Manoj Jaladi v. Deekshitha Turaka ( 2023 )

RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-1120-ME
MANOJ JALADI APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE LAUREN ADAMS OGDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 22-D-500466-001
DEEKSHITHA TURAKA APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EASTON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Manoj Jaladi brings this appeal from an August 16, 2022,
Order of Protection (Domestic Violence Order or DVO) entered against him by the
Jefferson Family Court upon petition by his wife, Deekshitha Turaka.1 For the
reasons stated, we affirm.
1
After entry of the Domestic Violence Order on August 16, 2022, Manoj Jaladi filed a Motion to
Amend Prior Order of Protection. By order entered August 30, 2022, the family court denied the
motion.
BACKGROUND
The parties wed in an arranged marriage in India on August 25, 2021,
and thereafter moved to Louisville, Kentucky. On January 16, 2022, Turaka
alleged that Jaladi became frustrated while filling out a questionnaire for marriage
counseling and threw a laptop at her, bruising her arm. The parties separated on
January 26, 2022, and Turaka left the marital residence.2 On February 19, 2022,
Turaka filed a DVO petition for an order of protection. In her petition, she alleged
multiple instances of domestic violence, emotional abuse, sexual abuse, and
detailed Jaladi’s aggressive and controlling behaviors. She also alleged Jaladi
threatened to take her back to India where she would be subject to dire
consequences. Record at 1. The on-call family court judge issued a summons and
set a hearing date for March 1, 2022; said summons was served on Jaladi on
February 21, 2022.
At the March 1, 2022, hearing, Turaka appeared without counsel and
Jaladi appeared with counsel.3 The family court read the petition aloud and Turaka
adopted the petition allegations through her testimony. Turaka admitted that Jaladi
had not actually “thrown” the laptop, but rather forcefully slid it along the carpet,
nor did she have any evidence of her injury. Turaka testified that she had filed a
2
Purportedly, in late January 2022, Jaladi moved to North Carolina.
3
Jaladi appeared at the hearing by Zoom and his counsel appeared in person.
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divorce action in India but it could take six months to two years to be finalized.
Video, March 1, 2022, Hearing – 10:41:30. Jaladi admitted to having punched a
hole in a wall on one occasion in the past, and often threw things when angry, but
he denied the other allegations of abuse, including sexual abuse. Video, March 1,
2022, Hearing – 10:59:20.
Turaka requested the entry of a protective order to extend until the
divorce proceedings in India could be completed. At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the family court entered an Emergency Protective Order
(EPO) to last for six (6) months from the date Turaka filed the petition. The order
was a standard Administrative Office of the Courts “AOC” Form 275.2 order of
protection. The court also made findings on an accompanying docket sheet and on
a continuation sheet. The family court made specific findings that Turaka was
credible in her detailing of Jaladi “throwing” a laptop and grabbing her as well as
punching and damaging walls; that Jaladi had forced sex upon Turaka; that Jaladi
was controlling, aggressive, and isolated Turaka from friends and family; that
Jaladi threatened to take Turaka back to India against her will; and that he
controlled Turaka financially, and refused to buy furniture or a car. Record at 19-
22. The court further scheduled another hearing prior to expiration of the EPO for
August 16, 2022.
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While Turaka and her attorney were present, neither Jaladi nor his
counsel appeared at the hearing on August 16, 2022. The family court noted on the
record that based on the previous hearing, there were sufficient findings to support
the entry of a DVO and incorporated the same upon entering the DVO on an AOC
form. Therein, the judge checked the box under the “Additional Findings” section
stating that it was established by a preponderance of the evidence that an act of
domestic violence and abuse occurred and may again occur. On the accompanying
docket sheet, the family court noted Jaladi and his counsel’s failure to appear at the
hearing and stated: “[Petitioner] is still fearful after numerous threats, damage to
property, sexual abuse, etc. [Three year no contact] DVO. DV has occurred [and]
likely to occur again. [Court] adopts findings from prior 3-1-22 order.” Record at
36.
On August 23, 2022, Jaladi filed a motion to amend the DVO
asserting that insufficient findings existed for its issuance. The family court denied
the motion by order entered August 30, 2022. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Jaladi raises three arguments: (1) that the family court
failed to make sufficient written findings of fact; (2) the family court erred by
entering a DVO based on insufficient evidence; and, (3) the family court
improperly converted the EPO to a DVO. We shall address each argument
seriatim.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A family court may issue a DVO if it “finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and may again occur[.]”
