said that the letter had been rejected due to
    content in that child pornography was discussed. Sergeant Hawkins read the letter
    in the evidence room. She also read the report to Hawkins, who responded, “Ms.
    Hawkins, you know me (Which I do not), you know that I’m not doing sick shit
    like that.” Hawkins explained that he had asked Pierce the questions because he
    wanted to make sure she would not want to stare at underage children at a nudist
    beach if he were to take her to one. Hawkins disputed the charge against him and
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    indicated that he wanted to call Pierce and Officer Roberts to question them at the
    hearing.
    As a result of this report, Hawkins was charged with the possession,
    creation, or distribution of child pornography pursuant to Kentucky Department of
    Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) 15.2, Category 6-16. A hearing before
    the adjustment committee was held, during which Hawkins stated that he had been
    trying to help Pierce and was asking her questions to do this. He denied that there
    was any child pornography or writing in the letter. However, he was found guilty,
    and his penalty was 30 days in disciplinary segregation and the forfeiture of 180
    good time days.
    Hawkins appealed the decision to KSP Warden DeEdra Hart, arguing
    that his due process rights had been violated because he was not given the
    opportunity to call any witnesses, he was not given advanced notice of the charges
    against him, he was not permitted to present exculpatory evidence at the hearing,
    and he had not been given a copy of the evidence against him 24 hours prior to the
    hearing. He stated that the documents used as evidence were related to Pierce’s
    post-conviction case that he had been working on for her. Warden Hart denied his
    appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the adjustment committee’s decision
    and that his “due process requirements have been protected, the disciplinary
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    violation to be fairly processed in accordance with CPP 15.6 and no justification of
    [his] appeal to alter the Committee’s decision.”
    The second disciplinary action (DR No. KSP-2019-01668) involved
    an incident with pages being removed from a book in the prison library. While
    Hawkins maintained that the book was torn when he received it, Jewell Humphries
    reported that he saw Hawkins tear pages out of the library book and place the
    pages in a blue folder. Humphries searched the folder and found two pages
    containing photos of naked children that had been taken from a book about the
    Vietnam War. Sergeant Jason Denny investigated the report and interviewed
    Hawkins. Hawkins told him, “I did tear the pages out of the book but it wasn’t
    because the pictures were naked children, they were pictures of children that had
    been napalmed during Vietnam.” He also interviewed Humphries, who confirmed
    his earlier statements. Sergeant Denny confirmed that Hawkins had been in the
    library at the time of the incident, but he could not verify this via camera because
    camera access was restricted to 3 Cell House RHU.
    As a result of this report, Hawkins was charged with the possession,
    creation, or distributing of child pornography pursuant to CPP 15.2, Category 6-16.
    He pled not guilty and requested a hearing before the adjustment committee. He
    was found guilty and received a penalty of 30 days in disciplinary segregation, the
    forfeiture of 180 good time days, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of
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    $12.97. Hawkins appealed the matter to Warden Hart, raising issues as to his
    request for the KSP security video footage, the members of the adjustment
    committee who decided his case, and his lack of guilt. Warden Hart again
    affirmed the decision of the adjustment committee, finding that his due process
    rights had been protected and that his disciplinary violation had been fairly
    processed.
    Hawkins filed a petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 418.040 with the Lyon Circuit Court, in which
    he alleged that his federal and state constitutional due process rights had been
    violated in the disciplinary proceedings. Warden Hart moved to dismiss Hawkins’
    petition pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f) for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted. She asserted that Hawkins’ due
    process rights had not been violated and that there was some evidence to support
    the findings of the adjustment committee in both cases. Hawkins objected to the
    motion to dismiss. In addition, Hawkins filed a motion seeking a temporary
    restraining order or preliminary injunction to seek the return of his legal materials
    from KSP officials and to prevent them from hindering his access to the courts.
    The circuit court entered an order of dismissal on October 21, 2019,
    finding that Hawkins had failed to demonstrate a due process violation. The court
    also denied Hawkins’ request for a restraining order or injunction as he had not
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    established that his rights were being or would be violated by an adverse party
    pursuant to CR 65.04 and because such relief was not appropriate in a declaration
    of rights proceeding. This appeal now follows.
    In Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 556, 
    94 S. Ct. 2963
    , 2975, 41 L.
    Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the United States Supreme Court stated, “[p]rison disciplinary
    proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
    due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Citing Wolff, the Supreme
    Court in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
    
    472 U.S. 445
    , 454, 
    105 S. Ct. 2768
    , 2773, 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 356
    (1985), held:
    Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in
    the loss of good time credits, Wolff held that the inmate
    must receive: (1) advance written notice of the
    disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent
    with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call
    witnesses and present documentary evidence in his
    defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of
    the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
    action.
    (Citation omitted.) Also citing Wolff, the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently
    held:
    Accordingly, an inmate facing disciplinary proceedings
    must be given: a hearing before any deprivation of
    property occurs; advance notice of the claimed violation;
    an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary
    evidence “when permitting him to do so will not be
    unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
    goals”; and a written statement by the factfinder detailing
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    the evidence relied on and the reasons for disciplinary
    action.
    Ramirez v. Nietzel, 
    424 S.W.3d 911
    , 916 (Ky. 2014) (footnote omitted). In
    addition, the Wolff Court mandates impartial 
    fact-finders. 418 U.S. at 564-65
    , 570-
    
