State v. Sitko , 2021 Ohio 788 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Sitko, 
    2021-Ohio-788
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :        OPINION
    Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
    CASE NO. 2020-T-0016
    - vs -                                   :
    RODNEY J. SITKO,                                  :
    Defendant-Appellant.           :
    Criminal Appeal from the Newton Falls Municipal Court, Case No. 2020 TRC 00681.
    Judgment: Affirmed.
    A. Joseph Fritz, Newton Falls Law Director, 19 North Canal Street, Newton Falls, OH
    44444 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    Stephen A. Turner, Turner, May & Shepherd, 185 High Street, N.E., Warren, OH 44481
    (For Defendant-Appellant).
    MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.
    {¶1}       Appellant, Rodney J. Sitko (“Mr. Sitko”), appeals from his conviction for
    operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), his third OVI conviction
    within 10 years.
    {¶2}       Mr. Sitko raises two assignments of error, contending that the trial court
    erred in overruling his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation, and the evidence was
    insufficient to sustain a verdict that he was operating a vehicle under the influence.
    {¶3}   After a review of the record and relevant case law, we find Mr. Sitko’s
    assignments of error without merit. After counting the days of delay chargeable to either
    side, Mr. Sitko was brought to trial within 90 days as required by R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) for
    a misdemeanor charge. Time was tolled for mutually agreed pretrial conferences that
    were held in an attempt to settle the case before trial.
    {¶4}   There was also sufficient evidence that Mr. Sitko was “under the influence”
    on the night of the incident by way of the deputies’ testimonies at trial. The deputies found
    Mr. Sitko slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle, sleeping, with an open beer
    bottle in his right hand, his car in drive, and the brakes applied in the middle of a roadway.
    The deputies observed several signs that indicated Mr. Sitko was under the influence
    prior to Mr. Sitko’s arrest in addition to his refusal to submit to field sobriety tests and/or
    a breath sample. Whether there was evidence at trial that Mr. Sitko was later diagnosed
    with sleep apnea, and potentially had a medical issue on the night of the incident, goes
    to the manifest weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
    {¶5}   The judgment of the Newton Falls Municipal Court is affirmed.
    Substantive and Procedural History
    {¶6}   Mr. Sitko’s conviction stems from an incident that occurred on July 19, 2019,
    in which two deputies from the Trumbull County Sheriff’s Office, Deputy Stephanie
    Slusher (“Dep. Slusher”) and Deputy Eric Hermsdorfer (“Dep. Hermsdorfer”), were
    dispatched to a disabled vehicle, which was parked in the middle of the roadway on State
    Route 45 in Bloomfield Township. The deputies found the car with its brake lights on and
    shifted in drive and the driver, Mr. Sitko, slumped over the wheel, sleeping, with an open
    beer bottle in his right hand.
    2
    Case History
    {¶7}   Mr. Sitko was arrested and subsequently charged with OVI, a fourth-degree
    felony, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(B), and in a companion case, OVI, a fourth-
    degree felony, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(A).
    {¶8}   Mr. Sitko was arraigned in the Newton Falls Municipal Court, where the
    court scheduled a preliminary hearing for July 30, 2019, and set bond at a $10,000 surety,
    with conditions, including electronically monitored house arrest (“EMHA”), suspended
    motor vehicle privileges, and an alcohol monitor. At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Sitko
    waived the hearing, and his case was bound over to the Trumbull County Grand Jury.
    His bond was modified to a $5,000 surety.
    {¶9}   On October 2, 2019, the Trumbull County Grand Jury handed down an
    indictment for two OVI charges, both first-degree misdemeanors, in violation of R.C.
    4511.19(A)(1)(a) & (G)(1)(a)(ii) and R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(b) & (G)(1)(a)(ii). Accordingly,
    the case was remanded to the Newton Falls Municipal Court on October 7, 2019.
    {¶10} Mr. Sitko pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on October 10, 2019. The
    court transferred his bond, with no change in conditions, and set the matter for a pretrial
    conference on October 15. Two more pretrial conferences were held on November 7,
    2019, and January 14, 2020. After a proposed Rule 11 plea agreement was rejected by
    the court on January 14, 2020, trial was scheduled for February 19.
    {¶11} On February 18, 2020, the state filed a motion to dismiss both pending
    misdemeanor charges in order to file a new complaint charging Mr. Sitko with one count
    of OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19, which was an unclassified misdemeanor inasmuch
    as this was his third OVI within ten years. He had been erroneously charged with first-
    3
    degree misdemeanors, which is the proper designation for a first or second OVI offense
    in ten years.