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1).
The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied
when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim
was more likely than not to have been a victim of
domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387
(Ky. App. 2007). The definition of domestic violence
and abuse, as expressed in KRS 403.720(1), includes
“physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse,
assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault
between family members. . . .” The standard of review
for factual determinations is whether the family court’s
finding of domestic violence was clearly erroneous.
[Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure] CR 52.01; Reichle
v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). Findings are
not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.
2003). “[I]n reviewing the decision of a trial court the
test is not whether we would have decided it differently,
but whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly
erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry v.
Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation
omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s
decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or
capricious. Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684
(Ky. 1994) (citations omitted).
While “domestic violence statutes should be
construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from
domestic violence and preventing future acts of domestic
violence[,]” Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky.
2003), “the construction cannot be unreasonable.” Id.(citing Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson
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County, 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1994)). Furthermore,
we give much deference to a decision by the family
court, but we cannot countenance actions that are
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. See Kuprion, 888
S.W.2d at 684.
Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114-15 (Ky. App. 2010) (footnote omitted).
ANALYSIS
The first argument that Jaladi raises on appeal is the sufficiency of
written findings for the entry of the DVO. A family court’s duty to make findings
of fact is not satisfied until they are reduced to writing. Keifer v. Keifer, 354
S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2011). The only two essential specific findings of facts that
need to be made and reduced to writing for the entry of a DVO are: (1) an act of
domestic violence or abuse occurred, and (2) an act may occur again. Smith v.
McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Ky. 2021). This can be accomplished upon the
family court completely and accurately filling out an AOC Form 275.3. Id.;
Williford v. Williford, 583 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. App. 2019).
As noted, the family court completed an AOC Form 275.3. Therein,
the court marked a box under the “Additional Findings” section stating that an act
of domestic violence or abuse occurred and may occur again, and made additional
findings of fact on the court’s docket sheet, including the adoption of the court’s
findings from the March 1, 2022, hearing. See, e.g., Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480
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S.W.3d 920, 925 (Ky. 2015). Thus, the written findings of the family court for the
DVO are sufficient.4
Jaladi’s second argument looks to the sufficiency of the evidence
itself. Following an evidentiary hearing, if a family court finds by “a
preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and
may again occur,” it may issue a DVO. KRS 403.740. The phrase “domestic
violence and abuse” is defined as “physical injury . . . the infliction of fear of
imminent physical injury . . . or assault between family members . . . .” KRS
403.720(2)(a). This standard is met when the court finds the alleged victim was
more likely than not to have been a victim. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387
(Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted).
At the hearing on March 1, 2022, there was conflicting testimony
about the incident on January 16, 2022, and whether Jaladi caused a physical injury
to Turaka. Turaka claimed that the laptop hit her and bruised her internally
causing pain for a week, though she admitted that she had no photos or medical
documentation to support this. Jaladi testified that he did not throw the laptop,
4
Jaladi cites to Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Ky. 2014), to support his assertion that the
docket sheets are nothing more than bench notes. We find this argument to be without merit.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has again recently confirmed that the use of docket sheets to
memorialize findings of fact in domestic violence proceedings satisfied the court’s good-faith
duty to document its fact-finding. See Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Ky. 2021).
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only shoved it along the carpet, and that the laptop was not damaged in any way.
Video, March 1, 2022, Hearing – 10:51:00.
Whether Turaka sustained a physical injury on January 16, 2022, is
immaterial to our analysis as sufficient evidence was admitted at the hearing on
March 1 for the family court to have concluded that Turaka feared imminent
physical injury by Jaladi. The infliction of fear of imminent physical injury does
not require finding that a physical injury actually occurred. Hohman v. Dery, 371
S.W.3d 780, 782-83 (Ky. App. 2012). In Hohman, the family court found that the
infliction of fear of imminent physical injury occurred, despite the nonexistence of
a physical injury, based on the petitioner’s testimony that she felt threatened by the
respondent’s actions which included clenching his fists, yelling, and gritting his
teeth. Id. Here, by Jaladi’s own admissions, he “pushed” the laptop toward
Turaka, punched a hole in a wall in anger previously, and returned to the marital
residence shortly after the parties had separated. There was also evidence
presented that Jaladi threw things when he was angry and that he had forced sex
upon Turaka against her will. The family court considered the entirety of the
evidence presented, found Turaka to be credible in her testimony, and chose to
believe her. See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). We are also
mindful that the family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Hohman, 371 S.W.3d at 783.
