Daniel Arceneaux, Louis Daverede, Jr., Vives Lemmon and Jules Menesses v. Amstar Corp., Amstar Sugar Corp., Tate and Lyle North American Sugars, Inc., and Domino Sugar Company , 200 So. 3d 277 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #045
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 7th day of September, 2016, are as follows:
BY HUGHES, J.:
2015-C -0588 DANIEL ARCENEAUX, LOUIS DAVEREDE, JR., VIVES LEMMON AND
JULES MENESSES, ET AL. v. AMSTAR CORP., AMSTAR SUGAR CORP.,
TATE AND LYLE NORTH AMERICAN SUGARS, INC., AND DOMINO SUGAR
COMPANY, ET AL. (Parish of St. Bernard)
We reverse the trial court's grant of the partial summary
judgment that ordered Continental Casualty Company to pay for
American Sugar's complete defense going forward in the Barbe and
Waguespack cases. We conclude that Continental is liable for its
pro rata share of defense costs based on its policy periods,
noting its contention that its pro rata share should be
calculated at 3.74% of the total in Barbe and 3.29% in
Waguespack, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
KNOLL, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
09/07/16
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2015-C-0588
DANIEL ARCENEAUX, LOUIS DAVEREDE, JR.,
VIVES LEMMON AND JULES MENESSES, ET AL.
VERSUS
AMSTAR CORP., AMSTAR SUGAR CORP.,
TATE AND LYLE NORTH AMERICAN SUGARS, INC.,
AND DOMINO SUGAR COMPANY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. BERNARD
HUGHES, J.
This case concerns whether the duty to defend in long latency disease cases
may be prorated between insurer and insured when occurrence-based policies
provide coverage for only a portion of the time during which exposure occurred.
Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”) asserts that defense costs are to be
prorated among insurers and the insured if there are periods of non-coverage.
American Sugar Refining, Inc. (“American Sugar”) asserts that the duty to defend
as agreed upon in the policy provides for a complete defense so long as the duty to
defend attaches, even if some claims fall outside of coverage. For the reasons set
forth below, we hold that the duty to defend should be prorated in this case based
upon policy language.
Facts and Procedural History
In the underlying Arceneaux suit, plaintiffs allege that they suffered hearing
loss from exposure to unreasonably loud noise in the course of their work at
American Sugar’s refinery in Arabi, Louisiana. Two sets of plaintiffs, the Barbe
plaintiffs and the Waguespack plaintiffs, filed suit against American Sugar in 2006.
These suits were consolidated with the Arceneaux action, which was filed in 1999
against American Sugar’s predecessor, Tate & Lyle North American Sugars, Inc.
The case at bar concerns only the Barbe and Waguespack plaintiffs, and not the
Arceneaux plaintiffs whose claims have been litigated extensively in the trial court,
the court of appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Arceneaux v. Amstar
Corp., 2005-0177 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/14/05), 921 So. 2d 189 (“Arceneaux I”);
Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 2006-1592 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/07), 969 So. 2d 755,
writs denied, 07-2486, 08-0053 (La. 3/24/08), 977 So. 2d 952, 953 (“Arceneaux
II”); and Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 2010-2329 (La. 7/1/11), 66 So. 3d 438
(“Arceneaux III”). 1
The plaintiffs, approximately 100 in number, allege that they worked at the
refinery during various years ranging from 1941 to 2006. 2 Continental issued eight
general liability policies in effect from March 1, 1963 to March 1, 1978. Each of
the policies contained exclusions for bodily injury to employees of the insured
arising out of the course and scope of employment. However, in the last policy, the
exclusion was deleted by special endorsement effective December 31, 1975. Thus,
there was coverage for bodily injury that occurred from December 31, 1975
through March 1, 1978, a period of twenty-six months. The parties agree that the
1
In the previous Arceneaux decisions, whether defense costs could be prorated was not at issue.
Initially, Continental was defending the insured without a reservation of rights. Arceneaux III, p.
2, 66 So. 3d at 441. Continental then withdrew its defense under the mistaken belief that none of
the policies it issued provided coverage. Id. at pp. 2-3, 442. Later, Continental agreed to pay
100% of the defense costs and to defend all of the claims going forward under a full reservation
of rights. Id. at pp. 4, 442-43. In Arceneaux III, the issue was whether Continental waived its
policy defenses, including the coverage periods and the employee exclusion, by breaching its
duty to defend. p. 17, 66 So. 3d at 450. This court held that Continental did not waive its policy
defenses. Id.
