State v. Willard , 2022 ND 34 ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    FEBRUARY 18, 2022
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2022 ND 34
    State of North Dakota,                                 Plaintiff and Appellee
    v.
    Cori Jean Willard,                                  Defendant and Appellant
    No. 20210203
    Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial
    District, the Honorable David E. Reich, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
    Dennis H. Ingold, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and
    appellee.
    Richard E. Edinger, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
    State v. Willard
    No. 20210203
    Crothers, Justice.
    [¶1] Cori Jean Willard appeals from a criminal judgment entered after she
    conditionally pleaded guilty to five drug-related offenses. She argues the
    district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the arresting
    officer had no legal basis to stop her and the officer’s mistake of law was not
    objectively reasonable. We affirm.
    I
    [¶2] In July 2020, a Bismarck Police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by
    Willard for failing to stop prior to entering the sidewalk and onto the roadway.
    At the time, Willard was exiting the parking lot of a gas station.
    [¶3] The officer smelled the odor of marijuana after he approached the vehicle
    and began speaking to Willard and her passenger. A search of the vehicle
    revealed methamphetamine, oxycodone pills, a scale, multiple cell phones, and
    thousands of dollars. Willard was charged with five drug-related offenses.
    [¶4] Willard moved to suppress the evidence seized during the stop, arguing
    the officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop. At the
    suppression hearing, the officer testified his sole basis for stopping Willard was
    a belief she violated N.D.C.C. § 39-10-45. That statute requires a driver
    emerging from an “alley, driveway, private road, or building within a business
    or residence district” to stop prior to driving onto a sidewalk. N.D.C.C. § 39-10-
    45. The district court denied Willard’s motion, finding Willard’s exit from the
    gas station parking lot onto the roadway was an exit from a “driveway” under
    the statute. The court also found the officer’s actions were objectively
    reasonable, even if he relied on a misinterpretation of the statute.
    [¶5] Willard conditionally pleaded guilty to the charges and preserved her
    right to appeal. The district court approved the conditional plea and entered
    judgment accordingly.
    1
    II
    [¶6] Willard argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
    for an alleged violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution.
    [¶7] The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
    U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Because automobile stops constitute seizures, “officers
    must have at least a reasonable suspicion that the motorist has violated the
    law[.]” State v. Hirschkorn, 
    2016 ND 117
    , ¶ 13, 
    881 N.W.2d 244
    . “Reasonable
    suspicion exists when a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be
    justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity.”
    
    Id.
     Traffic violations, even if common or minor, provide officers with the
    suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop. 
    Id.
     Additionally, an officer’s
    objectively reasonable mistake of law or fact may be the officer’s basis of
    reasonable suspicion. Id. at ¶ 14.
    [¶8] This Court will affirm a district court’s decision regarding a motion to
    suppress if there is “sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting
    the district court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest
    weight of the evidence.” City of Lincoln v. Schuler, 
    2021 ND 123
    , ¶ 6, 
    962 N.W.2d 413
    .
    III
    [¶9] Willard argues the word “driveway” in N.D.C.C. § 39-10-45 does not
    encompass a “parking lot.”
    [¶10] Statutory interpretation is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal.
    Schuler, 
    2021 ND 123
    , ¶ 7.
    “Our primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain the
    intent of the legislature, and we first look to the plain language of
    the statute and give each word of the statute its ordinary meaning.
    When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity,
    the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
    pursuing its spirit. . . . We presume the legislature did not intend
    an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and we
    2
    construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the
    context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were
    enacted.”
    
    Id.
    [¶11] Section 39-10-45, N.D.C.C., provides:
    “The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway,
    private road, or building within a business or residence district
    shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a
    sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across such alley,
    building entrance, road, or driveway, or in the event there is no
    sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be
    entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic
    thereon.”
    [¶12] Willard argues her exit from a gas station parking lot did not constitute
    an exit from a “driveway” under the statute. Her argument focuses broadly on
    whether an entire parking lot is a “driveway.” However, the question is
    narrower—whether the portion of the parking lot from which Willard emerged
    constitutes a “driveway.”
    [¶13] Chapter 39-10, N.D.C.C., does not define the term “driveway.” Therefore,
    we look to the ordinary meaning of the term. Schuler, 
    2021 ND 123
    , ¶ 7.
    Willard points to the dictionary’s definition of “driveway” which is “a private
    road giving access from a public way to a building on abutting grounds.”
    Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 382 (11th ed. 2005). The ordinary
    meaning of “driveway” has remained consistent since the term first appeared
    in section 39-10-45 in 1955. See Webster’s New International Dictionary 788
    (2d ed. 1954) (“A passageway for vehicles to the front or rear of a building.”)
    Another definition for “driveway” is “a road, especially a private one, leading
    from a street or other thoroughfare to a building, house, garage, etc.” Driveway,
    Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/driveway (last visited Jan.
    20, 2022). The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a case decided under similar law,
    provided a series of definitions for “driveway.” State v. Jones, 
    401 P.3d 271
    , 274
    (Or. Ct. App. 2017). The court concluded all the definitions shared the common
    3
    idea that a “driveway” is “a private way of access that allows drivers to reach
    a private place from a public road.” 
    Id.
     We agree.
    [¶14] Here, the officer observed Willard’s vehicle failed to stop in the portion
    of the parking lot that allows motorists to enter and exit the gas station
    parking lot from the main road. Thus, that portion of the parking lot is a
    “driveway” and Willard’s failure to stop constituted a violation of N.D.C.C. §
    39-10-45.
    [¶15] Willard’s traffic violation provided the officer with reasonable suspicion
    necessary to justify the stop. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying
    Willard’s motion to suppress.
    IV
    [¶16] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the
    parties and find them to be either unnecessary to our decision or without merit.
    The district court’s criminal judgment is affirmed.
    [¶17] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20210203

Citation Numbers: 2022 ND 34

Judges: Crothers, Daniel John

Filed Date: 2/18/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2022