People v. Taylor CA1/4 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 9/1/16 P. v. Taylor CA1/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    A146259
    v.
    WILLIAM A. TAYLOR,                                                   (San Francisco City & County
    Super. Ct. Nos. 223904 & 224379)
    Defendant and Respondent.
    I.
    INTRODUCTION
    In this government appeal, the prosecution argues that the superior court erred in
    granting a Penal Code section 995 motion1 to set aside three counts of the information
    charging respondent William Taylor with commercial burglary. The superior court
    granted the motion based upon its conclusion the magistrate improperly took judicial
    notice of William Taylor’s birth date, race, and gender from the court’s computer
    information database which was not shown to be accurate or reliable. We conclude the
    magistrate properly took judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452 and
    452.5, and we reverse.
    1
    All subsequent references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise identified.
    1
    II.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Taylor allegedly committed two burglaries within six days of each other in March
    2015. The first burglary, which is the subject of this appeal, occurred on March 17,
    2015.2 A suspect, alleged to be Taylor, entered the Wilkes Bashford store on Sutter
    Street in San Francisco by using a metal pipe to shatter a glass panel on the main entrance
    door. The police reviewed surveillance footage that showed the suspect using a mirror to
    smash a jewelry display case inside the store. The suspect took more than $100,000
    worth of jewelry. A responding officer noticed in the surveillance footage that the
    suspect was not wearing gloves; the officer also observed possible latent fingerprints on
    the display case.
    At the preliminary hearing, one of the police crime scene investigation unit (CSI)
    officers, Rosalyn Rouede, explained that she had lifted two fingerprints and two palm
    prints from the display case. There was no match for the fingerprints and one palm print,
    but the final palm print was a match to Taylor. A second CSI officer, Lyn O’Connor,
    conducted the analysis of the palm print from the burglary scene (exhibit four) to a
    “known print” for William Taylor with a birth date of May 14, 1977 (exhibit five).
    Sergeant O’Connor determined that the prints matched. Taylor’s counsel objected that
    there was no foundation for the date of birth. O’Connor testified that Officer Rouede
    provided her with a name, date of birth, and RAP sheet number when she asked her to do
    the comparison. Sergeant O’Connor then identified the latent print envelope that
    contained the case number and the name William Taylor (exhibit four).
    The prosecutor asked defense counsel to stipulate that the known prints (exhibit
    five) belonged to Taylor, and counsel declined. The prosecutor moved to admit them as a
    business record under Evidence Code section 1271. To lay a foundation, the prosecutor
    2
    The second burglary, which is not at issue in this appeal, occurred on March 23,
    2015. Taylor allegedly used a metal pipe to unlawfully enter the bicycle garage of a
    commercial building on Brannan Street in San Francisco. He attempted to steal a bicycle
    and was apprehended by the police.
    2
    asked Sergeant O’Connor if exhibit five was the type of document produced in the
    regular course of business in the CSI lab, and O’Connor answered “yes.” Exhibit five
    was the known palm print of William Taylor printed from a certified printer in the CSI
    unit. The magistrate accepted the exhibit as a business record.
    The prosecutor requested the magistrate take judicial notice of the docket in this
    case as to Taylor’s name, date of birth, and RAP sheet number. The magistrate
    recognized its authority to take judicial notice, but stated it only had a “reconstructed
    file” that did not include the information. The magistrate stated: “I can only take judicial
    notice of what I see with my eyes, with those senses, and I don’t have the date of birth
    before me. There might be some other document or court record that would accomplish
    the purpose. What do you want me to take judicial notice of?” The magistrate then
    asked the court clerk to access the court computer information database for the case
    number for the preliminary hearing. The magistrate asked the clerk if the date of birth
    was included in the court information and the clerk answered affirmatively, stating the
    date was May 14, 1977. The magistrate then asked if the race and gender were indicated,
    and the clerk responded that it was listed as a white male.
    Defense counsel objected for lack of foundation because there was no indication
    of the reliability of the court records. The magistrate overruled the objection because it
    could “properly take judicial notice of the information without calling as a separate
    witness [, a] court information custodian or keeper of those records. The Court uses this
    information every single day and I am satisfied for the purpose of this preliminary
    hearing that it is proper to take judicial notice.” The magistrate found that based on the
    court information with the date of birth, gender and race, that “the Defendant here who
    has always proceeded under this court number with that name is the person who provided
    Exhibit 5, which is in evidence, with the same name, same race, same gender, and same
    date of birth.” The magistrate found that there was probable cause for the charges.
