David Rawlings v. Kentucky Retirement Systems ( 2021 )


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  •                  RENDERED: JANUARY 15, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    Commonwealth of Kentucky
    Court of Appeals
    NO. 2019-CA-1861-MR
    DAVID RAWLINGS                                                       APPELLANT
    APPEAL FROM FRANKLN CIRCUIT COURT
    v.              HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
    ACTION NO. 19-CI-00235
    KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY
    RETIREMENT SYSTEMS; DISABILITY
    APPEALS COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD
    OF TRUSTEES OF KENTUCKY RETIREMENT
    SYSTEMS; AND COUNTY EMPLOYEE
    RETIREMENT SYSTEMS                                                    APPELLEES
    OPINION
    AFFIRMING
    ** ** ** ** **
    BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON, AND MAZE, JUDGES.
    MAZE, JUDGE: David Rawlings (Rawlings) appeals from an opinion and order
    of the Franklin Circuit Court which affirmed a final order of the disability appeals
    committee of the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems (Board)
    denying his claims for non-hazardous and duty-related disability benefits. He
    contends that the Board clearly erred by classifying his position as “light work”
    and by determining his functional capacity based on that classification. Rawlings
    further argues that the Board’s decision to deny his benefits was not supported by
    substantial evidence. But while the evidence in this case was conflicting, the
    Board was entitled to rely on contrary objective medical evidence, as well as the
    hearing officer’s determinations regarding Rawlings’ credibility. In light of our
    standard of review, we cannot find that the Board’s decision was arbitrary or
    unsupported by substantial evidence. Hence, we affirm.
    Rawlings was previously employed as an equipment senior
    operator/resource recovery operator for the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
    Government (LFUCG). He started his membership with the County Employees
    Retirement Systems (CERS) on October 31, 1999, and his last day of paid
    employment was January 13, 2016. On March 8, 2016, Rawlings filed an
    application for non-hazardous disability retirement benefits and duty-related
    disability retirement benefits. He alleged disability based on back injuries he
    sustained in a work-related injury on May 29, 2015. He also alleged that his
    existing low-back pain, left ankle pain, and upper shoulder pain had become
    disabling following the injury.
    -2-
    His application was reviewed by the Medical Review Board, which
    collectively recommended denial of benefits. Thereafter, Rawlings submitted
    additional medical records. Upon further review, all three members of the Medical
    Review Board recommended denial of the application of duty-related disability
    retirement benefits. However, one member recommended approval of his
    application for non-hazardous disability retirement benefits.
    Subsequently, Rawlings requested an administrative hearing, which
    was held on August 7, 2018. On January 9, 2019, the hearing officer issued a
    recommended order that Rawlings’ application for duty-related disability and non-
    hazardous disability retirement benefits be denied. On February 26, 2019, the
    Board adopted the recommended order with one modification.
    Rawlings then filed a petition for review in the Franklin Circuit Court
    pursuant to KRS1 61.665(5) and KRS 13B.140. Upon review of the record, the
    circuit court determined that the record did not compel a finding that Rawlings is
    entitled either to non-hazardous or to duty-related disability retirement benefits.
    Rawlings now appeals to this Court.
    1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    -3-
    In McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 
    124 S.W.3d 454
    (Ky.
    App. 2003), this Court set out the standard of review for decisions by the Board as
    follows:
    Determination of the burden of proof also impacts
    the standard of review on appeal of an agency decision.
    When the decision of the fact-finder is in favor of the
    party with the burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on
    appeal is whether the agency’s decision is supported by
    substantial evidence, which is defined as evidence of
    substance and consequence when taken alone or in light
    of all the evidence that is sufficient to induce conviction
    in the minds of reasonable people. Where the fact-
    finder’s decision is to deny relief to the party with the
    burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on appeal is
    whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so
    compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to
    be persuaded by it. In its role as a finder of fact, an
    administrative agency is afforded great latitude in its
    evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of
    witnesses, including its findings and conclusions of
    fact . . . . A reviewing court is not free to substitute its
    judgment for that of an agency on a factual issue unless
    the agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious.
    Id. at 458-59
    (cleaned up). See also Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. Bowens, 
    281 S.W.3d 776
    (Ky. 2009).