    {¶12} Mr. Sitko filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation on February 28,
    2020.
    {¶13} After holding a hearing, the court denied the motion on March 4, 2020, and,
    on the following day, set trial for March 10, 2020.
    The Court’s Judgment Entry
    {¶14} The court issued a detailed judgment entry on March 9 denying Mr. Sitko’s
    motion to dismiss, finding Mr. Sitko was brought to trial within the speedy trial time of 90
    days for an unclassified misdemeanor. The court reviewed the procedural history of the
    case, noting that at the first pretrial on October 15, defense counsel delivered the file to
    the bailiff/court scheduler and requested that the matter be set for a second pretrial.
    Defense counsel made the same request after the second pretrial on November 7. The
    trial court specifically found that “[e]ach of those pretrials were set at the request of
    defense counsel, and/ or at a mutual request of defense counsel and the prosecutor.”
    {¶15} On January 14, 2020, the attorneys again met in conference and a Rule 11
    plea agreement was proposed; however, the court declined the proposal with regard to
    the sentencing recommendation.         Mr. Sitko rejected any further modification of the
    sentence and, for the first time, asked for the matter to be set for trial.
    {¶16} An oral hearing on Mr. Sitko’s motion to dismiss was held on March 3, 2020.
    (No transcript or agreed upon statement pursuant to App.R. 9 has been filed on appeal.)
    Per the court’s findings, both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed at the hearing
    that the pretrial conferences were attempts to get the matter resolved short of trial and
    4
    that they were not at the request of the court or delays by the prosecution. Mr. Sitko did
    not seek to set a trial date until the Rule 11 plea agreement proposed sentencing
    recommendation was rejected on January 14. Defense counsel argued that the mutual
    requests for pretrials were not formal written motions; thus, they did not toll the speedy
    trial date. The court noted that it was unaware of any caselaw that required the motions
    to be in writing.
    {¶17} The court found that if the speedy trial date was not tolled, then it expired
    on January 8, 2020, prior to the Rule 11 proposal. If tolled, the request for a pretrial
    conference on November 7, 2019, tolled the statute 23 days, and the request for the
    January 14, 2020, conference tolled the statute 68 days, making the speedy trial date
    April 8, 2020.
    {¶18} The court concluded that under these facts, there was no constitutional
    violation of Mr. Sitko’s rights to a speedy trial since the delay was not “uncommonly long”;
    he was as much to “blame” for the delay; he never asserted his right to a speedy trial until
    after the Rule 11 plea agreement was rejected; and there is no evidence that he suffered
    any prejudice as a result and/or that he has been languishing in jail. He was not in jail
    while the misdemeanor case was pending. Further, while Mr. Sitko did not file formal,
    written “motions,” there was “action made or instituted by the accused” pursuant to R.C.
    2945.72(E).
    {¶19} Thus, the court denied Mr. Sitko’s motion to dismiss, finding that he was
    using the speedy trial guarantee as a “sword” rather than a “shield,” and “to require
    dismissal for failing to reduce the request to written motions under the circumstances here
    is more form over substance.”
    5
    The Trial
    {¶20} A one-day bench trial was held in which the state presented the evidence
    and testimony of the two deputies from the Trumbull County Sheriff’s Office who
    responded to the incident, Dep. Slusher and Dep. Hermsdorfer.
    {¶21} Dep. Slusher testified that she and Dep. Hermsdorfer were dispatched to
    the scene for a disabled vehicle parked in the middle of the roadway on State Route 45
    in Bloomfield Township, Trumbull County. As they approached the vehicle, she could
    see that the brake lights were on and the windows were foggy. Dep. Slusher went to the
    passenger side and Dep. Hermsdorfer approached the driver’s side. They observed the
    driver slumped over the steering wheel, sleeping, with a glass beer bottle in his right hand
    and the car in drive. Dep. Hermsdorfer knocked on the window several times to get the
    attention of the driver. “Once the driver kind of came to, he looked up, kind of peered
    around, like, trying to see where he was at.”
    {¶22} The driver attempted to drive away, but stopped after several feet. The
    deputies each opened a front door and were overwhelmed by the smell of alcohol. Dep.
    Slusher reached in from the passenger side and placed the vehicle in park. She was then
    able to turn the car off and take the keys out of the ignition. Dep. Hermsdorfer asked the
    driver if he had a medical issue, but the driver failed to respond – he was “awake and
    looking, but there was no verbal response.”