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Further, when considering whether domestic violence may again
occur, the family court must consider the “totality of the circumstances and weigh
the risk of future violence against issuing a protective order.” Pettingill, 480
S.W.3d at 925. It is clear the family court did so, as it considered past aggressive
and controlling behaviors of Jaladi, the heightened chance for conflict during
divorce proceedings, and the likelihood of Jaladi returning to Kentucky from his
residence in North Carolina.
Jaladi further argues that because the family court did not have
sufficient evidence to enter a DVO on March 1, 2022, it necessarily follows that it
did not have sufficient evidence on August 16, 2022, when the court did not elicit
any new testimony at that hearing. However, Jaladi’s argument is based on the
misguided presumption that the family court did not have sufficient evidence on
March 1, 2022, to grant the DVO. Based on our analysis above, because sufficient
and substantial evidence existed on March 1, 2022, for the entry of a DVO,
sufficient and substantial evidence existed on August 16, 2022, and the family
court appropriately adopted and incorporated the March 1, 2022, findings into its
DVO.
Finally, Jaladi asserts that the family court abused its discretion by
converting the EPO entered March 1, 2022, into a DVO on August 16, 2022, after
the court allegedly expressed, at the March 1, 2022, hearing, an intent to dismiss
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the action if Jaladi did not violate the EPO before the next hearing date. However,
based on our review of the entire record, it is clear that the August 16, 2022,
hearing was intended to be a continuation of the March 1, 2022, hearing. Of
particular concern to the family court in March was whether the parties pending
divorce could be finalized in India in expedient fashion, which the court noted
would take at least six months. At the hearing on August 16, 2022, it was obvious
that the divorce would not be finalized for a substantial period of time. Providing
Turaka protection during the pendency of the divorce was addressed by the family
court at both the March 1 and August 16 hearings. Given this circumstance and
the evidence before the family court, we do not believe the family court abused its
discretion in granting a DVO at the August 16, hearing.
We also note that Jaladi was properly served with the petition and
notice of the March 1, 2022, hearing, at which he and his counsel appeared. Each
party was allowed to fully present their case at the hearing, which is not disputed.
The family court addressed the scheduling for the next hearing date, setting it for
August 16, 2022, which was the closest available date to the expiration of the EPO
on August 19, 2022. Video, March 1, 2022, Hearing – 11:07:00. Jaladi and his
counsel agreed to the new date, the date was noted twice on the docket sheets, and
the docket sheets were served on Jaladi’s counsel along with the EPO.
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Attendance is not always mandatory for hearings involving DVOs.
Cottrell v. Cottrell, 571 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Ky. App. 2019) (holding there is no
inherent or statutorily mandated due process right for an evidentiary hearing for the
extension of a DVO). While Jaladi was not present at the continued hearing on
August 16, 2022, his testimony was not cut short at the first hearing; he agreed to
the second hearing date; and has not asserted that his and his counsel’s absence
was unavoidable. Cf. Hawkins v. Jones, 555 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Ky. App. 2018).
During the hearing on the Motion to Amend Prior Order of Protection,
Jaladi’s counsel admitted that he was not present at the hearing on August 16,
2022, because he mistakenly believed that the continued DVO hearing date would
have been on the date of expiration of the EPO, which was August 19, 2022.
Video, August 30, 2022, Hearing – 8:38:00. However, counsel’s misunderstanding
of a date does not generally amount to excusable neglect. See St. Joseph Cath.
Orphan Soc’y v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Ky. 2014). Because counsel’s
absence was not the result of excusable neglect and was otherwise avoidable, and
there being sufficient evidence presented on March 1 that domestic violence had
occurred, again we find no error in the family court converting the EPO to a DVO
based on the evidence presented at the March 1, 2022, hearing.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 16, 2022, Domestic
Violence Order entered by the Jefferson Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
M. Thomas Underwood Jonathan D. Miller
Louisville, Kentucky Louisville, Kentucky
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