    Rawlings primarily argues that the Board erred in finding no objective
    evidence supporting his claims for either non-hazardous disability retirement
    benefits or duty-related disability benefits. To be eligible for disability retirement
    benefits, KRS 61.600(3) requires a worker to prove, among other things, that: (a)
    he or she is mentally or physically incapacitated to perform the duties of his or her
    -4-
    job; (b) “[t]he incapacity is a result of bodily injury, mental illness, or disease”; (c)
    “[t]he incapacity is deemed to be permanent”; and (d) “[t]he incapacity does not
    result directly or indirectly from bodily injury, mental illness, disease, or condition
    which pre-existed membership in the system or reemployment, whichever is most
    recent.” However, KRS 61.600(3)(d) does not apply if “[t]he incapacity is a result
    of bodily injury, mental illness, disease, or condition which has been substantially
    aggravated by an injury or accident arising out of or in the course of employment;
    or . . . [t]he person has at least sixteen (16) years’ current or prior service for
    employment with employers participating in the retirement systems administered
    by the Kentucky Retirement Systems.” KRS 61.600(4)(a)-(b).
    Furthermore, KRS 61.621 provides for enhanced benefits if an
    employee dies or becomes totally and permanently disabled as a result of a duty-
    related injury. For purposes of this section, “duty-related injury” means:
    1. a. A single traumatic event that occurs while the
    employee is performing the duties of his position;
    or
    b. A single act of violence committed against the
    employee that is found to be related to his job
    duties, whether or not it occurs at his job site; and
    2. The event or act of violence produces a
    harmful change in the human organism evidenced
    by objective medical findings.
    (b) Duty-related injury does not include the effects of
    the natural aging process, a communicable disease unless
    the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
    nature of the employment, or a psychological, psychiatric
    -5-
    or stress-related change in the human organism unless it
    is the direct result of a physical injury.
    KRS 61.621(2).
    Rawlings first argues that the Board clearly erred by classifying his
    position as “light work” and by determining his functional capacity on that basis.
    The LFUCG’s description of Rawlings’ position provides that he was required to
    hand/finger/feel and climb/balance repetitively and to reach/push/pull, bend/stoop
    crouch, and kneel/crawl frequently. The description further provides that Rawlings
    had to lift 20 pounds frequently and the heaviest items he had to lift without
    assistance were 10-pound shovels used to clean out the back of a garbage truck.
    Rawlings worked eight hours per day, with six hours spent sitting/driving and two
    hours standing/walking. Based upon this description, the hearing officer found that
    Rawlings’ job “can be best described as light duty work.”
    Rawlings takes issue with this finding, noting his own testimony that
    his position required a lot of bending and pulling as well as heavy lifting of over
    100 pounds. Under KRS 61.600(5)(c)4., these requirements would classify the job
    as heavy work. Rawlings also notes that the hearing officer’s findings reference a
    different job description stating that his position required lifting of 50 pounds
    repetitively and up to or over 100 pounds occasionally. Based on this description,
    Rawlings contends that his position should have been classified as at least medium
    work. KRS 61.600(5)(c)3.
    -6-
    But for reasons discussed below, the hearing officer did not find
    Rawlings’ testimony about the physical exertion requirements of his job to be
    credible. And while the hearing officer referenced the other job description in the
    recitation of evidence, the hearing officer based her findings upon the job
    description setting out the lesser physical exertion requirements. A reviewing
    court must afford great latitude to the hearing officer in the evaluation of the
    evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses. Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v.
    Fuller, 
    481 S.W.2d 298
    , 308 (Ky. 1972). As the circuit court noted,
    This Court, sitting in review, is not at liberty to set aside
    the factual findings from the administrative proceeding,
    even if there is conflicting evidence in the record and
    even if the Court would have afforded different
    evidentiary values to Rawlings’ testimony and the
    employer job description.
    We agree with the circuit court’s assessment. Although there was
    evidence supporting Rawlings’ claim that his job should be classified as at least
    medium duty work, the evidence did not compel that conclusion. In light of the
    findings of fact, the hearing officer properly classified Rawlings’ job as “light
    work” as defined by KRS 61.600(5)(c)2.
    Rawlings primarily argues that he presented compelling and objective
    medical evidence supporting his claim. Prior to the May 29, 2015, accident,
    Rawlings had been treated for conditions including low back pain, chronic left
    ankle pain, and upper shoulder pain. He suffered a work-related back injury in
    -7-
    2004, for which he received workers’ compensation benefits. From 2009 to 2011,
    Rawlings was treated for complaints of intermittent low back pain. Thereafter, he
    was treated by Dr. Donald Douglas for lumbar sprains/strains and spondylosis, and
    by Dr. Wesley Johnson for left knee pain and swelling and chronic pain syndrome.
    In 2012, Dr. Jason Harrod performed surgery on Rawlings’ left foot and left lower
    extremity.
