Angelika Kasey v. Andrew Beshear Governor ( 2021 )

RENDERED: APRIL 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION OF MARCH 12, 2021, WITHDRAWN
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2018-CA-1643-MR
ANGELIKA KASEY; MICHELE NEWTZ;
CHRISTINA TOBIN; JULIA SHARP;
AND TLC RESCUE – TERESA’S
LEGACY CONTINUES, INC. APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CI-00006
ANDREW BESHEAR
AND RYAN QUARLES APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: Angelika Kasey, Michele Newtz,1 Christina Tobin, Julia
Sharp, and TLC Rescue – Teresa’s Legacy Continues, Inc. (collectively
“Appellants”), appeal the opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court
dismissing their complaint against Governor Andrew Beshear2 and Commissioner
of Agriculture, Ryan Quarles (collectively “Appellees”). After careful review, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The focus of this lawsuit is on KRS3 Chapter 258, Animal Control and
Protection. Relevant to this case are KRS 258.095 (definitions for KRS 258.095 to
258.500), KRS 258.117 (creates the Animal Control Advisory Board), KRS
258.119 (creates the animal control and care fund and sets forth the requirements
for counties to qualify for funds), and KRS 258.195 (pertains to the employment or
appointment of animal control officers and the establishment and maintenance of
1
There appears to be some discrepancy as to whether Michele Newtz is suing as an individual
or on behalf of the corporation Fiona’s Legacy. The complaint lists Michele Newtz on behalf of
Fiona’s Legacy while the notice of appeal simply lists Michele Newtz. The distinction has no
bearing on the outcome of this case; however, because the notice of appeal refers to Michele
Newtz individually, we will also do so.
2
Suit was originally filed against former Governor Matthew Bevin. In February 2020, we
entered an order granting Governor Beshear’s motion to be substituted as a party in Governor
Bevin’s stead. The record was amended to reflect the substitution.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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animal shelters). To distinguish these from the remaining statutes in the chapter,
we will refer to them collectively as the “animal shelter statutes.”4
In January 2018, the Appellants, as citizens and taxpayers of
Kentucky, filed suit against the Appellees for their alleged failure to monitor or
enforce compliance with the animal shelter statutes. More specifically, the
Appellants alleged
[s]ince the enactment of the [animal shelter statutes], the
[Appellees] have failed and refused to monitor or enforce
the laws leaving them largely useless and of no import.
The evidence will show only 12% of Kentucky’s 120
counties are in compliance with the [animal shelter
statutes] while over 50% are in violation of three (3) or
more parts of the [animal shelter statutes]. Major
problems existent [sic] include but are not limited to pet
overpopulation leading to crowded shelters, insufficient
work force at shelters, and lack of education of shelter
personnel. Additionally, a number of shelters are
inadequate as a result of aging and poorly maintained
facilities built with inappropriate materials that cannot be
properly cleaned and disinfected; poor ventilation; lack
of appropriate veterinary care; and lack of appropriate
quarantine areas.
(Record (R.) at 4.)
The Appellees filed a motion to dismiss per CR5 12.02(a) and (f) in
lieu of an answer. They made a number of arguments as to why their motion was
4
With some exceptions, the remainder of the statutes in KRS Chapter 258 pertain to rabies,
vaccinations, and euthanasia.
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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appropriate; however, most relevant for purposes of this appeal was the argument
that the Appellants lacked standing. In February 2018, the circuit court conducted
a hearing on the Appellees’ motion. At the time, the court voiced concern about its
ability to grant the Appellants’ requested relief. Regardless, the court set a briefing
schedule giving the Appellants the opportunity to respond.
In their response, the Appellants claimed to have standing because
they suffered actual damage. Also, they claimed to have “a real and substantial
interest in the outcome” of the case because they used “substantial post-tax funds
to provide services the state and counties should otherwise be funding,” thereby
unjustly enriching the Commonwealth. (R. at 47.) Attached to the Appellants’
response was a study whose purported goal was “to assess current conditions in
Kentucky’s county shelters and determine the degree of compliance with Kentucky
shelter laws.” (R. at 50.) It concluded that a majority of Kentucky’s animal
shelters were not compliant with existing laws and two major factors contributing
to this are a lack of funding and unsatisfactory laws. (R. at 71-72.) Notably, the
Appellants did not assert in their response that the animal control and care funds
are being mishandled or misappropriated.
After the Appellees filed a reply, the Appellants filed a notice of
submission, and neither party requested additional briefing or oral argument. In
October 2018, the circuit court issued its opinion and order wherein it dismissed
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the Appellants’ complaint because they lacked standing and had presented a
nonjusticiable political question. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
The threshold issue before us is whether the Appellants have
constitutional standing to pursue this suit in circuit court. Matters of constitutional
standing are reviewed de novo. Overstreet v. Mayberry, 603 S.W.3d 244, 251-52
(Ky. 2020).
