in Re Enterprise Beaumont Marine West, LP F/K/A Oiltanking Beaumont Partners, LP and Enterprise Beaumont Marine West GP, LLC F/K/A Oiltanking Beaumont GP, LLC ( 2016 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
NO. 09-16-00032-CV
_________________
IN RE ENTERPRISE BEAUMONT MARINE WEST, LP F/K/A
OILTANKING BEAUMONT PARTNERS, LP AND ENTERPRISE
BEAUMONT MARINE WEST GP, LLC F/K/A OILTANKING
BEAUMONT GP, LLC
________________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding
172nd District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. E-194,114
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus proceeding, Relators, Enterprise Beaumont Marine West,
LP f/k/a Oiltanking Beaumont Partners, LP and Enterprise Beaumont Marine West
GP, LLC f/k/a Oiltanking Beaumont GP, LLC, contend the judge of the 172nd
District Court of Jefferson County abused its discretion by striking their
responsible-third-party designation of AmSpec Services, LLC, the former
1
employer of the plaintiff and Real Party in Interest, Michael Stelly. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004 (West 2015).
Stelly worked for AmSpec as an inspector on Oiltanking’s premises. In
August 2012, Stelly injured his right shoulder while gauging samples of a shore
tank. Stelly’s personal physician signed his return to work excuse with the
notation, “Light duty, no climbing[.]” Approximately six weeks later, Stelly
allegedly injured his back and shoulder while traversing a platform that Oiltanking
used as a gangway to connect a barge to the dock. Relators argued to the trial court
that Stelly’s alleged shoulder injury was not caused by the fall. Further, Relators
argued that AmSpec knew Stelly was on medical restrictions and breached its duty
to Stelly by allowing him to work as an inspector on a barge after Stelly’s doctor
restricted him to light duty with no climbing.
Section 33.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that
“[a]fter an adequate time for discovery, a party may move to strike the designation
of a responsible third party on the ground that there is no evidence that the
designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant’s alleged injury or
damage.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(l). Once a motion to strike
is filed, the trial court “shall grant” the motion “unless a defendant produces
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated
2
person’s responsibility for the claimant’s injury or damage.” Id. Under this
standard, a defendant has the burden to produce sufficient evidence—that is, more
than a scintilla of evidence—for a reasonable jury to hold the third party
responsible for at least a portion of the plaintiff’s injury or damage. See In re
Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., No. 12-13-00364-CV, 2014 WL 1922724,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 14, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Relators argue sufficient evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
AmSpec’s responsibility for Stelly’s fall because there is evidence to show that if
AmSpec had assigned Stelly to light duty or restricted him from working as a
petroleum inspector on the date of the accident, Stelly would not have been present
at Oiltanking’s terminal, would not have been on the gangway, and would not have
slipped and fallen in the course of his assignment. Stelly argues that Relators
offered no evidence that allowing Stelly to work was a proximate cause of his
accident, and that the evidence produced by Relators in support of their designation
does no more than furnish a condition that made the injury possible. See IHS
Cedars Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex.
2004).
Having reviewed the petition and the response, including the evidence
presented to the trial court, we conclude that Relators have failed to demonstrate
3
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking the responsible third
party designation. We deny the mandamus petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on March 9, 2016
Opinion Delivered April 14, 2016
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
4