2
The Barbe suit was filed on January 17, 2006 and, as supplemented and amended, alleged that
the plaintiffs had suffered occupational hearing loss due to noise exposure while employed at the
refinery between 1946 and 2005. The Waguespack suit was filed on April 6, 2006 and, as
amended, alleged that the plaintiffs had suffered occupational hearing loss due to noise exposure
while employed at the refinery between 1941 and 2006.
2
Barbe and Waguespack actions trigger coverage. The relevant policy language
provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured . . . shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of
Y. bodily injury
Z. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent . . . .
The policy defines bodily injury as “bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at
any time resulting therefrom.” (Emphasis added.) The policy defines occurrence as
“an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured.”
American Sugar brought a third party demand against Continental on
September 19, 2007, alleging that Continental had issued policies that provide
coverage for the Barbe and Waguespack claims. Furthermore, American Sugar
alleged that Continental had been put on notice of the litigation in June 2006 and
that Continental breached its policy provisions by failing to provide a defense.
American Sugar sought past defense costs, a complete defense going forward, and
penalties and attorney fees. Continental agreed to pay 25% of the past and future
defense costs, subject to a full reservation of rights.
On May 22, 2013, American Sugar filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment seeking a declaration that Continental owes a duty to defend, including a
duty to provide American Sugar a complete defense, reimbursement of defense
costs expended plus interest, statutory bad faith penalties, and attorney fees.
3
Without offering reasons, on October 3, 2013 the trial court granted American
Sugar’s request for a complete defense going forward, but denied the motion in all
other respects, including the request for past defense costs. The trial court also
designated the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal pursuant to
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(B).
Continental took a suspensive appeal and argued that it should not be
ordered to provide a complete defense given that its policies covered but twenty-
six months of the approximately sixty-year exposure period alleged by the
plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling holding that an
insurer’s duty to defend is not subject to proration. Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp.,
2014-0271, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/25/15), 161 So. 3d 115, 124. The court of
appeal opined that an insurer’s duty to defend arises when the pleadings disclose
even a possibility of liability under the policy, even if some of the claims fall
outside the policy’s coverage. Id. at pp. 6-7, 119-20. The court of appeal
determined that the jurisprudence did not support a deviation from the rule that the
duty to defend is not divisible, even in long latency disease cases. Id. at p. 14, 123-
24. The court of appeal did note, however, that other jurisdictions have adopted the
“more equitable system” of defense cost proration, that the state’s jurisprudence is
“moving in the direction of proration,” and that this case presents an opportunity
for the supreme court to “extend and/or clarify the law on this issue.” Id. at pp. 13-
14, 123-24. Continental sought review with this court, which was granted.
Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 2015-0588 (La. 8/28/15), 174 So. 3d 1157. 3
3
Before this court granted Continental’s writ, we requested additional briefing on the effect and
applicability of Arrant v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc. 2013-2878 (La. 5/5/15), 169
So. 3d 296. Arrant was handed down while Continental’s writ application was pending in this
court. Arrant held that employees’ gradual noise-induced hearing loss caused by exposure to
hazardous levels of noise constituted an “occupational disease” within the meaning of the
Workers’ Compensation Act. Neither Continental nor American Sugar argued that Arrant
foreclosed the need to decide the instant case as Arrant did not address the duty to defend issue
at bar.
4
Standard of Review
Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review in considering lower
court rulings on summary judgment motions. Thus, we use the same criteria that
govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is
appropriate. A court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art.
966(B). Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact. This case thus presents a
question of law.
Law and Analysis
At the outset, we must note that an insurer’s duty to defend is distinct from
its duty to indemnify. Generally, an insurer’s obligation to defend suits filed
against an insured is broader than its obligation to provide coverage for damage
claims. Elliott v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 2006-1505, p. 5 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d 1247,
1250 (citing Steptore v. Masco Const. Co., 93-2064, pp. 8-9 (La. 8/18/94), 643
So. 2d 1213, 1218). The insurer’s duty to defend is determined by the allegations of
the plaintiff’s petition, and the insurer is obligated to furnish a defense unless the
petition unambiguously excludes coverage. Steptore, p. 8, 643 So. 2d at 1218. If,
assuming all allegations of the petition to be true, there would be both coverage
under the policy and liability of the insured to the plaintiff, the insurer must defend
regardless of the outcome of the suit. Id. In short, the duty to defend arises
whenever the pleadings against the insured disclose even a possibility of liability
under the policy. Id. at pp. 8-9, 1218.
