Linda G. Holt v. Thompson Hine, LLP ( 2021 )

RENDERED: JULY 23, 2021; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2017-CA-1245-MR
LINDA G. HOLT, JUDITH E.
PREWITT, AND CYNTHIA L.
ROEDER APPELLANTS
ON REMAND FROM KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
(FILE NO. 2019-SC-0596-DG)
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE REBECCA LESLIE KNIGHT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 16-CI-01429
THOMPSON HINE, LLP APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: This case is again before this Court upon remand from
the Kentucky Supreme Court for further consideration in light of its decision in
Seiller Waterman, LLC v. RLB Properties, Ltd., 610 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. 2020)
(Seiller).
Initially, following oral argument, in our previous opinion we
affirmed the Kenton Circuit Court’s order granting the law firm of Thompson
Hine, LLP’s motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Linda G. Holt, Judith
E. Prewitt, and Cynthia L. Roeder (the sisters). We continue to affirm on remand,
albeit with different reasoning regarding the statute of limitations issue.
In 2013, the sisters sued some of their brothers in federal court over
the alleged manipulation of their parents’ estates, including claims for breaching
fiduciary duties. That complaint was consolidated with an extant case brought by
another sister. Eventually, after having dismissed or granted summary judgment to
the brothers on many claims, the federal court ruled in favor of the sisters on the
breach of fiduciary duty claims and ordered the brothers to pay the sisters roughly
$548 million.1 Osborn v. Griffin, No. CV 2011-89, 2016 WL 1092672, at *36
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2016) (unpublished). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Osborn v.
Griffin, 865 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2017).
While the brothers’ appeal was pending before the Sixth Circuit, on
August 29, 2016, the sisters filed this action against Thompson Hine for its alleged
role in aiding and abetting the brothers’ breaches of fiduciary duty. Doubtlessly
1
This includes an amount to a fourth sister who is not a party in the present action.
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anticipating Thompson Hine’s arguing that the complaint was untimely, the sisters’
complaint alleges that they did not learn they had possible claims against
Thompson Hine until August 2013 during discovery in the federal litigation. At
oral argument, the sisters’ counsel stated they did not seek to add Thompson Hine
as a defendant to the then ongoing federal litigation because they did not discover
the claims until after the deadline for amending their federal pleadings.
In lieu of an answer, Thompson Hine filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02, arguing the complaint
was not timely filed and otherwise failed to set forth a cognizable claim for relief.
On July 6, 2017, roughly three months after conducting oral argument on the
motion to dismiss, the circuit court judge’s judicial assistant sent an ex parte email
to only counsel for Thompson Hine, which stated that the judge had decided to
grant the motion to dismiss and wanted counsel to resubmit a previously tendered
proposed order. In response, counsel emailed the assistant the same terse proposed
order it had previously submitted. On July 7, 2017, the judge’s assistant again
emailed only counsel for Thompson Hine. That email said the judge wanted
counsel to submit a more detailed proposed order. Thompson Hine’s counsel
emailed a greatly expanded proposed order to only the judge’s assistant on July 10,
2017. The sisters’ counsel was not copied on any of the emails between the circuit
court’s staff and Thompson Hine’s counsel.
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On July 11, 2017, the sisters’ counsel learned about the ex parte
emails between the judge’s staff and Thompson Hine’s counsel at a hearing in
federal court. That same date, the circuit court signed the order submitted by
Thompson Hine without making any changes thereto. Three days later, counsel for
Thompson Hine filed its expanded proposed order in the record.
Dismissal was granted on the basis that the sisters’ claim was time-
barred as legal malpractice claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations
under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 413.245 or, alternatively, the sisters’
claims were untimely under the general five-year statute of limitation contained in
KRS 413.120(6) because statutory tolling pursuant to KRS 413.190(2) did not
apply to the nonresident law firm. Shortly after the circuit court denied the sisters’
motions for the judge to recuse and to withdraw the order, they filed this appeal.
The sisters contend that the circuit court’s decision contains a host of
errors, but dispositive for this appeal are the resolution of two of their arguments,
whether the judgment must be reversed because the circuit court erred in
dismissing the complaint as untimely and conducting ex parte contacts. After
remand, we permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the impact
of Seiller.
“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted admits as true the material facts of the complaint . . . [s]o a court
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should not grant such a motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved[.]” Fox v. Grayson,
317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must liberally construe the pleadings
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the allegations therein.
Id. Since a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted presents “a pure question of law,” we review the matter de novo. Id.The professional malpractice statute of limitations provides in relevant
part:
Notwithstanding any other prescribed limitation of
actions which might otherwise appear applicable, except
those provided in KRS 413.140, a civil action, whether
brought in tort or contract, arising out of any act or
omission in rendering, or failing to render, professional
services for others shall be brought within one (1) year
from the date of the occurrence or from the date when the
cause of action was, or reasonably should have been,
discovered by the party injured.