    Initially, Taylor was charged separately with the two burglaries, but after the
    preliminary hearing, the prosecution made a motion to consolidate the Wilkes Bashford
    burglary with the second burglary of the Brannan Street garage. The court granted the
    3
    motion and the prosecution filed a consolidated information. The consolidated
    information charged the Brannan Street offenses in the first two counts: second degree
    commercial burglary in violation of section 459 (count one) and possession of burglary
    tools in violation of section 466 (count two). It charged the Wilkes Bashford offenses in
    counts three, four, and five: second degree commercial burglary in violation of section
    459 (count three), grand theft in violation of section 487, subdivision (a), with an
    enhancement for theft exceeding $100,000 (count four), and possession of burglary tools
    in violation of section 466 (count five).
    Section 995 Motion and Hearing
    Taylor filed a motion pursuant to section 995 (995 motion) to set aside counts
    three, four, and five of the information for lack of probable cause, and the superior court
    held a hearing on the motion. Taylor argued the magistrate improperly took judicial
    notice of “a vaguely-identified database” to provide Taylor’s date of birth, race, and
    gender, and such “a procedurally loose method of identification should not establish
    probable cause.” Taylor contended the unidentified computer database was not a reliable
    source. Further, the court clerk was not established as a public employee performing an
    official duty.
    The prosecutor argued that looking at a computer screen is functionally the same
    as looking at a printed docket. A court can take judicial notice of its own docket in the
    case before it.
    The court stated that the magistrate could take judicial notice of its own record
    under Evidence Code section 452, but the issue here was “the reliability and the
    truthfulness of the input and access of that information in the court system. And there is
    nothing in the record to reflect that there is accuracy in the manner in which it was put
    together, the way it was inputted, the way it was accessed or which database was
    accessed, than just saying it was the court computer.” The prosecutor argued that the
    clerk could have printed out the minutes and handed them to the judge and under
    Evidence Code section 664, it would have been presumed correct. The court responded:
    “But ‘could have.’ Could have, would have, should have, the oldest saying. And it falls
    4
    short in this case.” The court granted the 995 motion as to counts three through five of
    the consolidated information.
    III.
    DISCUSSION
    “ ‘[I]n proceedings under section 995 it is the magistrate who is the finder of fact;
    the superior court . . . sits merely as a reviewing court; it must draw every legitimate
    inference in favor of the information, and cannot substitute its judgment as to the
    credibility or weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. [Citation.] On review by
    appeal or writ, moreover, the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior
    court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate holding the defendant to
    answer. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Lujan) (1999) 
    73 Cal.App.4th 1123
    , 1127, quoting People v. Laiwa (1983) 
    34 Cal.3d 711
    , 718.)
    The magistrate found there was probable cause and the prosecution had
    established that the William Taylor charged in the information, the William Taylor in
    court at the preliminary hearing, and the William Taylor who provided the palm print
    used to match him to the Wilkes-Bashford burglary were all the same person. Taylor was
    present in court and had appeared before this magistrate in the same courtroom in the
    same case on seven prior occasions. To confirm Taylor’s identity, the court sought to use
    the official court records to establish his birth date, race, and gender.
    Neither party disputes that the court could properly take judicial notice of this
    information. Rather, the disagreement is about whether the information provided from
    the court computer was accurate and reliable. Respondent argues while it is proper for a
    court to take judicial notice of official court documents, the magistrate could not rely
    “upon hearsay information contained on an unidentified computer database.” The trial
    court similarly agreed that the magistrate could take judicial notice of a printout of the
    court’s minutes or docket, yet found there was nothing in the record to support the
    reliability or accuracy of the record on the court computer. Respondent asks us to
    conclude there is a difference of legal significance between a court clerk reading
    information from the court’s official records in open court to the magistrate and a court
    5
    clerk hitting the print function and printing out that same information and handing the
    printout to the magistrate. Whether the information is contained on the computer screen
    or in a printout, the accuracy and reliability of the court’s computer system is the same.
    The information does not become more reliable simply because it is printed on paper or
    contained in a paper file.
    Evidence Code section 452 provides that a court may take judicial notice of the
    records of “any court of this state” or “any court of record of the United States or of any
    state of the United States.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) The court can take judicial
    notice of its own records in a pending case. (People v. Cavanna (1989) 
    214 Cal.App.3d 1054
    , 1058; City and County of San Francisco v. Carraro (1963) 
    220 Cal.App.2d 509
    ,
    527 [“A court may judicially notice its own records and proceedings in the same case.”].)