    {¶23} Mr. Sitko exited the vehicle at Dep. Hermsdorfer’s instruction and walked
    with the deputy’s assistance because “he had no balance.” Mr. Sitko refused to answer
    Dep. Hermsdorfer’s questions and was placed under arrest for suspicion of OVI. When
    Dep. Slusher removed the beer bottle from the vehicle, she noticed it was still cold and
    6
    “partially full.” She reiterated on cross examination that she heard Dep. Hermsdorfer ask
    Mr. Sitko multiple times whether he was having a medical issue.
    {¶24} Dep. Hermsdorfer testified that upon waking, Mr. Sitko showed signs of
    being confused and was “not able to follow any of the simple verbal commands” to put
    his vehicle in park and turn it off. He noticed that Mr. Sitko’s eyes were bloodshot and
    glossy and that upon asking him to exit the vehicle, he was “slow-moving” and off balance.
    Dep. Hermsdorfer could smell alcohol “on or about” Mr. Sitko’s person while he was
    speaking to him.
    {¶25} Mr. Sitko refused to answer any of Dep. Hermsdorfer’s questions; he just
    “looked forward, and he had what had appeared to be, like, the thousand-mile stare.” Mr.
    Sitko refused to speak and/or comply with field sobriety tests. The deputies discovered
    this was Mr. Sitko’s sixth OVI within 20 years. While Dep. Slusher was walking Mr. Sitko
    to Dep. Hermsdorfer’s police vehicle, he observed that “she had to help him walk, more
    so to prevent him from falling down.”
    {¶26} Dep. Hermsdorfer was unable to obtain a warrant for a blood sample due
    to the early hour of the morning (3:00 am) and decided to transport Mr. Sitko to the
    Cortland Police Department for a breathalyzer test.
    {¶27} While placing Mr. Sitko in his police cruiser, Dep. Hermsdorfer continued to
    ask him if he needed medical assistance. Mr. Sitko responded by asking, “Is my dad
    okay?” Dep. Hermsdorfer was “confused on that statement,” and asked, “Well, where is
    your dad?” “He said, he’s in the front seat. So he was – appeared that he was starting
    to hallucinate, that he thought his father was in the front seat of the vehicle, when there
    were no other occupants inside of the vehicle. He then said that his, his lawyer wanted
    7
    to talk to him, when – in fact, wanted to talk to him on the phone when Mr. Sitko was not
    on the phone. So he was not acting normal.” On the way to the station, Mr. Sitko was
    “mumbling to himself.”
    {¶28} Dep. Slusher assisted Mr. Sitko into the station, and once there, he became
    verbally aggressive, interrupting the deputy as he was trying to read the BMV breathalyzer
    form and commenting “about taking this to the feds.” After multiple offers to take a
    breathalyzer test, Mr. Sitko “just kind of looked up, gave me a funny-looking grin,” and
    “further refused to submit to a breath test.” Dep. Hermsdorfer transported Mr. Sitko to the
    Trumbull County Jail.
    Sentencing
    {¶29} The trial court found Mr. Sitko guilty of OVI, in violation of R.C.
    4511.19(A)(1)(a), which was an unclassified misdemeanor since this was his third
    conviction within ten years. The court sentenced him to 365 days jail, with 275 days
    suspended and credit for 20 days served; a $1,500 fine; a six-year driver’s license
    suspension; and a three-year term of probation. The court also granted Mr. Sitko’s motion
    to stay for “30 days or until the appeal is filed and thereafter” and ordered him to remain
    on EMHA during the stay.
    {¶30} Mr. Sitko raises two assignments of error on appeal:
    {¶31} “[1.] The trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the charge for a violation
    of appellant’s statutory speedy-time rights.
    {¶32} “[2.] The state failed to produce evidence that was legally sufficient to
    sustain the verdict that appellant operated a vehicle while under the influence (OVI).”
    8
    Statutory Speedy Trial Violation
    {¶33} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Sitko contends the court erred in denying
    his motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation because the speedy-time period for the
    misdemeanor charges began when he was arrested on the original felony charge and the
    subsequent charges involved the same incident.
    {¶34} The right to a speedy trial is set forth in the Sixth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution and is obligatory on the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. State
    v. Broughton, 
    62 Ohio St.3d 253
    , 256 (1991). R.C. 2945.73(B) requires a person charged
    with an offense to be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the applicable speedy
    trial time, and discharge bars “any further criminal proceedings against him based on the
    same conduct.” R.C. 2945.73(D).
    {¶35} “The standard of review of a speedy-trial issue is to count the days of delay
    chargeable to either side and determine whether the case was tried within the time limits
    set by R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Kist, 
    173 Ohio App.3d 158
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4773
    , ¶ 17 (11th
    Dist.); see also State v. Pierson, 
    149 Ohio App.3d 318
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4515
    , ¶ 12 (11th Dist.).
