United States v. William Deangelo Strachan , 319 F. App'x 774 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 13, 2009
No. 08-13949 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-14012-CR-KMM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM DEANGELO STRACHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(March 13, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On September 21, 2007, appellant having pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement, the district court sentenced appellant to concurrent prison terms of 120
months for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count I), possession of a firearm by a felon
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 3), and possession of an unregistered
short barreled shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(Count 5). On June 12,
2008, appellant moved the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
reduce his sentences based on Amendments 706 and 713 to the Sentencing
Guidelines, which reduced the offense level for most amounts of cocaine base by
two levels. These amendments had the effect of reducing appellant’s offense level
(Counts 1, 3, and 5 had been grouped together for sentencing purposes, with
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), which established the base offense level for the Count 1
offense, setting the offense level for all three counts). The district court granted
appellant’s motion and reduced his concurrent sentences to 108 months, at the
middle of the amended sentence range of 92 to 155 months’ imprisonment. He
now appeals the district court’s decision. Citing the disparity between sentences
for crack cocaine and powder cocaine, appellant argues that the district court
abused its discretion by not resentencing him to the low end of the amended
sentence range.
I.
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As an initial matter, the Government argues that we should dismiss this
appeal because this case is covered by the sentence appeal waiver in appellant’s
plea agreement. Whether a defendant effectively (knowingly and voluntarily)
waived his right to appeal his sentence is a question of law that we review de novo.
United States v. Benitez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997). For an
appeal waiver to be enforced, “the government must show either that (1) the
district court specifically questioned the defendant about the provision during the
plea colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant fully
understood the significance of the waiver.” United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d
1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001).
We use an objective standard in interpreting plea agreements. United States
v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 2004). We avoid “a ‘hyper-technical
reading of the written agreement’ and ‘a rigidly literal approach in the construction
of language.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1990)). Any ambiguities in a plea agreement are interpreted in favor of the
defendant. Id. at 1105-1106.
We recently interpreted the scope of a sentence appeal waiver in United
States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2008). Carruth had been sentenced to 18
months in prison upon revocation of his supervised release. Id. at 845. On appeal,
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he argued that his new sentence was invalid because he had not been given an
opportunity to allocute, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E). Id. at 845-
46. Although Carruth’s original plea agreement contained a sentence appeal
waiver, we held that it was not applicable because it did not include specific
language stating that Carruth could not appeal the revocation of his supervised
release. Id. at 846.
In this case, the record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the change
of plea hearing, nor does it otherwise indicate that appellant clearly understood the
consequences of his sentence appeal waiver. Therefore, the Government has not
met its burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Also, the
language of the waiver is unclear as to whether it covers the appeal of a new
sentence imposed pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Accordingly, we find that appellant’s
sentence appeal waiver does not require us to dismiss this case.
II.
We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v. White, 305 F.3d
1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002). Substantively, § 3582(c)(2) gives federal courts the
authority to consider reducing the sentence “of a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
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subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Amendment 706 to
the Sentencing Guidelines reduced the base offense level for some amounts of
cocaine base by two. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (2007). Amendment 713
later made this change retroactive. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May
1, 2008). Amendment 715 provided that, in a case where a defendant was found
responsible for both cocaine base and another substance, these substances should
be converted into an equivalent amount of marihuana using an amended drug
equivalency table. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 715 (Supp. May 1, 2008). The
resulting base offense level is then reduced by two. Id.
Procedurally, a district court must follow a two-step process in ruling on a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir. 2000).
First, the court must recalculate the defendant’s sentence range based on the
relevant amendment to the Guidelines. Id. None of the other Guidelines
applications made during the original sentencing are changed. Id. Second, the
court must decide whether to retain the original sentence or to resentence the
defendant under the amended guideline range. Id. at 781. The court should
consider three factors in making this determination: (1) the sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) public safety; and (3) the defendant’s post-
sentencing conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 comment. (n. 1(b)).
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Generally, a district court must specifically state its reasons for imposing a
sentence at a particular point within the sentence range. United States v. Williams,
438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). The court need not
make detailed findings with respect to each § 3553(a) factor, but the record must
make it clear that it considered them. United States v. Williams, No. 08-11361, at
5-7 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2009); United States v. Eggersdorf, 126 F.3d 1318, 1322
(11th Cir. 1997). The court “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow
for meaningful appellate review.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct.
586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
In this case, the district court properly calculated appellant’s amended
sentence range. In fashioning appellant’s new sentence, however, the court did not
discuss any of the § 3553(a) factors, or otherwise explain its decision to resentence
appellant to the middle rather than the low end of his amended sentence range.
Because the court did not make sufficient findings to support its decision, we
vacate appellant’s sentence and remand the case for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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