    The judicial notice of official court records includes computer-generated records.
    (People v. Duran (2002) 
    97 Cal.App.4th 1448
    , 1460 (Duran); Evid. Code, §§ 452,
    subd. (d), 452.5.) A court can take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452
    of the online dockets for a defendant’s cases in other counties because they are the
    official acts and records of the courts of the state. (People v. Mendoza (2015) 
    241 Cal.App.4th 764
    , 773, fn. 1.) We note appellate courts also routinely take judicial notice
    of superior court’s online dockets. (See Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 
    156 Cal.App.4th 865
    ,
    872, fn. 3.)
    Both respondent and the superior court voiced concerns that the magistrate was
    relying on the content of information from the court computer system which came from
    an “unidentified database” not known to be accurate. The source of the information,
    however, was clearly identified as the court’s file for the case before it. The magistrate
    stated: “I am going to ask my staff to access the court computer information database for
    the case number for this preliminary hearing 15007086. I am looking at Exhibit 5 which
    is already in evidence and it has a name, a race, a sex, a date of birth. No photograph is
    attached.” The magistrate then stated: “In the court’s database, Mr. Thompson[,] court
    clerk for this case, is a date of birth included in the Court information?” The court clerk
    responded “Yes it is, Your Honor,” and the magistrate stated: “Date of birth please.” The
    6
    clerk responded: “Date of birth listed on the computer is 05/14/77.” At the request of the
    court, the clerk provided the gender and race as “white male.” The magistrate then took
    judicial notice of the court information database as part of the court record.
    “It is settled that a court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own
    records. [Citations.]” (Dwan v. Dixon (1963) 
    216 Cal.App.2d 260
    , 265, italics added.)
    A “ ‘court may properly take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents
    such as orders, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgments.’ ” (Sosinsky v. Grant
    (1992) 
    6 Cal.App.4th 1548
    , 1565, quoting Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp
    (1980) 
    114 Cal.App.3d 39
    , 46.) The magistrate could properly rely upon the court
    records to provide Taylor’s date of birth, race, and gender. (See McBride v. Boughton
    (2004) 
    123 Cal.App.4th 379
    , 383 [court could take judicial notice of a child’s date of
    birth in a prior paternity pleading where the date of birth was not contained in the current
    complaint].)
    Not surprisingly, the parties cite no cases addressing precisely the situation that
    arose here, but if courts can take judicial notice of computer-generated records and online
    docket information, there is no evidentiary impediment preventing a court clerk from
    orally providing this information to the magistrate in open court. Recording and
    reporting information from the court information system is one of the duties of a court
    clerk. (Duran, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1461-1462, fn. 5 [keeping minutes and
    preparing orders are “within the scope of a public employee’s duty”].) “It is presumed
    that official duty has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, § 664.) This presumption
    applies to the duties of clerks of court. (Fergus v. Songer (2007) 
    150 Cal.App.4th 552
    ,
    565.)
    Further, the court’s computer system confirmed information that was already
    known to the magistrate. William Taylor had appeared in this matter before the
    magistrate on at least seven prior occasions. (See Duran, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1464 [minute order reflected information already known to the witness who had seen
    the defendant and reviewed his RAP sheet].) This familiarity bolsters the presumptive
    correctness of the information’s accuracy.
    7
    Finally, any argument that the court’s computer system is unreliable applies
    equally to viewing an electronic record as viewing a paper printout of the court’s docket
    or minute orders. (See People v. Martinez (2000) 
    22 Cal.4th 106
    ,131-134 [rejecting
    argument that uncertified computer printouts of a defendant’s criminal history lacked
    indicia of reliability].) Taylor has failed to present any evidence that the court computer
    information database is unreliable. As the magistrate explained, it used the information
    “every single day.” In order for our system of justice to function, we must presume that
    court records are properly and accurately maintained. (People v. Delgado (2008) 
    43 Cal.4th 1059
    , 1070-1071.) And further, as outlined above, we presume judicial officers
    and court clerks properly perform their duties. (Ibid.)
    The magistrate, therefore, could take judicial notice of information in the court’s
    computer information database provided by the court clerk.
    IV.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment of the superior court is reversed.
    8
    _________________________
    RUVOLO, P. J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    REARDON, J.
    _________________________
    RIVERA, J.
    A146259, People v. Taylor
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A146259

Filed Date: 9/1/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/1/2016