As to an insurer’s duty to indemnify, liability is to be prorated among
insurance carriers that were on the risk during periods of exposure to injurious
conditions. Norfolk S. Corp. v. California Union Ins. Co., 2002-0369, pp. 42-43
5
(La. App. 1 Cir. 9/12/03), 859 So. 2d 167, 197-98, writ denied, 2003-2742 (La.
12/19/03), 861 So. 2d 579; see also Arceneaux, p. 22, 66 So. 3d at 453 (“Arceneaux
III”). That indemnification is allocated pro rata is based in large part on
Louisiana’s adoption of the exposure theory in long latency disease cases. Id. at pp.
40-41, 197; see also S. Silica of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
2007-1680, p. 8 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So. 2d 460, 466. Long latency occupational
disease cases are sui generis in that a distinct body of jurisprudential law has been
developed which applies solely to them. See Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d
1058 (La. 1992). Under the exposure theory, the “occurrence” that triggers
coverage under an insurance policy is the plaintiff’s exposure to harmful
conditions within the policy period. Id. at 1076. Such a theory was adopted to
establish when coverage was triggered in cases that involved diseases when there
is a “lengthy temporal separation between the alleged tortious conduct and the
appearance of injury.” S. Silica, p. 6, 979 So. 2d at 465. This approach is based on
the concept that insurers may limit their liability to discrete and finite periods.
Norfolk S., p. 42-43, 859 So. 2d at 198. As the Norfolk Southern court explained:
The exposure theory, upon which the Louisiana allocation approach is
based, relies on the principle that an insurer will only be responsible
within the terms of its policy for those damages arising out of the
period the policy is in effect. In short, each insurer is responsible, up
to the limits of its policy, for all damages emanating from occurrences
taking place during the insurer’s policy period. All damages
emanating from occurrences taking place outside the policy period are
covered by the insurer on the risk at the time the occurrence took
place.
Id. Further, in cases when claims arise out of occurrences that take place during a
period in which no insurer is on the risk, a liable entity is assigned a pro rata share
for purposes of indemnification. Id. at p. 43, 198.
While the aforementioned case law pertains to indemnification, there
appears to be no Louisiana precedent on the precise issue the court is presented
6
with in this case, which is whether an insurer’s duty to defend may be prorated
among insurers and the insured during periods of self-insurance in long latency
disease cases. Nationwide, two general approaches to allocation of defense costs
in long latency disease cases have emerged: the pro rata allocation method and the
joint and several allocation method. Under pro rata allocation, insurance carriers of
triggered policies are responsible for a share of defense costs based at least in part
on the period of time they are on the risk. Defense costs are divided among
insurers, and if the insured has periods of non-coverage, the insured is responsible
for its pro rata share. Under joint and several allocation, the insured selects one
insurer that is on the risk and holds it liable for the entire loss up to the policy
limits. The elected insurer then has the burden of collecting contribution from other
insurers. Under this scheme, defense costs are divided only among the insurance
carriers, even for periods during which there was no coverage in place. The most
significant difference between joint and several allocation and pro rata allocation is
the treatment of uninsured time periods. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co.,
650 A.2d 974, 989 (N.J. 1994).
A leading decision in applying joint and several allocation is Keene Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982). In this case, manufacturer Keene Corporation sought
declaratory judgment of the rights and obligations of insurers under comprehensive
general liability policies, specifically to what extent each policy covered Keene’s
liability for asbestos-related diseases. Id. at 1038. The applicable insurance policies
in Keene are substantially similar to the Continental policy at issue in this case. 4
4
The policies in Keene provided that “(t)he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury . . .
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right
and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury
. . . even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent . . . .” Keene, 667
F.2d at 1039. The policies in Keene defined bodily injury as “bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by any person,” and defined occurrence as “an accident, including injurious exposure
7
The federal district court held that indemnification and defense costs should be
prorated among the insurers according to the relative extent of exposure during
their respective policy periods and that the insured was liable for its pro rata share
during periods of non-coverage. Id. at 1039. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. Id. The appellate court in Keene
adopted the continuous trigger theory in long latency disease cases, holding that
each insurer on the risk between exposure to asbestos and manifestation of injury
was liable to the insured, Keene Corporation. Id. at 1041.
Next, the court determined the extent of coverage for which each insurer was
liable. The court noted that the policies provided that the insurer will pay on behalf
of the insured “all sums” that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury during the policy period. Id. at 1047. The court
reasoned that the policies issued to the insured relieved it of the risk of liability for
latent injury of which the insured could not be aware when it purchased insurance.
Id. The court continued:
Keene did not expect, nor should it have expected, that its security
was undermined by the existence of prior periods in which it was
uninsured, and in which no known or knowable injury occurred. If,
however, an insurer were obligated to pay only a pro-rata share of
Keene’s liability, as the district court held, those reasonable
expectations would be violated. Keene’s security would be contingent
on the existence and validity of all the other applicable policies. Each
policy, therefore, would fail to serve its function of relieving Keene of
all risk of liability. The logical consequence of this is that the policies
must require that once an insurer’s coverage is triggered, the insurer is
liable to Keene to the full extent of Keene’s liability up to its policy’s
limits, but subject to ‘other insurance’ clauses.
Id. at 1047-48. The court noted that there is “nothing in the policies that provides
for a reduction of the insurer’s liability if an injury occurs only in part during a
policy period” and that it had “no authority upon which to pretend that Keene also
to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury . . . neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Id.
8
has a ‘self-insurance’ policy that is triggered for periods in which no other policy
was purchased.” Id. at 1048-49. The Keene court also held that only one policy’s
limits can apply to each injury and that Keene was not entitled to “stack”
applicable policies’ limits of liability. Id. at 1049.
As to allocation of liability, the court reasoned that in asbestos-related
disease suits, it is likely that the coverage of more than one insurer will be
triggered. Id. at 1050. The court stated:
Because each insurer is fully liable, and because Keene cannot collect
more than it owes in damages, the issue of dividing insurance
obligations arises. The only logical resolution of this issue is for
Keene to be able to collect from any insurer whose coverage is
triggered, the full amount of indemnity that it is due, subject only to
the provisions in the policies that govern the allocation of liability
when more than one policy covers an injury.
Id.
Finally, the Keene court determined the insurers’ liability for defense costs.
It reasoned that because the policies provide that the insurer shall defend any suit
against Keene for damages due to bodily injury, and because it held that each
insurer is fully liable to Keene for indemnification, “it follows that each is fully
liable for defense costs.” Id. Thus, the reviewing court reversed the district court’s
judgment that held indemnification and defense costs are to be prorated, and it held
that such costs should be allocated under the joint and several scheme.
Other jurisdictions have concluded differently, although dealing with
essentially the same policy language. The seminal case applying the pro rata
allocation method is Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified on reh’g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
In Forty-Eight Insulations, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment to
establish that the insured was responsible for a portion of its defense costs and
liability for an asbestos action brought against it because it had been self-insured
9
for a period of time. Id. at 1215. The insured, Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., claimed
it had coverage for all the years in which exposure was alleged, but some of the
policies had been lost or destroyed. Id. at n. 4. Faced with substantially similar
insurance policies 5 to the policy in the instant matter and the argument that so long
as one insurer had the duty to defend, the insured should not be liable for defense
costs, even during periods of non-coverage, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit held that defense costs are to be prorated among insurers and the
insured for periods of non-coverage. Id. at 1225. The court reasoned that when
there is no reasonable means of prorating defense costs between covered and non-
covered claims, the insurer must bear the entire cost of defense. Id. at 1224. The
court noted this scenario typically arises in suits brought as the result of a single
accident, when only some of the damages sought are covered under a policy. Id.
However, in the context of asbestos exposure cases and other long latency disease
claims when coverage was triggered under the exposure theory, defense costs can
be “readily apportioned.” Id. at 1224. The court further stated:
The duty to defend arises solely under contract. An insurer contracts
to pay the entire cost of defending a claim which has arisen within the
policy period. The insurer has not contracted to pay defense costs for
occurrences which took place outside the policy period.
