Brian K. Clark v. Commonwealth of Kentucky ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0036-MR
BRIAN K. CLARK APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE BRUCE T. BUTLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CR-00151
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: JONES, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Brian K. Clark appeals from the Meade Circuit Court’s
order denying Clark’s motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
On August 19, 2019, Clark was involved in a fatal motor vehicle
accident wherein he crossed the center line on U.S. Highway 60 in Meade County
and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing one passenger, and critically
injuring the other. Clark also suffered injuries in the collision. He had to be
extricated from his vehicle. He was transported by helicopter from the scene of the
accident to the University of Louisville Hospital, where he remained for several
days.
There was no opportunity for field sobriety testing for impairment or a
blood draw from Clark before he was airlifted from the accident scene. Thus, on
September 5, 2019, Officer Brandon Wright (Meade County Deputy Sheriff) filed
an affidavit for a search warrant to obtain “any and all University of Louisville
Hospital medical records of Brian Clark, . . . beginning August 19, 2019, and
ending August 22, 2019.” The search, executed the following day, resulted in the
Hospital releasing a digital copy of Clark’s records. The certified medical records
revealed that Clark had a blood alcohol content of 0.282 (over three times the legal
limit of 0.08) after Clark was admitted to the Hospital.
The case was transferred to circuit court after the Commonwealth
sought an indictment. On September 9, 2019, the Meade County grand jury
returned an indictment charging Clark with the following offenses: murder;
wanton endangerment, first degree; assault, first degree; and operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol, first offense. Clark was arrested
on September 16, 2019. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a subpoena duces
tecum, seeking Clark’s medical records from the Hospital’s Health Information
Management Department. The Hospital’s custodian of records complied with the
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subpoena on October 24, 2019, by releasing the identical information sought by
Officer Wright’s search warrant.
Clark moved to suppress the medical records obtained via search
warrant. He asserted that the warrant was neither based on probable cause nor
sufficiently particular, and that it was also an improper means by which to obtain
certified medical records. After hearing the parties’ legal arguments, the circuit
court denied Clark’s suppression motion; the order denying the motion was entered
on August 21, 2021.
Clark ultimately accepted the Commonwealth’s offer on a plea of
guilty to all charges included in the indictment except for murder, which was
amended to the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter.1 He reserved
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The circuit court entered
its order of judgment and sentence of the Commonwealth’s recommended thirteen
years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
We begin by enunciating our standard of review, namely:
An affidavit supporting a search warrant must
“‘reasonably describe the property or premises to be
1
Clark’s guilty pleas were entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct.
160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), which “permits a conviction without requiring an admission of
guilt and while permitting a protestation of innocence.” Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d
84, 103 (Ky. App. 2004). “The entry of a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine carries the same
consequences as a standard plea of guilty. By entering such a plea, a defendant may be able to
avoid formally admitting guilt at the time of sentencing, but he nonetheless consents to being
treated as if he were guilty with no assurances to the contrary.” Wilfong, 175 S.W.3d at 102(internal quotation marks omitted).
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searched and state sufficient facts to establish probable
cause for the search of the property or premises.’” Guth
v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Ky. App. 2000)
(emphasis added) (quoting Coker v. Commonwealth, 811
S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky. App. 1991)). The test for probable
cause is whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place. Moore v.
Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Ky. 2005). When
reviewing the issuance of a search warrant, we must give
great deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s findings of
probable cause and must not reverse unless the court
arbitrarily exercised its discretion. Id.Beckam v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Ky. App. 2009) (emphasis
omitted). “An appellate court reviewing a lower court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence utilizes a clear error standard of review for factual findings and
a de novo standard of review for conclusions of law. Welch v. Commonwealth, 149
S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004).” Tucker v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 297, 299
(Ky. App. 2020).
In its order denying Clark’s motion to suppress, the Meade Circuit
Court concluded:
In the instant case, Officer Wright asserted in his
affidavit for the search warrant that [Clark] was heard at
the scene of the collision making the statement that he
had “too much to drink,” and that [Clark’s] speech was
slurred. Officer Wright’s affidavit further asserted that
[Clark’s] “vehicle crossed the center line and hit a
vehicle head on injuring one person and killing the
other.” The affidavit indicated that [Clark] “was taken to
the University of Louisville Hospital,” and the warrant
sought “any and all University of Louisville Hospital
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records” for Clark. Under a totality of the circumstances,
and with appropriate deference to the initial probable
cause determination, the Court concludes that the search
warrant furnished probable cause that evidence of a
crime would be found in [Clark’s] medical records.
The circuit court went on to address Clark’s allegations regarding particularity
about the offense or the matters sought, concluding that the warrant was
sufficiently particular in both aspects. See Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441
S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 2014).
We likewise find no deficiencies. Nor do we fault the circuit court for
referencing an unpublished decision of this Court. Ample published case law
supports the circuit court’s denial of Clark’s motion to suppress.
Moreover, we fail to discern error when these very same medical
records were properly sought, obtained, and admitted into the record by the
subsequent subpoena duces tecum. In his reply brief, Clark concedes that he was
not challenging the records obtained through the subpoena, and that “[t]he defense
opted to challenge the warrant instead.” We agree with the circuit court’s
assessment that, “even if the Court were to grant [Clark’s] motion to suppress his
medical records obtained via the search warrant, that would have no effect on his
medical records obtained via the subpoena duces tecum.”
The Meade Circuit Court’s order denying Clark’s motion to suppress
is affirmed. We thus affirm Clark’s convictions.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jared Travis Bewley Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin L. Conder
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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