    71, 94 S. Ct. at 2979
    , 2982.
    “Courts reviewing inmate disciplinary proceedings are to apply a very
    deferential standard of review.” Mobley v. Payne, 
    484 S.W.3d 746
    , 750 (Ky. App.
    2016). The Hill Court held “that revocation of good time does not comport with
    the minimum requirements of procedural due process unless the findings of the
    prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.” 
    Hill, 472 U.S. at 454
    , 105 S. Ct. at 2773 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
    determining the existence of “some evidence,” the Court stated, “[a]scertaining
    whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record,
    independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the
    evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the
    record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 
    Id., 472 U.S. at 455-56
    , 105 S. Ct. at 2774 (citations omitted). See also Smith v.
    O’Dea, 
    939 S.W.2d 353
    (Ky. App. 1997) (adopting the holding in Hill). Even
    “meager” evidence has been found to meet this burden. Hill, 472 U.S. at 
    457, 105 S. Ct. at 2775
    ; 
    Ramirez, 424 S.W.3d at 917
    .
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    In Smith v. 
    O’Dea, supra
    , this Court explained the process of review
    for prison disciplinary actions and specifically stated that the summary judgment
    standard applies:
    [W]e believe summary judgment for the Corrections
    Department is proper if and only if the inmate’s petition
    and any supporting materials, construed in light of the
    entire agency record (including, if submitted,
    administrators’ affidavits describing the context of their
    acts or decisions), [do] not raise specific, genuine issues
    of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption
    of agency propriety, and the Department is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. The court must be sensitive
    to the possibility of prison abuses and not dismiss
    legitimate petitions merely because of unskilled
    presentations.
    
    O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d at 356
    (citation omitted).
    As to the first disciplinary action regarding the letter and
    questionnaire sent to an inmate at another facility, we agree with Warden Hart that
    Hawkins received sufficient due process during the proceedings and that some
    evidence supported the conviction. Hawkins received advanced written notice
    through the Disciplinary Report Form Part I, in which Sergeant Hawkins indicated
    that Hawkins would be provided with a copy of the form through institutional mail.
    This also informed him of his right to call witness and his right to legal aid. And it
    memorialized that Hawkins had not waived his right to 24 hours’ notice before the
    hearing, that he entered a not guilty plea, and that he had not waived his presence
    at the hearing. Hawkins sought to call Officer Roberts and Pierce to testify during
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    the hearing. However, Pierce was an inmate at another facility, and Officer
    Roberts had recorded his statement in the report. Finally, Hawkins received a
    written statement of the evidence relied upon by the fact-finder as well as the
    reasons for the disciplinary action. We note that Hawkins never disputed that he
    had sent the letter and the questionnaire, which referenced children who were
    naked. Rather, he sought to explain that he was trying to help Pierce by sending
    the documents. Based upon the evidence presented, the “some evidence” standard
    was met to establish Hawkins had violated CPP 15.2, Category 6-16’s prohibition
    against creating or distributing any writing of which child pornography is the
    subject. Therefore, we find that the circuit court properly dismissed Hawkins’
    claim related to this disciplinary action.
    As to the second disciplinary action, we also hold that Hawkins’ due
    process rights were not violated and that some evidence supported the conviction.
    He again received advanced notice of the charges based upon the notations on the
    Disciplinary Report Form Part I, he did not name any witnesses he wished to call,
    and the fact-finder provided a written statement of the facts relied upon. The
    adjustment committee noted Hawkins’ claim that he had not torn the page out of
    the book, but it found more support for the results of Sergeant Denny’s
    investigation. And while the photographs were from a book about the Vietnam
    War, the photographs on the removed pages were of naked children, which is
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    enough to support the charges against Hawkins. We also find no merit in
    Hawkins’ arguments related to the lack of the video footage from when he was in
    the library based upon Sergeant Denny’s statement that camera access was
    restricted to another area or the make-up of the adjustment committee. Therefore,
    we also hold that the circuit court properly dismissed Hawkins’ claim related to the
    second disciplinary action.
    Finally, we find no merit in Hawkins’ request for a temporary
    restraining order for the reasons expressed by the circuit court in its order of
    dismissal. His complaints about prison staff in relation to his legal materials and
    supplies have no place in this appeal or in the declaratory judgment action below.
    For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Lyon Circuit Court
    dismissing Hawkins’ petition for declaration of rights is affirmed.
    ALL CONCUR.
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    Chris Douglas Hawkins, pro se              Richard D. Lilly
    Eddyville, Kentucky                        Frankfort, Kentucky
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2019 CA 001850

Filed Date: 9/10/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/22/2020