State of Louisiana v. Randy Lee Turner ( 2019 )

Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #021
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 8th day of May, 2019, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2018-K-0780 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RANDY LEE TURNER (Parish of Terrebonne)
We granted the State’s application to resolve this disagreement
as to whether the crime of aggravated flight from an officer
requires proof that a defendant committed two different acts from
among those enumerated in La.R.S. 14:108.1(D), or whether proof
of the repeated commission of one of those enumerated acts
suffices. We find no real uncertainty in the meaning of “at least
two of the following acts” in La.R.S. 14:108.1(D). Instead, we
find that this language in its context plainly encompasses the
commission of one of the acts enumerated in that provision more
than once. Therefore, the district court did not err in
instructing the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal
and reinstate defendant’s conviction and sentence. REVERSED
Retired Judge Marion Edwards appointed Justice ad hoc, sitting
for Justice Weimer, recused.
JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
05/08/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-K-0780
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
RANDY LEE TURNER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
PER CURIAM *
Defendant was found guilty as charged of aggravated flight from an officer,
La. R.S. 14:108.1. He was adjudicated a habitual offender based on the
commission of seven predicate felonies and sentenced to 40 years imprisonment at
hard labor. The court of appeal reversed the conviction and sentence. State v.
Turner, 17-1648 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/11/18) (unpub’d). A majority of the panel
found the district court erred in instructing the jury, and in allowing the State to
argue, that the jury could find human life was endangered if the defendant
committed one of the acts enumerated in La. R.S. 14:108.1(D) more than once. See
Turner, 17-1648, p. 12 (“[U]nder the principle of lenity, we must interpret
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:108.1(D) in the manner favorable to the defendant.
Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in granting the State’s motion and
in instructing the jury that it was sufficient to have a repeated enumerated act.”).
Judge Theriot, dissenting, disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the
statute:
*
Retired Judge Marion Edwards appointed as Justice ad hoc, sitting for Weimer, J., recused
Allowing a defendant to commit any of the enumerated acts more than
once without being deemed to have endangered human life would not
serve the purpose of La. R.S. 108.1. The statute lists six acts; the
violation of two of these acts would constitute circumstances wherein
human life is endangered. La. R.S. 108.1(D)(1) considers an offender
leaving the roadway or forcing another vehicle to leave the roadway.
The legislature used the singular form of “vehicle” rather than its
plural. Thus, it appears that forcing one vehicle from the roadway
constitutes one “act” under the statute, and forcing a second vehicle
off the roadway would constitute an additional “act.” Similarly,
failing to obey a single stop sign or yield sign constitutes one “act,”
but an offender who fails to obey multiple stop signs has committed
multiple “acts” under the statute.
Turner, 17-1648, p. 2 (Theriot, J., dissenting). We granted the State’s application
to resolve this disagreement as to whether the crime of aggravated flight from an
officer requires proof that a defendant committed two different acts from among
those enumerated in La.R.S. 14:108.1(D), or whether proof of the repeated
commission of one of those enumerated acts suffices.
The question presented is one of statutory interpretation, which begins “as
[it] must, with the language of the statute.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137,
143, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). “Unequivocal provisions are not
subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving words their
generally understood meaning.” State v. Oliphant, 12-1176, p. 5 (La. 3/19/13), 113
So. 3d 165, 168; see also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54,
112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (“In any event, canons of
construction are no more than rules of thumb to help courts determine the meaning
of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one,
cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted)).
Aggravated flight from an officer is defined as follows:
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Aggravated flight from an officer is the intentional refusal of a driver
to bring a vehicle to a stop or of an operator to bring a watercraft to a
stop, under circumstances wherein human life is endangered, knowing
that he has been given a visual and audible signal to stop by a police
officer when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the
driver or operator has committed an offense. The signal shall be given
by an emergency light and a siren on a vehicle marked as a police
vehicle or marked police watercraft.
La. R.S. 14:108.1(C). In addition, the statute defines circumstances wherein human
life is endangered as follows:
Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be any
situation where the operator of the fleeing vehicle or watercraft
commits at least two of the following acts:
(1) Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave the
roadway.
(2) Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.
(3) Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per
hour.
(4) Travels against the flow of traffic or in the case of watercraft,
operates the watercraft in a careless manner in violation of R.S.
34:851.4 or in a reckless manner in violation of R.S. 14:99.
(5) Fails to obey a stop sign or a yield sign.
(6) Fails to obey a traffic control signal device.
La. R.S. 14:108.1(D). This court has described Section D as providing “a specific
and seemingly exclusive definition of the aggravating factors which elevate the
crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. State v. Williams, 07-0931 (La. 2/26/08)
(per curiam), 978 So. 2d 895.
The principle of lenity “directs that a court construe a criminal statute in
favor of the most narrow application when there are serious doubts concerning a
meaning of a term.” State v. Ritchie, 590 So. 2d 1139, 1149 n.6 (La. 1991); State v.
Boowell, 406 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. 1981). Defendant here invokes lenity to argue
that any doubt as to whether the statute requires commission of two different types
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of acts, or the repeated commission of a single act, should be resolved in his favor.
However, the mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction does not by
itself make the rule of lenity applicable. Instead, that venerable rule is reserved for
cases where, “[a]fter ‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived,’” the
court is “left with an ambiguous statute.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347,
92 S. Ct. 515, 522, 30 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1971) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 2
Cranch 358, 386, 2 L. Ed. 304 (1805)).