In 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court formally adopted the Lujan6
test “as the constitutional standing doctrine in Kentucky[.]” Commonwealth
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department of Medicaid Services v.
Sexton by and through Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185,
196 (Ky. 2018). The Court stated
at bottom, for a party to sue in Kentucky, the initiating
party must have the requisite constitutional standing to
do so, defined by three requirements: (1) injury, (2)
causation, and (3) redressability. In other words, [a]
plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.
6
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351
(1992).
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Id. (quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Although we affirm the opinion and
order of the circuit court, because it did not apply this test to the case sub judice,
we must do so now.
First, the Appellants must demonstrate they have suffered a personal
injury. An injury has been defined as “[t]he violation of another’s legal right, for
which the law provides a remedy; a wrong or injustice.” Injury, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
To establish the first requirement, an injury must be
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling. For an injury to be particularized, it
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
This means the plaintiff personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury. For an injury to be concrete,
it must actually exist.
Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
As citizens and taxpayers in Kentucky, the Appellants assert they
have a right to the enforcement of Kentucky laws. This right, they suggest, has
been violated by the Appellees’ failure to enforce the animal shelter laws.
Additionally, they argue they have “far more ‘skin in the game’ than the average
citizen” because “they contributed substantial funds and time to provide services
the state and counties should otherwise be funding.”
To begin, we cannot say that the failure to enforce Kentucky laws is
the type of concrete and particularized injury contemplated by the Court when it
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adopted the Lujan test. The only reason this case becomes particularized to the
Appellants is because they voluntarily decided to expend their personal time and
resources to care for stray and abandoned animals, although they were under no
legal obligation to do so. The Appellants have not provided us with any Kentucky
case law allowing a party to assert standing due to a voluntary injury.7 We decline
to expand the doctrine of standing to include such a theory.
The Appellants also asserted standing as taxpayers. In Overstreet v.
Mayberry, where the Court dealt exclusively with the injury element of standing,
the Court explained that taxpayers in Kentucky have been permitted to sue the
government or its agents “on behalf of themselves . . . to challenge the propriety of
city, county, or state tax or expenditure of public funds[,]” or “on behalf of the
Commonwealth as a matter of equity[.]” Overstreet, 603 S.W.3d at 263-65. Given
7
The Appellants cited to Humane Society of the United States v. The United States Postal
Service, 609 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. D.C. 2009), as support for their position. In that case, the
Humane Society challenged the United States Postal Service’s (USPS) distribution of a magazine
that promoted chicken fighting. The USPS argued the Humane Society lacked standing because
it was a voluntary organization and its injury was voluntarily inflicted. In an effort to show it
had standing, the Humane Society attached an affidavit and articles indicating that the circulation
of the publication increased its expenditure of funds for emergency services. The Court
concluded “[the Humane Society’s] decision to dedicate time and resources to [reducing illegal
animal fighting] may be a voluntary budgetary decision, but if the need to care for animals on an
emergency basis is increased by USPS’s circulation of [the publication], then the financial injury
to the Humane Society is neither voluntary nor self-inflicted.” Id. at 91. While we may have
been persuaded by this theory of standing, at least for the Appellant, TLC Rescue, the Appellants
did not attempt to put forth any evidence indicating TLC’s decision to budget additional monies
was the result of the Appellees’ actions.
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the Appellants’ pleadings, specifically the allegations above, it appears they
attempted to gain standing under the first theory.
The Court alluded that the cases where taxpayers had successfully
obtained standing on behalf of themselves were those where
taxpayers [sought] to enjoin the imposition of an illegal
tax or expenditure of public funds or to compel
compliance with certain statutory or constitutional
requirements attached thereto.
Id. at 263-64. However, the Appellants did not allege in the circuit court that the
funds made available through the animal shelter laws were being illegally
expended. In a footnote in their reply brief for this Court, the Appellants stated
“[o]f significant note and concern are distributions made in obvious contravention
of KRS 258.119[.]” Also, attached to their reply was a series of spreadsheets
purporting to reflect the dispersal of grant funds. We are not permitted to review
an argument for the first time on appeal. We have said repeatedly
we will not allow appellants, under the guise of
‘developing’ an argument raised in the trial court, to feed
one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court.
Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Ky. 2000) (internal quotation marks
and footnote omitted). Thus, the Appellants failed to show they suffered the type
of injury required to demonstrate standing.
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Considering the Appellants need to successfully meet all elements of
the Lujan test to have constitutional standing, we need not proceed with our
analysis. However, because further analysis may prove insightful, we will
continue.
