Lester Keith Hurt v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2020 )


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  •                    RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2020; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2018-CA-001637-MR
    LESTER KEITH HURT                                                     APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
    v.                    HONORABLE ALISON C. WELLS, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 10-CR-00240-001
    COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE
    OPINION AND ORDER
    DISMISSING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
    CALDWELL, JUDGE: Lester Keith Hurt (Hurt) appeals the Perry Circuit Court’s
    denial of his petition for relief pursuant to RCr1 11.42. Finding that the Perry
    Circuit Court was, and consequently this Court is, without jurisdiction to consider
    the pleading filed, we dismiss this appeal.
    1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    FACTS
    Hurt was found guilty of wanton murder and three counts of wanton
    endangerment in the first degree, criminal mischief, and assault in the fourth
    degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011. His conviction was
    affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on direct appeal in 2013 and became
    final on October 17, 2013.
    Hurt mailed to the Perry Circuit Court a pleading entitled
    “Memorandum of Law in Support of Movant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment of
    Conviction Pursuant to RCr 11.42” which was filed by the clerk on June 15, 2018.
    The allegations put forth in that pleading are not relevant to our actions here. We
    would note, however, that there was no “Motion” in the record which this
    memorandum could have been meant to support.2
    RCr 11.42 states, in part:
    (1) A prisoner in custody under sentence or a defendant
    on probation, parole or conditional discharge who claims
    a right to be released on the ground that the sentence is
    subject to collateral attack may at any time proceed
    directly by motion in the court that imposed the sentence
    to vacate, set aside or correct it.
    (2) The motion shall be signed and verified by the
    movant and shall state specifically the grounds on which
    2
    “[W]e have consistently and repeatedly held that it is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure
    that the record contains all of the materials necessary for an appellate court to rule upon all the
    issues raised.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 
    223 S.W.3d 90
    , 102 (Ky. 2007).
    -2-
    the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which
    the movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to
    comply with this section shall warrant a summary
    dismissal of the motion.
    (Emphasis added.)
    ANALYSIS
    A trial court loses jurisdiction ten (10) days after the entry of a
    judgment or order. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 
    964 S.W.2d 803
    , 804 (Ky. 1998).3
    If Hurt had followed the dictates of RCr 11.42 and filed a verified pleading,
    jurisdiction could have been reinvested in the Perry Circuit Court. However, he
    failed to do so. No motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 whatsoever filed by him appears
    in the record as certified. Such failure to file a verified motion could be forgiven,
    due to his pro se status at that time, had he verified the “Memorandum” he filed,
    also pro se.4 However, the memorandum was likewise unverified. As there was a
    lack of conformity with RCr 11.42, the Perry Circuit Court did not have
    jurisdiction to consider the pleading.
    The motion for relief must be in writing, verified by the
    movant, and state specifically the grounds of challenge
    and the facts in support thereof. In the instant case, there
    being no written motion, there could be no compliance
    3
    “[The trial] court lost jurisdiction over Appellant’s case ten days after entry of the final
    judgment. Silverburg v. Commonwealth, Ky., 
    587 S.W.2d 241
    , 244 (1979). It could be
    reinvested with jurisdiction only upon the filing of a proper motion under RCr 11.42 or CR
    60.02. . .” 
    Bowling, 964 S.W.2d at 804
    .
    4
    Watkins v. Fannin, 
    278 S.W.3d 637
    , 643 (Ky. App. 2009).
    -3-
    with the provisions of RCr 11.42, not even a substantial
    compliance. It is jurisdictional that the terms and
    provisions of RCr 11.42 must be complied with, even
    though a substantial, and not an absolute, compliance is
    adequate.
    Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 
    569 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Ky. 1978).
    Further, because we find that the Perry Circuit Court had no
    jurisdiction to enter the order denying any relief Hurt was attempting to secure, we
    are likewise without jurisdiction to review that order. “As the trial court did not
    have jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant’s motion, this Court is similarly without
    jurisdiction to hear any appeal therefrom.” Bush v. Commonwealth, 
    236 S.W.3d 621
    , 623 (Ky. App. 2007).
    Hurt suggests on reply that because the Commonwealth did not raise
    the question of verification in the circuit court, the issue has been waived. What
    Hurt fails to appreciate is that the Commonwealth never answered his
    memorandum in any way; the Commonwealth filed no responsive pleading. The
    only hearing held on this matter, according to the circuit court’s order, concerned
    the timing of Hurt’s receipt of his trial counsel’s file. Yet again, the record does
    not contain this hearing. Still, it is the Appellant’s responsibility to provide the
    appellate court with a complete record which supports its contentions; we cannot
    assume that the Commonwealth did not address the lack of verification as Hurt
    argues without support.
    -4-
    It would be inappropriate for this Court to address the merits of Hurt’s
    allegations as we have determined that we lack jurisdiction to rule. Accordingly,
    Appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.
    ALL CONCUR.
    ENTERED: __Sept. 18, 2020___
    JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
    J. Ryan Chailland                          Daniel Cameron
    Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky
    James Havey
    Assistant Attorney General
    Frankfort, Kentucky
    -5-