“The general rule that ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity applies when the court is uncertain about the
statute’s meaning and is ‘not to be used in complete disregard of the purpose of the
legislature.’” State v. Brown, 03-2788, pp. 5–6 (La.7/6/04), 879 So. 2d 1270, 1280
(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 n.13, 100 S. Ct. 311, 317, 62
L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979)). A court should not “blindly incant the rule of lenity to
‘destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to and did
enact.’” Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 832, 94 S. Ct. 1262, 1272, 39
L. Ed. 2d 782 (1974) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S.
284, 293, 28 S. Ct. 72, 52 L. Ed. 208 (1907)). In the present case, although
defendant has articulated a narrower construction, we find that the statute is
unambiguous, and therefore the rule of lenity does not apply.
Defendant argues that “at least two of the following,” as it is commonly
used, denotes two different acts. In the context of the statute here, however, in
which the legislature provides aggravating acts that, when committed more than
once, can elevate the grade of the offense, there is no reason to interpret “at least
two of the following” as including the performance of different acts while
excluding the repeated performance of the same act. A dangerous act repeated may
be no less dangerous than a variety of dangerous acts. Therefore, we will not
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blindly incant the rule of lenity to unreasonably constrain the force of the law that
the legislature enacted.
We find no real uncertainty in the meaning of “at least two of the following
acts” in La.R.S. 14:108.1(D). Instead, we find that this language in its context
plainly encompasses the commission of one of the acts enumerated in that
provision more than once. Therefore, the district court did not err in instructing the
jury. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate defendant’s
conviction and sentence.
REVERSED
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05/08/19
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2018-K-0780
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
RANDY LEE TURNER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,
FIRST CIRCUIT, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
JOHNSON, Chief Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated flight from an officer, which is
defined as “the intentional refusal of a driver to bring a vehicle to a stop ... under
circumstances wherein human life is endangered, knowing that he has been given
a visual and audible signal to stop by a police officer[.]” La. R.S. 14:108.1(C)
(emphasis added). Subsection D of the statute defines circumstances wherein
human life is endangered by outlining an exclusive list of acts committed by the
driver, two of which are required to find human life is endangered:
Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be any situation
where the operator of the fleeing vehicle or watercraft commits at least
two of the following acts:
(1) Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave the roadway.
(2) Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.
(3) Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per
hour.
(4) Travels against the flow of traffic[.]
(5) Fails to obey a stop sign or a yield sign.
(6) Fails to obey a traffic control signal device.
La. R.S. 14:108.1(D). In this case, it is undisputed that defendant did not commit
separate enumerated acts. Instead, defendant was convicted because the state
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argued, and the district court instructed the jury, that it was sufficient if defendant
committed one of the enumerated acts twice. I agree with the court of appeal that the
district court erred in this regard and therefore defendant’s conviction was properly
reversed.
Louisiana criminal statutes must be “given a genuine construction, according
to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the
context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.” La. R.S. 14:3; State v.
Muschkat, 96-2922 (La. 3/4/98), 706 So. 2d 429, 432. In my view, a natural reading
of the statute suggests that the language “at least two of the following acts” means
two of the separate, enumerated acts within subsection D must to be committed.
Although this court has not previously addressed this issue directly, our opinion in
State v. Williams, 07-0931 (La. 2/26/08), 978 So. 2d 895, supports the position that
two separate enumerated acts are required. In Williams, the defendant was charged
in the 24th Judicial District Court with aggravated flight from an officer, and charged
in the Second Parish Court, Jefferson Parish, with a variety of traffic offenses arising
from the same incident. Defendant filed a Motion to Quash the pending prosecution
for aggravated flight asserting a double jeopardy argument on the grounds that he
would be subjected to trial for the same conduct for which he had been previously
convicted in the Second Parish Court. The district court denied the motion, and
defendant entered a plea of guilty while reserving his right to appeal the adverse
ruling. On review, the court of appeal conceded that the police report supported a
finding that the defendant had forced several vehicles off the road, but found that the
state could not satisfy the statute’s requirement of “at least” two aggravating acts
without violating double jeopardy protections, as defendant had already been
convicted for the underlying conduct of speeding. State v. Williams, 06-1898 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 2/27/07)(unpub’d). This court reinstated defendant’s conviction and
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sentence, observing that the police report contained information indicating that the
defendant had backed away from officers and nearly collided with a patrol unit,
thereby traveling against the flow of traffic in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1(D)(4),
and forced other vehicles off the road in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1(D)(1). State
v. Williams, 07-0931 (La. 2/26/08), 978 So. 2d 895. By finding that the police report
contained information supporting the violation of two separate acts (namely
traveling against the flow of traffic and forcing other vehicles off the roadway) as
opposed to addressing it in the context of forcing multiple vehicles off the roadway
(i.e. “at least two”), this court’s opinion in Williams supports a finding that two
separate enumerated acts are required.
Moreover, contrary to the majority, I find the principle of lenity should apply
here. The principle of lenity “directs that a court construe a criminal statute in favor
of the most narrow application when there are serious doubts concerning a meaning
of a term.” State v. Ritchie, 590 So. 2d 1139, 1149 n.6 (La. 1991); State v. Boowell,
406 So. 2d 213, 216 (La. 1981). Indeed, criminal statutes are strictly and narrowly
construed with any ambiguity resolved in favor of the accused. State v. Carr, 99-
2209 (La. 5/26/00), 761 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (citing State v. Becnel, 93-2536 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 959, 960); State v. Piazza, 596 So. 2d 817, 820 (La. 1992).
Thus, even if the meaning of the language in La. R.S. 14:108.1(D) is deemed unclear
or ambiguous, this court should apply a narrow application in favor of the defendant.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
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