If the Appellants had pled a particularized injury, the Appellants
would have needed to show the Appellees were the cause of their injury. In other
words, the injury must be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct.” Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 196. Here, the Appellants argued that their
injury was a result of the Appellees’ failure to monitor and enforce compliance
with the animal shelter laws.
This is problematic for two reasons. Again, we note that the
Appellants’ chose to spend their time and resources rescuing animals; they had no
legal obligation to do so. If the Appellants had not chosen to pursue this cause, no
matter how noble, there would be no injury particular to the Appellants.
Additionally, the animal shelter statutes do not vest enforcement
power with the Governor or the Commissioner of Agriculture. KRS 258.117
creates the Animal Control Advisory Board (ACAB) and attaches it to the
Department of Agriculture for administrative purposes. The purpose of the ACAB
is to
evaluat[e] applications for and [review] disbursements
from the animal control and care fund, create[e] training
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programs, and other duties relating to animal control and
care in the counties of the Commonwealth.
KRS 258.117(1). The ACAB is further instructed to “promulgate administrative
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.” Id.
KRS 258.119 creates the animal control and care fund (the “Fund”)
and sets forth the terms for how the Fund is to be funded, spent, and distributed to
the counties. Further, it states that if the counties have received funds and failed to
follow the terms of the statute, then the money must be refunded to the Department
of Agriculture. KRS 258.119(5). Again, oversight of the distribution of the Fund
was given to the ACAB; however, the responsibility to establish and enforce these
programs was granted to “[t]he governing body of each county” and animal control
officers. KRS 258.195(1).
The only action required of the Governor is to appoint the members of
the ACAB, and we can find no statutory obligation imposed upon the
Commissioner of Agriculture. KRS 258.117(2). Thus, even if we were to
acknowledge that the Appellants’ injuries were not self-inflicted, we cannot say the
cause of those injuries was the Governor or the Commissioner of Agriculture’s
failure to enforce the animal shelter statutes.
Had the Appellants established the first two elements of the Lujan
test, they would have lastly needed to show their injury was “likely to be redressed
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by the requested relief.” Sexton, 566 S.W.3d at 196. The Appellants requested the
following relief:
[D]eclaratory judgment that the Defendants[’] of lack
financing for, oversight of, and enforcement of the
statutory requirements of Kentucky’s county animal
shelters is in conflict with the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 258 et seq.
....
That the Court declare the respective rights and duties of
the parties and enter judgment declaring the Plaintiffs
have been and are being denied rights as citizens of this
Commonwealth to the enforcement of laws of this
jurisdiction.
That mandamus issue to the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky requiring him to
recommend to the General Assembly of Kentucky, either
at its next regular session or at a special session, that the
General Assembly enact legislation pertaining to the
animal shelters required by the [animal shelter statutes]
to obtain necessary compliance therewith and
enforcement including but not limited to adequate
training, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms.
That mandamus issue to the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Commissioner of
Agriculture to take all necessary and appropriate action
to assure the laws set forth in KRS 258 et seq. are
faithfully executed.
(R. at 3-5.) The circuit court correctly held that it could not grant this requested
relief because it blatantly violates the separation of powers doctrine. As the circuit
court so aptly stated
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while these goals may be worthy and laudable, they
present public policy questions that are within the
province of the legislature, not the judiciary. The
solution to the problem presented in the [c]omplaint is to
enact better legislation, not to impose reform of the status
quo concerning animal shelters by judicial fiat.
(R. at 123.)
As a final point, we note that, at its core, this case concerns animal
rights. The statutes at issue in this case, and others within the chapter, set forth
standard guidelines for the humane care of stray and abandoned animals. The
Appellants asserted that this standard, while inadequate, has not been met in the
majority of Kentucky counties. Unfortunately, standing requirements have made it
difficult for animal rights activists to enforce animal protections. Varu
Chilakamarri, Taxpayer Standing: A Step Toward Animal-Centric Litigation, 10
ANIMAL L. 251, 252 (2004). While some of our sister states have addressed the
issue of standing in animal rights cases differently, Kentucky does not appear to
have considered it. In the case sub judice, the Appellants have attempted to show
standing via their status as citizens and taxpayers of Kentucky. Perhaps, given the
right facts and circumstances, one could obtain such standing. However, for the
reasons set forth above, we cannot say the Appellants have properly pled it here.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the October 26, 2018 opinion
and order of the Franklin Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Nolia G. Batey M. Stephen Pitt
Katie Brophy S. Chad Meredith
Julia W. Springsteen Matthew F. Kuhn
Louisville, Kentucky Joseph A. Bilby
Frankfort, Kentucky
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