    {¶36} “Speedy-trial issues present mixed questions of law and fact.” Kist at ¶ 18.
    When reviewing a defendant’s claim that he or she was denied the right to a speedy trial,
    we apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law and the clearly erroneous
    standard to questions of fact. State v. Evans, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0132, 2005-
    Ohio-1787, ¶ 32.
    {¶37} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), “a person against whom a charge of
    misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, is pending in a court of record, shall be
    brought to trial * * * [w]ithin ninety days after the person’s arrest or the service of
    9
    summons, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree, or other
    misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for more than sixty days.”
    {¶38} R.C. 2945.72 specifies the reasons for which a trial court may extend the
    limits of R.C. 2945.71. R.C. 2945.72 states, in relevant part:
    {¶39} “The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case
    of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:
    {¶40} “ * * *
    {¶41} “(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or
    abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused;
    {¶42} “ * * *
    {¶43} “(H) The period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion,
    and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s
    own motion[.]”
    {¶44} A defendant establishes a prima facie case for dismissal once he
    demonstrates that he was not brought to trial within the applicable statutory speedy trial
    time limit, and the burden then shifts to the state to prove that the defendant’s right has
    not been violated in light of applicable tolling periods. Kist at ¶ 22; State v. Smith, 11th
    Dist. Ashtabula No. 2000-A-0052, 
    2001 WL 901016
    , *5 (Aug. 10, 2001).
    {¶45} We begin by counting the days chargeable to either side for delay. Mr. Sitko
    argues that time began running from the date of his original arraignment, July 22, 2019.
    He was bound over to the Trumbull County Grand Jury, which returned an indictment on
    two misdemeanors on October 2, and the following day, remanded the case back to the
    10
    Newton Falls Municipal Court. Mr. Sitko was arraigned on October 10, 2019, which is the
    date the court began its counting.
    {¶46} When an original charge is later reduced to a lesser offense based upon the
    same conduct, the speedy trial limitations of R.C. 2945.71 begin to run anew on the date
    the defendant is served with the indictment on the lesser offense at the arraignment.
    State v. Clark, 11th Dist. No. 2007-L-139, 
    2008-Ohio-2760
    , ¶ 30. The additional number
    of days that the state receives to try the defendant for the lesser charge, however, cannot
    exceed the date of the speedy trial deadline of the original charge. 
    Id.
     Thus, the new
    speedy trial deadline must be “‘computed by comparing the deadlines for the original and
    reduced charges and using the earlier of the two deadlines.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting State v.
    Besimer, 4th Dist. Ross No. 95CA2110, 
    1996 WL 87461
    , *7 (Feb. 28, 1996).
    {¶47} We agree with the court below that time began running on the date he was
    arraigned on the misdemeanor indictment in the Newton Falls Municipal Court, i.e.,
    October 10, 2019, and that 90 days from October 10, 2019 (January 8) is the earlier of
    the two deadlines. Thus, if we began counting from the date of Mr. Sitko’s original felony
    charges, i.e., July 22, 2019, the speedy trial limit would be 270 days (April 17, 2020).
    {¶48} Time was then tolled on October 15, 2019, until November 7, 2019, and
    then again until January 14, 2020, for the pretrial conferences, which were mutually
    scheduled by the prosecutor and defense counsel in an attempt to settle the case before
    trial. It was not until January 14, 2020, when the Rule 11 plea agreement was rejected
    by the court, that Mr. Sitko demanded a trial date be set.
    {¶49} The court found that both parties agreed during the hearing on Mr. Sitko’s
    motion to dismiss that the pretrial conferences were scheduled at their mutual request.
    11
    Mr. Sitko failed to file a transcript or agreed upon statement of the motion hearing
    pursuant to App.R. 9; thus, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings. Knapp
    v. Edwards Laboratories, 
    61 Ohio St.2d 197
    , 199 (1980) (Without a transcript or App.R.
    9 equivalent, we must presume the regularity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm).
    {¶50} We agree that the pretrial conferences tolled the speedy trial time (23 days
    and 68 days, respectively), since they were a period of delay “necessitated by reason of
    a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the
    accused.” R.C. 2945.72(E). Further, a motion filed by the defendant does not have to be
    written and filed; it can be an oral motion made in open court. State v. Angstrom, 11th
    Dist. Geauga No. 1392, 
    1988 WL 32959
    , *2 (Mar. 11, 1988).