Id. at 1224-25. In Forty-Eight Insulations, the court applied the exposure theory to
indemnity liability, and stated that the exposure theory established that a
reasonable means of proration was available in allocating defense costs. Id. at
5
The policy language in Forty-Eight Insulations provided:
[The insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be
legally obligated to pay as damages because of . . . bodily injury or . . . property
damage to which this policy applies caused by an occurrence.
“Bodily injury” means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person
which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting
therefrom.
“Occurrence” means an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions
which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury . . . .
Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216.
10
1225.
As to allocating defense costs to an insured for periods of no coverage, the
Forty-Eight Insulations court held that it was reasonable to treat the insured as an
insurer for periods of time in which there was no triggered policy. Id. The court
speculated that were the court to adopt a rule whereby once the duty to defend was
triggered, an insured would be owed a full defense even if there were gaps in
coverage, “a manufacturer which had insurance coverage for only one year out of
20 would be entitled to a complete defense of all asbestos actions the same as a
manufacturer which had coverage for 20 years out of 20. Neither logic nor
precedent support such a result.” Id.
Another court that adopted the pro rata method of apportioning defense costs
is the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance
Co. 650 A.2d 974. In detailing the public policy interests presented in its decision,
the court wrote:
The theory of insurance is that of transferring risks. Insurance
companies accept risks from manufacturers and either retain the risks
or spread the risks through reinsurance. John A. Appleman & Jean
Appleman, 13A Insurance Law and Practice § 7681 (1976). Because
insurance companies can spread costs throughout an industry and thus
achieve cost efficiency, the law should, at a minimum, not provide
disincentives to parties to acquire insurance when available to cover
their risks. Spreading the risk is conceptually more efficient.
Id. at 992; see also Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826
A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003). Accordingly, the New Jersey high court rejected the
Keene method of allocation as it reduces the incentive to insure against future risks
and adopted the pro rata method of apportioning defense costs. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 650 A.2d at 995-96.
Across the country in cases where “it has been determined that the insured is
self-insured for part of the coverage period, the weight of authority is that the
insured must bear a pro rata share of the defense costs.” Barry R. Ostrager &
11
Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes, §6.02(a)(2)
(17th ed. 2014). 6
We are persuaded by the reasoning presented in Forty-Eight Insulations and
its progeny and adopt the pro rata allocation method for defense costs in the case
before us based on the policy language.
The duty to defend arises solely under contract. Arceneaux, p. 21, 66 So. 3d
at 452 (“Arceneaux III”). It is well-settled that “an insurance policy is a contract
between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of
interpretation of contracts set forth in the Civil Code.” Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral
Home, Inc., 07-0054, p. 7 (La. 5/22/07), 956 So. 2d 583, 588-89. According to
those rules, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine the common intent
of the parties. The ascertainment of that common intent begins with an
examination of the words of the insurance contract itself. Id. In this case, the words
of the insurance contract at issue are clear and unambiguous. According to the
contract, Continental has “the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of . . . bodily injury.” “Bodily injury” is defined as
“bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during
the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom.” (Emphasis
added.)
American Sugar argues that under the terms of the policy Continental must
“defend” “any suit” that contains at least one allegation seeking damages that is
potentially covered. However, the policy language limits coverage for bodily
injury to that which occurs during the policy period.
6
See, e.g., Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d
365 (5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1990);
Budd Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 820 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1987); Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co., 98-1788, slip op. at 19-22, 1999 WL 679664, *11 (E.D. 1999) (Minnesota
law); Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., No. 85-CV-10037-BC, slip op. at 12-13, 1991
WL 568033 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 1991); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 685 F.
Supp. 621, 626 (E.D. Mich. 1987); N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d
657 (Minn. 1994).
12
Moreover, applying the pro rata method of allocation here does not violate
the reasonable expectations of the insurer or the insured. Based on the policy
language, neither party could reasonably expect that the insurer was liable for
losses that occurred outside the policy coverage periods. See Sec. Ins. Co. of
Hartford, 826 A.2d at 121 (Conn. 2003). While the duty to defend is broader than
the duty to indemnify, neither obligation is broader than the policy’s coverage
period in the context of long latency disease cases that trigger occurrence-based
policies. In addition, the concept of “joint and several” is not a concept that is
currently a part of Louisiana’s tort law. See Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc., 13-
002 (La. 6/28/13), 120 So. 3d 678, 687-89; see also Denoux v. Vessel Management
Services, Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So. 2d 84, 92.
