United States v. Wilson-Garcia , 309 F. App'x 633 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-6-2009
    USA v. Wilson-Garcia
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-4463
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1910
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 07-4463
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    RIGOBERTO WILSON-GARCIA,
    Appellant
    _______________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (Criminal No. 06-cr-00055)
    District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 8, 2009
    Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, and ELLIS * District Judge.
    (Filed: February 6, 2009)
    __________________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    __________________
    CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
    *
    The Honorable Thomas S. Ellis III, Senior District Judge for the United States
    District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Rigoberto Wilson-Garcia appeals from a judgment of conviction, arguing that the
    District Court plainly erred in instructing the jury at his trial. The threshold question
    before us is whether, even assuming that the jury instructions were erroneous, the errors
    were invited and thus nonreviewable where Wilson-Garcia’s proposed instructions were
    the exact instructions that the District Court actually delivered to the jury, and Wilson-
    Garcia specifically requested that the District Court give those instructions. We conclude
    that any error in this case was invited, and we will therefore affirm the District Court’s
    judgment.
    I.
    Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
    summarize the essential facts.
    On March 24, 2006, Wilson-Garcia, a prison inmate, was involved in an
    altercation with a fellow inmate. Several officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons tried
    to break up the fight, ordering the inmates to stop and eventually physically restraining
    them. At some point during this altercation, Wilson-Garcia injured two of the officers
    with a pair of scissors he was holding.
    On July 11, 2007, Wilson-Garcia was charged with two criminal counts (one for
    each officer) of intentionally and unlawfully forcibly assaulting, resisting, opposing,
    impeding, intimidating, interfering, and inflicting bodily injury upon officers of the
    Federal Bureau of Prisons while they were engaged in the performance of their duties, in
    2
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b). With the assistance of counsel, Wilson-
    Garcia contested these charges and proceeded to trial.
    At trial, Wilson-Garcia argued that at the time he injured the officers, he was in a
    fight for his life against a substantially larger inmate who was attacking him with a shank.
    He claimed that he was acting in self-defense and did not intend to injure the officers.
    After a two-day trial, the jury found Wilson-Garcia guilty of one count and acquitted him
    of the other. The District Court sentenced Wilson-Garcia to 150 months imprisonment
    consecutive to another sentence he was serving, and imposed a $100 special assessment.
    Wilson-Garcia filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Because Wilson-
    Garcia is appealing from a final judgment of conviction, we have jurisdiction pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Flanagan v. United States, 
    465 U.S. 259
    , 263 (1984); Catlin v.
    United States, 
    324 U.S. 229
    , 233 (1945).
    Generally, we “review jury instructions for abuse of discretion to determine
    whether they are misleading or inadequate,” and we have plenary review over “whether
    the instructions misstate the law.” Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 
    109 F.3d 913
    , 929 (3d
    Cir. 1997). Where the moving party failed to make a timely objection, however, we
    review for plain error. See Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 
    174 F.3d 95
    , 123-124 (3d
    Cir. 1999). The plain error determination is left to the sole discretion of this Court and
    3
    this discretion should be exercised sparingly. 
    Id. at 123.
    If the moving party establishes
    that “(1) the court erred; (2) the error was obvious under the law at the time of review;
    and (3) the error affected substantial rights,” then this Court may grant the moving party’s
    motion. United States v. Guadalupe, 
    402 F.3d 409
    , 410 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). We only
    exercise our discretion to grant relief, however, “if the error affects the fairness, integrity
    or public perception of the proceeding.” 
    Id. Moreover, where
    a party invites the alleged
    error, that error cannot support reversal. United States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., 
    127 F.3d 299
    , 306 (3d Cir. 1997).
    III.
    Wilson-Garcia contends that the District Court committed plain error when (1) it
    failed to sua sponte alter the self-defense instruction that Wilson-Garcia requested to state
    that self-defense was a complete defense to any conduct set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 111, not
    just assault; and (2) it failed to sua sponte alter the (allegedly “flawed and confusing”)
    intent instruction that Wilson-Garcia requested to state specifically that the Government
    had to prove that Wilson-Garcia intended to cause bodily injury. We conclude that if
    there was any error at all, it was “invited error” that cannot now serve as a basis for
    reversal.
    In United States v. West Indies Transport, Inc., we held that an error in the jury
    instructions was “invited error” that did not support reversal where defendants failed to
    request the instruction that they asserted on appeal and where “their proposed instruction
    4
    was remarkably similar to that actually delivered by the district 
    court.” 127 F.3d at 306
    .
    Moreover, in 2660 Woodley Road Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., we held that even
    a “fundamental error” in jury instructions cannot serve as a basis for reversal where the
    defendant failed to submit a correct instruction. 
    369 F.3d 732
    , 744 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting
    that even “assuming that the instruction was wrong, it was tantamount to invited error”).
    The factual context here calls for application of the “invited error” doctrine. In
    fact, this case is easier than West Indies Transport and 2660 Woodely Road Joint Venture
    because Wilson-Garcia’s proposed instructions were the exact instructions that the
    District Court actually delivered to the jury, and Wilson-Garcia specifically requested that
    the District Court give those instructions. Wilson-Garcia cannot now complain of alleged
    errors that he himself introduced.1
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    1
    We have recognized an exception to the “invited error” doctrine “[w]here a
    defendant submits proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct
    appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm.” West Indies Transp., 
    Inc., 127 F.3d at 305
    . That situation is not presented in this case.
    5