    Rawlings was involved in a motor vehicle accident on May 29, 2015,
    while driving his garbage truck. He testified that a vehicle stopped abruptly.
    While attempting to avoid hitting the vehicle in front of him, Rawlings stood to
    press on the air brakes. Rawlings stated that the brakes were faulty, resulting in the
    garbage truck striking the rear end of the vehicle in front of him. Rawlings
    testified that the truck had a full load, and the force of the collision knocked him
    back down into the seat. He went to the emergency room one week after the
    accident with complaints of pain in the lower left side of his back. Rawlings was
    released from work following the accident, and he did not return to work until
    October 2015.
    Rawlings relied on medical records and a report by his treating
    physician, Dr. John Richard. Dr. Richard reported that, following treatment and
    physical therapy, Rawlings’ spine showed normal curvature with no evidence of
    scoliosis. However, Rawlings demonstrated decreased flexion and extension and
    -8-
    pain with flexion and extension. Rawlings continued to complain of back pain
    despite use of anti-inflammatory medication and physical therapy. His other
    physicians reported similar complaints.
    Rawlings underwent a Functional Capacity evaluation based upon his
    diagnosis of lumbar spondylosis and lumbar degenerative disc disease. The
    evaluation noted that Rawlings demonstrated decreased lumbar range of motion
    and strength; decreased bilateral hip range of motion and strength; and limitations
    with pushing, lifting, carrying, standing, walking, climbing stairs, crouching,
    kneeling, crawling, bending, stooping, and overhead reaching. The evaluation
    concluded that Rawlings was unable to perform his current job duties but was able
    to perform sedentary work. Similarly, Dr. Frank Burke submitted an evaluation
    concluding that Rawlings was unable to perform his job duties. Rawlings also
    presented evidence that he received private disability benefits through CIGNA
    Insurance. Finally, Rawlings has been awarded workers’ compensation benefits
    for the accident and Social Security Disability benefits based on his inability to
    perform his job duties.
    In response, LFUCG focuses on Rawlings’ suspension and ultimate
    resignation after he twice tested positive for drug use. Rawlings tested positive for
    cocaine after the accident. He received a 180-day suspension for testing positive
    after the accident, which he served upon his release to work in October 2015. In
    -9-
    December 2015, Rawlings was again suspended pending termination following
    another positive drug test. LFUCG contends that Rawlings resigned from his
    position because he was about to be terminated and not because he was unable to
    perform the essential functions of his job. LFUCG also maintains that Rawlings’
    drug use and inconsistent answers cast doubt on his credibility.
    In addition, LFUCG also presented at the hearing the police report
    from the May 29, 2015 accident indicating that the damage to the garbage truck
    was relatively minor and Rawlings did not seek treatment for his injuries until after
    he tested positive for cocaine. LFUCG further presented evaluations from two
    physicians who stated that Rawlings was not disabled from performing his job
    duties. Dr. Henry Tutt opined that Rawlings had not sustained anything greater
    than a lumbar sprain/strain, which should have reached maximum medical
    improvement within six to eight weeks following the date of injury. Dr. Tutt
    advised that Rawlings should be capable of performing his usual job duties without
    restriction. Similarly, Dr. J. Rick Lyon concluded that Rawlings reached
    maximum medical improvement in October 2015 and had a 0% whole-person
    impairment.
    The record does not support the suggestion in the Board’s brief that
    Rawlings has no functional impairment. Indeed, the objective medical evidence
    clearly shows that Rawlings had ongoing back problems before the May 29, 2015,
    -10-
    accident and that he developed significant functional impairments following the
    accident. The only question is whether those impairments rendered him physically
    incapacitated to perform the job, or jobs of like duties, from which he received his
    last paid employment.
    But while there was conflicting evidence, we must again point out that
    a reviewing court must give great deference to the hearing officer’s evaluation of
    the evidence. There was substantial evidence supporting the hearing officer’s
    finding that Rawlings is not physically incapacitated from performing the essential
    functions of his job duties. Likewise, there was substantial evidence to support the
    hearing officer’s findings that Rawlings failed to show he is totally and
    permanently disabled as a result of the May 25, 2015, accident. Since the Board’s
    final order was supported by substantial evidence of record and followed the
    correct rule of law, neither the circuit court nor this Court is at liberty to reach a
    different result.
    Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Franklin Circuit Court
    affirming the Board’s February 26, 2019, final order.
    ALL CONCUR.
    -11-
    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
    Timothy E. Geertz         Leigh A. Jordan Davis
    Lexington, Kentucky       Frankfort, Kentucky
    -12-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2019 CA 001861

Filed Date: 1/14/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/22/2021