We note also that “subject to the rules on insurance contract interpretation,
insurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any manner they desire, so
long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy.”
Edwards v. Daugherty, 03-2103, 03-2104, p. 23 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So. 2d 932, 947.
Thus, the policy language in this case that supports a pro rata allocation of defense
costs may not appear in another policy, requiring a different result with regard to
responsibility for defense costs. The manner in which defense costs are to be
allocated may need to be determined on a case by case basis, according to the
precise language of the insurance contract at issue.
Additionally, as recognized by Forty-Eight Insulations and its progeny, the
pro rata allocation scheme is an equitable system, that can be readily used in long
latency disease claims in Louisiana. In Cole, this court adopted the exposure
theory of liability as set out in Forty-Eight Insulations. Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1076.
The exposure theory, under which the occurrence that triggers coverage is the
exposure to harmful conditions, provides a clear way to apportion defense costs as
each year of alleged exposure will trigger the insurer’s duty to defend. American
13
Sugar argues that proration of defense costs will result in mini-trials to determine
the exposure periods for each plaintiff. However, because the duty to defend is
determined by consulting the allegations within the petition and the terms of the
insurance policy, no such mini-trials are necessary.
Here, American Sugar will be required to pay for its defense during years in
which it did not acquire an insurance policy that would be triggered by the instant
litigation. As noted by Forty-Eight Insulations, such a result is “reasonable” as the
joint and several scheme would treat an insured who had uninterrupted policies for
twenty years the same as an insured who had a triggered policy for one year. 633
F.2d at 1225. To hold otherwise would entitle an insured to receive coverage for a
period in which it did not pay a premium. See Owens-Illinois, Inc., 650 A.2d at 988
(citing Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
Moreover, the joint and several allocation approach provides a disincentive to
insureds to purchase uninterrupted insurance coverage and provides a windfall to
companies that fail to obtain continuous coverage. See Sec. Inc. Co. of Hartford,
826 A.2d at 121. The pro rata allocation method, by contrast, promotes risk
spreading.
The decision to prorate defense costs in this case is buttressed by our
decision in Southern Silica of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty
Ass’n. 979 So. 2d 460. In Southern Silica, an insured obtained policies through
various insurers that were triggered by employees’ alleged exposure to silica. Id. at
p. 2, 462. One of the insurers, Reliance, was declared insolvent and the question
became whether the solvent insurers must first absorb the insolvent insurer’s share
of indemnity and defense costs to the extent of their policy limits before the
insured could claim indemnity and defense costs from the Louisiana Insurance
Guaranty Association. Id. To answer the question, this court reviewed the lower
court’s determination that Act 108 of 2004 was unconstitutional on the basis that it
14
impaired the contract between insured and insurer. Id. at p. 3-4, 463. By 2004 La.
Acts, No. 108, § 1, R.S. 22:1386(A) was amended to provide:
In the case of a claimant alleging personal injury or death caused by
exposure to asbestos fibers or other claim resulting from exposure to,
release of, or contamination from any environmental pollutant or
contaminant, such claimant must first exhaust any and all other
insurance available to the insured for said claim for any policy period
for which insurance is available before recovering from the
association, even if an insolvent insurer provided the only coverage
for one or more policy periods of the alleged exposure.
Section 3 of Act 108 further provided that: “[t]his Act shall apply to all
covered claims, as defined in R.S. 22:1379, pending or arising after the effective
date of the Act.”