    {¶51} The next motion that tolled the running of the speedy trial clock was Mr.
    Sitko’s motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation on February 28, 2020. Like motions to
    suppress and motions in limine, motions to dismiss toll the speedy trial period. Broughton
    at 262. The court denied the motion on March 4, 2020. Mr. Sitko was convicted on March
    10, 2020.
    {¶52} Thus, the applicable time periods are as follows:
    {¶53} October 10, 2020 – October 15, 2020 = 5 days
    {¶54} January 14, 2020 – February 28, 2020 = 44 days
    {¶55} March 4, 2020 – March 10, 2020 = 6 days
    {¶56} Since Mr. Sitko was brought to trial within 55 days, he was brought to trial
    well within the applicable time period. The rationale supporting speedy-trial legislation is
    to prevent inexcusable delays caused by indolence within the judicial system. State v.
    Sanchez, 
    110 Ohio St.3d 274
    , 
    2006-Ohio-4478
    , ¶ 8. A review of the case history reveals
    12
    the instant case is devoid of any inexcusable delays, and the parties were attempting to
    settle the case without the need for a trial.
    {¶57} Mr. Sitko’s first assignment of error is without merit.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    {¶58} In Mr. Sitko’s second assignment of error, he contends the state failed to
    produce sufficient evidence that he was driving while intoxicated since there was a
    “possibility he was suffering from some medical issue.”
    {¶59} The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether
    after viewing the probative evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of
    the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The claim of insufficient evidence invokes an
    inquiry about due process. It raises a question of law, the resolution of which does not
    allow the court to weigh the evidence. In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy;
    whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997). Sufficiency of the evidence tests the burden
    of production. 
    Id.
    {¶60} Mr. Sitko was convicted of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), which states that “[n]o
    person shall operate any vehicle * * * within this state, if, at the time of the operation, * *
    * [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.”
    {¶61} “The term ‘under the influence’ means that ‘the defendant consumed some
    [alcohol], * * * in such a quantity, whether small or great, that it adversely affected and
    appreciably impaired the defendant’s actions, reactions, or mental processes under the
    circumstances then existing * * *.’” State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88731, 2007-
    13
    Ohio-3777, ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 545.25. “[T]he state can rely
    on physiological factors (e.g., odor of alcohol, glossy or bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,
    confused appearance) to demonstrate that a person’s physical and mental ability to drive
    was impaired.” State v. Kilbane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99485, 
    2014-Ohio-1228
    , ¶ 23.
    “The state may also submit evidence that a person refused to submit to a chemical test
    to determine alcohol consumption, and use lay-witness testimony to establish that an
    individual is intoxicated. Maumee v. Anistik, 
    69 Ohio St.3d 339
    , 344, 
    632 N.E.2d 497
    (1994); State v. Zetner, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 02CA0040, 
    2003-Ohio-2352
    , ¶ 19, citing
    State v. DeLong, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 02CA35, 
    2002-Ohio-5289
    .” State v. May, 2018-
    Ohio-1510, 
    111 N.E.3d 48
    , ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).
    {¶62} A review of the evidence presented at trial by way of the deputies’ testimony
    reveals the state introduced more than sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could
    find Mr. Sitko was under the influence of alcohol while operating a vehicle. Both deputies
    testified that Mr. Sitko was found slumped over his steering wheel, sleeping, with a beer
    bottle in his right hand, with the car in drive and the brake applied, in the middle of the
    roadway. When the deputies opened the doors to the vehicle, they were overwhelmed
    by the smell of alcohol. Mr. Sitko was incoherent, at times aggressive, and so unsteady
    on his feet that he required the assistance of Dep. Slusher when walking to the car at the
    scene and then again at the Cortland Police Station. Dep. Hermsdorfer testified Mr. Sitko
    had red and glossy eyes, was slow-moving and off-balance, and smelled of alcohol once
    he stepped outside of his vehicle. He refused to submit to a breathalyzer test and/or field
    sobriety tests.
    14
    {¶63} Simply because Mr. Sitko suffers from sleep apnea does not mean there
    was insufficient evidence that he was under the influence of alcohol. Conflicting evidence
    goes to the manifest weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the evidence. On
    review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether the state’s evidence is to be
    believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a
    conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook J., concurring).
    {¶64} Mr. Sitko’s second assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶65} The judgment of the Newton Falls Municipal Court is affirmed.
    CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
    concur.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020-T-0016

Citation Numbers: 2021 Ohio 788

Judges: Trapp

Filed Date: 3/15/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/15/2021