KRS 413.245. Our Supreme Court has held that “KRS 413.245 is the exclusive
statute of limitations governing claims of attorney malpractice.” Abel v. Austin,
411 S.W.3d 728, 738 (Ky. 2013).
In Seiller, the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed a decision of our
Court regarding a nonclient suit against a law firm for allegedly wrongful acts
undertaken on behalf of the firm’s clients. Seiller, 610 S.W.3d at 191. Our Court
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had ruled that the claims for illegal lien, slander of title, and civil conspiracy were
not barred by the one-year statute of limitations contained in KRS 413.245 if
malice was proven. Seiller, 610 S.W.3d at 192.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed this portion of the opinion. It
disagreed with the Court of Appeals that when acts by attorneys “through the
pretense of providing professional services” are committing an act “for some
malicious purpose[,]” there is an exception to this statute of limitations. Id. at 202.
It explained:
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that KRS 413.245 is
limited to claims free from malice cannot be discerned
from the plain language expressed in the statute. The
statute does not refer to malice or contain any language
from which the presence or absence of malice might be
inferred as relevant to the statute’s applicability. Without
language restricting the application of KRS 413.245 to
claims not involving malice, the plain language of the
statute directs that the one-year limitation applies to any
claim against an attorney arising out of any act or
omission in rendering or failing to render professional
services . . . . Regardless of whether malice is alleged,
claims arising from an act or omission in the rendering
of, or failing to render, professional services are
governed by KRS 413.245 and must be brought within
one year.
Id. at 204. The Kentucky Supreme Court further concluded that KRS 413.245
applied to claims brought against attorneys by nonclients:
By its plain, unambiguous language, KRS 413.245
applies to civil actions arising out of any act or omission
in rendering or failing to render professional services.
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Nothing in the statute limits its application to only those
claims brought by individuals or entities who engaged
the professional to provide such services. KRS 413.245
thus applies to any civil action against an attorney arising
out of any act or omission in rendering or failing to
render professional services without regard to the identity
of the claimant.
Seiller, 610 S.W.3d at 205.
The sisters attempt to distinguish Seiller on the basis that aiding and
abetting criminal conduct is not a “professional service” and, therefore, the one-
year statute of limitations for KRS 413.245 is not applicable. Given the expansive
language used by the Kentucky Supreme Court, it is evident that the civil action
which the sisters filed against the law firm is governed by KRS 413.245. The
actions they complain of were undertaken while the law firm was providing
professional services to the brothers. The fact that these professional services were
undertaken for improper and illegal purposes does not exempt these services from
KRS 413.245 any more than professional acts committed with malice would be.
Therefore, pursuant to Seiller, this one-year statute of limitations applies.
While the sisters argue that tolling is appropriate, they did not file
their action for three years after they claim it accrued through discovery in the
federal case. Therefore, tolling cannot save their claims as the statute of
limitations expired prior to them bringing suit.
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The complaint’s untimeliness moots all remaining issues except,
arguably, the sisters’ argument that the decision must be reversed due to the ex
parte contacts between the circuit court’s staff and counsel for Thompson Hine.
We agree that the ex parte contact was improper, but do not agree that it
invalidates the ruling here.
“A basic tenet of the legal profession is ex parte communication
between a judge and an attorney in a pending case is disfavored.” Commonwealth
v. Cambron, 546 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Ky.App. 2018). Consequently, Supreme Court
Rule (SCR) 4.300, Canon 2, Rule 2.9(A)(1) permits a judge to make ex parte
contact with a party or its counsel only “for scheduling, administrative, or
emergency purposes, which do[ ] not address substantive matters” provided that
“(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive,
or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and (b) the judge
makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex parte
communication, and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.” Comment (1) to
SCR 2.9 states in plain language that “[t]o the extent reasonably possible, all
parties or their lawyers shall be included in all communications to or from a
judge.”
Because of the ex parte emails, Thompson Hine knew what the
outcome of the case would be several days before the sisters, who were neither
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informed of the ex parte contact nor given an opportunity to respond to it. A judge
may ask counsel for draft findings on the record but may not contact only one
side’s counsel ex parte to inform it of an upcoming decision and to ask for findings
to support that inchoate decision. Additionally, SCR 2.9(D) and SCR 2.12(A)
make it plain that a judge may not direct its staff to engage in similar ex parte
contact.
Because the circuit court indicated that it had already decided to grant
the motion, the sisters have not shown that its decision was not the product of its
own independent deliberations. Under these facts, the sisters have not
demonstrated that the ex parte contacts materially impacted the outcome of the
motion to dismiss. Therefore, though improper, the contacts here must be deemed
harmless errors. However, we strongly discourage the circuit court from engaging
in similar ex parte communications in the future.
For the foregoing reasons, the Kenton Circuit Court’s order granting
Thompson Hine’s motion to dismiss is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Kent Wicker Todd V. McMurtry
Louisville, Kentucky Kyle M. Winslow
Fort Mitchell, Kentucky
Eva Christine Trout
Lexington, Kentucky Carolyn J. Fairless
Christopher P. Montille
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR Denver, Colorado
APPELLANTS:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
Kent Wicker APPELLEE:
Louisville, Kentucky
Carolyn J. Fairless
Denver, Colorado
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