While the court of appeal determined that there was an impairment of
contract as the statute required the insured to assert its claims against the solvent
insurers when there were no contracts in effect and where the insurers did not
receive premiums, this court held that the statute could be read in such a way that it
was not unconstitutional Id. at p. 10, 467. This court reasoned:
The above provision merely states the order in which a claim must be
handled. The claimant must “first” collect other insurance “available
to the insured” before the claimant can collect from LIGA. What is
“available” is the pro rata share of each insurer for each year that
insurer was on the risk. Thus, the amendment provides a procedure for
asserting a claim against LIGA: the claimant must “exhaust” the other
solvent insurers’ pro rata shares of his or her damages before asserting
a claim against LIGA to pay Reliance’s pro rata shares. This reading
of the amended statute comports with Louisiana’s use of the
significant exposure theory in long latency disease cases and its
component, proration of insurance coverage. Even if the monetary
limits of each policy is far in excess of the prorated share, there is no
authority in the legislation for the courts to assess an insurer with an
amount in excess of the prorated amount of the claimant’s damages,
as would be necessary if the insurer were to “fill the gap” of the
Reliance years.
Id. at p. 12, 468-69 (footnote omitted). We note that the decree in Southern Silica
stated in part: “Because LIGA also owes Southern Silica a defense for the 1977-
1982 time period, indemnification for defense costs borne by Southern Silica can
15
be recovered from LIGA upon proper proof thereof.” Id. at p. 14, 469. The
Southern Silica decision concerned itself with the interpretation and
constitutionality of a statute, and it contains no recitation of law or analysis on the
duty to defend. Yet, the holding in Southern Silica and the holding in the instant
case appear to be consistent.
In contrast to Southern Silica is a Texas silicosis case that was similarly
concerned with whether an insured must exhaust coverage from solvent insurers
before the insurance guaranty association’s duty to assume the obligations of an
impaired insurer was triggered under the state’s Guaranty Act. 7 Texas Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n/Sw. Aggregates, Inc. v. Sw. Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d
600, 602 (Tex. App. 1998). The court noted that Texas had adopted the joint and
several allocation method in Keene and that each insurer is fully liable to the
insured for defense costs. Id. at 605. The Texas court affirmed the trial court’s
holding that the Guaranty Act required an insured to exhaust its right to a complete
defense under each policy with solvent insurers before the Guaranty Association’s
statutory obligations are triggered. Id. at 616. The difference in outcome in Texas
Property and Southern Silica is underscored by the difference in how each
jurisdiction has decided to allocate defense costs in long latency disease cases.
When each insurer on the risk owes the insured a complete defense, such an
insured cannot seek recovery from the insurance guaranty association until it
exhausts other triggered policies. Where each insurer on the risk owes the insured a
prorated share, an insured may assert a claim against the insurance guaranty
7
The relevant portion of the Texas Guaranty Act, Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.28–C, § 12(a)
(West Supp. 1998), stated in part:
A person who has a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance
policy other than a policy of an impaired insurer that is also a covered claim shall
exhaust first the person’s rights under the policy, including any claim for
indemnity or medical benefits under any workers’ compensation, health,
disability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, medical payment,
liability, or other policy, and the right to defense under the policy.
16
association for the insolvent insurer’s pro rata shares after it recovers the pro rata
shares from the solvent insurers. See Sayre v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 701 A.2d 1311,
1314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), superseded by statute, N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5,
as recognized in Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. New Jersey Property-
Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 74 A.3d 860 (N.J. 2013), (holding that the state’s
surplus lines guaranty fund must pay the share that would have been allocated to
the insolvent insurer’s policy up to the statutory limit because of the previous
adoption of pro rata allocation method of indemnity and defense costs). Thus,
while the issues presented in the case at bar differ from those presented in Southern
Silica, the result reached in both is consistent.
Having concluded that defense costs are to be prorated in this case, we now
determine the formula for allocation. Some courts take into consideration policy
limits in conjunction with time on the risk. For example, in Owens-Illinois, the
New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a special master should be appointed
to create a formula for calculating indemnity and defense costs. 138 N.J. at 996. It
instructed that a “fair method of allocation appears to be one that is related to both
the time on the risk and the degree of risk assumed.” Id. at 995. While the court left
the ultimate formula up to the special master, it noted that to determine the risk
assumed, policy limits and the years of coverage should be factors. Id. at 993-94.
In Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the Utah court concluded
that multiplying policy limits by the years of coverage results in a more equitable
allocation of defense costs than proration based on policy limits alone. 931 P.2d
127, 140 (Utah 1997). It noted that taking into account policy limits “affixes the
responsibility of the insurer in proration to the total coverage which that insurer
undertook to provide” and “acknowledges that insurers do not stand on an equal
footing where there are significantly different liability limits.” Id.
In this case, however, the amount of time an insurer was on the risk would
17
seem to be the appropriate consideration. Because the duty to defend is distinct
from the duty to indemnify, the details of the policy need not enter the equation of
how defense costs are to be allocated so long as the policy is triggered.
Additionally, in this case there are periods where there is no policy in effect and
thus where there are no policy limits. Thus, we conclude a time on the risk
assessment is appropriate in this case. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at
1225.
Decree
We reverse the trial court’s grant of the partial summary judgment that
ordered Continental Casualty Company to pay for American Sugar’s complete
defense going forward in the Barbe and Waguespack cases. We conclude that
Continental is liable for its pro rata share of defense costs based on its policy
periods, noting its contention that its pro rata share should be calculated at 3.74%
of the total in Barbe and 3.29% in Waguespack, and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
18
09/07/16
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 15-C-0588
DANIEL ARCENEAUX, LOUIS DAVEREDE, JR.,
VIVES LEMMON AND JULES MENESSES, ET AL.
VERSUS
AMSTAR CORP., AMSTAR SUGAR CORP.,
TATE AND LYLE NORTH AMERICAN SUGARS, INC.,
AND DOMINO SUGAR COMPANY, ET AL.
KNOLL, J., concurs in the result.
With all due respect, I concur in the result because I find the opinion tends to
be confusing. In my view, the issue of whether Continental is entitled to a pro rata
sharing of defense costs involves a pure contract question based on the terms of its
insurance policy. The plain language of the insurance contract concerning the duty
to defend provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and
the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against
the Insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or
property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are
groundless, false or fraudulent....
Thus, Continental has an obligation to pay damages because of “bodily injury . . .
to which this insurance applies” and to defend “any suit . . . on account of any such
bodily injury.” The policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness, or
disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including
death at any time resulting therefrom.” The clear language of the policy limits
Continental’s coverage for indemnification of liability and defense costs for bodily
injury occurring during the policy period. Thus, the defense costs should be
prorated according to the terms of its policy.
This is essentially a simple insurance contract case requiring us to apply
fundamental principles of contract interpretation. Magnon v. Collins, 98-2822 (La.
7/7/99), 739 So. 2d 191, 196 (“An insurance policy is a contract between the parties
and should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set
forth in the Civil Code. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,
93-0911 (La.1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 759. The judicial responsibility in interpreting
insurance contracts is to determine the parties’ common intent. La.C.C. art.2045.”).
Because the cost of defending an insured is determined by the contract of
insurance, the Court cannot create a bright-line rule prorating defense costs in
every case; it must be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to the terms
of the contract of insurance.
Because this is exclusively a matter of contract law, I find the opinion’s
focus on other courts’ analyses concerning indemnification for liability in long
latency disease cases involving principles of tort law to be both misplaced and
confusing. Accordingly, I concur in the result.
09/07/16
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2015-C-0588
DANIEL ARCENEAUX, LOUIS DAVEREDE, JR.,
VIVES LEMMON AND JULES MENESSES, ET AL.
VERSUS
AMSTAR CORP., AMSTAR SUGAR CORP.,
TATE AND LYLE NORTH AMERICAN SUGARS, INC.,
AND DOMINO SUGAR COMPANY, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ST. BERNARD
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I agree with the majority opinion in this case. I write separately to point out,
as an initial matter, that as we remarked in Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058
(La. 1992), long latency occupational disease cases are “unique,” because a distinct
body of jurisprudence has been developed which applies solely to them. Id. at
1065-66. As a result, I note that the holding of this case should not, as a matter of
course, be extended beyond this body of case law.
Additionally, I believe the majority opinion adoption of the pro rata
allocation method is mandated here for the several reasons. First, the policy
language, in conjunction with the nature of long latency exposure, supports this
result, because the policy limits coverage for “bodily injury” to that which occurs
“during the policy period.” Second, for the reasons explained by the majority, the
parties’ reasonable expectations are not violated by the application of the pro rata
method. Because only injuries “during the policy period” are covered, injuries that
occur outside of that period are, by their very nature, not covered. Third, and
relatedly, policy considerations favor the adoption of pro rata allocation in this
case, particularly insofar as holding otherwise would permit American Sugar to
obtain defense coverage for a period it did not even pay a premium for insurance.